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symposium dedicated to special jurisdictions. 

Editor’s Note 
The Chapman Law Review is pleased to release the second 
issue of Volume 21 dedicated to our annual symposium. On 
January 26, 2018, the Chapman Law Review hosted a 
symposium titled “Special Jurisdictions Within and Outside of 
the United States.” This event facilitated the discussion of 
special economic zones (“SEZs”) and how they fit within 
conventional models of state authority. Panelists also discussed 
the form of SEZs within the United States and what SEZs may 
look like in the future. Despite the growing popularity of SEZs 
and their unusual features, they have largely escaped the 
attention of legal scholars. 
The symposium portion of this issue opens with 
thought-provoking articles by experts in the field. Professor 
Bell begins the conversation with special international zones 
(a term he created), and specifically focuses on pre-asylum 
waiting areas, duty-free retail areas, international transit 
zones, international residency and work zones, and the public 
good they have the opportunity to hold in the future. Mr. 
Castle-Miller focuses on the Convention and Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and how refugee cities—a type of SEZ 
designed to facilitate migrant integration by allowing displaced 
people the opportunity to rebuild their lives and deliver benefits 
to the respective country—can assist countries to come into 
closer alignment with international law. Mr. Frazier explains 
opportunities for a New Hanseatic League of free zones and free 
cities in order to allow new frontiers to make way, such as 
seasteading on the oceans and entrepreneurial communities in 
space. Dr. Moberg discusses SEZs in the United States, 
including the reasons why they have had little impact on 
economic development and the implications they have for the 
future. Finally, Mr. Mulopulos concludes the symposium with a 
solution to the digital trade restrictions problem—digital trade 
zones. Mr. Mulopulos discusses what a theoretical framework of 
digital trade zones would look like and anticipates successes 
and problems posed by these zones.  
The issue then concludes with three student comments. 
First, Chapman Law Review’s current Senior Notes and 
Comments Editor Taylor Brown proposes alternative methods for 
physicians involved with firearm screening and counseling to 
ensure accurate communication to patients. Next, current 
Production Editor Marissa Hamilton explains the California 
Supreme Court case People v. Sanchez and its application of the 
hearsay rule as it relates to the disclosure of expert basis 
testimony. Finally, current Articles Editor Steven Rimmer 
explores three different jurisdictional approaches to homeowner 
association lien priority in relation to other instruments, and 
discusses the best approach to fairly balance the competing 
policy interests. 
The Chapman Law Review is grateful for the support of the 
members of the administration and faculty that made the 
symposium and the publication of this issue possible. We would 
like to thank Dean of Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School 
of Law, Matthew Parlow; our faculty advisor, Professor Celestine 
McConville; and our faculty advisory committee, Professors 
Deepa Badrinarayana, Michael Bayzler, John Hall, Janine Kim, 
and Associate Dean of Research and Faculty Development, 
Donald Kochan. 
We would especially like to thank Professor Tom Bell for 
supporting the Chapman Law Review throughout the many 
stages of planning for the symposium—from his efforts in 
developing the topic and recruiting scholars, to his personal 
contribution to the discourse—and for his participation as a 
panelist and moderator. Additionally, I would like to recognize 
and thank Cindy Park, Chapman Law Review’s Senior 
Symposium Editor, for her hard work and enthusiasm in making 
this year’s symposium a success.  
Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of 
the 2017–2018 Chapman Law Review editors. It was an honor 
to work beside such a talented, committed, and passionate group 
of individuals. 
Lauren Fitzpatrick 
Editor-in-Chief 
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Special International Zones in Practice and 
Theory 
Tom W. Bell
ABSTRACT
The French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had 
flown into the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport near Paris and 
claimed the right to stay as refugees seeking asylum. Unwilling 
to have the supposed refugees imposed upon it, France resolved 
to process their claims without letting them into the country. 
How? By keeping them in the airport’s international transit 
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from 
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance.
This split border allowed France to summarily process and 
(typically) deport the foreigners while keeping them outside the 
country’s territory for asylum purposes. When detainees got 
seriously ill, France created so-called “floating international 
zones” to take them to a local hospital, a portion of which became 
a temporary international zone. These French innovations in 
border control inspired Hungarian transit zones, Australian 
migration zones, and similar partial territories across the planet. 
Few people beyond government attorneys and human rights 
workers have heard of that particular kind of special 
international zone, but most people know of the airport transit 
zone—an area where foreign travelers can catch connecting 
flights without going through local border controls and buy goods 
free of local customs, duties, or taxes. Research uncovers still 
other institutions that aspire to rise above merely local rules, 
including the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN 
laboratories. Each of these species fits within a more general 
 Professor, Chapman University Fowler School of Law. Copyright 2018 Tom W. 
Bell. For material aid, useful information, and worthy challenges, the author thanks: 
Nicolas Germineau, Marc Collins, Sherry Leysen, Matthew Flyntz, Michael Castle Miller, 
Kelly Ryan, Mark Frazier, Johann Thusbass, Sevan Chorluyan, Greg Knott, Joe Quirk, 
Mark Frazier, and Chapman University, Fowler School of Law. Disclosures and 
disclaimer: Although the author does or did provide consulting services for projects under 
the Honduran ZEDE system, to The Seasteading Institute (pro bono) in its effort to secure 
an MOU with French Polynesia for a Floating Island Project in that country, and to Blue 
Frontiers Pte. Ltd., for its SeaZone, this article does not represent the views of any 
principal, agent, or business associate of the author, who alone bears responsibility for its 
contents. “Author trans” herein refers to yours truly. 
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genus, the special international zone (“SIZ”): An area that its host 
nation state places outside of its territory for the purpose of some 
local laws, leaving other such laws and applicable international 
obligations in force. Special international zones already exist in 
great number and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and 
adapt. This article introduces SIZs as objects worthy of study on 
many counts, but most particularly because SIZs offer nation 
states a mechanism for selectively unbundling their territorial 
services in response to necessity, the constraints of international 
law, and promotion of the public good. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION: NATION STATES BY DEGREES
In 1992, at the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport outside 
Paris, the French Republic had a problem. Foreign nationals had 
flown into the airport and tried to stay as refugees seeking 
asylum. The government regarded the claims as bogus and the 
supposed refugees as mere economic migrants attempting to 
exploit a loophole in international law. Unwilling to have 
unwanted foreigners imposed upon it, France came up with a 
clever solution: It would process the supposed refugee’s claims 
without letting them into the country.1
How did France work this bit of legal legerdemain? By 
keeping the foreigners within de Gaulle’s international transit 
zone—the area between the exit doors of airplanes arriving from 
abroad and the far side of customs and immigration clearance, 
beyond which lies France proper.2 Exploiting this bubble in its 
border allowed France to summarily process and deport most of 
the supposed refugees while keeping them outside of the national 
territory for purposes of claiming asylum.3 Voilà.
As the days dragged on, the French built accommodations for 
the foreigners within the airport’s international zone, forcing them 
to choose between staying within its confines or leaving the country 
entirely. That kept them safely outside of France’s territory for 
immigration purposes. Eventually, though, the foreigners suffered 
medical conditions requiring hospital treatment. So the French 
designated certain vehicles as floating international zones and used 
them to transport the patients to a local hospital, relevant parts of 
which they also designated as temporary international zones.4 This 
entire archipelago of fixed, floating, and temporary zones, specially 
created to allow foreign nationals to stay within the geographic 
borders of France but outside of its immigration or asylum 
territory, lawmakers called zones d’attente pour personnes en 
instance (“ZAPI” or “zones d’attente”).5
This French innovation, turning international transit zones 
into extra-territorial pre-asylum processing areas, proved both 
popular and controversial. It rapidly spread to other countries, 
mutating in the process, giving rise to Hungarian transit zones,
1 See TUGBA BASARAN, SECURITY, LAW AND BORDERS: AT THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY
3 (2010). 
2 Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile [Code of entry and stay 
of foreigners and of the right of asylum] art. L221-2 (Fr.) [hereinafter CESEDA art. L221-2]. 
3 See BASARAN, supra note 1, at 50–64. 
4 See id. at 59. 
5 See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
298 (2005); F. Julien-Lafferrière, Le traitment des demanderus d’Asile en Zone d’attente 
entre théorie et réalité, 1238 HOMME & MIGRATIONS 32, 32–36 (2002). 
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Australian migration zones or excised territory, and similar 
devices in countries across the globe, under names such as 
reception area, transit area, or detention area.6 Faced with 
similar problems at sea, the United States declared its territorial 
waters outside the reach of national and international laws 
applicable to asylum-seekers.7 Some countries have even 
declared the decks of their ships extraterritorial zones, allowing 
them to rescue and return migrants without affording a venue for 
asylum claims.8
The advent of this new species of institution alarmed 
commentators, who criticized the supposedly extraterritorial zones 
as fictional, illegal, and illiberal.9 Judicial authorities, in contrast, 
have gone no further than demanding respect for preexisting 
international obligations.10 Thus, scrutinized and somewhat 
tempered, zones d’attente and similar special international zones 
have come to play an important role in regulating the global flow 
of asylum seekers, economic migrants, and others seeking to enter 
unwelcoming nation states. 
Most people know of just one kind of international zone: the 
airport transit zone, where foreign travelers can buy goods free of 
customs, duties, or taxes and catch connecting flights without 
going through local border controls.11 Students of international 
law may have heard of still more obscure examples of nation 
states willingly rolling back their effective borders, such as they 
have done for the United Nation’s headquarters and CERN’s 
laboratories.12 In each of these and similar cases, such as the 
French zones d’attente, the same general pattern repeats: A 
nation state designates a portion of its geographic territory as 
outside the reach of some local laws, leaving local laws still in 
effect and preexisting international obligations unchanged. 
Given their shared features, growing practical importance, 
and common theoretical challenges, these legal institutions need 
6 Boldizsár Nagy, Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization 
Instead of Loyal Cooperation, 17 GERMAN L.J. 1033, 1048–49 (2016) (discussing migration 
zones); Tugba Basaran, Legal Borders in Europe: The Waiting Zone, in A THREAT AGAINST 
EUROPE?: SECURITY, MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION 63, 64 (J. Peter Burgess & Serge 
Gutwirth eds., 2011) (discussing other zones). 
7 Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens’ Arrival in United States 
Territorial Waters, 17 U.S. OP. O.L.C. 77, 79 (1993).  
8 Tugba Basaran, Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion, 2 INT’L POL. SOC.
339, 343 (2008). 
9 See infra Section II(A). 
10 See, e.g., Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826 (holding that France could 
not unilaterally place part of its territory beyond the scope of Article 5, section 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pertaining to detention of protected persons). 
11 See infra Sections I(A), II(C). 
12 See infra Section I(E). 
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a shared name. The term “special economic zones” (“SEZs”) offers 
a model because SEZs also represent discrete areas where a host 
country applies unique, and usually less burdensome, financial 
and business regulations. Hence the term adopted for this article: 
Special International Zone (“SIZ”). 
Summarizing the examples to follow, this article defines as 
an SIZ: 
An area that its host nation state places outside of its 
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving 
other such laws and applicable international obligations 
in force.
Special international zones already exist in great number 
and variety. They continue to spread, grow, and adapt. What 
does the future hold for SIZs? Perhaps more of the same—but 
worse. A country could take France’s example too far, for 
instance, creating special border areas and floating personal 
temporary microzones that together have the practical effect of 
keeping entire regions and populations outside the country’s 
national territory in terms of legal rights and privileges, while 
putting them firmly inside the territory in terms of police powers. 
Or SIZs might evolve in a more benign direction, creating 
refugee cities for homeless populations, “deep blue” zones for 
seasteads, or special international residency and work (“SIRW”) 
zones for digital nomads.13 All these and other options become 
possible once the general concept of a SIZ—a designated area 
outside the reach of some local laws but still subject to 
international obligations—has been defined, illustrated, and 
explained. If that appeals, read on. 
After this Introduction, Part I of the article surveys 
contemporary legal practices to discover SIZs regulating trade 
and travel across the globe through SEZs, international transit 
zones, duty-free retail areas, pre-asylum waiting areas, and other 
variations on the theme. Part II reviews the scant extant 
commentary on special international zones, especially criticisms 
of pre-asylum waiting areas, to develop a theory of special 
international zones under which they might redeem themselves 
as instruments of public policy. Part III applies that theory to 
describe some possible forms of future SIZs. The article concludes 
by explaining how special economic zones can promote the public 
good by providing a means for nation states, under the 
constraints of international law, to selectively unbundle their 
13 See infra Part III. 
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services, by placing select territories outside the reach of some 
local laws by placing them within SIZs. 
I. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN PRACTICE
This Part describes special international zones as observed 
in the field, so to speak, in the many places nation states have 
deliberately rolled back their powers, leaving a void filled by the 
governing influences of international trade, travel, and 
cultural exchange. The little-celebrated, but indisputably useful, 
international transit zone, described in Section I(A), fits 
squarely within the definition of a SIZ. Other examples fall at 
its edges. Section I(B) describes a class of zones—special 
economic zones—that do not so much import international law 
as simply let the default level for customs, duties, and taxes 
revert to their default level—zero—in the absence of a nation 
state. Section I(C)’s topic, the duty-free retail area, likewise 
serves the international community by setting certain parts of a 
nation state’s territory beyond the reach of its powers. 
Pre-asylum waiting areas, discussed in Section I(D), do the 
opposite; they leave some of a nation state’s territory or guests 
within the reach of its power, but outside the comfort of its 
rights and privileges. In these areas, the chaos of international 
human migration smashes into the hard edges of state power. 
These, too, represent special international zones of a type—a 
distinctly dystopian one. Ending this survey of SIZs on a lighter 
note, Section I(E) offers a collection of other interesting species 
in the genus. 
A. International Transit Zones 
International transit zones ease the transition between a 
host state’s territory and the places beyond, including the 
territories of other sovereigns and the ungoverned international 
commons of the sea and sky. The zone turns the border from a 
thin, solid line into a thick, complex, modulated buffer.14 So far as 
passengers and their luggage are concerned, international transit 
zones typically extend from the point of departure from the craft 
arriving from abroad—the exit door of a foreign airplane, for 
instance—to the inside border of immigrations and customs 
control. They ease international transit by allowing passengers to 
touch down on the host’s territory without passing through 
14 See generally Jean-Baptiste Frétigny, Air Travel Opens New Understanding of 
Borders: The Case of Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport, ANNALES DE GEOGRAPHIE 1, 5 
(2014), http://www.academia.edu/12970808/Air_Travel_Opens_New_Understanding_of_ 
Borders_ The_Case_of_Paris_Charles_de_Gaulle_Airport.  
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customs and immigration controls. Though it arises more as a 
gap between borders than as an entity unto itself, the 
international transit zones satisfies the definition of SIZ 
above: “An area that its host nation state places outside of its 
territory for the purpose of some local laws, leaving other such 
laws and applicable international obligations in force.”15
Like all SIZs, international transit zones come into being by 
the choice of the local sovereign, which withdraws the effective 
reach of otherwise applicable laws relating to customs, duties, 
and immigration. Still other local laws, such as those forbidding 
trafficking in forbidden drugs, remain in force. In almost all 
cases (because almost all countries have joined it), the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (aka Chicago 
Convention) requires that an airport treat transiting craft as if in 
a customs and duty-free area.16 In other cases, such as in 
implementing the special privileges shared by travelers among 
Schengen Area countries, airports in particular countries may 
configure their international transit zones to favor certain trips 
or travelers.17
In addition to serving the quotidian needs of typical 
travelers, international transit zones have won a storied place in 
diplomatic relations by serving as temporary (and sometimes not 
so temporary) holding pens for people caught between being 
arrested at home and becoming a political problem abroad.18
Consider the case of Eric Snowden. Offered shelter of sorts by 
Russian authorities, who evidently sympathized with his crusade 
against elements of the United States government, he was 
allegedly housed in the international transit zone of Moscow’s 
Sheremetyevo International Airport; or perhaps, in a move akin 
to that used by France to justify scattering zones d’attente across 
its territory, in a more comfortable location nearby temporarily 
designated as extra-territorial by the Russians in pursuance 
of their campaign to irk the Americans.19 But more on that 
ploy anon.20
15 See supra Introduction. 
16 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 24, Dec. 7, 1944. 
17 Frétigny, supra note 14, at 13–15. 
18 Mehran Karimi Nasseri, an Iranian refugee, lived within the international transit 
area of Terminal 1 at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport from 1988 to 2006. See Frétigny,
supra note 14, at 21. 
19 Brian Palmer, What’s Life Like in an Airport Transit Zone?, SLATE (July 2, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/07/edward_snowden_has_spen
t_a_week_in_a_transit_zone_at_moscow_s_airport_what.html [http://perma.cc/CZ8G-QC9V]. 
20 See infra Section I(D). 
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B. SEZs and Related Special Jurisdictions 
The World Bank defines SEZs as “demarcated geographic 
areas contained within a country’s national boundaries where the 
rules of business are different from those that prevail in the 
national territory.”21 Through SEZs, in other words, a host offers 
a haven from the status quo that prevails elsewhere in the 
national territory. As such, SEZs represent a kind of special 
international zone—one wherein the host country rolls back the 
scope of customs, duties, taxes, and other select impediments to 
commerce, leaving in their place nothing but lots of freedom on a 
thin layer of international law. 
SEZs come in many types, including free trade zones, export 
processing zones, and wide-area hybrid export processing zone 
freeports.22 They come in many sizes, too, ranging from a portion 
of a single factory to metropolitan areas housing millions.23
Though not SEZs in the modern sense, areas governed by special 
rules have existed almost as long as government itself. SEZs 
proper have enjoyed special vigor in recent decades.24
To better understand how SEZs as a class qualify as a kind 
of special international zone, consider the Foreign Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”), which are popular in the United States.25 FTZs lay 
within the country’s borders geographically speaking, but “are 
treated for purposes of the tariff laws and customs entry 
procedures as being outside the customs territory of the United 
States.”26 The board charged with administering the zones thus 
considers them “outside the customs territory of the United 
States for the purposes of duty payment.”27
By design, being outside the customs and excise taxes area of 
the United States offers a considerable inducement to 
transshipment and import-export processing services. Other 
benefits follow from the extra-territorial status of FTZs, too. If a 
21 Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 3 (Thomas Farole & 
Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011) (quoting Claude Baissac, Brief History of SEZs and Overview of 
Policy Debates, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND 
LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 23 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011)). 
22 Id. at 2. 
23 See id.
24 See TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION STATE TO 
STATELESS NATIONS 19–27 (2018). 
25 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a–81u (2016); Regulations of the 
Foreign-Trade Zones Board, 15 C.F.R. § 400 (2018). Section 81c(a) distinguishes between 
FTZs and the customs territory of the United States. 
26 Scope, 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (2018). 
27 Preface to FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FOREIGN-
TRADE ZONES BOARD TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2016). 
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processor in the zone works imported materials into goods 
destined for the United States proper, the processor can choose to 
have the requisite duties assessed on either the value of the 
materials as imported or the value of the finished goods that 
include them—a useful option for accounting reasons.28
Merchandise brought into a zone for shipment abroad can be 
counted as exported immediately, before it physically leaves the 
United States, for purposes of federal excise taxes and 
drawbacks.29 Also, consistent with the notion that in a federal 
system, no individual state can have a territory greater than the 
United States to which it belongs, personal property stored in the 
zone falls outside the scope of state and local ad valorem taxes.30
By withdrawing the reach of select federal and state laws 
back from the border of FTZs, the United States effectively 
cedes governance of such matters to international law, such as 
it is in these matters. And in the sorts of matters that concern 
FTZs—customs and taxes—international law mostly is not. As
with the duty-free zones discussed next, in other words, FTZs 
represent special areas where international rather than local 
law has real effect. 
C. Duty-Free Retail Areas 
A duty-free retail area functions as if it were outside the tax 
area of its host country for a select few people: passengers leaving 
for abroad. It allows them to purchase certain goods—typically, 
luxury ones such as liquor, cigarettes, or perfume—on condition 
that they immediately remove them from the host’s tax territory. 
The law of the United States, for instance, defines a duty-free 
retailer as “a person that sells, for use outside the customs 
territory, duty-free merchandise that is delivered from a bonded 
warehouse to an airport or other exit point for exportation by, or 
on behalf of, individuals departing from the customs territory.”31
Duty-free retail areas are thus defined not only by limits on 
a map, but also limits on behavior. Which transactions classify as 
“duty-free” depends not merely on where they happen, but also 
on the intent of the purchaser. More generally than that, with the 
advent of market-defined “Traveler Spaces” catering solely to the 
needs of ticket-bearing passengers passing through international 
transit zones and “duty-free prices” outside such zones designed to 
28 William G. Kanellis, Comment, Reining in the Foreign Trade Zones Board: 
Making Foreign Trade Zone Decisions Reflect the Legislative Intent of the Foreign Trade 
Zones Act of 1934, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 606, 618 (1995). 
29 Id. at 618–19. 
30 See Foreign-Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C. § 81o(e) (2016).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1555(b)(8)(D) (2016). 
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simulate the financial experience of shopping within them, 
duty-free retail areas have come to symbolize places freed from the 
usual, mundane social obligations.32
The ready availability of cut-priced alcohol, cigarettes, and 
luxury goods drives home the point: duty-free retail areas 
offer special zones beyond merely parochial local regulations. 
Duty-free zones belong in “an in-between space, global in 
dimension, whose strategies of appropriation are at odds with 
those of the nation states.”33 Duty-free retail areas operate not so 
much as a space on a map, or even as a label for some people, but 
as an idealized special international zone, where nation states 
withdraw their impositions, and the bland nothing of the 
ungoverned commons allows as much trade in rich and 
intoxicating goods as the market will bear.  
D. Pre-Asylum Waiting Areas 
As related in the Introduction above, France created an 
innovative new kind of SIZ—zones d’attente—by placing areas 
within the geographic boundaries of the country outside of its 
territory for immigration and asylum purposes.34 This new kind 
of SIZ began within Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport in 1992, 
but quickly multiplied across France, growing in size and 
number, and mutating into floating and temporary forms.35 From 
France, pre-asylum waiting areas spread to other countries.36
They now represent a routine matter of local law, used across the 
world, usually without much note, as one of several mechanisms 
that nation states use to manage the flow of refugees, economic 
migrants, and other wandering people.37
Why did the French create zones d’attente? Because, like 
other signatories to the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”), it has promised to 
give refugees within its territory a variety of rights and 
privileges.38 France has bound itself to allow guest refugees to 
practice their religion, receive identity papers, and travel freely 
throughout the country.39 Most significantly, the convention 
forbids France, like other contracting parties, from expelling or 
32 Frétigny, supra note 14, at 22. 
33 Id. at 25. 
34 See supra Introduction. 
35 CESEDA art. L221-2. 
36 Basaran, supra note 6, at 64. 
37 See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 8. 
38 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Introduction to CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2010) [hereinafter REFUGEE CONVENTION]. 
39 Id. at 17, 28–29. 
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returning refugees to the country’s borders if to do so would put 
his or her life or liberty at risk for certain reasons, such as on 
account of race, religion, or social group.40 France doubts that the 
economic migrants showing up at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle and 
its other ports of entry qualify as “refugees” for purposes of the 
Refugee Convention, but if they can make it onto French 
territory, they can make a play for the status, thus winning at 
least temporary admittance (which by dint of flight often 
becomes de facto but illegal permanent admittance). France thus 
created the zones d’attente to, in effect, push back the border of 
its territory for purposes of those seeking asylum under the 
Refugee Convention.41
How did the French create the zone d’attente? The applicable 
provision of the civil code begins by giving the zone tightly 
defined boundaries, saying it “extends from embarkation and 
disembarkation points to where immigration checks are carried 
out.”42 From there, though, the lines quickly get broader and 
blurrier. The zone may also include, “in transit areas or near 
the railway station, port, or airport, or near the place of 
disembarkation, one or more places of accommodation providing 
the concerned foreigners with hotel-type services.”43
The zone d’attente can thus grow within the boundaries of 
the existing international transit zone. The largest of France’s 
immigration detention centers is located next to the runways of 
Roissy-Charles de Gaulle, for instance, ensuring that those 
housed in the zone receive frequent and unpleasant reminders of 
their tenuous status in the country.44 Given that they arise by 
mere administrative fiat, a zone d’attente could also be added to 
the edges of an existing international zone, making up a larger 
complex of associated but distinct SIZs.45 The French have done 
far more than that, though. 
The civil code also stretches the zone d’attente to any place 
the unwanted alien must go for administrative procedures, such 
as to attend an off-site asylum hearing or “in case of medical 
necessity.”46 Through that provision, the French can justify their 
40 Id. at 30. 
41 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 56–59. 
42 CESEDA art. L221-2. 
43 Id.
44 Morgane Iserte, Enquête en « zone d'attente réservée » de l'aéroport de Paris-
Charles de Gaulle: vers une gestion sécuritaire des « flux migratoires » [Investigation into 
“Waiting Area” of Paris-Charles de Gaulle], 71 CULTURES & CONFLICT 31, 33 (2008). 
45 CESEDA art. L221-2. The article's first line gives power to set the zone's 
boundaries to “the competent administrative authority.” 
46 Id.
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use of floating and temporary zones. The creativity of French 
lawyers does not end there, however. The code even provides for 
the creation of a retroactive temporary zone d’attente that runs 
from where and when any group of ten or more foreigners has 
arrived in France from outside a border crossing to where they 
are discovered, up to twenty-six days later.47
Commentators have not always treated the French zones
d’attente with the highest regard, calling them fictional, illegal, 
and illiberal. This article reviews those critiques below.48
Regardless of such theoretical musings, though, the zones
d’attente did and do exist. Indeed, they have been booming. 
Courts have shaped the operations of zones d’attente, as 
when the European Court of Human Rights held that France 
could not detain foreigners without counsel indefinitely.49 This 
commentary and judicial guidance operates only at the edges, 
though. These sorts of pre-asylum waiting areas, because they 
help nation states regulate the flow of refugees, economic 
migrants, and other wandering people, will not go away any time 
soon. Whether called migration zones, excised territories, 
reception areas, transit areas, or detention areas, these SIZs will 
play a continuing and important role in international law.50
D. Other Special International Zones 
This Section reviews some other special international zones. 
It offers only a small sample of what a more complete catalog 
might include: SIZs ranging from ancient sanctuaries to nascent 
block chain governments, with references to the many privileges 
traditionally associated with diplomatic personnel, friendly 
foreign military forces, and non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”).51 The examples could include SIZs as well known as 
the United Nations’ headquarters,52 or as obscure as Canada’s 
temporary surrender of sovereignty to aid the birth of a princess 
in exile.53 The “other” SIZs reviewed here: CERN and the special 
administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. 
47 Id. France is not alone in retroactively creating pre-asylum waiting areas. See
BASARAN, supra note 3, at 91 (discussing Australian retrospective regulations). 
48 See infra Part II. 
49 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826. 
50 Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048–49; Basaran, supra note 6, at 64.  
51 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66.
52 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 350 (1950) (describing the origins and effects of UN's 
“headquarters district”). 
53 Netherlands’ Princess Margriet born in Ottawa, RADIO CANADA (Jan. 23, 1992), 
http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/1403696302 (recounting that in 1940, Canada temporarily 
withdrew sovereignty over an Ottawa hospital room in order to ensure that the birth of 
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1. CERN 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research, better 
known as “CERN” from the acronym for its French name, the 
“Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire,” offers a notable 
example of how an international zone can create a safe space for 
large scale investment, research, and development. CERN enjoys 
a special status in the laws of the member countries that 
together created and fund it. This status, set forth in the Protocol 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Organization 
for Nuclear Research (“Protocol”), exempts CERN’s property, 
officials, and the family of CERN officials from customs, duties, 
national taxes, and visa restrictions.54 This has the practical 
effect of placing CERN properties, papers, and people in a sort of 
special international zone.
Territory under the reach of particular national laws seem to 
pull back where CERN touches down. The Protocol provides that 
CERN’s real property—its grounds, buildings, and other 
structures—“shall be inviolable” against the authority of any 
“agent of the public authorities,” who may enter only with “the 
express consent of the Director-General or his duly authorized 
representative.”55 The organization, its property, its income, and 
its imports and exports escape national taxation, duties, or 
similar fees.56 The Protocol thus defines CERN’s special 
international zone in both territorial and functional terms. 
Although the Protocol reserves most of its benefits to CERN 
“officials,” it defines that term broadly enough to cover a wide 
range of employees, including “‘members of personnel’ as defined 
in the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Organization.”57 These 
people must pay a sort of internal tax “for the benefit of the 
Organization,” but the salaries and emoluments they get from 
the Organization remain “exempt from national income tax” 
under the Protocol.58 In practice, therefore, most CERN 
employment falls outside of any nation’s tax territory. 
the Netherlands’ Princess Margriet there to her family in exile would not take place 
under the cloud of a foreign flag, which might otherwise threaten her claim to royal 
succession).
54 PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION 
FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH (Mar. 18, 2004), http://cds.cern.ch/record/1035110/files/cer-
002693576.pdf [http://perma.cc/RVV4-S7UU]. 
55 Id. at art. 3(1), (2). 
56 Id. at art. 6. Note, however, that this exemption does not extend to “the purchase 
or use of goods or services or the import of goods intended for the personal use” of those 
working for CERN. Id. 
57 Id. at art. 1(d). 
58 Id. at art. 10(2)(b)(i). 
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CERN employment and residency falls outside of any 
member country’s legal territory, too. CERN officials enjoy “for 
themselves and the family members forming part of their 
household, the same exemption from immigration restrictions 
and aliens’ registration formalities as are normally granted to 
officials of international organizations.”59 The Protocol renders 
Organization officials exempt “from all compulsory contributions 
to national social security schemes, on the understanding that 
such persons are provided with equivalent social protection” 
by CERN.60
The Protocol even puts CERN outside the justice systems of 
its member countries. As befits an international organization, the 
Protocol makes careful provision for the resolution of CERN’s 
disputes in forums, such as in private arbitrations, that remain 
outside the control of any one country.61 It could hardly be 
otherwise, given the high stakes at issue—CERN’s cross-border 
Large Hadron Collider cost almost U.S. $4.4 billion to build—and 
the many national interests affected.62
Taken together, these provisions have the practical effect of 
putting CERN property, papers, and personnel in a special 
international zone. As in a French zone d’attente, these exemptions 
apply only to certain activities and people. A CERN SIZ lies 
outside not all national boundaries, but only the boundaries of 
select customs, taxes, and visa laws. And like a French zone 
d’attente, the status of a CERN SIZ can attach to particular 
people, creating floating personal temporary microzones that 
follow covered individuals even outside of the zone.63
2. Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau 
Thanks to the history of European colonialism and the 
vagaries of fate, the People’s Republic of China has adopted a 
policy of “one country, two systems” with regard to both Hong 
Kong and Macau, allowing each to exist within China’s national 
territory as a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) with some, 
59 Id. at art. 10(2)(c).  
60 Id. at art. 11. 
61 Id. at arts. 16–19. 
62 CERN, LARGE HADRON COLLIDER THE GUIDE 17 (2017), http://cds.cern.ch/ 
record/2255762/files/CERN-Brochure-2017-002-Eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/RZK8-HX99] (listing 
total price of LHC of 4.332 billion Swiss francs). 
63 Appropriately enough, given its innovations with other sorts of SIZs, France had a 
central role in the creation of CERN; the Convention forming it was written in Paris and 
signed by France, naturellement. See The European Organization for Nuclear Research is 
born, CERN, https://timeline.web.cern.ch/events/the-european-organization-for-nuclear-
research-is-born [http://perma.cc/YL2W-6BQT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017). 
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but not all, attributes of sovereignty.64 This policy, embodied in a 
Basic Law adopted to govern each region upon its handover from 
European powers to Chinese powers in the late 1990s, allows 
Hong Kong and Macau responsibility over each of their local 
customs,65 taxes,66 immigration,67 labor,68 and other areas of law 
traditionally the sole province of a national government. These 
SARs exist in a bubble of sorts—within the national Chinese 
territory but without the legal territory of Chinese customs, 
taxes, etc.
This special international zone is not, however, outside the 
reach of all Chinese laws. When the law concerns matters closer 
to the core of Chinese authority and pride, such as pertaining to 
the applicability of international agreements,69 the supremacy of 
the national constitution,70 or the adoption of flags and related 
symbols,71 the SAR’s autonomy ends. Here, the national and legal 
borders of China coincide, and the SARs exist in the same 
territory(ies) as other parts of China. 
In a functional sense, the Hong Kong and Macau SARs fit 
the definition of special international zone set forth above. Both 
have been placed by China outside its territory for the purpose of 
some laws, leaving other Chinese laws and applicable 
international obligations in force. Granted, the peculiar 
circumstances surrounding the origins of those SARs makes 
them very special kinds of SIZs. The colonial powers that China 
convinced to peacefully abandon all claims to Hong Kong and 
Macau, England and Portugal, respectively, did so only under the 
promise that the newly formed SARs would enjoy considerable 
autonomy. Query, therefore, if China ever had full title to the 
powers hypothetically transferred. Did China withdraw its legal 
territory from Hong Kong and Macau? Or did China decline to 
fully expand to the SARs sovereign powers it enjoyed in adjoining 
territories? In either event, Hong Kong and Macau offer 
examples of a host country designating part of its territory as 
beyond the reach of select national laws and leaving room for 
64 See THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 1, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_ 
full_text_en.pdf [hereinafter HONG KONG BASIC LAW]; MACAU BASIC LAW pmbl., 
http://www.umac.mo/basiclaw/english/pre.html. 
65 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 116; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 112. 
66 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 106, 108; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 104, 106. 
67 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 154; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 139. 
68 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 147; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 115. 
69 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 153; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 138. 
70 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 11; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 11. 
71 HONG KONG BASIC LAW art. 10; MACAU BASIC LAW art. 10. 
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international principles—here, those of a more cosmopolitan and 
liberal world—to have effect. 
II. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN THEORY
As documented above, special international zones have long 
operated, in many guises, all across the globe, without much 
incident. The SIZ has not, however, been subject to much 
consideration as a theoretical object itself. Has it perhaps been so 
ubiquitous as to escape notice? 
Nation states have, after all, long relied on an intrinsic power 
to reshape their interior borders as each alone sees fit. As Tugba 
Basaran observes, “[t]he distinction between physical presence 
and legal presence is not a new invention used for migration 
controls only, but relies on historical precedents in different 
contexts.”72 Citing ancient examples such as ancient sanctuaries 
from prosecution, the special privileges of ambassadors, military 
personnel deployed abroad, NGOs, and modern inventions such 
as special economic zones, Basaran concludes that “[t]he creation 
of outside spaces on the territory of the host state, placed under 
an international or foreign legal jurisdiction, and thus not part of 
domestic law, is an old technique.”73
In recent years, however, the advent of zones d’attente and
similar pre-asylum waiting areas has raised concerns that nation 
states might be using SIZs not simply to reshape the scope of 
domestic law, but to evade the obligations of international law. 
This, in turn, has made the theoretical status of SIZs a pressing 
matter. Hence this Part. Section II(A) relates the predominant 
critiques of SIZs qua pre-asylum waiting areas: that they are 
legal fictions, illegal, or illiberal. Section II(B) offers a way to 
redeem SIZs in terms of theory, as refuges free from the 
constraining effects of some domestic laws on the one side and 
governed by principles of international liberty on the other. If 
built to those specifications, (which admittedly cannot always be 
said of pre-asylum waiting areas) SIZs fit nicely within the 
existing theoretical framework, both positive and normative, of 
international law. 
A. Zones as Fictional, Illegal, and/or Illiberal 
Although for the most part SIZs quietly regulate the flow of 
international trade, travel, and cultural exchange without 
incident, zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas have 
72 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 66. 
73 Id.
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drawn withering criticism. James C. Hathaway calls pre-asylum 
areas “[a] particularly insidious mechanism”74 and “a legal 
ruse”75 used by France and other nation states to avoid their 
international obligations to refugees.76 Other commentators call 
it “a fiction,”77 “legal fiction,”78 “arbitrary,”79 or, perhaps most 
tellingly, as “places of illiberal practices.”80 Such critiques speak 
too broadly, insofar as they condemn all SIZs, but justly target 
the growing practice of nation states rolling back the borders of 
local laws and protecting individual rights and privileges while 
leaving in place local police, security, and penal laws. 
Why do commentators direct such ire at pre-asylum waiting 
areas? Because nation states arguably use them as a subterfuge 
to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the Refugee
Convention.81 That international agreement has proven very 
popular on paper; 146 countries have signed, including those now 
hosting various sorts of pre-asylum waiting zones.82 In so doing, 
each promised to afford several rights to refugees who find 
themselves “in” or “within” the contracting state’s territory.83
And while no country is legally required to admit refugees, 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention says, “[n]o Contracting State 
shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”84
Commentators argue that member countries violate this 
principle of non-refoulement when they use pre-asylum waiting 
areas to “expel or return” refugees “to the frontiers of territories” 
where the enumerated threats await. Hathaway, for example, 
after dismissing the zones d’attente as “a legal ruse” and citing 
the seminal European Court of Human Rights case, Amuur v. 
74 HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 298. 
75 Id. at 321. 
76 Id. at 298, 321. 
77 Nagy, supra note 6, at 1048. 
78 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOST IN TRANSIT: INSUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR 
UNACCOMPANIED MINOR CHILDREN AT ROISSY CHARLES DE GAULLE AIRPORT 5 (2009); see 
also Lydia Gall, Dispatches: Asylum Seekers Stuck Outside Transit Zones in Hungary,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 4, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/04/ 
dispatches-asylum-seekers-stuck-outside-transit-zones-hungary. 
79 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 5. 
80 Basaran, supra note 6, at 70. 
81 See generally REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38.
82 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ch. 5, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
83 See REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 17 (guaranteeing religion); id. at 28 
(art. 27 guaranteeing issuance of identity papers); id. at 29 (art. 31(1)–(2) guaranteeing 
“non-penalization for illegal entry or presence” and movements of refugees within country 
of refuge).  
84 REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 38, at 30. 
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France, as authority, summarily concludes: “There is thus no 
international legal difference between opting not to consider the 
refugee status of persons present in ‘international zones’ or 
‘excised territory’ and refusing to consider the refugee status of 
persons clearly acknowledged to be on the state’s territory.”85
Human Rights Watch uses the same quick two-step citing Amuur
and other cases in support of the claim that such zones represent 
nothing more than legal fictions used to hide violations of 
migrants’ rights.86
The Amuur court gave these critics an irresistibly good 
quote: “[d]espite its name, the international zone does not have 
extraterritorial status.”87 In truth, however, like any holding, the 
effect of Amuur’s words can reach no farther than the underlying 
controversy allows. The dispute turned on application of Article 
5, section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a 
provision directed at preventing wrongful detention. Specifically, 
the court held that for France to hold the applicants in the zone
d’attente for twenty days “under strict and constant police 
surveillance,” and without any “legal and social assistance,” 
wrongfully deprived the applicants of their liberty.88
The Amuur court thus did not speak so boldly as its 
oft-quoted words might suggest. Instead of ruling all 
extraterritorial zones legal nullities—an issue not before the 
court and quite beyond its power to decide—the court ruled only 
that France had operated its zone d’attente in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.89 That much should 
prove unremarkable. 
The court did notand indeed could notforbid France from 
drawing its territorial borders in ways that impact only local law, 
or that leave its international obligations unimpeached. As proof 
of the opinion’s limited effect, France responded to Amuur and
similar judicial corrections, not by abandoning its use of 
extra-territorial areas, but by amending and expanding the use 
of zones d’attente.90
Calling pre-asylum waiting zones “fictional” does not change 
their very real impact. Calling the operation of such zones “illegal” 
may or may not have an effect, as indicated by (sometimes) 
85 HATHAWAY, supra note 5, at 321–22. 
86 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 9–10. 
87 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 851. 
88 Id. at 848–49. 
89 Id.
90 See Gebremedhin v. France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 174, 178 (holding that lack 
of a suspensive clause in appeals from denials of asylum violates the Refugees 
Convention). 
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successful litigation.91 But what about calling pre-asylum waiting 
zones “illiberal” (in the sense of “liberty-violating” rather than 
of “leftist”)? 
That is the concern voiced by Tugba Basaran, who argues 
that through such devices, “liberal states can deny to particular 
populations fundamental rights, which are the normative and 
legal foundation of liberal states, whilst continuing to control 
the very same space through policing powers.”92 Contrary to 
commentators who view zones d’attente as fictional or per
se illegal, Basaran sees them as alarmingly mundane tools of 
contemporary governance. “Border zones are legal constructions 
and law is an ordinary means by which the liberal state 
legitimizes illiberal practices.”93
On that view, at least in the guise of pre-asylum waiting 
zones, SIZs allow nation states to roll back human rights while 
leaving police powers in place. Indeed, in actual practice, most 
hosts not only leave police powers in place, but considerably 
augment them, surrounding the zones with fences and walls, 
placing them under close observation, and creating an overall 
experience, from the point of view of detainees and those tasked 
to guard them, not far removed from a prison.94 The worst of 
these pre-asylum waiting areas has, by credible accounts, added 
not just detention, but punishment to the mix, offered in the form 
of ad hoc abuse dished out by overburdened border officials.95
Sadly, but unsurprisingly, children have fared especially badly 
when foreign migration flows have run into modern machinery of 
border control.96 It offers scant consolation to the detainees 
caught within such zones that they can exit back to the countries 
from which they fled.97
91 For an example of unsuccessful litigation against the operation of a pre-asylum 
waiting area, see Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria, 2005-XIII HRDC 289, 300, which held 
that a three-day wait in an international transit zone at Vienna International Airport, 
pending consideration of asylum claim, did not constitute unlawful deprivation of liberty. 
92 BASARAN, supra note 3, at 1. 
93 Id. at 7. 
94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78, at 16, 42; see also Clémence Richard & 
Nicolas Fischer, A Legal Disgrace? The Retention of Deported Migrants in Contemporary 
France, 47 SOC. SCI. INFO. 581, 594–95 (2008); see also Julien-Lafferrière, supra note 5. 
95 Sonia Wolf, Illegal Immigrants Suffer Beatings, Humiliation at Paris Airport:
Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE-ENGLISH 1 (Dec. 16, 2003). 
96 See Kim Willsher, Boy of eight held at Paris airport for more than a week,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2016, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/ 
boy-of-eight-held-at-paris-airport-for-more-than-a-week [http://perma.cc/QW5Y-RH94]; 
France: Unaccompanied Children Detained at Borders, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 8, 
2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/08/france-unaccompanied-children-
detained-borders [http://perma.cc/HFK9-V6JM]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 78. 
97 Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 826, 849–50. 
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The fractured nature of pre-asylum waiting areas abets their 
use as instruments of illiberal government. They pop into 
existence and disappear again, even appearing retroactively, at 
the whim of mere administrators. They split like amoeba and 
wiggle away in the form of floating and temporary zones. At the 
farthest extreme, pre-asylum waiting areas become little more 
than labels reading “unwelcome foreigner” attached to entire 
populations in the form of myriad floating personal temporary 
micro-zones. Far from a legal fiction, that describes how zones
d’attente function quite realistically.98 It may, however, qualify as 
a legal absurdity. 
It arguably mocks the meaning of “international” to call 
these kinds of zones “SIZs.” Rather than areas between nation 
states, pre-asylum waiting areas represent areas more fully 
national and statist than anywhere else on earth. In them, the 
softening graces of liberal government—its respect for human 
dignity and its adherence to the rules of law—draw back, leaving 
nothing but brute force. 
On the charge of illiberality, then, the critics of zones
d’attente and similar pre-asylum zones lay a telling blow. Done 
wrong, SIZs could allow nation states to violate their obligations 
to human rights, the international community, and their own 
citizens. How can theory set SIZs right? The next Section 
suggests keeping the “international” in SIZ by ensuring that they 
continue to promote free travel, trade, and cultural exchange. 
B. Zones as Liberal International Refuges 
The prior Section reviewed the theoretical critiques against 
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas and found 
one in particular especially telling: Such zones can serve as 
instruments through which supposedly liberal states enforce 
illiberal policies. This danger arises not only because nation 
states find it expedient to shrink the effective territory of the 
liberties and privileges they uphold while leaving the reach of 
their police powers undiminished, but also because international 
law has relatively little force to compel nation states to treat 
foreigners more respectfully in special international areas. 
Transit zones, SEZs, duty-free areas, and other SIZs typically 
serve those aims in practice, of course. As yet, though, theory has 
little to say about the matter. This Section begins filling that gap 
by justifying special international zones not simply as 
expressions of local power, but also as institutions that the 
98 See BASARAN, supra note 3, at 54. 
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community of nations accepts and respects as instruments for 
promoting freedom of travel, trade, and cultural exchange. 
It does not take much imagination to discern how SIZs could 
serve as refuges to those traditionally liberal values. All of the 
many types of SIZs reviewed above in Part I serve international 
trade, travel, and cultural exchange in various ways. Some do so 
obviously, as when international transit zones ease the passage 
of travelers through a country or when free ports encourage 
trade. Others do so indirectly, as when the Hong Kong and 
Macau SARs allow liberal values to subsist in a sea of nominal 
communism, or when, with the best of intentions but with mixed 
results, pre-asylum waiting areas attempt to impose a measure 
of order on the chaos of human migration. 
These innate virtues of SIZs remain as yet underappreciated 
as theoretical ideals. It could hardly be otherwise, given that only 
in this article has the SIZ itself emerged as worthy of study. 
Now, having identified it in the wild, so to speak, and come to 
understand its ways, we can turn to directing SIZs toward 
human ends. That exercise might begin by curbing mutations, 
such as zones d’attente and other pre-asylum waiting areas that, 
if unchecked, might remove whole regions and people from the 
liberality of the nation state, but not coercive grip. 
Again, it does not take much imagination to discern how to 
save SIZs from that fate. Activists, reporters, and scholars have 
brought the problem to the world’s attention. Amuur and other 
judicial correctives on the scope of police powers imposed within 
zones d’attente show international law working exactly as it 
should, albeit at its usual glacial pace.99 No theoretical discussion 
was needed to start that remedial process. Perhaps now it might 
contribute to the effort, however.  
As SIZs continue to grow, spread, and adapt in practice, our 
theories about SIZs must keep pace. It ill serves our 
understanding to dismiss them as fictional or illegal. SIZs are 
no less real than any social institution and have become a 
commonplace tool of international law. Good theory should 
recognize the full potential, good and bad, of special 
international zones. 
Illiberality is not built into the DNA of SIZs; quite the 
contrary. For the greatest part, during the long course of their 
history and throughout their many instantiations, SIZs have 
made international travel, trade, and cultural exchange more 
99 See generally Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533 (1996); Gebremedhin v. 
France, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 131. 
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cheap, easy, and safe. In this capacity, they have served as 
powerful forces for peace, prosperity, and human freedom. 
Recognizing this theoretic ideal might make it easier to reform 
zones d’attente and similar pre-asylum waiting areas. It might 
also help when it comes to designing new SIZs—the topic of the 
next Part. 
III. SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL ZONES IN DEVELOPMENT
Having above described special international zones in 
practice and theory, this article now turns to questions of 
application. What might the next generation of SIZs bring? 
This Part offers four examples: refugee cities, deep blue zones, 
peer group country standards, and special international 
residency and work zones. The following Sections address each 
in turn, seriatim.
A. Refugee Cities 
A select few policymakers and commentators have proposed 
creating zones designed to give displaced people a more 
appealing option than flinging themselves against the gates of 
unwelcoming countries. Alexander Betts and Paul Collier have 
called for the creation of special economic zones where refugees 
might find gainful employment relatively close to home, rather 
than in some far off European or North American country, 
without unduly disrupting the local labor markets of the host 
country.100 Refugee Cities, a 501(c)(3) public charity, proposes to 
help host countries and NGOs implement a similar policy.101
Special refugee zones have already gotten a bit of traction in 
the real world. The EU has entered into a compact with Jordan 
under which productions from its SEZs will receive favored 
access to European markets on condition that Syrian refugees get 
to work alongside Jordanians (instead of, as is more typical of 
refugee populations, being barred from local labor markets).102
That approach to aiding refugees has drawn criticism from 
human rights activists, however, and no other such projects 
appear in the offing.103 Perhaps would-be host countries worry 
100 See ALEXANDER BETTS AND PAUL COLLIER, REFUGE: RETHINKING REFUGEE POLICY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 171–73 (2017). 
101 REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org [http://perma.cc/AV7C-46WB] (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
102 See European Union Press Release IP/16/588, Syrian Crisis: EU Ready to Step Up 
on Partnerships with Lebanon and Jordan (Oct. 17, 2016). 
103 See Heaven Crawley, Why jobs in special economic zones won’t solve the 
problems facing the world’s refugees, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2017, 6:45 AM), 
https://theconversation.com/why-jobs-in-special-economic-zones-wont-solve-the-
problems-facing-the-worlds-refugees-75249 [http://perma.cc/SQK3-J6XX].
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about setting out to offer aid to those in need but ending up with
unwanted residents and citizens. A properly structured SIZ could 
help fix that problem. 
Structuring a refugee camp as a special zone that lies 
outside the territory of its host country for purposes of many local 
laws, including for the purpose of establishing the privileges of 
residency or citizenship, would lower the risks of a host country 
taking in refugees and other wandering populations. That would 
make it easier for those suffering masses to find a place to rest. 
Absent binding international obligations to the contrary, a 
country should be able to create a SIZ outside of the host’s legal 
territory for some purposes, such as for establishing rights to 
residency or citizenship, without causing much of a diplomatic 
stir. As noted above, such devices have become routine in many 
contexts and countries.104
Done right, and reported fairly, such a refugee SIZ program 
would likely win its host accolades. Who could complain if a 
country willing to let foreigners onto its territory as an act of 
humanitarian mercy, in response to an emergency situation, 
redrew its legal boundaries to withdraw the full panoply of its 
residents’ and citizens’ privileges and obligations from the foreign 
guests? All the many other countries unwilling to give shelter on 
better terms would, at any rate, have little grounds to criticize. 
This outline of a legal framework for refugee SIZs leaves 
many questions unanswered. Foremost among them: Would it be 
right for a country hosting a refugee SIZ to deny those taking 
shelter within the zone from free access to and from other 
international zones, traffic, and travelers? The French zones
d’attente seem headed in that direction, but remain a lot more 
like prisons than areas where local law has given way to 
international norms. Tugba Basaran reports a trend toward 
greater access, but notes that French zones d’attente remain 
subject to strict limits, under which a few NGOs can access 
certain parts of the zones, and certain parties therein, subject to 
the unfettered discretion of the Minister of the Interior.105
Another question worth asking: Conceding that a host 
country ought to have every right to deny a foreign sovereign the 
right to govern some or all of a refugee SIZ, can it rightly deny 
migrant people some form of self-government, if only that 
provided by an NGO, or church, or some other organization short 
of a competing sovereign nation? I should hope not, but should 
104 See supra Part I. 
105 See Basaran, supra note 8, at 350. 
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also confess to a partial view of such matters, given professional 
interests in the field.106 Refugee Cities seems to agree; it suggests 
that “a regional, supranational entity, such as the EU, or a 
collection of representatives from the host country and 
neighboring nations, could establish the regulatory authority” for 
the refugee cities it advocates.107 It also calls for giving the 
residents of refugee cities various ways to get involved in 
self-government.108
Only time will tell what form refugee cities will take, and 
whether they will take form at all. Many other questions persist. 
The problems that inspire the idea of special international zones 
for refugees persist, too, though. Perhaps refugee cities, in some 
form, will help to abate them. 
B. Deep Blue Zone 
French Polynesia has invited Blue Frontiers Pte. Ltd. to 
submit plans for developing a new kind of special economic zone 
in that country—a “SeaZone” encompassing both land and 
water areas.109 The final legal structure of that special 
jurisdiction will depend on action by the National Assembly of 
French Polynesia. Even as a mere hypothetical, though, the 
SeaZone presents an interesting exercise for the application of 
the SIZ model. The seasteader’s unique situation—they seek 
little more from French Polynesia than a safe nursery where 
the first generation of their floating communities can grow 
and mature in anticipation of eventually moving to the high 
seas—calls for unique solutions.110 It calls, for reasons set forth 
in more detail earlier and elsewhere, for a unique kind of special 
international zone: a “‘deep blue’ zone.”111
What is a deep blue zone? It takes its name from the 
prevailing color of the international waters of the planet, ocean 
areas shared by the vessels of all nations, under the exclusive 
control of none. The deep blue zone would recreate those areas in 
simulated form by offering close to shore many of the legal effects 
of staying far out at sea. 
106 See BELL, supra note 24, at 219–33 (relating “stories of the sort ordinarily 
recounted over drinks” about the author’s consulting practice). 
107 Governance, REFUGEE CITIES, https://refugeecities.org/about-the-project/our-
response/governance/ [http://perma.cc/4FUN-YDKA] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
108 Id.
109 BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2017). 
110 See generally JOE QUIRK WITH PATRI FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING 
NATIONS WILL RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT, ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND 
LIBERATE HUMANITY FROM POLITICIANS (2017). 
111 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63. 
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A deep blue SIZ would allow select foreign vessels to anchor 
within the territorial or inland waters of its host nation on 
terms designed to simulate those that apply in international 
waters. This would change the rule ordinarily applicable in 
territorial waters, wherein foreign vessels can typically do no 
more than maintain innocent passage.112 Because the host could 
fine-tune the zone’s rules to disallow military vessels, resource 
extraction, and other international rights ill-suited for inland 
waters, the deep blue zone need not pose any unusual risks. At 
the same time, the arrangement would give seasteaders a 
protected harbor, both literally and legally speaking, in which 
they could try out the arrangements they aim to someday use in 
international waters. 
If seasteaders make it out into the open ocean, for instance, 
as they so ardently claim to want, they will find themselves 
living in cities that, because they float in international waters, 
will enjoy ready access to the world’s maritime trade. Vessels 
flying the flags of many sovereigns will visit and trade with 
seasteads. Furthermore, the seasteaders’ vessels will themselves 
likely sport various flags, whether of nation states or, still more 
hypothetically, of seasteading polities.113
Because each flag brings with it much of the substantive law 
of the flag’s issuer, rendering the vessel flying it national 
territory for some purposes,114 seasteads offer the prospect of 
bringing many various polities together in close proximity under 
fluid conditions. Just as the borders of ecosystems, such as where 
a river meets the ocean, generate the greatest diversity and 
growth, this polycentric feature of seasteads offers the prospect of 
untold wondersor chaos. Such complex systems do not always 
behave predictably. Through a deep blue SIZ, seasteaders might 
reduce the rough and tumble of international seas and laws to 
safe, controlled conditions. 
C. Peer Group Country Standards 
Special economic zones, for the most part, aim to offer little 
more than areas free of customs, duties, and taxes, sometimes 
with the added benefit of one-window service for any government 
paperwork that persists. Zones competing on those fronts need 
not reference the laws of other countries. Relatively recently, 
112 See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
arts. 17–21. 
113 See BELL, supra note 24, at 63 (discussing flagging options, including self-
flagging seasteads). 
114 See id. at 62. 
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however, zones have begun to compete not only on the price and 
convenience of governing services, but also on the applicable 
rules.115 That opens the door for a zone that allows its guests to 
choose rule sets from any of a number of pre-approved countries, 
bringing international law to bear on what is ordinarily a purely 
local question. 
Though somewhat by historical accident rather than by 
Chinese design, Hong Kong demonstrated long ago that 
importing the right foreign laws to a special jurisdiction can help 
it thrive. First as a Crown Colony and then, under a “Basic Law” 
that maintained the legal system’s fundamental features after its 
handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong has succeeded by offering 
Asia a common law legal system relatively friendly to private 
enterprise and high finance.116 Eager to replicate that success, 
Dubai employed retired English judges, even fitting them out with 
robes and perukes, and wrote “the laws of England and Wales” 
into its legal system.117 Honduras plans to take the process even 
further with its zonas de empleo y desarrollo económico (“zones of 
employment and economic development” or “ZEDEs”), which 
within broad limits will allow each zone to import common law or 
other rules from public or private sources of its own choosing.118
These trends suggest that a future special international zone 
might best satisfy the market demand for good rules not simply 
by offering another country’s laws within its bounds, as in Hong 
Kong or Dubai, nor even by offering a flag-free generic common 
law legal system, as Honduran ZEDEs might, but by offering a 
choice between any of the many rule sets that a variety of peer 
countries would apply to a particular area of regulation. The host 
would select the countries in its peer group on the basis of the 
quality of their regulations, market demand for them among zone 
clients, and their suitability given local conditions. A special zone 
set up in Central America might choose to put all OECD 
countries (thus including all members of EU and NAFTA) and its 
neighboring countries in its peer group, for example. With regard 
to some areas of regulation, guests could either stick with the 
regulatory scheme that applies by default in the zone (which 
115 See BELL, supra note 24, at 187.
116 See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 273–77 (2004). 
117 Law on the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws in the Dubai International 
Finance Center, DIFC Law No. 3 of 2004, art. 8(2)(e) (U.A.E.), https://www.difc.ae/files/92
14/5448/9184/Law_on_the_Application_of_Civil_and_Commercial_Laws_in_the_DIFC_DI
FC_Law_No._3_oF_2004.pdf. 
118 Decreto No. 120-1203, Ley Organica de las Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo 
Economico (ZEDE) [Organic Act for Zones for Employment and Economic Development 
(ZEDE)], LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL DEL LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS (Sept. 6, 2013). 
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might itself come from outside the host country) or choose one 
from a peer country. 
Under peer group standards, for example, if a company that 
manufactures and sells medical devices in the German market 
decides to expand its operations to the zone, it could choose to 
stick with the rules it has already mastered. The zone would not 
try to master those rules itself, but would instead require the 
company to certify that its practices in the zone, because they 
follow those established in its home country, comply with 
German law. This certification could be provided by the peer 
country itself under special arrangement or by some trusted 
third party. Upon offering its certification of compliance with 
peer group country standards, the company would be allowed to 
make and sell medical devices in the zone. 
Though companies would probably often want to “bring to 
the zone” the same regulations they have already satisfied back 
home, thus saving the need to master another set of rules, a 
company setting up in the zone could choose the regulations of 
any peer country. It may turn out, after all, that all medical 
device companies in the zone, even those from other countries, 
will want work under German regulations. 
In this way, a SIZ run on peer group standards could reveal 
which countries, among those trusted to have reasonably good 
rules, offer the sorts of regulations that protect the public while 
encouraging economic development. That in turn might 
encourage countries to compete for the coveted top spot in terms 
of trusted but efficient regulatory services. This is not just a 
matter of prestige, nor even of what revenue might be had from 
selling certification services to parties invoking a particular 
countries’ regulations within a zone that applies peer group 
country standards. The countries that take the lead in offering 
the world regulations that both protect the public while 
promoting profit will give its domestic industry a great 
advantage over foreign competitors, who instead of having 
already mastered the prevailing rules will have to either play 
catch up or suffer under the familiar but unpopular rules of their 
own home countries. 
D. Special International Residency and Work Zones 
Future SIZs could also take a form designed to attract digital 
nomads, voluntary exiles, and other parties eager to pay for 
enjoying lower barriers to international travel, trade, and 
cultural exchange. Enterprising host countries could serve that 
growing market by offering special international residency and 
work zones. This Section explains SIRW zones in greater detail. 
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In a SIRW zone, a nation state would roll back its customs 
and immigration border, legally speaking, and leave behind an 
area open to visitors, residents, and workers from abroad. Like 
French zones d’attente, these zones would begin as offshoots of 
a pre-existing international transit zone. The usual tourist and 
resident visa and work permit rules would not apply in a SIRW 
zone. Other rules might apply of course; that depends on the host 
government, the organization (probably private) that operates the 
zone, and the international market for places to live and work. 
Most likely, the SIRW zone would offer comfortable housing 
and work environments for all its guests and expedited processing 
of residency visas and work permits for those seeking stronger 
links to the host country. To judge from current practices in 
international transit zones, private parties will likely manage 
SIRW zones under the host’s oversight.119 Instead of applying its 
customs and immigration rules to the zone, the host would assess 
a flat lease, per capita, or other fee. This would ensure that the 
zone pays its way, in terms of public finances, while being treated 
as a black box by the host country in terms of the taxation of (and 
thus interference with) the zone’s internal operations. 
Extant SIZs have come close to creating SIRW zones without 
quite fulfilling all the criteria. Norway’s Svalbard Islands look like 
one at first glance. As its welcoming website says, “[e]veryone 
may, in principle, travel to Svalbard, and foreign citizens do not 
need a visa or a work or residence permit from Norwegian 
authorities in order to settle in Svalbard.”120 In contrast to the 
voluntary process through which host countries ordinarily create 
SIZs, however, Norway had to accept this limitation on its 
sovereignty somewhat by force. It never had the right to impose 
visa or work permit requirements in the islands, but rather had 
to foreswear imposing those limits on nationals of other parties 
to the Svalbard Treaty in order to win such control over the 
islands as it now claims.121 It bears noting, however, that the 
Governor of Svalbard, evidently not pressed for space, has 
extended the invitation to all foreigners.122
Something akin to a SIRW zone also emerges from the 
details of the Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water 
Harbour and Industrial Area) Act, the legislative enactment of 
an agreement reached between the government and the private 
119 See Frétigny, supra note 14, at 15–16; see also BASARAN, supra note 3, at 102–03. 
120 Entry and Residence, THE GOVERNOR OF SVALBARD, https://www.sysselmannen.no/ 
en/Visitors/Entry-and-residence/ [http://perma.cc/W747-M99G] (last updated Sept. 27, 2016). 
121 The Svalbard Treaty art. 3, Feb. 9, 1920. 
122 Entry and Residence, supra note 120. 
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something like service à la carte. Whereas in most of its territory, 
a government offers a single package of services—taxes, 
regulations, policing, etc.—in a SIZ it can offer a curated 
selection of these. In an international transit zone, for instance, 
most of the usual laws apply with the exception of certain ones 
relating to immigration and taxes. A SIRW zone might remove 
labor regulations from the mix, too. A deep blue zone would 
remove still other local restrictions, leaving international norms 
to fill the gap. This, the power of special international zones to 
regulate the territorial boundaries of nation states, stands to 
work widespread and lasting changes on the structure of 
international relations. 
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The Law and Policy of Refugee Cities: Special 
Economic Zones for Migrants 
Michael Castle-Miller* 
INTRODUCTION
Migration is quickly becoming one of the most pressing issues 
of our time. Conflict, persecution, natural disasters, and economic 
inequality are driving people from their homes in record numbers. 
Meanwhile, traditional responses to mass migration are 
becoming increasingly inadequate. Humanitarian assistance and 
border policing are ineffective and costly over the long term 
because they fail to address the root causes of migration.1 Barriers 
to the labor market, both legal and socio-economic, prevent 
migrants from contributing to the economic development of the 
countries hosting them and force them into dependency.2
Recognizing this, some countries are exploring pragmatic 
pathways toward integrating migrants into economies. The special 
economic zone (“SEZ”) concept offers one potential path forward. 
SEZs are designated areas designed to promote development 
through a distinct policy and administrative framework. They can 
serve as vehicles for initiating beneficial policies when political 
obstacles stand in the way of nationwide reform. 
Refugee cities would be a type of SEZ designed to facilitate 
migrant integration. They would be special-status jurisdictions in 
which displaced people—who would otherwise be barred from 
working—can be employed, start businesses, access finance, and 
rebuild their lives. Applying principles from SEZs, refugee cities 
could help countries benefit from migrants’ presence in a 
politically realistic manner. They could also deliver high-quality 
infrastructure, foreign direct investment, and improvements to 
the business environment. 
 * Michael Castle-Miller is an international lawyer and public policy consultant who 
helps design special jurisdictions for governments and private investors. He is the CEO of 
Politas Consulting (www.politasconsulting.com/) and the founder and executive director of 
Refugee Cities (www.refugeecities.org/). 
1 See infra Section I(A). 
2 See infra Section I(B). 
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Refugee cities would also serve as a pathway for countries to 
come into closer alignment with international law. Under the 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(“Refugee Convention” and “1967 Protocol,” respectively), refugees 
are entitled to relatively strong rights regarding property, 
employment, and entrepreneurship.3 However, most countries’ 
domestic legislation falls well short of these rights. 
This article explores these gaps to show how refugee cities 
could fill them by creating designated areas in which refugee 
rights are respected and the policy benefits of migrant integration 
are achieved. Part I provides the background of the global 
migration situation. Part II discusses the evolution and role of 
SEZs. Part III explains the refugee-cities concept and its policy 
benefits. Part IV analyzes international and domestic law 
pertaining to refugees, including a special focus on Turkey. 
I. BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT
Forced displacement is a growing major global concern. By the 
end of 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) reported 65.6 million people were forcibly displaced by 
persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations.4
Included in that total are 22.5 million refugees,5 40.3 million 
internally displaced persons (“IDPs”),6 and 2.8 million asylum 
seekers.7 Moreover, 10.3 million people were forcibly displaced 
during 2016 alone, meaning that twenty people were forced to flee 
their homes every minute that year.8
3 Protecting Refugees: questions and answers, UNHCR (Feb. 1, 2002), http://www.un 
hcr.org/afr/publications/brochures/3b779dfe2/protecting-refugees-questions-answers.html 
[http://perma.cc/XY46-Z396]. 
4 UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2016, at 2 (2016), 
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf [http://perma.cc/5CCH-HMCT]. Actual numbers of 
displaced persons, including refugees, are probably much higher than the numbers 
provided in this section due to the number of people who would qualify as refugees, but are 
undocumented and thus not counted in official tallies. See Roger Zetter & Héloïse Ruaudel, 
Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment, Part I: Synthesis 11
(KNOMAD Study 2016) (noting, for instance, that the Iranian government estimates 1.4 
million to 2 million undocumented Afghans are within its borders, beyond the 979,400 
documented refugees, and that there are an estimated 175,000 undocumented refugees in 
Venezuela, compared with only 5000 who are documented).
5 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 2. “Refugees” generally includes people who have been 
forced to leave their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution and includes 
people who fall under the definition of refugee under international treaties, people granted 
complementary forms of protection and temporary protection, and people in “refugee-like 
situations.” Id. at 56. 
6 Id. at 2. “Internally displaced persons” are people who have been forced to leave 
their homes but have not left their country. Id. at 56. 
7 Id. at 2. “Asylum seekers” are those who have applied for international protection 
in a country, but whose refugee status is yet to be determined. Id. at 39. 
8 Id. at 2. 
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straining to provide basic services like water, healthcare, shelter, 
and sanitation.17
A. Responses to Refugees 
The international response to refugee situations has evolved 
over the last several decades. After massive displacement caused 
by the Second World War, the newly created United Nations 
formed the UNHCR and adopted a treaty, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, obligating member states to respect certain minimum 
standards of treatment of refugees. Since then, the UNHCR’s main 
objective has been to ensure the international protection of 
refugees and to seek permanent solutions to their problems.18
Traditionally, the UNHCR’s focus was on providing 
short-term humanitarian aid through emergency shelters, food, 
water, and medical care.19 Over time, the UNHCR increasingly 
shifted to emphasize “durable solutions” for refugees.20 The three 
durable solutions are: voluntary repatriation to the refugee’s home 
country, resettlement to a third country, or integration into the 
host country.21
However, in recent years, the UNHCR has increasingly 
recognized that durable solutions are often only a remote 
possibility for refugees.22 Conditions in their home country often 
do not improve for many years, making repatriation impossible in 
the near future. Only a small portion of the global refugee 
population are accepted for resettlement in third countries,23 and 
few of the major refugee-hosting countries are willing to 
meaningfully integrate refugees into their societies. 
As a result, most refugees remain displaced for many years, 
often in isolated refugee camps or informal settlements. As of the 
end of 2016, 11.6 million refugees (two-thirds of the total) were in 
“protracted refugee situations,” generally lasting five years or 
more.24 Of that number, 4.1 million people were in refugee 
situations lasting twenty years or more.25
17 Rohingya Refugee Crisis, supra note 16.
18 OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 3 (2015). 
19 Id.
20 Id. at 4. 
21 Id. at 5. 
22 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 24. 
23 In 2016, 189,300 refugees were resettled into thirty-seven countries. Id. at 3. The 
U.S. admitted the largest number at 96,900. Id. 
24 Id. at 22. “Protracted refugee situations” is defined as situations where 25,000 or 
more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or 
more in a given asylum country. Id. 
25 Id.
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To address this reality, the UNHCR has been seeking to 
identify new approaches to refugee situations, including 
“complementary pathways,” which countries have implemented 
when durable solutions are not possible.26 Examples of current 
complementary pathways include private sponsorship programs, 
labor schemes, family reunification programs, talent registers, 
and education programs.27
B. Refugees’ Access to the Labor Market 
The vast majority of refugees are prevented from working, 
both de jure and de facto.28 In addition to legal restrictions, which 
are discussed in Part IV, refugees face restrictive policies and 
practices like forced encampment or bureaucratic and expensive 
processes for obtaining work permits.29 They also face 
socio-economic barriers impacting the freedom to work and the 
ability to assimilate, such as xenophobia and discrimination, 
language difficulties, inadequate access to the courts, and lack of 
vocational training for refugees who need to develop new skills.30
As a result, most refugees work in the informal sector and under 
relatively poor conditions where they have less of a positive impact 
on the economy than if they were allowed to work formally.31
These barriers exist despite evidence that allowing refugees, 
and other immigrants to work tends to bring significant net 
economic benefits to host countries. Over the medium-term to 
long-term, refugees tend to raise wages, create jobs, stimulate 
commerce, fill gaps in the labor market, and increase cross-border 
trade.32 Refugees represent a major underutilized labor force that 
could make significant contributions to the economies hosting 
them if activated.33 Additionally, work would enable them to 
develop skills and capital to facilitate their return to their home 
countries and would help advance the UN’s 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals to end poverty and fight inequality.34
26 Id. at 24, 29. 
27 Id. at 29. 
28 ASYLUM ACCESS & THE REFUGEE WORK RIGHTS COALITION, GLOBAL REFUGEE WORK 
RIGHTS REPORT: TAKING THE MOVEMENT FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 5 (2014) [hereinafter 
ASYLUM ACCESS].
29 Id.; Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 14–19. 
30 ASYLUM ACCESS, supra note 28, at 5; Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 20. 
31 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 26. 
32 See, e.g., id.; see also ASYLUM ACCESS, supra note 28, at 8; OECD, Is migration 
good for the economy? (May 2014), https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration 
%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf [http://perma.cc/345C-LQAL]; ALEXANDER 
BETTS ET AL., REFUGEE ECONOMIES: RETHINKING POPULAR ASSUMPTIONS (2014), 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/refugee-economies-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/E5EQ-UBVZ]. 
33 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 4. 
34 Id.
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II. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES HISTORY AND POLICY FUNCTIONS
An SEZ can be generally understood as a designated 
geographic area designed to promote economic development 
through a policy and administrative framework that is somehow 
different from the typical policy and administrative frameworks 
surrounding it.35 The legal and regulatory regime is the most 
central aspect to an SEZ; their geographic, administrative, and 
infrastructural characteristics are also important, but less so.36
The SEZ concept can include a wide variety of special-status 
jurisdictions going by different names from ancient to modern 
times, including free trade zones, export processing zones, 
freeports, and even semi-autonomous city-states.37
In recent years, new attention is being placed on the role of 
SEZs as vehicles for policy and structural transformation, such 
as by helping catalyze growth in new industry sectors or 
overcoming political roadblocks to beneficial legal reforms.38
SEZs often also serve as industrial parks by providing facilities, 
infrastructure, and services designed to cater to certain types of 
businesses.39 However, an increasing number are mixed-use or 
urban, in character.40
A. History of Development 
Modern SEZs emerged out of several historical precedents. 
The island of Delos functioned as a free zone during the Greek and 
Roman empires by serving as a place where goods could be stored 
and exchanged free of local prohibitions and taxes.41 Medieval and 
Renaissance-era city-states, such as those in the Hanseatic 
35 See Gokhan Akinci & James Crittle, Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons 
Learned, and Implications for Zone Development 2–6, 9–22 (World Bank Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service, Working Paper No. 45869, 2008) (referring to SEZs as 
“geographically delimited areas administered by a single body, offering certain 
incentives . . . to businesses [within it]” and noting how they enhance competitiveness 
through special policy, regulatory frameworks, and administration); see also Claude 
Baissac, Brief History of SEZs and Overview of Policy Debates, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 23
(Thomas Farole ed., 2011) (defining SEZs as areas where the “rules of business are different 
from those that prevail in the national territory,” generally with more liberal policies and 
more effective administration); Lotta Moberg, The Political Economy of Special Economic 
Zones (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (defining SEZs as “areas where 
a government allows for different rules to apply than the rest of the country”). 
36 Baissac, supra note 35, at 24–25 (2011) (observing how some SEZ programs—as in 
the case of “single-factory zone” programs—do not even have a designated geographic area; 
instead companies can acquire SEZ status while being located anywhere in the country).
37 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 9–12. 
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Baissac, supra note 35, at 31–32. 
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League, had almost complete autonomy from the ruling powers 
around them and provided spaces for free trade and commerce.42
Colonial-era chartered territories and trading posts were 
independently administered by state-backed private companies.43
Some of these trading posts emerged in the modern era as 
prosperous city-states and freeports, including Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Macau.44 These also could be characterized as a type 
of SEZ.45
In the early twentieth century, free-trade zones (“FTZs”), or 
“free zones,” existed near major international transit points, 
offering exemptions from tariffs for trade-related activities, 
including warehousing, packaging, sorting, exhibition, and sales.46
In 1934, the United States adopted the Foreign Trade Zones Act,47
which created these types of zones to mitigate the damaging 
impact of high tariffs under the protectionist trade policies 
prevailing just before and during the early Great Depression 
under laws like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.48 FTZs were deemed 
outside the customs territory of the country, which meant 
businesses could import foreign products and sell them in foreign 
markets duty free, and only pay customs duties if and when 
products were sold in the domestic market.49
FTZs evolved in the mid-twentieth century by opening up 
more to manufacturing industries, instead of remaining restricted 
to trade activities.50 The starkest early example was the Shannon 
Free Zone (1959) which applied the FTZ model to a wide area 
located next to a major airport and offered ready-built industrial 
infrastructure and facilities, dedicated administrative support, 
and investment incentives.51
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 14–16 (identifying Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Singapore as city-wide freeport SEZs). 
46 Baissac, supra note 35, at 32. Notably, however, the FTZ at the Port of Cadiz 
included substantial industrial production, even featuring one of the first Ford Motor 
Plants in Europe. Id. 
47 Foreign Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 81a (1934). 
48 Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act), 46 Stat. 590; see also Baissac, supra
note 35, at 32. 
49 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 9, 52; see also, e.g., WORLD CUSTOMS ORG.,
GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS TERMS 17 (2013) (defining “free zone” as “a part of 
the territory of a Contracting Party where any goods introduced are generally regarded, 
insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the Customs Territory”); 
19 U.S.C.A. § 81c (2003) (describing the U.S. Customs territory as distinct from the FTZs). 
50 Baissac, supra note 35, at 32.
51 Id. As another example of a growing openness of FTZs to manufacturing, in 1950, 
the United States amended the Foreign Trade Zones Act to allow for manufacturing 
activities. Id. However, this did not result in much manufacturing activity until an April 
12, 1980 ruling from the U.S. Customs Service changed the formula for calculating the tariff 
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The Shannon Free Zone model was copied and spread 
throughout developing countries under the name “export processing 
zone” (“EPZ”) from the 1960s to the 1990s.52 For developing 
countries, EPZs were tools for stimulating export-led industrial 
development, which boosted employment and labor productivity, 
diversified the economy, generated foreign exchange, attracted 
foreign direct investment, and facilitated technology transfer.53
EPZs also had an important function as policy incubators—they 
served as pilots for trade liberalization in the midst of protectionist 
import-substitution regimes, which generally prevailed in 
developing countries at the time.54 Over time, EPZ programs grew 
increasingly open to a wider range of business activities, to linkages 
with local businesses outside the EPZs, and to domestic sales, as 
opposed to an exclusive focus on exports.55
China took a monumental step in shaping the nature of SEZs 
in the early 1980s, when several local officials sought to boost 
economic growth in their jurisdictions by designating areas as 
free-market enclaves.56 The idea was an outgrowth of the Open 
Door reforms, which began in the late 1970s as a controlled 
experiment of market-based reforms.57 In 1980, the country 
designated four “special economic zones” (perhaps the first use of 
the term now used generically), which spanned large city-sized 
areas and granted a wide range of free market policies affecting 
finance, labor, foreign investment, and trade.58 Many of these 
SEZs, especially Shenzhen, experienced explosive growth in 
investment, wages, population, and living standards.59
applied to finished products sold from an FTZ to the domestic market so that domestic parts 
and labor were excluded from the value. A Brief History of the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones 
Program, FOREIGN-TRADE ZONE RES. CTR., http://www.foreign-trade-zone.com/history.htm 
[http://perma.cc/M8N8-SV89] (last visited Dec. 3, 2017). 
52 Baissac, supra note 35, at 33. 
53 See generally THOMAS FAROLE & GOKHAN AKINCI, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Thomas Farole & Gokhan 
Akinci eds., 2011) (evaluating the performance of SEZs in various countries). 
54 Id. (describing policy incubation as an important dynamic benefit of SEZs around 
the world). 
55 Baissac, supra note 35, at 28. 
56 Moberg, supra note 35, at 92–93. 
57 Douglas Zhihua Zeng, How Do Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters 
Drive China’s Rapid Development?, in BUILDING ENGINES FOR GROWTH AND 
COMPETITIVENESS IN CHINA: EXPERIENCE WITH SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND INDUSTRIAL 
CLUSTERS 1, 8–9 (Douglas Zhihua Zeng ed., 2010) (noting how Chinese Premier Deng 
Xiaping referred to the choice to only open certain segments of the economy to the market 
as “crossing the river by touching the stones”). 
58 Id.
59 Id. As an example, Shenzhen’s GDP grew by fifty-eight percent per year between 
1980 and 1984, and its GDP per capita grew from under $100 at formation to over $25,000 
in 2016. Shenzhen (Guangdong) City Information, HKTDC RES. (Aug. 30, 2017), 
http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/Shenzhen-
Guangdong-City-Information/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X09VT4H.htm [http://perma.cc/7BB3-KU5G].
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Beginning largely in the 1990s, zones in Latin America 
initiated another major shift in the nature of SEZs.60 Whereas 
previous zones were primarily government-driven projects, SEZs 
began to increasingly rely on private-sector companies to finance, 
own, develop, and provide services to users.61 This model has 
allowed the state to concentrate its resources on providing 
effective regulation, ideally through a dedicated SEZ regulatory 
authority that independently performs or coordinates many of the 
functions of government in a streamlined fashion.62 In general, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that SEZs managed by private-sector 
companies or public-private partnerships have delivered higher 
quality services and facilities, better social and environmental 
outcomes, and higher financial returns at a lower cost than 
government-run SEZs.63
B. Function of SEZs 
While SEZs can bring static benefits such as employment 
generation and foreign direct investment to an area, their greatest 
potential is in delivering dynamic benefits, especially long-term 
structural transformation, upgrades to domestic economy capacity, 
and changes to nationwide policy.64 Examples of countries that 
have achieved these dynamic benefits in a very noticeable way 
include Mexico, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Mauritius.65
Many, if not most, SEZs have failed to achieve significant 
dynamic benefits; some may have even been counterproductive. 
For instance, rather than serving as catalysts of good policy, some 
SEZs may have acted as “pressure valves” that allow elites to avoid 
or delay nationwide reform by diverting social movements and 
isolating their impact to zones.66 Many SEZs impose economic 
costs that exceed their benefits, primarily when SEZs rely heavily 
on the public sector for financing or operation or on massive tax 
It grew from a fishing village of 300,000 people to over fourteen million people today, many 
of them young people from rural areas in search of opportunities. See Da Wei David Wang, 
Continuity and Change in the Urban Villages of Shenzhen, 4 INT’L J. CHINA STUD. 233, 
233–56 (2013). Many of the original fishing villagers became landowners in the city, 
profiting from the city’s success. Id. at 246. 
60 Baissac, supra note 35, at 37. 
61 Id. (noting how this shift was driven by the need to limit government spending and 
to regenerate stagnate free zone programs). 
62 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 5. 
63 Id. at 45–47. 
64 See id. at 32; see also THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA:
COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 3–16 (2011). 
65 See Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci, Introduction, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 53, at 1, 8; Akinci 
& Crittle, supra note 35, at 26, 36. 
66 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 4, 34, 42. 
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breaks to attract investment.67 Numerous reports have observed 
that many SEZs have not performed well at advancing beyond 
low-wage/low-skill jobs, stimulating local economic activity, or 
promoting labor and environmental performance.68 SEZs have 
generally been successful at job creation and access to income for 
women, though there have been significant problems with pay 
equity, denying women access to attain higher paying positions, 
discriminatory working conditions, and sexual harassment.69
SEZs are becoming increasingly important vehicles for 
wide-ranging reforms.70 Previously, their primary function was to 
reduce tariff barriers between countries.71 Today, with overall 
effective tariff rates very low worldwide, their primary value is in 
easing other constraints in the investment climate through 
reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers, streamlining customs 
inspection and compliance procedures, facilitating human 
development (especially skills), easing access to investment 
approvals and business licenses, delivering reliable infrastructure, 
and improving access to work visas for foreign workers.72 Generous 
tax incentives no longer offset disadvantages in these areas.73
III. REFUGEE CITIES CONCEPT
The refugee cities concept is an evolution of the SEZ model. 
Whereas traditional zones have prioritized tax reductions, 
customs exemptions, business registration and licensing, and 
similar measures, refugee cities would prioritize migrant 
integration.74 In refugee cities, migrants could legally work, 
operate their own businesses, access goods and services, have 
67 Id. at 32–34, 39, 45–47. 
68 See, e.g., Sheba Tejani, The Gender Dimension of Special Economic Zones, in
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS,
supra note 53, at 247, 262–72; Int’l Labour Office, Report of the InFocus Initiative on Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs): Latest Trends and Policy Developments in EPZs, at 3–9, ILO Doc. 
GB.301/ESP/5 (March 2008); Int’l Labour Office, Labour and Social Issues Relating to 
Export Processing Zones: Report for Discussion at the Tripartite Meeting of Export 
Processing Zones–Operating Countries, at 47, ILO Doc. TMEPZ (1998). However, SEZs may 
perform better, in relative terms, than non-zone businesses and performance appears 
stronger in privately managed and geographically demarcated SEZs, as opposed to publicly 
operated zones and “single-factory” zones scattered throughout the country. Akinci & 
Crittle, supra note 35, at 17. 
69 See Tejani, supra note 68, at 269–70; see also Int’l Labour Office, Report of the 
InFocus Initiative on Export Processing Zones (EPZs): Latest Trends and Policy 
Developments in EPZs, supra note 68, at 4–7. 
70 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 6, 42–43. 
71 See id. at 13. 
72 See id. at 57–58. 
73 See id. at 49. 
74 See REFUGEE CITIES, REFUGEE CITIES: EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE 
THROUGH SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 4 (Nov. 2016), https://refugeecities.files.word 
press.com/2016/11/refugee-cities-concept-paper-november-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZKR-2AKU]. 
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property rights, and enjoy other rights and privileges ordinarily 
denied to them.75 Ideally, refugee cities would also include aspects 
of well-performing SEZs, such as an effective and efficient 
regulatory system, private-sector investment, and trade 
facilitation.76 However, they would also go beyond these elements, 
offering diverse, multi-use urban areas, support for entrepreneurs 
and small-sized and medium-sized enterprises, healthcare, 
trauma counseling, education, financial assistance, and other 
support in collaboration with international organizations and non-
governmental organizations.77
A. Benefits of Refugee Cities 
1. Host Countries 
For countries hosting large numbers of refugees, refugee 
cities convert a perceived problem into an economic growth 
opportunity.78 Since these countries cannot keep migrants outside 
their borders for both practical and political reasons, they must 
decide how they will handle migrants.79 If they house migrants in 
typical camps without economic opportunities, the migrants will 
tend to drain public resources and possibly become more prone to 
radicalization and violence.80 The migrants will also tend to find 
ways to leave or avoid the camps and instead work in the informal 
sector “where they have less of a positive impact on the economy 
than if they were allowed to work legally.”81 On the other hand, 
efforts to allow refugees to work anywhere in the country face 
overwhelming political resistance, especially due to the fear that 
they will take away employment opportunities from citizens.82
Refugee cities would help countries realize some of the 
potential benefits of refugees83 by designating new spaces where 
75 See id. at 6–7. 
76 See id.
77 See id. at 8. 
78 See id. at 6. 
79 See id.
80 See generally Rebecca Horn, Exploring the Impact of Displacement and 
Encampment on Domestic Violence in the Kakuma Refugee Camp, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 356 
(2010) (analyzing the connection between refugee camp residents’ structural conditions and 
domestic violence); see also BARBARA SUDE ET AL., LESSENING THE RISK OF REFUGEE 
RADICALIZATION 3 (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE 
100/PE166/RAND_PE166.pdf [http://perma.cc/9KWK-J6ZD] (discussing the connection 
between refugee camp conditions and radicalization). 
81 REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6; see also, e.g., BETTS ET AL., supra note 32, at 5. 
82 See Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4 (studying twenty countries hosting seventy 
percent of the world’s refugees and observing a general reluctance to ease restrictions on 
refugees’ ability to work). 
83 See BETTS ET AL., supra note 32, at 16–20 (covering the economic benefits of allowing 
refugees to enter the labor market). 
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refugees can work and start businesses, and where new foreign 
investment can be brought in, without competing for existing 
resources in existing spaces.84 Host populations could also live and 
work in the new spaces and benefit from the opportunities and 
infrastructure developed there.85
Refugee cities are better tools for accomplishing the goals of 
refugee camps. Host countries often use refugee camps to cluster 
refugees to facilitate aid distribution, avoid competition for jobs, 
and more easily locate and, eventually, repatriate them.86 Camps 
often do not accomplish this goal well, however, since refugees 
often avoid them because of the few economic opportunities 
there.87 Refugee cities can reverse this trend by attracting 
migrants rather than repelling them.88
2. International Community and Aid Agencies 
Refugee cities can also offer the international community a 
more cost-effective response to refugee crises than existing 
humanitarian methods. International organizations traditionally 
respond to mass migration with food aid, tents, water, basic 
security, and emergency medical care.89 Refugee cities would offer 
these services, while also creating a platform for migrants to 
become self-supporting.90 Private capital can be invested in real 
estate, businesses, and infrastructure and can generate returns 
from these productive assets.91 Donor institutions can simply 
facilitate and abet this investment through technical support, 
investment guarantees, and monitoring and evaluation.92
For developed countries, such as in Europe, that are weary or 
fearful of migrants passing through refugee hosting countries and 
entering their territory, refugee cities could provide refugees with 
other attractive areas for settling.93 Rather than attempting to 
find opportunities in an advanced economy, they can find 
opportunities in the countries hosting them.94
84 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6–7. 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 See MILICA Z. BOOKMAN, AFTER INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS 134–36 (2002). 
87 Id. at 98. 
88 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6. 
89 See U.N. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 4 (2015). 
90 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 3. 
91 See id. at 1, 4. 
92 See id. at 7. 
93 See id. at 6. 
94 See id. at 4. 
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employees are Syrian refugees.102 The agreement covers fifty-two 
product groups and will last for ten years.103
Also, in 2016, the World Bank launched a $300 million 
Program for Results Loan to improve Jordan’s investment climate, 
attract investment, implement labor market reforms, and allow 
the Syrian labor force to further Jordan’s economic growth.104
There is a special focus on supporting trade facilitation, 
investment promotion, and Syrian entrepreneurship activities in 
existing SEZs.105 Disbursements are linked to transparency 
requirements ensuring compliance with good labor practices.106
Jordan set a global target of bringing 200,000 Syrian refugees 
into the formal labor market and began issuing work permits free 
of charge to Syrians for a three-month period.107 It also removed 
the requirement for holding a valid passport to obtain a work 
permit, a requirement that was impossible for many Syrians to 
fulfill.108 Instead, Ministry of the Interior identification cards now 
serve as a substitute for a passport.109
The King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (“KHBTDA”), 
one of Jordan’s SEZs, has been identified as a strong option for 
allowing refugees access to the labor market.110 KHBTDA is 
located nearby the Za’atari refugee camp in Mafraq, which houses 
roughly 80,000 Syrian refugees.111
IV. LAW APPLICABLE TO REFUGEES
The laws applicable to refugees depend on the countries in 
which they find themselves. International law pertaining to 
refugees is relatively well-developed; however, the strongest 
rights are conferred under treaties to which countries may or may 
not be a party. Even if they are parties, the countries may have 
102 Id. (stating that after three years, the threshold will rise to twenty-five percent, and 
the agreement modifies the rules of origin applicable to qualifying products so that they are 
eligible for the same benefits applied to least-developed countries under the Everything but 
Arms Agreement).
103 Id.
104 See The World Bank Group, Jordan – Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and 
Syrian Refugees Program-for-Results Project, at 1–3, Report No. 108201-JO (Sept. 2, 2016), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/802781476219833115/pdf/Jordan-PforR-PAD- 
P159522-FINAL-DISCLOSURE-10052016.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GQ3-DJZ5]. 
105 Id. at 5. 
106 Id. at 82. 
107 Id. at 4. 
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Bethan Staton, Jordan Experiment Spurs Jobs for Refugees, NEWS DEEPLY:
REFUGEES DEEPLY (July 25, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/ 
07/25/jordan-experiment-spurs-jobs-for-refugees [http://perma.cc/7M7D-GBWW]. 
111 Id.
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made reservations regarding certain provisions, thereby limiting 
their applicability.  
Domestic legislation varies greatly across countries. In most 
cases, it falls well short of international law, particularly in those 
countries hosting most of the world’s refugees. Migrant-inclusive 
SEZs, or refugee cities, could help countries move significantly 
closer to alignment with the standards under international law in 
designated areas. 
This Part analyzes both international law and domestic law. 
Regarding domestic law, it provides a general overview of 
countries hosting large refugee populations and then takes a more 
specific look at the law pertaining to refugees in Turkey—the 
largest host of refugees. 
A. International Law 
While certain standards are enshrined in customary 
international law and in general treaties regarding humanitarian 
law and human rights (such as the Geneva Conventions), the most 
specific and protective sources of international law pertaining to 
refugees is the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.112 States that are parties to the Refugee Convention are 
obligated to certain minimum standards of treatment toward 
refugees within their borders.113 To qualify as a “refugee” entitled 
to protection under the Convention, a person must be outside the 
country of his or her nationality and unable to avail him-or-herself 
of the protection of that country114 because of a well-founded fear 
of persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”115
112 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/v1crs.htm [http://perma.cc/KV3T-5BBF] [hereinafter 1951 
Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/v2prsr.htm [http://perma.cc/8NXC-JDQG].
When the 1951 Refugee Convention was adopted, it only applied to people displaced by 
events occurring before January 1, 1951 (i.e., because of World War II). 1951 Refugee 
Convention, art. 1(A)(2). Furthermore, states had the option of either applying it only to 
people displaced from events in Europe or from anywhere in the world. Id. art. 1(B)(1). 
However, the 1967 Protocol amended the 1951 Convention by removing the date restriction. 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1. 
113 See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112 (providing wide-ranging 
obligations regarding the treatment of refugees). 
114 Id. art. 1(A)(2). Stateless persons are also protected. For them, “country of his [or 
her] nationality” is effectively replaced with country of his or her place of habitual 
residence. Id. 
115 Id. There are certain types of people explicitly excluded from protection under the 
Refugee Convention. This includes people who can now receive protection from the country of 
their nationality. Id. art 1(C)(5). It also includes people receiving assistance from agencies of 
the UN other than the UNHCR. Id. art 1(D). For example, Palestinian refugees who receive 
assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (“UNRWA”). UNHCR, Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention (Oct. 
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There are 145 states party to the Refugee Convention.116
Among those members hosting the largest numbers of refugees as 
of the end of 2016 are Turkey (2.9 million),117 Iran (979,400),118
Uganda (940,800),119 Ethiopia (791,600),120 Germany (669,500),121
Democratic Republic of Congo (452,000),122 and Kenya (451,100).123
Notable non-members of the 1967 Protocol with large refugee 
populations include: Pakistan (1.4 million),124 Lebanon (1 million),125
and Jordan (685,200).126 Additionally, Bangladesh, which began 
hosting a sudden influx of Rohingya refugees in the last half of 
2017, is not a party to the Refugee Convention.127
The Refugee Convention contains several provisions that are 
relevant to the refugee cities concept, including rights to property, 
work, residency and movement, and administrative facilities. 
These are discussed below. 
1. Rights to Property 
First, refugees have the right to property. Article 13 requires 
states to “accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible 
and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances,128 as regards the acquisition 
of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining 
thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and 
2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4add88379.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q7UV-3Q9Z]. War criminals and 
others who have committed serious non-political crimes are also not protected. 1951 Refugee 
Convention, supra note 112, art. 1(F). 
116 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112. There are 142 countries party to both the 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Id. The United States is a party to the 1967 
Protocol only. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112. 
117 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 14. 
118 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15. 
119 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15. 
120 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15. 
121 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15. 
122 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 16. 
123 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 16. 
124 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Pakistan 
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 14. 
125 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Lebanon 
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 15. 
126 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Jordan 
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 15. 
127 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing 
Bangladesh as a state party). 
128 For the meaning of “in the same circumstances,” see infra note 135. 
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immovable property.”129 Consequently, if a country generally 
allows aliens within its borders to purchase land, own shares of 
stock in a company, or lease real estate, it must also allow refugees 
this same right.130
Treatment “not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally” does not include rights that are only given to aliens by 
legislative reciprocity,131 nor treatment conferred because of 
special economic and customs agreements between nations.132
Therefore, refugees can only enjoy those rights that are accorded 
to aliens in the absence of reciprocity requirements or special 
agreements.133 However, many commentators consider the right 
to acquire movable and immovable property as now recognized 
by customary international law, which would make refugees 
entitled to the right even if the country’s laws condition the right 
upon reciprocity.134
2. Rights to Work 
Secondly, refugees have the rights to work and to operate 
their own businesses. These rights are included in Articles 17, 18, 
19, and 24 of the Refugee Convention. 
Article 17 of the Refugee Convention covers wage-earning 
employment. It states in the first paragraph that “[t]he 
Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in 
their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances,135 as 
regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.”136
Commentators assert that “wage-earning employment” includes 
all kinds of employment that are not self-employment or a “liberal 
129 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 13. 
130 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951: Articles 2-11, 
13-37, art. 13 (Oct. 1997), www.unhcr.org/3d4ab5fb9.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7UW-9X7Y]. 
This article includes the right to receive compensation in the case of expropriation, which 
is now enshrined in customary international law as well. Id.
131 That is, rights conditioned on the alien’s home state conferring similar rights. Id. 
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 “In the same circumstances” is understood as including any requirements (such as 
to length and conditions of residence) that aliens would have to fulfill to enjoy the right in 
question, except for those requirements that a refugee is incapable of fulfilling by virtue of 
being a refugee. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 6. So, requirements such as 
education, examinations, membership in associations, length of residency, financial 
solvency, etc., that are generally imposed on aliens would need to be fulfilled by refugees 
as well. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 6, cmt. 3. However, for requirements the 
refugee is incapable of fulfilling, such as, potentially, the inability to produce a certificate 
of nationality or to produce a certificate of graduation from a university in the home state, 
the state must provide other means of satisfying the requirements. Id.
136 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17. 
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profession” (two categories treated in Articles 18 and 19, 
respectively), including work in factories, agriculture, offices, sales, 
domestic work, and virtually all other industrial or service sector 
occupations, including state employment.137
The standard of “most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of a foreign country” goes beyond the standard expressed 
for property rights (at least as favorable as treatment “accorded to 
aliens generally”).138 It requires states to give refugees the same 
rights regarding employment as are given to any other aliens, even 
if they are given in the context of a special relationship with 
another state or under international agreements.139 The purpose 
of this requirement, as expressed by the French delegate to the 
Convention, was to not deprive refugees of the support that could 
have only been obtained by the work of their home government, 
since refugees, by their very nature, are denied such support.140
On its face, this paragraph would appear to give refugees the 
same rights to receive work permits or visas as any other alien. 
Refugees would be subject to the most lenient requirements and 
standards for such permits or visas as are imposed on foreign 
nationals from other countries.141 This would include work visas 
that are otherwise only issued on the basis of reciprocity.142
Refugees would benefit regardless of whether their own 
government issues such visas or permits.143
The second paragraph of Article 17 goes further by requiring 
states to exempt refugees from “restrictive measures imposed on 
aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the 
national labour market” if they have completed three years’ 
residency in the country or if they have a spouse or children who 
are nationals of the country.144
This paragraph has its origin in earlier conventions 
pertaining to refugees in 1933 and 1938, in which similar 
paragraphs were drafted, despite the economic depression at the 
time—a period in which lawmakers became especially concerned 
with protecting nations’ jobs for their own nationals.145 It was felt 
that such restrictions should not apply to refugees who had a 
137 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 4.
138 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17. 
139 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 3. 
140 UN Economic & Social Council, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, First Session: Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting, REFWORLD (Feb. 6, 
1950), http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aa1cc34.html [http://perma.cc/4JNB-MXFK]. 
141 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17. 
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17. 
145 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmts. 1, 5.  
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special link to their country of refuge.146 Based on his reading of 
the history of this paragraph, commentator Grahl-Madsen 
asserts that the requirement of three years’ residency is to be 
interpreted as broadly as possible, even including individuals 
who have not had the status of refugees for the entire period of 
their residence, individuals whose presence has not been legal, 
and individuals who have spent short periods travelling or 
visiting other countries.147
The second paragraph only lifts restrictions that intend to 
prevent competition for domestic jobs.148 Measures that restrict 
employment of foreign nationals for other purposes, such as 
national security, are not affected by this paragraph.149
The third paragraph of Article 17 requires states to “give 
sympathetic consideration” to giving refugees the same right to 
wage-earning employment as nationals, especially refugees who 
came to the country as part of labor recruitment programs or 
immigration schemes.150 This provision obligates governments to 
undergo a good faith process in which they consider fully 
integrating refugees into the nation’s labor market.151 It does so 
with extra force if the country attracted the refugees under the 
promise of having the right to work.152
The effect of Article 17 is that states must place refugees on par 
with the most favorably treated foreign nationals when it comes to 
the right to employment—or better, if the refugees have lived in the 
country for three years or have a spouse or children who are 
nationals.153 In this latter case, the refugees are not held back by 
restrictions imposed on the employment of foreign nationals for the 
purpose of preserving jobs for the country’s own citizens.154 States 
must also favorably consider fully assimilating refugees into their 
labor market, giving them national treatment.155
Article 18 extends similar, but slightly different, rights to 
self-employed refugees. It requires states to: 
[A]ccord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable 
as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to 
146 League of Nations Doc. G.A. C.2/1933 (1933). 
147 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 7.  
148 Id. art. 17, cmt. 5. 
149 Id.
150 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17(3). 
151 JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
763 (2005). 
152 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 12. 
153 Id. art. 17. 
154 Id.
155 Id.
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aliens generally in the same circumstances,156 as regards the right to 
engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts, and 
commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.157
The range of activities covered under this provision is the 
broadest possible.158
The term “lawfully in their territory” does not include the 
“staying” component that is in other articles using this phrase, 
such as was seen in Article 17.159 This suggests that short-term 
visitors and persons merely travelling through the state are 
covered, provided they are refugees and their presence is legal.160
Additionally, the standard of treatment is potentially lower 
than the standard for wage-earning employment in Article 17. It 
is the same as was observed for the right to property: “[A]s 
favourable as possible . . . [but] not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”161
Therefore, if the country generally allows aliens to be self-employed 
in the absence of reciprocity or special arrangements with other 
states, the country must grant the same rights to refugees. 
Article 19 provides similar rights to refugees in “liberal 
professions.”162 States must “accord to refugees lawfully staying in 
their territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent 
authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practicing a 
liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any 
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in 
the same circumstances.”163
According to Grahl-Madsen, the term “diploma” is to be 
understood as “any degree, examination, admission, authorization, 
completion of course which is required for the exercise of a 
profession,” such as admission to the bar (for lawyers).164 The term 
“liberal profession” is intended to include persons who act on their 
own in an occupation that requires certain qualifications, such as 
an advanced degree or license.165 Lawyers, doctors, dentists, 
engineers, architects, and probably scientists would be included.166
156 For the meaning of “in the same circumstance,” see supra note 135. 
157 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 18. 
158 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 18, cmt. 4. 
159 Id. art. 18, cmt. 2. 
160 Id.
161 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 13(II). 
162 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 19(1). 
163 Id.
164 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 19, cmt. 3. 
165 Id. art. 19, cmt. 4. 
166 Id.
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Finally, Article 24 requires states to extend to refugees 
many of the same labor and social security protections as 
nationals. This includes covering them under any laws or 
regulations dealing with remuneration, work hours, overtime, 
holidays, child labor, apprenticeship and training, work-related 
injury, maternity, sickness, disability, and unemployment.167
3. Residency and Movement 
Third, refugees have rights pertaining to residency and 
movement within the territory. Article 26 requires each state 
party to “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to 
choose their place of residence and to move freely within its 
territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances.”168
The right to choose a residence and to move about freely is 
distinct from the right to employment in Articles 17–19. To the 
extent that the country limits rights to employment to certain 
areas, that would not technically affect the right of refugees to 
move throughout the country or settle outside those areas, even 
though it might do so in practice.169 Conversely, if the country 
requires aliens generally to only reside or travel in certain 
areas, this would also apply to refugees, even if they have the 
technical right to be employed anywhere in the country in 
accordance with Article 17.170
4. Administrative Facilities 
Fourth, states are required to provide administrative 
assistance to refugees. Article 25 obligates states to arrange for 
administrative assistance to be provided to refugees when they 
would normally only be able to obtain that assistance from a 
foreign country.171 This includes documents and certifications 
like birth, marriage, and death certificates, affidavits, and 
divorce judgements (or substitute instruments); it also includes 
broader forms of assistance, such as correspondence, 
investigations, and counselling.172
167 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 24. 
168 Id. art. 26. 
169 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 26, cmt. 5 (observing that “in so far as there are 
restrictions on the freedom to seek whatever employment one might desire, the right to 
choose one’s place of residence may be restricted in fact though not in law”). 
170 Id. art. 26, cmt. 6 (describing situations in which immigrants are only admitted on 
the condition that they remain in certain regions of the country and how such restrictions 
would apply to refugees as well). 
171 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 25. 
172 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 25, cmts. 1–2.  
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the principle of non-refoulement,184 non-penalization,185 and 
non-discrimination.186
Finally, the Refugee Convention contains a requirement for 
states to “accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to 
aliens generally,” unless other articles require more favorable 
treatment.187 This blanket requirement covers all those benefits 
that aliens generally might enjoy that are not mentioned in the 
Refugee Convention.188 The phrase “aliens generally” means that 
the requirement excludes benefits conferred under special 
arrangements with other countries or benefits granted on the 
basis of reciprocity.189 This would naturally include all those rights 
provided under customary international law, such as the right to 
leave the territory of the state, protection from confiscation of 
property without compensation, and the right to not be expelled 
without cause. 
Moreover, refugees enjoy any benefits to aliens that are 
conditioned on legislative reciprocity after three years’ 
residence.190 This means that benefits that are only conferred upon 
foreign nationals if those individuals’ home states confer similar 
benefits on nationals of the other state, are available to refugees, 
notwithstanding the refugee’s home state’s policies. 
B. Domestic Laws Pertaining to Refugees 
Domestic law is typically far more restrictive toward refugees 
than the Refugee Convention. Even though many of the countries 
hosting large numbers of the world’s refugees are parties to the 
convention, few fully apply key rights, especially work rights. 
Common concerns supporting these restrictions are the fear that 
refugees will decrease the supply of jobs available to citizens, 
strain and distort an already weak labor market, reduce wages 
and working conditions, encourage refugees to claim citizenship, 
and pose security risks.191
184 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 33. “Non-refoulement” is a 
prohibition on expelling or returning refugees against their will to any territories where 
they fear threats to life or freedom. UNHCR, supra note 183, at 3. 
185 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 31. 
186 Id. art. 3. 
187 Id. art. 7(1). 
188 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 7, cmt. 2. 
189 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Grahl-Madsen, however, notes that 
reciprocity requirements may not apply at all if the benefits are ones that a country is 
prepared to grant to any alien and any number of aliens (as opposed to ones conferred on 
the basis of a particularly close relationship), since these are effectively a form of retaliation 
against the refugee’s home state, but transmitted through the refugee, who has no power 
to affect his home state’s policies. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 7, cmt. 5. 
190 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 7(2). 
191 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at viii, xi.
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Turkey is one example. The vast majority of forcibly displaced 
people within it do not meet the technical definition of “refugee” 
and thus do not have access to the rights granted by the Refugee 
Convention. Nevertheless, Turkey has made progress since the 
beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis at modifying its legal 
framework to extend more rights to refugees.192 The refugee cities 
approach could help advance these efforts. 
1. Overview of Domestic Law 
The legal framework for refugees in many countries has 
weaknesses in terms of the ability to obtain formal status as 
refugees and, for those who do obtain refugee status, the 
protections conferred to them.193 Inability to obtain formal status 
and protection as refugees leaves these individuals, such as 
Eritrean refugees in Sudan and Colombian refugees in Venezuela, 
vulnerable to roundups, detention, and refoulment.194 Refugees 
who are not granted formal status as refugees are sometimes given 
other classifications, such as temporary protection.195
Only seventy-five of the 145 states that are party to the 
Refugee Convention formally grant refugees the right to work.196
Half of the states have declared full or partial reservations to the 
rights to work conferred in Articles 17–19, usually imposing 
similar restrictions as states not party to the Refugee 
Convention.197 Only a few countries have refugee and labor 
legislation that specifically refers to a refugee’s right to work.198
Others, such as Chad, Ecuador, and India, handle refugees under 
the same provisions applicable to foreigners generally.199
Many countries impose restrictions on the sectors refugees 
can work in. Prohibiting refugees from working in security and 
defense, as well as government employment generally, are fairly 
common.200 Many countries go further, such as requiring that no 
qualified nationals be available to work in the particular sector.201
Other legal limitations supplement restrictions on the right 
to work, such as restrictions on owning property, mobility, 
192 See id. at 15, 33. 
193 Id. at 11.
194 Id. Also noting that failure to make refugee status determinations skews official 
counts of refugees because people who would otherwise receive refugee status are often left 
undocumented and thus uncounted. Id. 
195 Id. at 12. 
196 Id. at 4–5.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 12 (noting the United States and Uganda as examples). 
199 Id.
200 Id. at 13.
201 Id.
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accessing credit, opening a business, opening a bank account, and 
entering into contracts.202 Many countries restrict refugees from 
employment-related rights and benefits, such as social security, 
unemployment and disability insurance, and general labor rights, 
as in the case of stateless Palestinians in Jordan.203
There are exceptions. Uganda’s 2006 Refugee Act provides a 
legal framework for refugees that is strongly oriented toward 
social and economic integration.204 The Act aligns with the 
Refugee Convention and provides freedoms to work, operate 
businesses, access courts, receive an education, move and reside 
freely throughout the country, and own property.205 The United 
States is similar.206
Beyond legal hurdles, countries’ policies and practices often 
impose major constraints on employment.207 There is significant 
confusion over where paperwork must be filed and whether 
obtaining refugee status is sufficient to work or whether an 
additional work permit is required.208
The processes for refugee status determinations, processing 
paperwork, and issuing permits and licenses are often slow, 
complex, costly, and burdensome.209 In many countries, refugees 
must first obtain a job offer from an employer before they can 
obtain a work permit, as in Lebanon and Zambia.210 Some 
countries are removing or simplifying these hurdles.211 In 2016, for 
instance, Jordan provided a three-month period in which it would 
waive fees for twelve-month work permits for Syrian refugees, and 
Turkey permitted Syrian refugees to apply for work permits if they 
202 Id. at 13, 16. For example, Pakistan requires refugees to have a Pakistani partner 
in order to own real estate or a business. Id. at 13. Ecuador and Turkey limit access to 
financial institutions. Id. Bangladesh prohibits refugees from accessing credit, engaging in 
trade, and owning property. Id. Refugees in India and Sudan are prohibited from 
purchasing land. Id. 
203 Id.
204 See UGANDA: THE REFUGEES ACT 2006 (May 24, 2006), http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/4b7baba52.html [http://perma.cc/56G6-UYDF]. 
205 Id. § 29; Refugee Law Project, Critique of the Refugees Act 3 (2006), 
https://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/legal_resources/RefugeesActRLPCritique.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LJ4M-KZXX]; see also WORLD BANK GROUP, AN ASSESSMENT OF UGANDA’S
PROGRESSIVE APPROACH TO REFUGEE MANAGEMENT (2016) (describing and assessing the 
impact of the law and policy affecting refugees in Uganda). 
206 See Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
207 See id. at 15. 
208 Id. at 12, 15 (observing that in the U.K. and U.S. a work permit is not necessary if 
a person has been determined to be a refugee, but noting how many countries are different). 
209 Id. at 15. 
210 Id.
211 Id.
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were in possession of temporary identity cards and resided in 
Turkey for six months.212
2. Turkey 
Turkey currently hosts the world’s largest refugee population 
at approximately 3.7 million as of 2017, and is a primary route for 
Syrians and Iraqis to reach Europe.213 The EU has been providing 
substantial assistance to Turkey to stop illegal or informal entry 
of these migrants into Europe.214
Turkey is a party to the Refugee Convention, yet 
counterintuitively, few, if any, of its refugees are actually 
protected by the Convention.215 This unusual situation arose from 
the fact that the primary impetus and focus of the Refugee 
Convention was the large number of displaced people in Europe 
after World War II.216 Therefore, when the Refugee Convention 
was adopted, its member states had the option of limiting its scope 
to only people displaced by events in Europe or extending coverage 
to refugees from anywhere in the world.217 Turkey was one of a few 
states that limited its scope to Europe, and expressly continued 
this limitation when it adopted the 1967 Protocol.218 As a result, 
the only people technically under the protection of the Refugee 
Convention in Turkey are those who have fled European nations.
219 Nearly all of Turkey’s refugee population is from non-European 
countries, especially Syria and Iraq.220
212 See id. at 15. But see Wendy Zeldin, Turkey, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 256, 273 (The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research 
Center, Mar. 2016) (noting that, in practice, less than three percent of Syrian refugees have 
been issued work permits under this policy because they have been deemed “unqualified”).
213 European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations: Turkey, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_syrian_ 
crisis_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/RPN7-TZWA] (last updated Jan. 10, 2018). 
214 Id.; see also, e.g., EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report (Feb. 10, 
2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european- 
agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_ 
join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/56MS-XJQ3]
(pledging €3 million in assistance for measures aimed at curbing irregular migration); 
Council of the EU Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016) (arranging 
that for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, one Syrian will be 
resettled from Turkey to the EU). 
215 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 256. 
216 UNHCR, supra note 183, at 2. 
217 See id. art. 1B(1) (providing states the option of interpreting the scope of Article 1 
as applying only to persons displaced by events in Europe or in any nation). 
218 See UNHCR, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS 
OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 5 (Apr. 2015) (observing that Turkey expressly 
maintained its declaration of geographic limitation). 
219 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261. 
220 Id.
2018] Special Economic Zones for Migrants 329 
Nevertheless, Turkey has substantially adjusted its domestic 
legislation to protect refugees in recent years and collaborates with 
UNHCR.221 The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
(“LFIP”)222 extended protections to categories of forcibly displaced 
people not meeting the strict Eurocentric definition of “refugee,” 
including “conditional refugees” and persons covered under 
“subsidiary protection” and “temporary protection.”223 UNHCR works 
with the Ministry of the Interior to conduct status determinations and 
attempts to resettle refugees into third countries.224 Generally 
speaking, the legal framework is geared to prevent integration of 
refugees and toward a temporary status, with eventual resettlement 
in a third country or repatriation as the goal.225
The LFIP created several classifications into which asylum 
seekers can fall. First it created the following classifications of 
persons entitled to “international protection status”: 
(1) Refugees, which are foreigners who, “as a result of events 
occurring in European countries,” cannot avail themselves of 
the protection of the country of their nationality or of former 
residence because of a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion.226
(2) Conditional Refugees, which are foreigners who, “as a 
result of events occurring outside European countries,”
cannot avail themselves the protection of the country of 
their nationality or of former residence because of a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion.227
(3) Beneficiaries of “subsidiary protection,” which are 
foreigners who cannot qualify as a refugee or conditional 
refugee, but if returned to their country of origin or former 
residence would face the death penalty, torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, or serious threat of indiscriminate 
violence from armed conflict.228
221 Id.
222 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Law No. 6458) (Apr. 4, 2013) 
(Republic of Turkey) (unofficial English translation), http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_ 
minikanun_5_son.pdf [http://perma.cc/KY8Y-H3RW] [hereinafter LFIP]. 
223 Id. art. 61–63.  
224 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261. 
225 As an example, refugees, conditional refugees, and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection are explicitly exempted from receiving long-term 
residence permits. LFIP, supra note 222, art. 42(2). 
226 Id. art. 61 (emphasis added). 
227 Id. art. 62 (emphasis added). 
228 Id. art. 63 (emphasis added). 
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Persons who apply for and receive international protection status 
must undergo lengthy procedures and are entitled to several rights 
specified in the LFIP.  
However, given the realities of mass migration, particularly of 
Syrians, and the attendant difficulties of satisfying the procedural 
requirements of international protection applications for each one, 
the LFIP added an additional category—Temporary Protection.229
Temporary protection status is more immediate than the 
categories of international protection and does not involve the 
same procedures and rights as the international protection 
categories.230 Beneficiaries of temporary protection are those 
“foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot 
return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or 
crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking 
immediate and temporary protection.”231
Syrians, who compose the vast majority of asylum seekers in 
Turkey, have been placed under temporary protection as a group, 
due to the large influx of them in recent years.232 Non-Syrian 
asylum seekers are generally processed under one of the 
international protection categories by the UNHCR.233
The Temporary Protection status is further defined in the 
Temporary Protection Regulation.234 Beneficiaries of temporary 
protection receive basic-needs assistance, including social 
services, translation services, IDs, travel documents, access to 
primary and secondary education, and the opportunity to receive 
work permits.235
People under temporary protection are typically required to 
live in designated reception and accommodation centers. These 
centers are managed by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency 
Management Authority and the Turkish Red Crescent, rather 
than by the UNHCR.236 Camps reportedly have markets, reliable 
heating, religious services, communications infrastructure, 
psychosocial support, banking, and other services.237 Residents are 
given three meals a day and electronic cards preloaded with funds 
for personal needs.238 Residents are also covered under the 
229 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261–63. 
230 Id.
231 LFIP, supra note 222, art. 91(1) (emphasis added). 
232 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261–63. 
233 Id.
234 Temporary Protection Regulation (Oct. 22, 2014) (unofficial English translation), 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/temptemp.pdf [http://perma.cc/9V29-HQZ5]. 
235 Id. art. 26–32. 
236 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 270. 
237 Id.
238 Id.
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country’s social security and medical insurance programs.239
Premium payments are at least partially covered by Turkey’s 
Directorate General of Migration Management, though recipients 
are expected to contribute in full or in part in proportion to their 
financial means.240
Asylum seekers have limited access to the labor market. 
Persons who apply for international protection, as well as persons 
given conditional refugee status, may apply for a work permit six 
months after their international protection application was 
filed.241 Persons who acquire refugee status or subsidiary 
protection status are automatically eligible to work, either in self-
employment or regular employment, with their identity document 
substituting for a work permit.242 However, such persons are 
subject to the general laws pertaining to foreign workers, which 
requires, among other things, for businesses to have at least five 
Turkish citizens as employees for every foreign worker.243
Additionally, the LFIP states that refugees’ and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries’ access to the labor market may be 
restricted concerning certain sectors, professions, lines of business 
or geographical areas for a period when necessary because of “the 
situation of the labor market,” “developments in the working life,” 
and employment-related “sectoral and economic conditions.”244
However, no such restrictions apply to refugees and subsidiary 
protection beneficiaries who have resided in Turkey for three years 
or have a spouse or children with Turkish citizenship.245
Persons under temporary protection may similarly apply for 
a work permit six months after being registered.246 In addition to 
the general requirements regarding the issuance of work 
permits, temporary protection workers cannot make up more 
than ten percent of the Turkish citizens employed at a business, 
unless the employer can prove there is no qualified Turkish 
citizen in the province who can perform the job.247 In practice, the 
government has deemed all but three percent of Syrian refugees 
as “unqualified” for work permits because they “do not have an 
identity card . . . [and their] professions are unknown.”248
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 LFIP, supra note 222, art. 89(4). 
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. This exemption from labor market restrictions is analogous to Article 17(2) of 
the Refugee Convention, which would apply anyway to refugees. The LFIP extends the 
exemption to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Id.
246 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 272.
247 Id. at 272–73. 
248 Id. at 273. 
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CONCLUSION
Refugee cities provide a pathway for refugee integration and 
alignment with international norms in the face of political resistance 
to countrywide integration. They apply the most important feature 
of SEZs—their ability to overcome roadblocks to beneficial policy 
reforms—to address one of the most pressing global concerns and 
help countries benefit from, rather than be burdened by, migrants. 
A refugee city would serve as a demonstration area where the 
benefits of extending international law pertaining to refugees 
would be tested. They would serve as a complementary pathway 
that helps achieve the UNHCR’s objective of integrating refugees 
into host economies—one of its “durable solutions”—in a 
designated geographic area. They would also help realize the 
policy benefits of integrating migrants into the formal economy.  
Within refugee cities, countries could extend rights to 
property that fulfill Article 13 of the Refugee Convention. 
Residents of a refugee city could have formal rights to land, such 
as a lease, and rights to movable property. At the same time, 
countries could address reluctance to make refugees permanent by 
setting time limits and expiration dates on leases, business 
licenses, or work permits. When the expiration date occurs, the 
country will have enabled refugees to return home on a much 
better footing then they would have been on otherwise. 
Countries could also extend rights to work and self-
employment that match Articles 17–19 of the Refugee Convention. 
This would mean refugees would have the most favourable 
treatment accorded to foreign nationals, with restrictions designed 
to protect the domestic labor market removed for those who have 
lived in the country for three years or have a spouse or children 
who are nationals. Alternatively, refugees could be placed on par 
with nationals, fulfilling the aspirations of Article 17, paragraph 3. 
Refugee cities could streamline regulatory functions through 
dedicated regulatory authorities and one-stop shops to enable a 
more efficient processing of residents’ status determinations and 
applications for work permits. These mechanisms would overcome 
the current backlog in countries like Turkey and others facing 
large refugee influxes. Refugee cities could also fulfill the blanket 
obligation to treat refugees with at least the same treatment as is 
accorded to aliens generally in Article 7 of the Refugee Convention. 
For the developing countries currently hosting the 
overwhelming share of migrants, refugee cities would transcend 
the traditional refugee camp model. They would be spaces in which 
international legal norms align with both political realities and 
good policy and drive economic and social progress. 
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Emergence of a New Hanseatic League: How 
Special Economic Zones Will Reshape 
Global Governance 
By Mark Frazier* 
ABSTRACT
As trust dwindles in public institutions, special economic 
zones and free cities will have an opportunity to introduce billions of 
people to new systems of transparent and accountable governance. 
Thousands of actual experiments in “extrastatecraft”—areas 
benefiting from concentrated reform—are under way, creating 
alternatives to the surrounding rent-seeking practices of politicians, 
bureaucracies, and crony capitalists. Successful areas including 
Singapore, Dubai, and Chinese Special Economic Zones are being 
invited to partner in the development of new free zones in poor 
regions. Virtual realms also now enable such areas to massively 
expand access to new legal systems and asset-awakening 
partnerships. As mobile networks grow, zones of extrastatecraft and 
aligned online guilds of volunteers will be in a position to offer 
Blockchain-based land registries, smart contracts, eGovernance 
toolkits, and arbitration solutions to localities that have suffered 
from misrule and that have sites to commit for future free zone 
development. In parallel, leading city states and free zones can 
create virtual resources to help fill gaps for billions who have been 
shortchanged by public education and dysfunctional job markets. 
Free and open courseware, online work-study projects, and small 
human capital investments can help spread understanding of the 
culture and workings of free economies, and prepare millions of 
job-seekers for successful entry to rapidly growing global free 
 * Mark Frazier is president of Openworld, a U.S.-based research and volunteer group 
specializing in free economic zones and innovative applications of information and 
communications technologies for development. He is founding chairman of the Startup 
Societies Foundation (www.startupsocieties.org), a nonprofit organization formed to 
assist contractually-created communities. 
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markets for telework. Such initiatives can resolve one of the great 
challenges to international and national legal systems: providing 
a solution for the more than sixty million economic migrants, 
refugees, and stateless persons fleeing from breakdowns of their 
nation states. A new generation of World Cities—immigration-
friendly areas of economic reform comparable in size to Hong Kong 
and Singapore—can be privately developed as havens for those 
who demonstrate skills and build reputations in online free 
markets. This article maps opportunities for a New Hanseatic 
League of free zones and free cities to fill voids left by dysfunctions 
in present systems of local, regional, and national governance. 
Such a network may be in a prime position to provide a legal 
framework for opening humanity’s next great frontiers—including 
seasteading on the oceans and entrepreneurial communities in 
space—in ways compatible with current international treaties. It 
can introduce “nondominium” structures (aligned with Elinor 
Ostrom’s contractual system for management of common pool 
resources) for humanity’s common heritage frontiers, and sponsor 
“tokenized” commercial ventures that contractually vest all on the 
planet as beneficiaries of cryptocurrencies issued by entrepreneurial 
seasteading and spacefaring ventures. 
INTRODUCTION
Today’s systems of government are failing. Remote power 
centers and growing politicization of life in large nations have 
sparked growing movements for decentralization, autonomy, and/or 
independence. These movements seek to disperse concentrated 
political power, curb its capture by rent-seeking special interests, 
and reverse the plunge into untenable debt. 
Opportunities are at hand for Special Economic Zones (“SEZs”) 
and startup societies to lead in spreading transparency and 
voluntary governance. As zones of “extrastatecraft,” they have 
become the world’s most dynamic and open economies.1 They have 
evolved as proving grounds for accountable, market-oriented 
alternatives in policies and institutional practice.  
Yet such zones of innovation to date have fallen short in a key 
respect—they have done little to bring hope to billions caught in 
failing states or to deliver a systemic alternative to the sense of 
1 Keller Easterling, Zone: The Spatial Softwares of Extrastatecraft, PLACES J. 
(June 2012), https://placesjournal.org/article/zone-the-spatial-softwares-of-extrastatecraft/ 
[http://perma.cc/26NT-K8FT].  
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decline that pervades many national and multilateral institutions. 
A growing need exists for entrepreneurial areas of policy reform 
and technological innovation to link up and lay the groundwork to 
bring transparent rule of law and new kinds of economic 
opportunity within reach of all on the planet.  
To explore how this scenario can practically unfold, it is useful 
to go back eight centuries to the early days of the Hanseatic 
League, a self-organizing network of free zones and free cities that 
endured for centuries and enabled much of Northern Europe to 
flourish. An updated version of the Hanseatic League open to 
participants across the globe can advance systemic changes in 
governance at all levels. In coming years, it could prepare tools for 
self-governance in voluntary communities and lay groundwork for 
new transcultural, immigration-friendly World Cities to cope with 
rising flows of migrants and refugees. And as entrepreneurs bring 
breakthrough technologies to market, a New Hanseatic League 
could offer a transnational framework for creating startup 
societies on the oceans and in space. 
I. THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE
A. Origins and Growth of the Hanseatic League 
Threats abounded in the Baltic and the North Sea during the 
twelfth century. Merchants attempting to travel on sea or land 
regularly came under threat from robbers, pirates, feudal lords, 
and tribal monarchs. Local rulers across Northern Europe often 
were bent on confiscating goods or exacting tributes. Merchants 
who tried to travel alone were fair game.2
In response, they began to organize convoys or troops—“Hanse” 
in Middle Low German—on trade routes across the region.3 As 
losses to robbers and pirates fell, merchants grew more 
prosperous. Negotiated agreements with local rulers also 
conferred a measure of security for storage and movements of 
goods. One local lord in Northern Germany, Henry the Lion, 
exempted the merchants in Lübeck—a recently-established town 
with excellent access to the Baltic—from paying taxes throughout 
2 I have relied on several works on the formation of the Hanseatic League for the 
background of this Part. See generally J.D. COLVIN, THE GERMANS IN ENGLAND: 1066-1598
(1971); PHILIPPE DOLLINGER, THE GERMAN HANSA (1970); GEOFFREY PARKER, SOVEREIGN 
CITY (2004); T.H. LLOYD, ENGLAND AND THE GERMAN HANSE (1991); and HELEN ZIMMERN,
THE HANSA TOWNS (2016). 
3 “Hansa” is the modern German term. 
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his realm.4 Another boost came in 1181, when the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Barbarossa, designated the new town as a free and 
Imperial City.5 This interim legal standing was reaffirmed by 
Emperor Frederick II in 1226, giving Lübeck an enduring shield 
to ward off the attentions of revenue-seeking nobles, and to 
effectively become a self-governing community.6 Merchants of 
Lübeck used the municipality’s status as a free city to negotiate 
trade agreements with the autonomous counterpart cities of 
Hamburg and Bremen, whose policies were also largely shaped by 
merchant guilds.7 Their agreements to remove barriers to trade 
and to standardize weights and measures, including precious 
metal content in coinage, gave a boost to profits and helped spread 
Hanseatic trade across the Baltic and beyond. 
In the largely Slavic-populated regions to the East, merchants 
from Hanseatic cities established new trade centers open to all 
guild members in good standing from their respective 
communities. These commercial outposts were often set up in the 
wake of conquests by Teutonic Knights determined to extend 
Christianity at swords’ point. Yet for the larger areas surrounding 
the Baltic, as well as for those with ports on the North Sea, 
Hanseatic merchants spread a network of low-tax or tax-free trade 
zones through negotiated agreements with local authorities, 
rather than through military means. The appeal of trade 
relationships, and the negotiating skills and gifts of Hanseatic 
merchants, convinced many local rulers to designate areas for 
Hanseatic guild members to do business without imposing onerous 
taxes or arbitrary regulations. From the thirteenth to fifteenth 
centuries, the network of Hanseatic trade outposts grew to as 
many as 170 communities, ranging from Novgorod in Russia, to 
London in England, and Bruges in Belgium.  
These zones enabled Hanseatic merchants to readily import 
grains, wax, fish, metal ores, and other raw materials from areas 
around the Baltic, and exchange them for textiles, apparel, and 
manufactured items produced in the Western European cities 
affiliated with the League.8 Their success in long distance trade 
prompted new communities to join. It also inspired youths to enter 
into years of challenging apprenticeships to absorb Hanseatic 
skills and culture and earn their way into full-fledged membership 
4 See ZIMMERN, supra note 2, at 318–19. 
5 See id. at 73. 
6 See id. at 73–74. 
7 See id. at 182. 
8 THE HANSE IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE 6 (Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz 
& Stuart Jenks eds., 2013). 
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in the guilds of their respective cities. Once accepted, they were 
free to independently do business with other members and become 
co-owners of cargos and vessels.  
Town-based merchant guilds were at the center of Hanseatic 
economic and social activity. Historian Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz 
has summarized them as “non-hierarchical, bottom-up organizations 
of traders . . . [where] membership was voluntary, based on 
equality among all members and sealed by an oath.”9 The basic 
rule for guild members was to “help each other in plight.”10
Members strove to stay in good standing with their peers by 
exchanging useful information, keeping promises and fostering 
relationships based on honest trade, and using informal systems 
to resolve internal tensions and conflicts. 
Hanseatic scholar Margrit Schulte Beerbühl has described the 
Hanseatic League as a: 
[L]ate-medieval network of economically largely independent long-
distance trade merchants which was based on trust, reputation and 
reciprocal relations. The informal cooperation among its members kept 
transactional, informational and organizational costs low, allowing the 
Hanse merchants to make good profits from the long-distance trade 
between the Baltic and the North Seas.11
Another German economic historian, Alexander Fink, has argued 
that the Hanse, overall, can be understood as a confluence of 
functionally overlapping and competing jurisdictions, whose 
fluidity enabled members to interact and adapt to circumstances 
faster than hierarchical political structures.12
Legal advances contributed to the growth of Hanseatic 
commerce. The town of Lübeck, whose governing council remained 
dominated by merchants, set new standards for procedural laws 
regarding trade, contracts, and dispute resolution. “Lübeck Law” 
grew to be widely admired and was adopted in whole or in part by 
other Hanseatic communities.13 Over time, merchant customs as 
practiced in Lübeck and other Hanseatic cities came to be codified 
as elements within the branch of private international law known 
9 Id. at 8.
10 Id. at 9. 
11 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, Networks of the Hanseatic League, EUROPEAN
HIST. ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schultebeerbuehlm-2011-en 
[http://perma.cc/6UFH-AF66].
12 See generally Alexander Fink, The Hanseatic League and the Concept of Functional 
Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions, 65 KYKLOS 194 (2012). 
13 See ZIMMERN, supra note 2, at 151. 
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as Lex Mercatoria, or merchant law.14 The impartiality of Lübeck’s 
arbitration services also contributed to the city’s enduring place as 
the de facto leader of the Hanseatic League. 
To expand their markets, the Hanseatic League cities honed 
diplomatic skills over four centuries. Their tactics included 
making gifts and strategically timed loans to rulers in return for 
tax-free trading privileges.15 Loans from Hanseatic merchants 
were vital to the success of various English monarchs. In 1317, 
King Edward II reaffirmed that Hanseatic merchants would be 
free of taxes, trade regulations, and travel restrictions applied to 
other foreign traders.16 As historian T.H. Lloyd noted, “[n]ot only 
did Edward II confirm the grants of his predecessors and his own 
award of immunity from arrest but, for the first time, he conceded 
that neither he nor his heirs would place new impositions on the 
Hanse without its consent.”17 (English merchants, by contrast, had 
to pay certain taxes from which their Hanseatic competitors were 
exempt.) Trade monopolies negotiated by the League with many 
rulers in Scandinavia went even further by securing agreements 
that denied or severely limited their competitors’ access to key 
markets. In Norway, Sweden, and other areas, local rulers acceded 
to the League’s demand to ban or restrict other foreign merchants 
from doing business in highly profitable commodities.18
Boycotts were the League’s means of choice for punishing 
countries and cities that moved to break agreements with 
Hanseatic merchants. When negotiated trade concessions came 
under threat or merchant cargos were confiscated without 
cause, the League called meetings of member cities to vote on 
imposing trade sanctions upon the offenders.19 Throughout 
much of the League’s history, such measures proved highly 
effective in reaffirming the trade privileges and securing 
restitution for damages. 
Participation in boycotts was voluntary on the part of 
Hanseatic communities. No political authority existed in the 
League to force member cities to abide by the majority decision. 
14 Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria and the TransLex-Principles, TRANS-LEX,
https://www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria-and-the-translex-principles_ID8 
[http://perma.cc/QC2T-V767].
15 See T.H. LLOYD, ENGLAND AND THE GERMAN HANSE, 1157–1611: A STUDY OF THEIR 
TRADE AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 319 (1991). 
16 Id. at 27–28. 
17 Id. at 27. 
18 See id. at 54. 
19 See id. at 40. 
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However, the majority could and often did punish communities 
that took action contrary to the League’s decisions, through 
expulsion (or “unhansing”).20 In this case, merchants of the 
ostracized community lost access to the favorable commercial 
agreements and trade outposts negotiated by the League, to the 
benefit of the League’s protective services, and to any right to do 
business with Hanseatic merchants in good standing. In cases 
where individual members of Hanseatic guilds abrogated an 
agreement, hearings would be held by guild appointed arbitrators, 
or by local courts in the Hanseatic cities. Any members who were 
found in breach of the local guild’s code were expelled from the 
guild—and similarly unhansed across the League.21
These measures were sustained despite the exceptionally 
ambiguous legal and political character of the Hanseatic League. 
England’s King Edward IV, under pressure from English 
merchants who chafed at the concessions given by his predecessors 
to the Hanseatic traders, imprisoned Hanseatic merchants and 
expropriated their goods in retaliation for the League’s suspected 
collusion with Danish privateers to stop English attempts to trade 
in the Baltic.22 As summarized by Professor Rainer Postel of 
Bundeswehr University, King Edward IV justified his action on 
the ground that the League was “a society, cooperative or 
corporation, originating from a joint agreement and alliance of 
several towns and villages, being able to form contracts and being 
liable as joint debtors for the offences of single members.”23 Lübeck 
sharply disagreed. In Postel’s account, Lübeck maintained that 
the Hansa was neither a society nor a corporation on the grounds 
that it: 
[O]wned no joint property, no joint till, no executive officials of their 
own; it was a tight alliance of many towns and communities to pursue 
their respective own trading interests securely and profitably. The 
Hansa was not ruled by merchants, every town having its own ruler. It 
also had no seal of its own, as sealing was done by the respective issuing 
town. The Hansa had no common council, but discussions were held by 
representatives of each town. There even was no obligation to take part 
in the Hansa meetings and there were no means of coercion to carry 
through their decisions. So, according to the Lübeck syndic [advocate], 
the Hansa could not be defined by Roman law and was not liable as a 
20 ZIMMERN, supra note 2, at 29. 
21 See id. at 206.  
22 See Rainer Postel, Professor, Bundeswehr Universität, Address at Central Connecticut 
State University: The Hanseatic League and its Decline (Nov. 20, 1996). 
23 Id.
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body. This was in fact correct and deliberately ambiguous; the Hansa 
was frequently urged to give a self-definition as well as the exact 
number of its members and deliberately left all this unclear.24
When Edward IV refused to free the Hanseatic merchants he 
had imprisoned and declined to restore their property, the League 
launched a boycott and assembled a powerful naval force in the 
Anglo-Hanseatic War.25 The war ended in 1474 with a decisive 
victory by the League, which had crippled English commercial 
shipping. The Treaty of Utrecht confirmed restoration of the 
London Steelyard as a tax-free base for Hanseatic merchant 
guilds and brought about a virtual halt to English trade in the 
Baltic region.26
B. Reasons for the League’s Demise 
Although the Hanseatic League had done much to create 
policies for its member merchants to prosper, challenges worsened 
as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries unfolded. Some of 
these were self-inflicted. Agreements among members of 
Hanseatic guilds—originally focused on setting standards for 
weights and measures, on the precious metal content of coinage, 
and on the quality of traded goods—mutated into complex 
requirements to restrict entry into the guilds, to fix prices, and 
limit supply of monopolized goods to drive up prices.27 While such 
moves benefited incumbent merchants in the short term, they also 
discouraged, over time, the entry of new members into Hanseatic 
merchant guilds. 
A larger reason for the erosion of the League was a rising 
resentment of one-sided tax and trade concessions. Hanseatic 
guilds were unwilling to open their membership to foreign 
merchants, or to allow open trade by foreign merchants with the 
League’s member cities.28 With the exception of Dinant, a small 
town with strong economic ties to Cologne, the League excluded 
all non-German speaking guilds from joining. Hanseatic insistence 
on exclusionary entry policies blocked merchants of non-German 
origins from access to a network of highly profitable tax-free trade 
concessions. The discrimination was also often backed by 
municipal ordinances in towns where Hanseatic merchants 
24 Id.
25 See M.M. POSTAN, MEDIEVAL TRADE AND FINANCE 101 (1978). 
26 See id.
27 See Erik Lindberg, Club Goods and Inefficient Institutions: Why Danzig and Lübeck 
Failed in the Early Modern Period, 62 ECON. HIST. REV. 604, 612–13 (2009). 
28 See id.
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dominated town councils.29 As economic historian Erik Lindberg 
has written of two leading Hanseatic communities (Lübeck 
and Danzig): 
The infamous ‘guest-rights’ legislation in the Hansa towns prohibited 
trade between non-Hanseatic merchants in the Hansa towns. 
Restrictions on the periods when foreigners were allowed to stay in the 
towns represented another cornerstone in the prohibitive legislation 
that characterized Hansa mercantile practices . . . . The long-term 
results for the two cities under scrutiny were stagnation and an 
increasingly marginal position in the European urban network.30
Foreign rivals in response stepped up their forays into the 
North Sea and the Baltic. Merchants from Holland and England, 
who long had been shut out of trading opportunities with cities in 
the Hanseatic trade network, grew especially bold as the Treaty of 
Utrecht fell into disregard. They did so by forging commercial links 
to communities that had left the League or were tenuously 
associated with it, by encouraging privateering and piracy against 
Hanseatic ships, and by deepening relationships with increasingly 
powerful monarchs across the region who had grown weary of 
Hanseatic trade monopolies.31
Holland dealt a further blow to the privileges of Hanseatic 
merchants. Instead of negotiating trade agreements that favored 
one foreign partner over another, Dutch cities began to experiment 
with introducing more open systems. Rulers of these cities, as 
described by Cambridge historian Sheilagh Ogilvie, discovered 
that wealth grew far faster by establishing generally welcoming 
environments for businesses, rather than setting rules that 
favored particular blocs of foreign merchants.32 The rising Dutch 
cities of Amsterdam and Antwerp, in particular, became known for 
their embrace of open trade and immigration policies, as well as 
religious pluralism.33 Their openness to free trade drew an influx 
of entrepreneurial talent, investors, and traders that eclipsed 
those of the leading Hanseatic cities, including Lübeck, Hamburg, 
and Bremen.34
29 See id. at 626. 
30 Id.
31 OSCAR GELDERBLOM, CITIES OF COMMERCE: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE LOW COUNTRIES, 1250–1650, at 179 (2013); see also generally
A COMPANION TO THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE (Donald J. Harreld ed., 2015). 
32 See SHEILAGH OGILVIE, INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN TRADE: MERCHANT GUILDS 
1000–1800, at 32, 211 (2011). 
33 See id. at 211, 399. 
34 See id. at 183, 211, 399. 
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As Dutch cities were confirming the value of open trade 
policies, English rulers again moved to overturn long-standing 
agreements that privileged merchants of the Hanseatic League. 
Queen Elizabeth of England, in 1598, ended all Hanseatic trade 
preferences and closed the Steelyard in London, where German 
merchants had owned and operated a tax-free zone for centuries.35
Although the Steelyard site was returned several years later to 
Hanseatic guilds, merchants operating there henceforth no longer 
enjoyed special freedoms from taxation.36 A further setback 
followed a few decades later with the signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648.37 The Treaty brought to an end the religious 
wars that had consumed much of Europe, affirmed the boundaries 
of newly powerful nation states, and enshrined their respective 
rights to control communities and economic activity within 
their borders. 
The commercial ascendency of free and highly autonomous 
Hanseatic cities was coming to a close. By the mid 1600s, only a 
small number of Hanseatic cities actively identified as members of 
the League. They held their last general meeting in 1687. Over the 
course of the following centuries, although they continued to 
identify as Hanseatic cities, the League’s flagship communities of 
Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg were politically absorbed as states 
of Bismarck’s Germany.38
Europe’s newly sovereign nation states, meanwhile, were 
growing eager for overseas territorial and commercial gains. 
Merchant guilds of England—beginning with the Merchants 
Adventurers, which had originally been formed to counter 
Hanseatic League successes, and its successors, including the East 
India Company—established foreign trade outposts and 
consolidated colonies overseas.39 Applying the free trade concepts 
advanced by Adam Smith, British trading companies and colonial 
administrators planted seeds in the 1800s for prosperous new 
freeports and tax-free trade zones in Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Aden in the Middle East. These, like the Dutch open cities before 
them, became flourishing havens for commerce. 
35 ZIMMERN, supra note 2, at 350–51. 
36 Id. at 353. 
37 Id. at 364. 
38 See id. at 375. 
39 Id. at 30. 
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II. THE RESURGENCE OF CITY STATES AND STARTUP COMMUNITIES
Let us return to the present. Once-confident nation states are 
ailing. In many cases their bureaucracies have grown increasingly 
detached from their people even as programmatic aims and 
budgets have expanded. Corruption and brazen favor-giving have 
intensified distrust of politicians, national governments, and 
state-funded international organizations. Torrential innovation is 
leaving slow-moving organizations far behind in realizing 
potentials of new technologies. Overseas, exhausting assertions of 
force and aid by superpowers have failed to establish durable 
regimes in areas with failed and failing states. As people around 
the world gain wider access to information, they have been 
reaching their own conclusions regarding the efficacy of global, 
national, and local institutions.  
Against this backdrop, cities are re-emerging as drivers of 
opportunities and hope. The late Benjamin Barber, author of If
Mayors Ruled the World, has noted: “More than 50 % [sic] of the 
world’s population lives in cities. Cities produce more than 80 % 
[sic] of GDP. It is therefore inconceivable that national and 
international bodies discuss and decide on policy actions without 
cities and their mayors present at the table.”40
Parag Khanna, a senior research fellow at the National 
University of Singapore, has gone farther. In Connectography,
Khanna writes:  
In a world that increasingly appears ungovernable, cities—not states—are 
the islands of governance on which the future world order will be built. 
Cities are humanity’s real building blocks because of their economic size, 
population density, political dominance, and innovative edge. They are 
real “facts on the ground,” almost immeasurably more meaningful to 
most people in the world than often invisible national borders. In this 
century, it will be the city—not the state—that becomes the nexus of 
economic and political power.41
Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution concurs: 
We’re entering a period where cities have new kinds of power. They 
have enormous chances to leverage their economic and financial 
advantages to augment their position and effect change . . . . Cities are 
not subordinate to nation-states, they are powerful networks of 
40 Mission Statement: Global Parliament of Mayors, GLOBAL PARLIAMENT OF MAYORS
(2017), https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/mission-statement/ [http://perma.cc/67ME-CP22].
41 Parag Khanna, When cities rule the world, MCKINSEY & CO. (Feb. 2011), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/urbanization/when-cities-rule-the-world 
[http://perma.cc/X9C5-2HUD].
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institutions and actors that co-produce the economy. Power in the 21st 
[sic] century belongs to the problem-solvers. National governments 
debate and mostly dither. Cities act, cities do.42
Katz concludes that “[p]ower increasingly comes from the cities up, 
not handed down from the nation-state.”43
A. SEZs and Autonomous Cities 
As today’s nation states falter, autonomous city states and 
SEZs are moving to the forefront as proving grounds for policy 
innovation and institutional reform. As noted by Yale professor 
Keller Easterling, areas offering highly liberalized environments 
have soared in number in the postwar era from 600 in 1976 by the 
count of Walter Diamond,44 to at least 3500.45 Today, zones that 
offer concentrated relief from tax, regulatory, and trade barriers 
account for tens of millions of jobs and the majority of the export 
earnings in a number of developing countries. In spatial 
configuration, zones range from footprints as small as several 
floors of a single office building, to campus-style industrial and 
office parks of hundreds of acres, and up to free economic zones 
with cities or “regiopolis” areas that span from hundreds to 
thousands of square kilometers. 
The dynamism of Hong Kong and Singapore, which occupy 
over 1100 square kilometers and 718 square kilometers 
respectively,46 has inspired developers to zones of extrastatecraft 
in many settings. By establishing what are widely deemed to be 
among the world’s most transparent and free market economies, 
Asia’s most prominent freeports have moved from low-wage 
manufacturing to become among the most advanced, diversified, 
and prosperous cities in the world.47 While their annual per capita 
income levels in 1965 were less than $700 in terms of today’s 
dollars, they now stand at more than $56,000 in Singapore and 
42 Jamie Bartlett, Return of the city-state, AEON (Sept. 5, 2017), https://aeon.co/ 
essays/the-end-of-a-world-of-nation-states-may-be-upon-us [http://perma.cc/7WSZ-EPWJ]
(quoting Bruce Katz, Centennial Scholar at the Brookings Institution). 
43 Id.
44 WALTER DIAMOND, TAX-FREE TRADE ZONES OF THE WORLD (Matthew Bender ed., 
1976). 
45 Easterling, supra note 1. 
46 See The World Factbook: Hong Kong, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hk.html (last updated Mar. 5, 2018); see also The 
World Factbook: Singapore, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sn.html (last updated Feb. 22, 2018). 
47 Chuang Peck Ming, Singapore Ranks 2nd in Ease of Doing Business, BUS. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2016, 5:50 AM), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore- 
ranks-2nd-in-ease-of-doing-business [http://perma.cc/7268-YUZ6].
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over $40,000 in Hong Kong.48 Both freeports have substantially 
overtaken per capita incomes of their former colonial ruler, the 
United Kingdom.49
Singapore’s economic success also has opened the door for it 
to embark on overseas joint ventures in free economic zone 
development. In the 1990s, Singapore prime minister Lee Kuan 
Yew announced a vision of creating up to a dozen “little 
Singapores” around the world, through real estate partnerships, 
to replicate the Singapore model.50 Its subsequent joint ventures 
in China have included the development of a sixty-eight square 
kilometer Singapore-Suzhou Industrial Park and a similar joint 
venture for Guangzhou Knowledge City.51 Singaporean private 
investors are also funding the development of a Health City in 
Gaobeidian, China, at a location which has just been designated 
as a SEZ.52 Designation of Health City as a SEZ tripled property 
values overnight in the adjacent residential areas.53 Singapore 
also has reached agreement with Jamaica to establish its first SEZ 
venture in the Caribbean.54
Hong Kong has had an even greater impact in spreading 
SEZs. Its economic progress in postwar decades stood in stark 
contrast to that of Mao’s China. In the late 1970s, Deng Xioping, 
Mao’s successor, moved to replicate Hong Kong’s success by 
instituting business friendly reforms (including a business tax 
48 Gary Cheung, Frenemy Cities, S. CHINA MORNING POST, http://www.scmp.com/ 
news/hong-kong/economy/article/1847695/hong-kong-and-singapores-transformations-story- 
both-rivalry [http://perma.cc/7KK4-5N3T] (last updated July 6, 2017, 11:13 PM).  
49 Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s lead over Britain holds both by measures of nominal 
GDP per capita and by measures of purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita. 
Projected GDP Ranking (2016-2020), STATISTICS TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), http://statistics 
times.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php [http://perma.cc/NZ9Q-Z2JV].
50 See Mark Frazier, What’s next for the special economic zones, CAYMAN FIN. REV.
(July 12, 2013), http://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2013/07/12/whats-next-for-the-
special-economic-zones/ [http://perma.cc/GKD6-WDT7]; see also Narendra Aggarwal, 
S’pore-China ties reach new heights, BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015, 5:50 AM), 
http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/hub/business-china-special/spore-china-ties-reach-new-
heights [http://perma.cc/VCB4-L3L8].
51 See id.
52 P.C. Lee, JV Partners Say China’s Latest SEZ Likely to Have ‘Positive Impact’ on 
Gaobeidian Project, EDGE (Apr. 4, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.theedgesingapore.com/ 
article/jv-partners-say-china%E2%80%99s-latest-sez-likely-have-%E2%80%98positive-
impact%E2%80%99-gaobeidian-project [http://perma.cc/72XC-8FUX].
53 Goola Warden, How KSH Hit the Jackpot with China’s Newest SEZ, EDGE (Apr. 13 
2017, 11:58 AM), https://www.theedgesingapore.com/article/how-ksh-hit-jackpot-china% 
E2%80%99s-newest-sez [http://perma.cc/VS3R-H42J].
54 Office of the Prime Minister, GOJ Partners with Singapore to Develop Special 
Economic Zone, JAM. INFO. SERV. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://jis.gov.jm/goj-partners-singapore-
develop-special-economic-zone/ [http://perma.cc/RN57-94BK].
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rate of fifteen percent, about ten percent lower than that of Hong 
Kong) in four initial SEZ areas. The first of these was launched in 
1979 in an area of 327 square kilometers along the Pearl River 
near Hong Kong.55 Shenzhen, originally a fishing village with a 
population numbering less than 10,000, became the epicenter of a 
profound success. Today, this SEZ has a population of more than 
eleven million and has expanded in size to almost 2000 square 
kilometers.56 Shenzhen’s favorable policy conditions, location, and 
labor productivity have transformed it into the world’s leading 
location for electronics manufacturing—the “Silicon Valley of 
hardware.”57 As World Bank Chief Economist Paul Romer has 
noted, Hong Kong played a pivotal role in inspiring Beijing to 
designate scores of SEZs, free trade zones, and open cities—and 
from there to liberalize the Chinese economy as a whole.58
Having transformed China’s own economy, SEZs also are now 
a strategic element in China’s moves to make infrastructure 
investments on a global scale. The “Belt and Road Initiative” 
launched by China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping in 2013,59
including a projected $4 to $8 trillion in loans and direct 
investment from China, aims to fund construction of a world-class 
network of road and rail links throughout Asia and into Europe 
and the Middle East.60 The plan also calls for a “maritime Silk 
Road” connecting with ports in Oceana, Africa and beyond.  
As many as 100 new Chinese-backed SEZs are expected to 
stimulate commerce along these new corridors. In recent years, 
China has become a major investment partner in two Vietnamese 
SEZs, and a Chinese-funded SEZ employing 16,000 employees is 
also operating in Cambodia, on a trajectory to grow to 100,000 
55 Ann Fenwick, Evaluating China’s Special Economic Zones, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. L.
376, 376 (1984). 
56 See Ben Bland, Shenzhen, China, a Silicon Valley of Hardware, FIN. TIMES (May 6, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/2c38ccb8-0ad8-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3. 
57 Comparative study on Special Economic Zones in Africa and China 49 (United 
Nations Development Programme, Working Paper No. 06.2015, 2015), https://issuu.com/undp-
china/docs/undp-ch-comparative_study_on_sezs_i [http://perma.cc/5U47-644S]; see also 
Bland, supra note 56. 
58 Paul Romer, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, 
TEDGlobal Talk: Why the World Needs Charter Cities (July 2009). 
59 Jason Lee, Belt and Road promotes growth of Cambodia’s special economic zone,
BELT & ROAD PORTAL (Apr. 28, 2017), https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/rdxw/12004.htm 
[http://perma.cc/9R7K-L4GX].
60 David Ho, Cost of funding ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ is daunting task,
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 27, 2017, 4:45 PM), http://www.scmp.com/special-
reports/business/topics/special-report-belt-and-road/article/2112978/cost-funding-belt-and 
[http://perma.cc/WA4L-LHE4].
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employees.61 China is now negotiating to partner in similar SEZ 
projects to be launched in Myanmar62 and Bangladesh, with the 
latter venture linked to construction of a $700 million tunnel.63 In 
Pakistan alone, China is planning partnerships to establish up to 
forty-six new SEZs.64 A China-backed $10 billion SEZ project 
oriented towards transshipment has been launched in Oman in 
the Middle East.65 In Africa, Djibouti has opted to ally with China 
for development of ports and free zones.66 China also has entered 
into SEZ development projects in six other African countries, most 
notably in Nigeria, Zambia, and Ethiopia 67
Private sector Chinese land developers have also been seeking 
out opportunities in overseas SEZs. At the doorstep of Singapore, 
Malaysia’s Iskandar SEZ hosts a new private community called 
Forest City.68 China-based Country Garden Holdings has reached 
into an agreement with influential Malaysian counterparts to 
develop a $100 billion startup community on four reclaimed islands 
totaling over thirteen square kilometers in Malaysia’s Johor State.69
To date, about 16,000 properties have been sold, primarily to 
Chinese citizens seeking to purchase overseas condominiums, 
single family homes in covenant-backed homeowners associations, 
and/or freehold land.70 The ultimate aim is a private community 
61 Lee, supra note 59. 
62 CITIC-led consortium wins bid for implementing SEZ in Myanmar, CHINA DAILY
(Dec. 31, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/31/content_ 
22882073.htm [http://perma.cc/GG7W-JYX3].  
63 Humayan Kabir, Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for Chinese industries, BUS.
INTELLIGENCE BANGL., http://bibd.info/special-economic-zone-sez-for-chinese-industries/ 
[http://perma.cc/2ARY-ATWS].
64 Fawad Maqsood, Government planning to establish 46 SEZs along CPEC route,
BUS. RECORDER (July 18, 2017), http://www.brecorder.com/2017/07/18/359937/govt-planning- 
to-establish-46-sezs-along-cpec-route/. 
65 Wade Shepard, Why China Is Building A New City Out In the Desert of Oman,
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2017, 6:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/09/08/why-
china-is-building-a-new-city-out-in-the-desert-of-oman/#2d848bd26b2f. 
66 Bashir Goth, Africa’s Singapore is Slowly Taking Shape, GULF NEWS (July 22, 
2017, 5:00 PM), http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/africa-s-singapore-is-slowly-taking-
shape- 1.2062649 [http://perma.cc/4QRT-P8GA]. 
67 Comparative study on Special Economic Zones in Africa and China, supra note 57. 
68 See Leanna Garfield, Drone footage reveals what Malaysia’s new $100 billion ‘dream 
paradise’ city looks like, BUS. INSIDER (May 10, 2017, 10:50 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/forest-city-malaysia-chinese-ghost-city-2017-5 [http://perma.cc/Q27V-4ULJ].
69 Sarah Moser, Forest city, Malaysia, and Chinese expansionism, URB. GEOGRAPHY 1,
3 (2017). 
70 Aradhana Aravindan, China Curbs Challenge $100 billion Forest City’s Malaysia 
Home Sales, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 1:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-forest-
city-strategy/china-curbs-challenge-100-billion-forest-citys-malaysia-home-sales-idUKKB 
N1AK0QP [http://perma.cc/M6XS-D8MJ].  
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a $500 billion private SEZ to be located on a site of almost 26,000 
square kilometers along the border with Jordan and Egypt.79 The 
new zone aims to be the most advanced location in the world for 
automated manufacturing and alternative energy production. It 
will have its own economic laws, designed with private sector 
inputs, with the aim of becoming the world’s most competitive 
venue for next generation manufacturing. 
Dubai’s breakaway economic success also has sparked 
invitations by African countries to extend its model for SEZ 
development. Dubai Ports World, over the past decade, has 
entered into agreements to upgrade transportation systems and 
assist in free zone development in Senegal, Egypt, Rwanda, 
Djibouti, and Mozambique.80 The most recent project, launched in 
November of 2017 with Somaliland, gives Dubai a thirty-year 
concession to fund, develop, and operate a twelve square kilometer 
free zone at the Port of Berbera.81
Across Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, similar 
trends are at work. The Colón Free Tree Zone opened in 1948 with 
a tax and customs duty-free status. It since has grown to become 
a major warehousing and transshipment hub with annual imports 
and exports exceeding $6.5 billion.82 In 1969, Gulf + Western 
Corporation launched the Dominican Republic’s first SEZ, using 
its (then-blocked) local currency holdings to fund site acquisition 
and development of an industrial park at La Romana, which grew 
rapidly to employ 15,000 workers.83 The success of La Romana 
Free Zone set off a wave of entrepreneurially developed free zones 
throughout the country.84 Today, the Dominican Republic is home 
to more than forty-seven privately developed and thirteen 
government owned industrial free zones specializing in apparel 
assembly, light manufacturing, and information services, 
79 Id.
80 See ASC Staff, DP World Sharpens Focus on African Expansion, ARABIAN SUPPLY 
CHAIN (Oct. 2, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://www.logisticsmiddleeast.com/article-13544-dp-
world-sharpens-focus-on-african-expansion [http://perma.cc/LTA9-4HWP]. 
81 Sarah Townsend, DP World Says to Build Economic Free Zone in Somaliland,
NATIONAL (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.thenational.ae/business/dp-world-says-to-
build- economic-free-zone-in-somaliland-1.673522 [http://perma.cc/962A-PN5B].
82 See Colon Free Zone, GA. TECH PANAMA LOGISTICS INNOVATION & RES. CTR., 
http://logistics.gatech.pa/en/assets/special-economic-zones/colon-free-zone/statistics 
[http://perma.cc/DUW9-6RN6].
83 WORLD BANK, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 162 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011). 
84 Id.
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employing 140,000 workers and contributing more than $5.5 
billion annually in export earnings.85
Inspired by Panamanian and Dominican free zone successes, 
developers across Latin America have established 400 SEZs in twenty 
countries, generating 1.7 million jobs according to a 2016 survey by 
the Asociación de Zonas Francas de las Américas (“AZFA”).86 Among 
Latin American SEZs, Zonamerica in Uruguay has won special 
recognition from AFZA for its achievements, which include 
de-monopolization of telecommunications, electricity, and other 
utilities in favor of free market alternatives.87 Zonamerica has been 
invited by countries in Central America and North Africa to extend 
its model, and has recently invested in a SEZ in Colombia as well as 
established an operating foothold in China.88
North America-based developers have moved in to reap land 
value gains made possible in zones of extrastatecraft. Given that 
US foreign-trade zones and enterprise zones offer pallid customs 
duty and tax relief, relative to the levels found in overseas SEZs, 
the focus of the largest American SEZ developers has been on 
opportunities offshore. 
Wallace Groves, a Florida-based developer, was the first to 
capitalize on the market. He negotiated in 1955 the Hawksbill 
Creek Agreement to privately develop approximately 500 square 
kilometers of marshy land in Grand Bahamas as a tax-free SEZ 
called Freeport.89 In addition to privately funding and maintaining 
streets, building a water system, and constructing a container port 
and an international airport, Grand Bahamas Port Authority has 
facilitated formation of homeowners associations and condominium 
associations to self-provide a range of amenities. Foreigners were 
given rights to purchase and live in homes. Today, 26,000 
85 JOSE DANIEL REYES, ET AL., SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND INCLUSIVE SECTOR 8–9, 
12 (2017).  
86 Start, ASOCIACIÓN DE ZONAS FRANCAS DE LAS AMÉRICAS (AZFA), http://www.asociacion 
zonasfrancas.org/es [http://perma.cc/9RBH-XVKG]. For further country statistics, see 3 
REVISTA AZFA (Nov. 2017), http://www.asociacionzonasfrancas.org/user/themes/azfa/ 
documents/home/revista/ARTEFINALDIGITAL-Revista-AZFA-03-DISE%C3%91O-(pgs1-34)- 
FINAL-AjustePagDoble(Dic1).pdf [http://perma.cc/M7EP-P4E6].
87 See Frequently Asked Questions, ZONAMERICA, http://web.zonamerica.com/#/faq 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
88 See Zonamerica Colombia, ZONAMERICA, http://web.zonamerica.com/#/zonamerica-
colombia [http://perma.cc/RF88-YM4Q]; Zonamerica China, ZONAMERICA, http://web.zon 
america.com/#/zonamerica-china [http://perma.cc/N6C8-VQMC]. 
89 OXFORD BUS. GRP., THE REPORT: THE BAHAMAS 2009, at 77 (2009).  
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permanent residents live in Freeport,90 and the SEZ attracts over 
a million visitors per year. 
More recently, Gale International—a New York-based private 
developer—has become the main driver in an estimated $40 billion 
Songdo SEZ in South Korea.91 In 2006, Gale reached agreement to 
design and build an International Business District on more than 
6000 hectares of reclaimed land in the Songdo SEZ. Songdo since 
has grown to a resident population of 30,000 and hosts a workforce 
of 33,000.92 Gale’s flagship venture is being planned as a 
springboard to further global SEZs and startup community 
ventures. “We want to crack the code of urbanism, then replicate 
it,” says Stanley Gale, CEO of the privately-owned firm.93 “We want 
to build at least twenty Songdos ourselves: the G20—Gale 20.”94
In Europe, the continent that gave birth to the Hanseatic 
League and founded the freeports of Singapore and Hong Kong, 
momentum has been shifting as well towards SEZs. Peter Hall—a 
world-known urban planner and former head of Britain’s socialist 
Fabian Society—proposed in 1977 a “Freeport Solution” inspired 
by the entrepreneurial energy he found in Asian cities, notably 
Singapore and Hong Kong.95 He urged inner cities in the United 
Kingdom to adopt “an essay in Non-Plan . . . . In other words, we 
would aim to recreate the Hong Kong of the 1950s and 1960s inside 
inner Liverpool or inner Glasgow.”96 Hall’s recommendations 
inspired the “enterprise zone” policy reforms central to Margaret 
Thatcher’s urban revitalization initiatives in the 1980s, notably 
including attraction of more than a billion dollars in private 
investment to London’s previously-dormant Docklands.97 Over the 
past twenty years, the European Union (“EU”)—once adamantly 
opposed to geographically targeting tax and regulatory relief—has 
accepted SEZs as proving grounds for transparency and policy 
liberalization, most notably in formerly Communist countries 
90 Bahamas Population 2018, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulation 
review.com/countries/bahamas-population/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
91 South Korea Conceptualizes the Ultimate Smart City, NEWCITIES (Dec. 28, 2014),
https://newcities.org/cityquest-songdo-south-korea-conceptualized-ultimate-smart-
sustainable-city/ [http://perma.cc/3S5Y-85N7].
92 New Songdo City, KOHN PEDERSON FOX ASSOCS. PC, https://www.kpf.com/projects/ 
new-songdo-city [http://perma.cc/QXY8-DKMW].
93 South Korea Conceptualizes the Ultimate Smart City, supra note 91. 
94 Id.
95 TIMOTHY P. R. WEAVER, BLAZING THE NEOLIBERAL TRAIL: URBAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 31 (2016). 
96 Id. at 84. 
97 See id. at 3, 8–9. 
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aspiring to EU accession.98 A leading specialist in refugee and 
migrant flows, Kilian Kleinschmidt, also recently has drawn 
global attention for proposing the creation of free economic zones 
in economically lagging areas of Europe to engage large numbers 
of currently unemployed and underemployed immigrants from the 
Middle East and Africa.99
Why are zones of extrastatecraft expanding so rapidly in the 
global economy? Author Nassim Nicholas Taleb has coined the 
term “antifragile” to describe certain policies and actions that gain 
strength as surrounding conditions deteriorate.100 This aptly 
describes an inherent quality of SEZs. As nation states slide 
towards dysfunction and corruption, rewards grow from creating 
trustworthy alternatives—areas whose governance is free of the 
surrounding woes. Hoover Institution Senior Fellow Alvin 
Rabushka has observed that the creation of free zones often 
becomes the only option available for failing, rent-seeking 
kleptocracies. “The last favor that a government can give—once its 
political favor-giving has paralyzed an economy—is to exempt 
areas from its own predations,” he has observed.101 As political 
intrusions are lifted in designated locations, risk-taking investors 
and entrepreneurs flow in, and new wealth arises through 
unimpeded exchange. Land values soar to the degree that high 
taxes, red tape, and corruption are lifted—in short, land rents rise 
as political rents fall. As politicians discover they can create 
98 See OECD, TRACKING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS:
OBJECTIVES, FEATURES AND KEY CHALLENGES 3, 22, 24 (2017), http://www.oecd.org/south-
east-europe/SEZ_WB_2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/YW5B-WdE3]. It is worth noting that 
leading voices in the EU, early in the present, decade endorsed expanding the ability of 
localities to experiment with policy changes and coordinate directly together across national 
lines. Viviane Reding, VP of the European Commission, made this case in European 
Commission Press Release SPEECH/11/539, Opening Trade and Opportunities: From the 
Hanseatic League to European Contract Law (July 19, 2011). Regional movements for 
autonomy and movements to break away from the European movement have since revealed 
levels of grassroots disenchantment with EU’s central bureaucracies. In the aftermath of 
Brexit, some “Remainers” have proposed that the City of London—one of the world’s two 
leading financial hubs—exit from Brexit by separating from the U.K. and rejoining the EU 
as a newly-sovereign city state. 
99 See Renny Ramakers, Immigrants Can Revive Shrinking Cities and Abandoned 
Areas, DESIGN+DESIRES (Nov. 30, 2015), http://socialcities.org/blog/immigrants-can-revive-
abandoned-and-shrinking-areas/ [http://perma.cc/MD3J-XR7H].
100 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 
3–6 (2012). 
101 Interview with Alvin Rabushka, David & Joan Traitel Senior Fellow, Hoover 
Institution, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Oct. 1976) (discussing free zone-generated funding for the 
Sabre Foundation Earthport Project). 
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windfall gains in areas they liberate, Rabushka has noted, “free 
zones become the way to pork-barrel freedom.”102
Economist Lotta Moberg has sounded a cautionary note. While 
zones in cases such as China have triggered wider reforms in their 
sponsoring countries, in other cases they have remained as 
firewalled enclaves, enabling predatory systems to keep their grip 
over much of the economy.103 But she also points to the rise in 
populism as a force encouraging the further spread of SEZs.104 “One 
feature of populism is nationalism, which leads to protectionism,” 
she has written. “And with increased protectionism, investors tend 
to demand more exemptions like those offered in SEZs.”105
Over the past four decades, the extraordinary growth in a 
number of SEZs has led to a rivalry among countries to stand out in 
the attractiveness of their policies and institutional environments.  
Chinese SEZs, as previously noted, undercut Hong Kong’s tax 
rates at the time of their launch. The duration of tax holidays 
offered by export processing zones, as another example, ratcheted 
upwards from five to ten years to longer terms as many countries 
sought to outdo Taiwan, South Korea, and other early implementers 
of industrial park-style free zones.106 Today, a prospering free zone 
technology park in Uruguay, Zonamerica, offers perpetual freedom 
from business taxes, customs duties, foreign exchange controls, and 
commercial governmental monopolies.107 The competition to create 
more liberal tax and regulatory environments gives a further 
reason to anticipate continued growth of free cities and free zones. 
As economists at the World Bank and elsewhere have argued, 
however, tax and regulatory competition aimed at attracting 
investors by no means assures success.108 Investors take into 
account a host of location factors beyond the policy and 
institutional reforms formally offered by SEZs. Other key location 
factors include quality and costs of infrastructure and utilities, 
102 Id.
103 See generally LOTTA MOBERG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC 
ZONES: CONCENTRATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2017). 
104 See Lotta Moberg, Is It Time That America Adopted Special Economic Zones?, DAILY 
CALLER (Mar. 30, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/30/is-it-time-that-america-
adopted-special-economic-zones/ [http://perma.cc/F52C-844T].
105 Lotta Moberg, Special Economic Zones: Opportunities and Pitfalls, WILLIAM BLAIR
(June 15, 2017), https://blog.williamblairfunds.com/lottamoberg/special-economic-zones-
opportunities-and-pitfalls/ [http://perma.cc/NF22-7NFK].
106 See ARADHNA AGGARWAL, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN SOUTH ASIA 8, 31 (2007).  
107 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 87. 
108 See, e.g., JACQUES MORISSET & NED PIRNIA, HOW TAX POLICY AND INCENTIVES 
AFFECT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 9 (2000); Alex Easson & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives,
WORLD BANK INSTITUTE 1, 8 (2002). 
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levels of labor skills and productivity, and the speed, efficiency, 
and responsiveness of administrative systems. Yet competition 
among zones is driving improvements in these areas as well. 
Private SEZ developers increasingly are shifting their focus to 
deliver unsurpassed solutions in all dimensions that concern 
investors. They are applying the higher rents accruing from 
exceptionally liberal business climates to privately fund 
improvements in essential infrastructure and amenities, skills 
training, and administrative systems. In consequence, the 
offerings of entrepreneurially developed zones often far surpass 
the quality of tax-funded infrastructure and services provided 
outside of the zones. Given the higher sensitivity of privately-run 
SEZs to market forces, in comparison with conventional 
municipalities and government-run zones, the competitive 
advantage of privately-funded zones of extrastatecraft will 
likely persist and even rise as exponentially improving 
technologies advance. 
B. The Growth of Private Communities 
As much as free zones and free cities today stand out globally 
as pioneers in tax and regulatory reform, private community 
associations have become proving grounds for market-based 
systems of governance. Their contractually-based systems of 
governance work to minimize “implicit taxes”—by filling the gap 
between what current political institutions ordinarily deliver, and 
what market-based governance can provide in higher quality and 
more efficient infrastructure, services, and amenities. 
Private community developers in recent decades have found 
that buyers in many cases will pay a premium of as much as 
fifteen percent to reside in areas with contractual systems of 
self-governance.109 In consequence, neighborhoods that include 
deed-based covenants to fund their infrastructure and services 
have grown spectacularly in numbers. A 1962 study by the Urban 
Land Institute found only 470 covenant-backed universal 
membership homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”) and condominium 
associations in the United States.110 Today the number has risen 
by more than 500-fold. In 2016, the Community Associations 
Institute—a North America-based nonprofit supporting startup 
109 URBAN LAND INST., THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 14–15 (rev. prtgs. 
1966, 1970). 
110 See Maurice C. Read, Foreword, in URBAN LAND INST., THE HOMES ASSOCIATION 
HANDBOOK (rev. prtgs. 1966, 1970); URBAN LAND INST., supra note 109, at vi. 
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societies around the world—tallied more than 340,000 such 
associations in the country,111 a number over 600 times higher 
than the ULI’s count. More than twenty-six million US households 
today live in private community associations.112 Neighborhoods 
with deed-based associations are normally highly resistant to 
decay, due to binding commitments on the part of all owners to 
keep buildings and grounds in good repair. These covenant-backed 
associations also commit their members to self-assess dues to meet 
the costs of shared infrastructure and amenities. They therefore 
overcome “free rider” problems that normally limit the private 
provision of public goods at local scale. By doing so, they boost 
property values in areas where municipal governments cannot be 
relied upon to deliver efficient services at acceptable quality. 
Influential examples of private communities with deed-
based covenants in the United States include Reston in Virginia 
(population 58,404),113 Columbia in Maryland (population 
99,615),114 and the Disney-developed “new urbanism” community 
of Celebration in Florida (population 7427).115 As noted by Tom 
W. Bell, the largest community based on a covenant-based 
contractual governance model appears to be Highland Ranch in 
Colorado, a community covering eighty-eight square kilometers 
with a population of 100,000 residents.116 The association’s 
annual budget for infrastructure, services, and amenities exceeds 
$22 million.117
111 Community Associations in the United States, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., 
https://www.caionline.org/AboutCommunityAssociations/Pages/StatisticalInformation.asx 
[http://perma.cc/M3SR-ZDBT] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
112 Id.
113 Quick Facts: Reston CDP, Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/restoncdpvirginia/PST045216 [http://perma.cc/RP7G-QQ6Q] (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2018). 
114 Quick Facts: Columbia CDP, Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/columbiacdpmaryland/PST045216 [http://perma.cc/BR8N-MR6R].
115 Quick Facts: Celebration CDP, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/celebrationcdpflorida/PST045216 [http://perma.cc/UCR4-CKDD]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018). See also SPENCER H. MACCALLUM, THE ART OF COMMUNITY
(1970), which argues that the most competitive kinds of private communities will be based 
on a single landlord model, rather than a private association of homeowners. Id. at 66. 
MacCallum points to large resorts as an example of efficiency and sensitivity to individual 
users. See id. at 14. The question remains, however, as to how such a model would 
scale—there would likely need to be a contract-based federation of such owners to deal 
with common problems. In this case, it appears to be conceptually identical to the 
property owners association model, albeit at a higher level. 
116 TOM W. BELL, YOUR NEXT GOVERNMENT?: FROM THE NATION STATE TO STATELESS 
NATIONS 18 (2017). 
117 Id. For the data cited, see Facts, HIGHLANDS RANCH CMTY ASS’N, https://hrcaonline.org/ 
area-resources/highlands-ranch/facts [http://perma.cc/ZE68-J8BS] last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
356 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
In recent years, Sandy Springs, Georgia—incorporated as a 
community with a current population of just over 100,000118— has 
also been noticed as a model of privatization. It has reduced the 
city management staff to a handful by outsourcing to private 
providers the responsibility for all city functions with the 
exception of police and fire/rescue operations. The annual cost 
savings to taxpayers—relative to comparable municipalities—is 
estimated at $20 million.119 Other notable startup communities 
are being developed by leading technology companies. With an aim 
to demonstrate efficiencies possible in convivial living 
environments, Google’s Sidewalk Labs has recently committed $50 
million to develop a waterfront “digital city” in a rundown area of 
Toronto.120 Bill Gates has similarly purchased approximately 
eighty square kilometers in Arizona to build an innovative “City of 
Tomorrow” that “embraces cutting-edge technology, designed 
around high speed networks, data centers, new manufacturing 
technologies and distribution models, autonomous vehicles and 
autonomous logistics hubs.”121
Private communities are spreading as well in regions of 
developing countries that have been plagued by corruption, crime, 
and underperforming municipal services. In India, private 
developers over the past thirty years have turned the once 
sparsely populated area of Gurgaon into a thriving city of more 
than half a million.122 The city features a privately-owned mass 
transit system along with extensive private security and fire 
protection services.123 It now has the third highest per capita 
income in India,124 and was recently ranked as the country’s best 
city to work in. Brazilian developer Alphaville Urbanismo has 
launched private gated communities based on homeowners 
associations in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitaba, and close to 
twenty other cities. The developer also has expanded to Cacais in 
118 See The Man Who Outsourced the Government: An Interview with Oliver Porter,
FOUND. ECON. EDUC. (May 28, 2013), https://fee.org/articles/the-man-who-outsourced-the-
government/ [http://perma.cc/P3WU-9P8N].
119 Id.
120 See Jane Wakefield, ‘Future City’ to be Built in Canada by Alphabet 
company, BBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41665670 
[http://perma.cc/K2QZ-4FY3].  
121 Conor Cawley, Bill Gates Just Bought an $80 Million Chunk of Land in Arizona,
TECH.CO (Nov. 8, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://tech.co/bill-gates-80-million-land-arizona-2017-
11 [http://perma.cc/5Z2S-V5J6].  
122 See Todd Krainin, Gurgaon: India’s Private City, REASON (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://reason.com/reasontv/2016/12/15/gurgaon-india-private-city [http://perma.cc/2669-3SXK]. 
123 Id.
124 Id.
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Portugal.125 Paranoazinho, a fifteen square kilometer new private 
community venture taking form near Brasilia, has the backing of 
libertarian developer Ricardo Birmann.126
Startup communities are improving conditions in low income 
neighborhoods as well as affluent areas. Thailand’s Building 
Together initiative has worked with the informal sector to plan 
layouts for roads and lots, prior to “invasion” by squatters of idle 
public lands at the outskirts of Bangkok.127 Squatter associations 
keep ownership of their newly created market areas and use the 
lease revenues paid by incoming merchants to defray the cost of 
infrastructure and basic services for community residents. In the 
Philippines, the Davao Development Foundation has worked in 
low and middle-income neighborhoods to help residents organize 
deed-based homeowners associations, to make neighborhoods 
safer and able to arrange for contractual provision of services.128
In the United States, a similar approach has proven highly 
effective in reversing crime and blight in Waterman Place, St. 
Louis, doubling property values within a year of the residents’ 
decision to turn from an informal group of neighbors into a 
durable, deed-based homeowners association.129
Housing cooperatives based on Community Land Trusts offer 
an innovative path to ensure affordable housing for low-income 
residents as property values rise. In Burlington, Vermont, the 
Champlain Housing Trust was formed in 1984 while Bernie 
Sanders was mayor.130 It since has grown to become the largest 
community land trust in the country, managing 2200 apartments 
and more than 500 owner-occupied homes.131 A notable innovation 
has been developed there. The Champlain Trust created a hybrid 
form of land trust that includes a commercial area where tenants 
pay market-priced rents, in parallel with residential areas where 
members of the Trust enjoy highly discounted long-term ground 
leases. The profits from the commercial areas enable the Trust to 
125 ALPHAVILLE URBANISMO, http://www.alphaville.com.br/ [http://perma.cc/4LRZ-XVBN]
(last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
126 Skype Interview with Ricardo Birmann [Brasilia] (Jan. 2016). 
127 See MARK FRAZIER & CECILIA SAGER, COMMUNITY SELF HELP: A NEW STRATEGY
12 (1985). 
128 See id. at 35. 
129 See Mark Frazier, Seeding Grass Roots Recovery: New Catalysts for Community 
Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 63, 64 (1989). 
130 See About Us, CHAMPLAIN HOUSING TRUST, http://www.getahome.org/about-us 
[http://perma.cc/99QS-NJWA] (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). 
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sustain affordable ground rents for low-income tenants and 
homeowners.132 This hybrid approach—akin to that used by 
Bangkok’s Building Together projects—suggests a path for 
building future left-right coalitions. As residents become 
beneficiaries, via Community Land Trusts, of rising land values in 
commercial areas, they may become much more receptive to the 
introduction of SEZs and similar policy reforms that can rapidly 
lift land values in these areas. The more political rent-seeking is 
lifted, the higher will be the Trust’s distributions of commercial 
land lease revenues for shared benefit. 
III. INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNANCE
As fiscal and political strains intensify in nation states, 
reforms initiated by SEZs and startup communities can emerge as 
models for transforming governance. The following innovations 
point to opportunities for a phase change in governmental 
accountability and efficiency. 
A. Incentivizing the Public Sector 
Bureaucracies around the world tend towards inertia and 
stagnation whenever the quality of their performance has no 
impact on their internal rewards. Two of the world’s most 
successful free zones have found an answer to this problem. They 
motivate their public sectors through innovative fiscal measures: 
1. Linking public sector pay to economic growth (via a national 
“Flexiwage” bonus) 
A key to Singapore’s success has been the introduction of 
systemic rewards in pay for all civil servants, proportional to the 
overall growth of the productive sector. The Flexiwage incentives, 
now known as National Bonuses, are indexed to GDP growth rates 
of the Singaporean economy.133 This compensation innovation was 
introduced in the mid-1980s as a key part of Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew’s effort to instill a higher level of professionalism and 
responsiveness in the culture of the civil service.134 The reform has 
helped the public sector of Singapore become perhaps the most 
132 See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS & AMY DEMETROWITZ, PERMANENTLY AFFORDABLE 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 1 (2003). 
133 Frequently Asked Questions: Bonus, PUB. SERV. DIV., http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/ 
PSD/apps/fcd_faqmain.aspx?FAQ=34258 [http://perma.cc/G5KP-LHA6] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2018). 
134 See 1 SINGAPORE COUNTRY STUDY GUIDE: STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 68 (2015). 
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transparent and efficient in the world. As a result of national 
bonuses based on the economy’s performance, which has averaged 
more than six percent per annum since introduction of the 
policy,135 compensation levels for Singaporean civil servants have 
risen to among the highest in the world. In contrast to their 
counterparts in most other countries, Singapore’s civil servants 
have tended to consistently welcome, rather than resist, 
introduction of eGovernment and other solutions that help to 
remove bottlenecks for investors and entrepreneurs. 
2. Capturing Land Value Gains
Singapore and Hong Kong, as Asia’s leading SEZs since the 
mid-1800s, also are world leaders in land value capture for 
shared benefit. More than ninety-nine percent of all land in 
Hong Kong, and more than eighty percent in Singapore, is now 
owned by government or parastatal bodies. Their governments 
offer long term leases to private developers who are competitively 
chosen through open auctions and tenders. Revenues from land 
value capture cover as much as a third of the public sector’s 
annual operating budgets. As landlords seeking to maximize 
demand for their offerings, the governments of Singapore and 
Hong Kong are keen to ensure world-class conditions for 
investors and entrepreneurs, because investors bid more for 
leases when they have confidence in the quality and stability of 
the business climate. 
B. Using Technology to Cut Red Tape 
SEZs also are innovators in eGovernment solutions that lift 
barriers to small and large firms alike. While bureaucracies in 
many nations cling to complex and opaque procedures for 
approving business startups, for importing/exporting goods, and 
for authorizing new investments, leading zones have introduced 
electronic systems that have radically simplified and sped up 
approval times to do business. Singapore’s 4.5 million citizens and 
enterprises, for example, now can access 1600 eGovernment 
services at any time, providing rapid turnaround times for 
passport renewals, tax filings, and building construction.136 The 
services—which can be accessed by cell phones as well as 
135 Singapore GDP Growth Rate, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/ 
singapore/gdp-growth [http://perma.cc/GC28-8MPP] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
136 See Speech Dr. Lee Boon Yang, Minister of Information, Communications & the 
Arts, Singapore’s e-Government Journey (Sept. 20, 2007). 
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computers—are being used more than 150 million times per 
year.137 Dubai similarly offers an eGovernment services app to 
interact with twenty-two government bodies.138 The app called 
DubaiNow offers a single portal for filling in forms, filing reports, 
or making payments.139
Dubai is intent on going much farther. It aims by 2020 to 
become the first government anywhere to fully embrace the 
Blockchain, the innovative encrypted public ledger that can create 
a public, tamper-proof, auditable, and distributed record keeping 
system for ensuring the transparency of all governmental 
transactions.140 A new government body, Smart Dubai, has been 
formed with a mission to improve the efficiency of living and doing 
business in Dubai with Blockchain-based solutions. Backers of the 
initiative predict that its Blockchain strategy will save 25.1 
million man-hours valued at $1.5 billion annually.141 The majority 
of the savings will come from a complete move away from 
paper-based systems in government to electronic document 
processing, which are to replace the current 100 million paper 
transactions a year.142
C. Doing More Through Privatization 
SEZs are setting global standards for comprehensive 
privatization. The 500 square kilometer tax-free concession of 
Freeport, Bahamas, which Florida developer Wallace Groves 
negotiated in 1955, became the first example of a large 
community featuring a privately-developed, owned, and operated 
international airport, port, highway and road network, 
water/sewerage system, and electrical grid.143
137 See Chew Hui Min, Download These Mobile Apps for Government Services on the 
Go, STRAITS TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015, 4:39 PM), http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/ 
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Other SEZ milestones in privatization exist in Zonamerica, 
created by a Uruguayan company following the passage in 1987 of 
a free zone law that states “state-owned monopolies do not apply 
within free zones.”144 This sentence gave Zonamerica the right to 
bypass costly state telecommunications, electricity, and insurance 
monopolies, and to make private arrangements that gave its 
tenants access to services at competitive market prices. In 
addition, the Government allowed the Zonamerica developer to 
create and operate an electronically monitored Customs systems 
for the Zone, speeding movement of inbound and outbound goods. 
Given the scope of its freedoms from state monopolies, Zonamerica 
has become one of the most successful business centers in Latin 
America, presently employing more than 10,000 workers in 
logistics, software development, and a range of technology-
intensive services and manufacturing operations.145
Privately developed startup communities—incorporating 
deed-based agreements that bind residential and commercial 
purchasers to join associations of property owners—have proven 
able to fund a full spectrum of local infrastructure and 
community services. Hundreds of thousands of homeowners 
associations, condominium associations, and housing cooperatives 
have been formed since the 1960s in the United States and 
around the world, taking on a number of responsibilities once left 
to local governments.146
D. Reducing Public Sector Debt 
SEZs are also helping countries deal with unrepayable 
sovereign debts. Sri Lanka is a case in point. In late 2016, 
recognizing that its $8 billion in debts to China were untenable, 
the government of Sri Lanka agreed to a Chinese proposal that 
erased $1.1 billion of the amount due.147 China accepted an in-kind 
144 INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE LOGISTICA, Regulatory Frameworks of Free Zones,
http://www.inalog.org.uy/en/regulatory-framework-of-free-zones/ [http://perma.cc/YZH4-8ULK]
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
145 ZONAMERICA CAMPUS + PERFORMANCE, http://web.zonamerica.com/#/conocer-
zonamerica (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
146 See Community Associations in the United States, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST. (2016). 
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associations, political pressures are growing to allow tax rebates or deductibility on tax 
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payment in form of a concession to develop a fifteen square 
kilometer site as a SEZ. In follow up to the debt swap, China will 
make new direct investments in zone development and operate the 
zone in a self-funding way, collecting lease payments in hard 
currency.148 Export-oriented companies locating in the new zone 
will contribute to Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange and potentially 
generate hundreds of thousands of new jobs.149 The Sri Lanka debt 
swap agreement creates a model that may become more widely 
applied with Chinese-owned SEZs in other countries, as and when 
host nations participating in China’s global $4 to $8 trillion “Belt 
and Road” initiative find themselves unable to repay debts they 
have incurred.150
Costa Rica pioneered a “debt-for-free zone” swap in the 1980s, 
using it to fund a free-zone project near the capital of San José.151
Private developers in that case purchased sovereign Costa Rican 
debt from third parties at a discount and reached an agreement 
with the Central Bank to erase the face value of the debt in 
exchange for a prime site and a concession to develop an industrial 
park-model SEZ. Today, the Sri Lankan and Costa Rican examples 
may prove useful precedents for investors seeking to convert 
unrepayable sovereign debt of countries such as Greece, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe into new SEZ concessions.152
E. Opening to Global Talent 
SEZs also offer examples of innovative ways to engage global 
talent. As developed countries have been raising new barriers to 
immigration, Dubai, Singapore, and other city states and 
autonomous regions are welcoming unskilled skilled workers from 
all over the world. Approximately ninety percent of the workforce 
in Dubai and its sister Emirates are guest workers from other 
countries as a result of a liberal visa policy.153 Although workers 
are exempt from paying income tax on their earnings, they or their 
employers must pay for a work permit and residency visa of 
approximately $135 per year per person (additional household 
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 Ho, supra note 60. 
151 Mark Frazier & Govindan Nair, Stimulating Growth in Developing Countries, 9 
CATO POL’Y REP. 15 (1987). 
152 See id.
153 See Froilan T. Malit Jr. & Ali Al Youha, Labor Migration in the United Arab 
Emirates: Challenges and Responses, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 18, 2013), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/labor-migration-united-arab-emirates-challenges-
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members pay about $67 annually for residency).154 Dubai and the 
Emirates earn approximately $800 million annually from 7.8 
million guest workers and their families.155
In Uruguay, Zonamerica is also benefiting from a liberal 
immigration policy. It is now home to more than 1000 software 
developers and ICT specialists from India, due to a policy that 
permits up to twenty-five percent of employees in the zone to be 
foreign nationals.156 China has recently liberalized its visa policy 
as well to attract global talent to the Chengdu Free Trade Area 
and to Shanghai for three SEZ-style innovation zones.157
For more than a decade, Singapore has cast a global net to 
encourage immigration by entrepreneurs and highly skilled 
scientists, engineers, and academics. It now ranks number two 
(behind Switzerland) in Institute of Business Administration 
(“NSEAD”) ratings of locations attractive to global talent.158 In 
mid-2017, Singapore took a further step towards gaining the top 
global ranking. It introduced an ‘EntrePass’ visa that widens the 
pool of overseas entrepreneurs eligible for immigration, expands 
the duration of the visa from one to two years, and waives the 
former $37,000 minimum paid-in capital requirement for their 
startups in high technology fields.159
Although technically not a SEZ or startup community, the 
small “info state” of Estonia has introduced another innovation 
aimed at engaging global entrepreneurs and investors. Its 
e-Residency program, launched in December of 2014, makes 
available a government-issued digital identity to individuals 
anywhere in the world who pass a background check and pay a 
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one-time fee of $120.160 Holders of e-Residency identities are 
allowed to virtually create and operate ventures in Estonia’s 
highly transparent business climate and are not subject to 
national tax for whatever income they generate outside of 
Estonia.161 To date, more than 4000 companies have been formed 
by 27,000 people who have responded to the program.162
Military and geopolitical strategist John Robb, a best-selling 
author, has speculated on how a city-state such as Singapore 
might use such a virtual system to become, almost overnight, a 
global superpower. In a 2013 symposium, he invited participants 
to consider a scenario in which Singapore decided that: 
[W]e’re going to expand our city state to 200 million of the best people in the 
world, and we’re going to adopt them as citizens and stitch them together 
in a variety of unique and interesting ways. In that instance, you have a 
virtual city state that will become extremely powerful, and [that] can do 
much more than you can see with current physical political structures.163
F. Serving the Whole Person 
As an alternative to distracting and harried lifestyles, a 
growing number of entrepreneurially-developed communities are 
offering amenities aimed at promoting personal wellbeing and 
civic engagement, as well as professional and business success. 
SEZs such as Zonamerica in Uruguay, and the America Free Zone 
in Costa Rica, offer campus-style parks that include green spaces, 
bikeways, arts and music events, recreation and fitness centers, 
learning venues, and residential areas.164
Startup communities, similarly, are evolving to encourage 
healthy lifestyles and engagement with neighbors. Celebration, a 
Disney-developed suburb of Orlando, incorporates elements of a 
“new urbanism” that encourages human scale development and 
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2016), https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/estonian-e-residency-is-lowering-business-costs-
around-the-world-d78d957a82fe [http://perma.cc/9NWL-WM8D].
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interaction with neighbors.165 Active adult communities with a 
variety of amenities for exercise and wellness, lifelong learning, 
and recreation are growing in North America for individuals and 
couples nearing retirement age.166 Resort communities in many 
cases have moved to diversify the range of activities and amenities 
offered to guests of all ages, and some now also promote service 
learning and “voluntourism” offerings that go beyond 
pre-packaged entertainment.167 The global growth of ecovillages 
and other intentional communities reflects a general trend where 
homebuyers are moving to areas that let residents interact with 
nature and with each other in more authentic ways.168
These trends may become increasingly relevant as 
accelerating technologies drive down the costs of goods and 
services, and as the trend towards automation of rote work creates 
opportunities for people to interact in more fulfilling ways. 
Entrepreneurial communities attuned to the needs of the “whole 
persons” who opt to reside or visit can point the way to new kinds 
of convivial living,169 and become destinations of choice for tens 
or hundreds of millions of people around the world who may seek 
to exit from, or create alternatives within, failed and failing 
nation states. 
G. Safeguarding the Environment 
Exemplary SEZs funded by private investors have become 
committed to lowering carbon footprints and operating in 
sustainable ways. Costa Rica’s America Free Zone, launched in 
1999, is at the forefront of environmentally sustainable office and 
industrial parks.170 With more than 10,000 employees working 
primarily in call center and light industry for export markets, the 
campus-style Park is the first SEZ to earn overall Carbon Neutral 
certification from INTE.171 Many of its buildings are LEED 
certified for Core & Shell, and the park has won Gold Certification 
from the US Green Building Council.172 Its approximately 3000 
165 See CELEBRATION, FLA., http://www.celebration.fl.us [http://perma.cc/3F9P-NFBA]. 
166 See id.
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square meters of solar panels generate an average of 500 kilowatt 
hours of electricity per month.173
The $40 billion Songdo SEZ in Korea is aiming higher.174 Its 
developer is planning it to become the world’s first completely 
LEED-certified city.175 All major buildings have been designed to 
meet Korean standards, as well as international LEED 
certification requirements.176 Its green design includes pneumatic 
tubes for waste disposal to avoid traditional garbage collection, 
windows with Low U value, water-cooled air conditioning, LED 
lighting, and solar energy.177 These factors will reduce building 
energy consumption by almost one-third.178 In addition to large 
reserves for parks and green areas, bike trails, and pedestrian 
paths, Songdo also features a network of charging stations for 
electrically powered vehicles.179
H. Sharing Upsides with Citizens 
As concerns rise in developed nations over joblessness due to 
robotics and artificial intelligence, Universal Basic Income (“UBI”) 
schemes are being discussed as a potential reform to soften the 
transition to economies that are based largely on automated 
production of goods and services. Three of the world’s leading 
city-states—Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macau—are among the 
five economies in the world to date that have piloted UBI plans 
benefiting all residents.180
In Singapore, “Grow & Share” growth dividends were 
distributed from 2006–2011 to all adult Singaporeans out of the 
government’s surplus.181 The amount each resident received was 
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174 South Korea Conceptualizes the Ultimate Smart City, supra note 91. 
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linked to their level of earnings and size of housing.182 During the 
final year that the Government was running surpluses and 
funding the program, the dividends averaged $700 per recipient.183
Hong Kong also briefly tried a similar “Scheme 6000” in 2011.184 It 
took the form of a tax rebate program distributing $770 to all 
holders of a Hong Kong permanent identity card for the declared 
aim to “leave wealth with the people.”185
Macau, a prosperous former Portuguese free trade zone 
located near Hong Kong, has embarked on a more sustained UBI 
initiative, the “Wealth Partaking Scheme.”186 Since 2008, Macau 
has distributed a UBI to all holders of a resident identity card 
issued by the Macau Special Administrative Region.187 More than 
half a million non-permanent and permanent residents get the 
payments, with permanent residents now receiving about $1200 
annually, double what transient residents receive.188
I. Experimenting with Polycentric Governance 
Economists, legal scholars, and historians—including Vincent 
Ostrom, Tom W. Bell, Alexander Fink, Avner Greif, Bruno Frey, 
and James C. Bennett—have argued for decades that competition 
among and between jurisdictions and systems of law can lead to 
more efficient governance. Giving freedom of choice to individuals 
to choose among systems can be rewarding for providers of 
consistently transparent and accountable law. 
SEZs in modern times have moved to make this promise a 
reality. By widening global options for entrepreneurs and 
investors, jurisdictions have had to compete to win the trust of 
people who formerly had far fewer high quality options for where 
to live and work.
Today, truly polycentric systems of law and governance are 
emerging in SEZs. These systems allow individuals to choose 
among legal systems without physically having to relocate. The 
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leading innovator in this regard is Dubai, which since 2004 has 
allowed firms operating under its Financial Services free zone 
regime to choose between resolving disputes under the law of the 
United Arab Emirates or under British Common Law.189 Local 
courts now have no power to overrule decisions made by the retired 
British judges who run the Common Law courts in Dubai.190 In 
part because of the confidence that this legal reform has 
engendered among leading global financial firms, Dubai has 
become a world-class financial center that directly employs more 
than 20,000 people.191 The Dubai dual court system is now 
prompting Abu Dhabi and Sharjah to follow suit.
Another pioneer in approving polycentric governance is 
Honduras, which enacted a law in December of 2013 that brings 
freedom of choice in legal systems to a new level.192 The ZEDE 
legislation not only recognizes English Common Law tradition as 
a baseline for dispute resolution, but also allows parties residing 
in any of the SEZs to use the legal system of any mutually agreed 
foreign government to resolve their dispute.193 Although local and 
overseas private investors are waiting on official designation of 
ZEDE sites, global developers anticipate a sizable market 
response given the freedom to create a new, corruption-resistant 
legal regime.194
In coming years, innovations of the kinds highlighted above 
will likely accelerate the global growth of SEZs. A world of 
increasingly brittle nation states and international systems can 
hope for the fullest possible extension of these innovations, sooner 
rather than later. Exponential technologies, as described by Peter 
Diamandis and Jeremy Rifkin in their recent books, are set to 
sweep across the world in ways that undo much of the present 
economic and financial base underpinning the present power of 
national and international bodies.195 Oxford University 
researchers have projected that robotics and artificial intelligence 
within several decades will put close to half of today’s jobs in 
189 Worthington, supra note 76. 
190 Id. 
191 Worthington, supra note 76. 
192 See Beth Geglia, Honduras: Reinventing the Enclave, 48 NACLA REP. AMERICAS
353, 355 (2016). 
193 See id.
194 See id. at 360. 
195 See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE RISE OF THE 
COLLABORATIVE COMMONS AND THE END OF CAPITALISM 78 (2015); see also PETER H.
DIAMANDIS & STEVEN KOTLER, ABUNDANCE: THE FUTURE IS BETTER THAN YOU THINK
31 (2012). 
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developed countries at risk.196 In developing countries, the World 
Bank has predicted that the impact will be even greater, with as 
many as two-thirds of all industrial and agricultural jobs likely to 
be displaced by automation.197 The rise of solar and other 
renewable energy technologies will have a further disruptive 
impact, collapsing revenues that now sustain fragile petrostates. 
This outcome will likely lead to job losses and contraction of 
entitlement programs, causing turmoil and further accelerating 
emigration. Polarizations and hatreds may flare as political 
demagogues cast blame upon others for deep technologically-
driven internal and global dislocations. 
Examples of trustworthy governance—and of new ways for 
people to share in the prosperity generated by free, 
technologically advanced areas—may be welcomed as traditional 
jobs grow scarce and nation states fail to meet public 
expectations. Successful SEZs and startup communities during 
this era of change can move to spread their innovations to 
economically troubled areas. Expanding relationships of trade, 
learning, and cultural exchange among SEZs can be key to their 
success. As Paragh Khanna observed: 
[C]ities rather than states are becoming the islands of governance on 
which the future world order will be built. This new world is not—and 
will not be—one global village, so much as a network of different 
ones. . . . Alliances of these agile cities are already forming, reminiscent 
of that trading and military powerhouse of the late Middle Ages, the 
Hanseatic League along the Baltic Sea. Already, Hamburg and Dubai 
have forged a partnership to boost shipping links and life-sciences 
research, while Abu Dhabi and Singapore have developed into a new 
commercial axis. No one is waiting for permission from Washington to 
make deals.198
196 See Aviva Hope Rutkin, Report Suggests Nearly Half of U.S. Jobs Are Vulnerable to 
Computerization, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/ 
s/519241/report-suggests-nearly-half-of-us-jobs-are-vulnerable-to-computerization/ 
[http://perma.cc/SHH9-GXF9].
197 World Bank: Automation Could Wipe Out Two-Thirds of Jobs in Developing 
Countries, VOICE OF AMERICA (Apr. 21, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/world-
bank-automation-could-wipe-out-two-thirds-of-jobs-in-developing-countries/3819640.html 
[http://perma.cc/K3JJ-6CEL].  
198 See Parag Khanna, Beyond City Limits, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 6, 2010, 8:05 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/08/06/beyond-city-limits/ [http://perma.cc/LD8J-ZN9C].
Khanna also notes that Japanese futurist Kenichi Ohmae foresaw the rise of an info-state 
era in The Next Global Stage (2005), including agglomerations of city-states resembling 
those of the Hanseatic era. He predicted these would become the world’s next power centers. 
Khanna, supra note 41. 
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IV. POTENTIAL ALLIES FOR A PHASE CHANGE IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Existing organizations that have specialized in free zones and 
contract-based communities are well positioned to help spread 
civil society and market-based governance alternatives. Potential 
global allies and partners for a global evolution in governing 
systems include:  
A. World Economic Processing Zones Association (www.wepza.org) 
Over the past four decades, WEPZA has been an influential 
proponent of SEZs, bringing together best practices from zone 
operators, public officials, researchers, and consultants. WEPZA 
began as a UN-funded intergovernmental body focused 
principally on assisting public sector Export Processing Zones, 
but gained independence and broadened its charter during the 
1980s to support knowledge sharing, conferences and workshops, 
and studies for a full range of SEZs.199 Key research findings have 
been shared via the web, and through the Flagstaff Journal of 
Special Economic Zones.200 In recent years, WEPZA has sought 
to become a collaboration network for zone practitioners, private 
consultants specializing in market analysis, legal reform, and 
engineering, multilateral development organizations, think 
tanks, university faculty members, and government officials.201
It also aims to map opportunities for “bold and innovative uses 
and implementations of zones.”202
B. World Free & SEZs Federation (www.femoza.org) 
WFSEZF is a second nonprofit research and technical 
advisory group on SEZs that traces its origins to UN-supported 
initiatives for free zones. Formed in 1999, the Geneva-based 
organization has been supporting governments in identification 
and planning of free zone development and promotion 
opportunities.203 It has assisted Iran, Kazakhstan, Serbia, and 
199 History, WEPZA, http://www.wepza.org/history/ [http://perma.cc/A98L-TT8Z] (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
200 Id.
201 Jean-Paul Gauthier, Mission, WEPZA, http://www.wepza.org/ [http://perma.cc/44GL-KGL8]
(last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
202 Id.
203 Meeting with the President of FEMOZA World Federation of Free and Special Economic 
Zones, BELARUSIAN CHAMBER OF COM. & INDUSTRY (Jan. 24, 2015), https://www.cci.by/ 
en/content/meeting-president-femoza-world-federation-free-and-special-economic-zones 
[http://perma.cc/TE2U-CECZ].
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Belarus via workshops, guided tours, training, and legal 
consultancies.204
C. The World Free Zones Organization (www.worldfzo.org) 
WFZO is a Dubai-based non-governmental organization 
established in Geneva.205 It was launched in 2014 by Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime 
Minister of the United Arab Republics and ruler of Dubai, with 
participation from fourteen countries hosting SEZs.206 WFZO has 
defined its mission as becoming the most international, 
multilateral organization for free zones of all kinds—“[p]roviding 
one, authoritative, collective voice to represent the interests of free 
zones around the world.”207 As of 2015, its membership had grown 
to 155 members, including free zones and zone associations; 
specialists including lawyers, consultants, government agencies, 
chambers of commerce, academics, and private corporations; and 
multilateral organizations including UN bodies, the World 
Customs Organization, and the World Trade Organization.208
Current priorities include creating and sharing best practices for 
free zone success, holding conferences and conducting workshops, 
and building databases on zone-related activities. WFZO aims 
to “ensure the sustainability and ongoing success of the free 
zone model.”209
D. Die Hanse – City League of the Hanse (www.hanse.org/en) 
In 1980, a movement was launched by former Hanseatic cities 
to rekindle long-dormant relationships for the purpose of fostering 
direct tourism, business, and cultural exchanges.210 This has led 
to the formation of Die Hanse, which describes its aim as “reviving 
the ideas and spirit of the European city/municipality on the basis 
of the cross-border concept of the historic Hanseatic League.”211 An 
annual assembly decides on which of member communities will 
204 FEMOZA & Other Organisations, FEMOZA, http://femoza.org/femoza-other-
organisations [http://perma.cc/PST3-3CNC] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
205 FAQ, WORLD FREE ZONES ORG. (2017), https://www.worldfzo.org/Pages/FAQ.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/4RS6-87ZQ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
206 About Us, WORLD FREE ZONES ORG., https://www.worldfzo.org/Pages/About-
Us.aspx [http://perma.cc/4JJS-7MD8] (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
207 FAQ, supra note 205. 
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Die Hanse today, STADTEBUND: DIE HANSE, http://www.hanse.org/en/hanse-
today/active-network/ [http://perma.cc/G9VA-7KHX]. 
211 Id.
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host the “Hanseatic Days of Modern Times” international festival 
for the coming year. Public relations activities focus on publicizing 
historical and cultural aspects common to the Hanseatic towns 
and cities, and on engaging young people in ways that foster 
transnational understanding and relationships.212 It is presently 
funded by the COSME program of the EU and by dues 
(approximately $60 yearly) paid by the member cities.213
Headquartered in Lübeck, Germany, its member cities range from 
Novgorod in Russia to Hull in England.214
E. Community Associations Institute (www.caionline.org) 
The leading association advancing the interests of privately-
developed residential communities is the Community Associations 
Institute (“CAI”). As a U.S.-based international organization with 
more than 35,000 members, CAI has sixty-three chapters 
worldwide, including Canada, the Middle East and South 
Africa.215 The organization assists private developers, HOA and 
Condominium Association board members, community managers, 
legal advisors, and other professionals.216 Its educational activities 
include conferences, workshops, seminars, training programs, and 
certifications.217 CAI maintains a library and database on 
community association management and governance, and 
publishes books, manuals, magazines, and newsletters in addition 
to its website.218 The organization also provides briefings and 
testifies about the impact of proposed policy changes that can 
positively or negatively affect the future of covenant-backed 
property owners’ associations. Through an affiliated foundation, 
CAI conducts research and acts as a global clearinghouse for 
information, innovations and best practices in private community 
association development, operations, and governance.219
212 See id.
213 Membership, STADTEBUND: DIE HANSE, http://www.hanse.org/en/hanse-today/ 
active-network/membership/ [http://perma.cc/G74K-WK6T] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
214 Association – The Hanseatic League, STADTEBUND: DIE HANSE, http://www.hanse. 
org/en/hanseatic-cities/ [http://perma.cc/5FQ7-NB4C] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
215 About CAI, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST. (2017), https://www.caionline.org/AboutCAI/ 
Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/3ZLX-BBZG].
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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F. Other Promising Allies  
Beyond these SEZ and private community-oriented 
organizations, other groups are working for increased 
decentralization and devolution of power to cities. Notable 
examples include the Global Parliament of Mayors, United Cities 
and Local Governments, and the World Association of Major 
Metropolises.220 These organizations and others aligned with their 
goals may play a key part in the rebirth of a world of increasingly 
autonomous and sovereign cities, given their rising power in 
economic and demographic terms, and their political ability to 
counter centralizing tendencies in today’s nation states.
V. OPPORTUNITY FOR A RE-EMERGENT HANSEATIC LEAGUE
Although they have deep knowledge of and experience with 
past and present best practices, the above groups to date have 
offered few solutions on how SEZs and startup communities can 
adapt to a fast-approaching era of exponential change. Existing 
organizations of all kinds will be tested to the limit by coming 
changes in technology, financial markets, migrant and refugee 
flows, cultural conflicts, and security challenges. New solutions 
will be needed to navigate torrential changes ahead.  
A New Hanseatic League can be at the forefront of 
innovating to meet these needs. It could arise through moves by 
online communities across the planet to explore self-funding 
solutions—grounded in zones of extrastatecraft—that can help 
societies transition through the upcoming disruptions.221 With 
the help of volunteers forming virtual guilds to assist a range of 
technologically advanced free zone ventures, a New Hanseatic 
League can fill the vacuum created by the zero-sum power 
struggles of nation states by using digital tools to spread islands 
of opportunity in areas now ruled by corrupt regimes. These tools 
can introduce contractual forms of governance that can awaken 
assets in communities mired in poverty. They also can be 
extended to governance systems that can fully open oceans and 
space to human settlement and discovery.  
220 Robert Muggah & Eugene Zapata Garesche, How cities are rewiring international 
affairs, DEVEX (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.devex.com/news/how-cities-are-rewiring-
international-affairs-88517 [http://perma.cc/7PZN-HTW6].
221 Vast pools of online talent could play a pivotal role in meeting these challenges. 
Wikipedia, Linux, Apache, and other open source and creative commons initiatives have 
engaged millions of volunteers in creation of free digital resources.  
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A global New Hanseatic League can engage those around the 
world who want to contribute towards these ends. It can offer 
associate member status to individuals who are ready to join (or 
create) online guilds that embrace what Explorers’ Foundation 
founder Leif Smith describes as “freeorder” values and that can 
volunteer services to help existing and future SEZs and startup 
communities expand the frontiers of extrastatecraft.222 Much as 
the original Hanseatic League drew strength upon the peer to peer 
relationships woven within and among its member guilds, a new 
Hanseatic League can work through social networks and 
specialized online communities to develop orientations and 
courses, provide work-study projects, and add value to grassroots 
projects freeing areas from political predation. This can create a 
powerful amplifier of extrastatecraft initiatives and force for their 
replication. Social networks, as observers such as Robert Muggah 
have noted, are now emerging as “Net States” approaching or 
overtaking nation states as a focus of the allegiances and daily 
engagement of billions of the world’s people.223
Active communities of online volunteers can support a New 
Hanseatic League in bringing a range of opportunities to areas 
within failing and failed states. They can help plan and crowdfund 
“day one” benefits, such as microscholarships for online learning 
and eVouchers for telemedicine resources, for local residents who 
are interested in better governance and alternatives to predatory 
rule. These digital donations and related support services can flow 
especially to local allies who view New Hanseatic League-prepared 
orientations, who express interest in finding work in global 
freelancing markets, and/or who wish to launch entrepreneurial 
startups and self-help ventures. Volunteer guilds can expand 
virtual support for communities that identify possible sites for 
future SEZs, and chart paths for removing barriers to investment. 
“In the twenty-first century, trust, reputation and reciprocal 
relations are again vital as people pursue projects and careers 
rather than just jobs,” notes Jerry Edling, past editor of Public 
Diplomacy magazine.224 “The port cities of the Hanseatic League 
222 See Leif Smith, freeorder – meaning and use, LIBERTY (Apr. 30, 2014), https://free 
order.liberty.me/freeorder-meaning-and-use-of-the-word/ [http://perma.cc/G9KP-8DAT].
223 Robert Muggah, Countries are so last century. Enter the ‘net state,’ WORLD ECON. F.
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/countries-nations-net-states-
globalization-populism/ [http://perma.cc/WW8J-VY23].
224 Jerry Edling, The Future of Work, AUGMENTED REALITY (May 9, 2017), http://augmented 
realtiy.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-future-of-work.html [http://perma.cc/KF5F-X3S9]. Parag 
Khanna has expressed the view on many occasions that Hanseatic precedents are 
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Phoenicians also created tax-free trade outposts. These formed the 
western world’s first enduring network of SEZs. 
Offering “gifts on a beach” in digital form will enable a New 
Hanseatic League to plant seeds for potentially thousands of new 
zones of extrastatecraft. In the Internet age, digital donations can 
begin relationships with even remote communities that have been 
long mired in poverty and misrule, yet have promising sites for 
developing as future zones of extrastatecraft. Gift bundles can 
include free cell phone minutes, vouchers for Internet access, 
microscholarships for online courses, and offers of global volunteer 
support to help identify and launch crowdfundable local projects. 
As local allies explore these and other opportunities available 
through the virtual offerings of a New Hanseatic League, they can 
respond by uploading evidence of their interest in moving forward. 
The most promising local responses will be those that map 
scenarios for committing sites and reforms for new SEZs and 
startup communities to flourish. (As outlined later, such responses 
could unlock much higher levels of engagement and partnership 
opportunities with the League.) 
Created with the help of new guilds of virtual volunteers, 
a new global Hanseatic League can offer digital donations 
and increasing layers of online support services for each of 
the following:
1. Anytime/Anywhere Learning  
Education in many parts of the world falls far short of meeting 
needs. Public school teachers are frequently absent or go through 
the motions of teaching. Students tune out in class. Topics taught 
often are outmoded, ill preparing learners for coming market and 
technological change. Catalytic gifts from a New Hanseatic League 
can begin to change this. Microscholarships can be offered to cover 
the costs of accessing online skills and certifications, including 
new language and technical skills. In a not-far-off future, 
AI-assisted personal tutoring services and cell phone-based 
Augmented Reality and Virtual Reality experiences also can help 
learners more rapidly advance. These kinds of help can go to 
students and households whose members watch short clips on New 
Hanseatic League values and who pass a brief online quiz to 
confirm understanding of the near and long-term rewards of 
extrastatecraft. A key part of such introductions can be scenarios 
for awakening land values on idle sites via community land trusts 
formed as locally-owned SEZ development ventures. The League 
also can sponsor online contests with globally-recognized judges to 
help learners gain and spread skills valued in online markets. 
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Awards can recognize any person or group that records and 
uploads a proof of notable success—whether achieved through 
informal peer learning or League-provided online courses. 
Successes can include gaining or spreading skills in literacy, 
persuasive speaking and writing, keyboarding, graphic design, 
music, and/or storytelling.  
2. Online Jobs and New Local Ventures  
At present, hundreds of millions of jobseekers around the 
world remain unaware of immediate opportunities to find work in 
global freelance markets. Gifts offered by a New Hanseatic League 
can include online orientations on the range of such opportunities 
as well as starter bundles of credential-building experiences. 
These opportunities can be offered to individuals of all skill levels. 
For the less skilled, the League can arrange to send basic tasks 
such as entering data from scanned business cards, watching 
remote security cameras, creating custom ring tones, writing 
lyrics, sketching ideas for logos, and editing photos. Microprojects 
that require higher skills can include doing web searches, 
distilling information, creating short animations, or improving 
eLearning resources (including those provided by the League). 
New freelancers, by these means, can build a track record of 
experience crucial to their successful entry into burgeoning online 
markets such as Fiverr.com and Freelancer.com. High performers 
in these markets then may attract notice and direct investments 
into their new startup freelance ventures through organizations 
such as CodersTrust.com.234
In parallel with offering initial work-study “gigs” for jobseekers 
to build reputation visible in fast-growing online markets, a New 
Hanseatic League also can offer starter resources for individuals 
who prefer to launch actual ventures in their community. These can 
include how-to information and toolkits helping recipients identify 
self-help projects that can make their communities safer, healthier, 
and more attractive for business startups. Specific toolkits and 
volunteer services offered to local allies in poor areas could include 
help with launching entrepreneurial schools and peer learning 
circles, identifying sites for community land trusts, exploring 
markets for potential ecotourism and AirBnb ventures, and 
234 About, CODERSTRUST, https://www.coderstrust.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/5B3F-XFFA].
CodersTrust describes its vision: “We believe in a borderless world with equal opportunities 
for everyone. We believe student finance and the freelance market will make this 
happen.” Id.
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creating web sites that highlight local opportunities for diaspora or 
other international investors. 
3. Local Tech Initiatives  
John Robb has summed up a formula for community 
success in the future: “[L]ocalize production. Virtualize everything 
else.”235 Exponentially improving technologies are bringing this 
success formula within reach. A New Hanseatic League can 
prepare online courses, toolkits, and coaching to help communities 
understand and act upon the expanding range resources for local 
self-sufficiency. Aspects covered can include advances in 
affordable solar powered microgrids, smartphone and drone 
assisted farming, makerspaces, shelter, water purification, and 
waste treatment.236 Digital tools and support services can help 
League-assisted counterparts in communities identify practical 
(and crowdfundable) options in the near term, as well as envision 
future opportunities to benefit from breakthrough technologies. 
By these steps, communities can better position themselves for 
self-sufficiency as technologies enable re-localizing of many kinds 
of production. This shift likely will have broader implications. As 
George Zarkadakis has noted, it is possible that “the automation 
of work will mean the demise of big corporations and the rise of 
digital, small-scale, distributed cottage industries. Over time, 
these collaborative networks might evolve into virtual city-states, 
and even replace physical nations as the units of political 
organisation and citizen loyalty.”237
4. Contract-based Governance  
As failures of current political governance mount, a New 
Hanseatic League can offer digital resources that can enable civil 
society to create contract-based alternatives. These can be 
grounded on a simple pledge that could become a condition of 
membership in a global New Hanseatic League: “Do what you 
commit to do. Do not transgress against the person or property of 
others. Give in ways that help others become free.” Individuals 
who uploaded a further pledge to use arbitration could unlock 
235 Michel Bauwens, Localize Production. Virtualize everything else. A collection of 
citations on open design and manufacturing, P2P FOUND. (June 3, 2010), 
https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/localize-production-virtualize-everything-else-a-collection-
of-citations-on-open-design-and-manufacturing/2010/06/03 [http://perma.cc/T6K7-LWME].
236 See KEVIN A. CARSON, THE HOMEBREW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: A LOW-OVERHEAD 
MANIFESTO 127 (2010).
237 George Zarkadakis, The economy is more a messy, fractal living thing than a 
machine, AEON (Oct. 13, 2016), https://aeon.co/ideas/the-economy-is-more-a-messy-fractal-
living-thing-than-a-machine [http://perma.cc/S2HC-5YSF].
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further levels of digital support from the League, flowing as well 
to all of their friends and neighbors who make similar (Blockchain-
recorded) commitments. 
Among the additional digital donations can be apps for 
residents of poor areas to create private land registries, which 
could be especially helpful in awakening land values in places 
where government registries are prone to corruption. Residents 
could use cell phone cameras to take pictures of lot boundaries 
as well as short video statements by their neighbors regarding 
the uncontested property lines. These then can be uploaded 
through local internet centers to League-affiliated, Blockchain-
based land registries for viewing by diaspora and other 
prospective investors. In cases where uploads to private land 
registries go unchallenged in an “open comments” period, and 
where public bodies agree to officially recognize the new 
(uncontested) neighborhood land registries, further digital 
resources would flow to all participants.238
A parallel offering by a New Hanseatic League could include 
apps and support services for neighborhoods seeking to form 
contract-based associations of property owners. Associations backed 
by Blockchain-recorded deed covenants would have a new means 
through which to privately undertake a wide range of functions. 
Based on their members’ decisions, these functions may include 
cleanup/fixup efforts, crime watches, and contracting with service 
providers to fill gaps left by underperforming municipalities. To 
make group decision-making easier in these private self-governance 
associations, the apps and toolkits also could support extended 
proxy voting systems (“liquid democracy”), as well as introduce 
“double democracy” innovations proposed by Tom W. Bell to protect 
the rights of non-property owners in the system.239
5. Asset Uplift 
Global “lead with a gift” offerings from a New Hanseatic 
League also could include innovative ways for all to share in the 
uplift in land values that occurs when political rent-seeking 
retreats. Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist and head of the 
238 See Mark Frazier, New Catalysts for Sustainability, 36–54 (Oct. 15, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.academia.edu/4397389/New_Catalysts_for_Sustain 
ability_Sabre_Foundation (exploring Asset-awakening impacts of digital donations for the 
Sabre Foundation with support from the late John C. Whitehead). The concept of digital 
donations as an opportunity for philanthropy originated with Sabre Foundation co-founder 
Josiah Lee Auspitz, an author and researcher on the philosophy of free institutions. 
239 Bell, supra note 116, at 158. 
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Institute for Liberty and Democracy, estimates that more than $9 
trillion in land values is now lost worldwide as a result of flawed 
governance systems.240 The emergence of trustworthy land 
registries and creation of lasting property owners associations can 
be enormous catalysts in lifting land values. 
Asset Uplift tools in the League’s gift packages for poor 
communities could contain two key elements. The first would help 
local allies map contract-based ways for impoverished as well as 
affluent residents to share in the benefits created by upward 
moves in land values. It would provide guidance and support for 
creation of revenue-generating Community Land Trusts on 
now-idle public lands conveyed by local authorities. As 
neighborhoods become more attractive through the formation of 
private land registries and formation of homeowners associations, 
lease revenues would rise from lands held by the trust. These 
revenues could be directly shared with low-income residents who 
stayed active in crime watches, youth mentoring and tutoring, 
cleanup/fixup efforts, art and music festivals, or other actions 
benefiting neighborhood property values.  
The second element in the Asset Uplift package would 
include tools for local residents to identify what barriers to 
investment and entrepreneurship most depress the value of their 
trust’s land holdings. Working with global virtual guilds of the 
New Hanseatic League, the local residents could take stock of 
remediable barriers and identify practical policy measures that 
could bring about further gains for their shared land holdings. 
These reforms can become the foundation for future dialog 
between local residents and policymakers regarding ways to 
maximize lease revenues flowing from the Community Land 
Trusts. Lease revenues benefiting low-income residents could 
rise many times in value as policy reforms lifted barriers to 
investment and entrepreneurship in the trust-held areas. 
Variants of SEZs such as Endowment Zones and All-Share Zones 
have been proposed exactly for such purpose.241
240 See Chris Arsenault, Property rights for world’s poor could unlock trillions in ‘dead 
capital’: economist, BUS. NEWS (July 31, 2016, 9:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-global-landrights-desoto/property-rights-for-worlds-poor-could-unlock-trillions-in-dead-
capital-economist-idUSKCN10C1C1. 
241 Endowment Zones: Building resilient safety nets, environmental trusts, and public 
services, RADICAL SOC. ENTREPRENEURS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.radicalsocialentreps.org/ 
2012/04/endowment-zones-using-commerce-to-build-safety-nets-and-public-services/ 
[http://perma.cc/MK2R-JQ63]; Mark Frazier, Generating Assets in “All-Share” Demonstration 
Areas, OPENWORLD INST. (2007), http://www.openworldinstitute.org/demonstration-areas-
open-world/ [http://perma.cc/7G8W-BTM7].
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Virtual guilds working on Asset Uplift initiatives could 
fast-track fundraising support for especially attractive local 
projects. The guilds can help local allies plan and launch global 
crowdfunding campaigns for development of small projects on the 
initial land trust areas. By agreement with the land trust, a 
(small) share in the lease revenues from large expansion areas 
could be set aside to recognize help from League-affiliated 
volunteer guilds that made exceptional contributions to the local 
Asset Uplift initiatives. Revenues from such shares could help 
cover costs of ongoing support from the virtual guild in attracting 
investors and businesses to the trust-held locations. 
6. Financial Innovations  
Another gift bundle offered by the New Hanseatic League, 
aimed at communities suffering from inflation or other monetary 
and financial disasters, could be a range of tools to bypass these 
failures. League support packages might include orientations on 
reasons for the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies, 
crowdfunding platforms, Blockchain-based systems for receiving 
and tracking overseas fund transfers, as well as new solutions for 
time-based bartering and creation of personally-issued currencies. 
The package also can include links to solution providers 
recommended by the League’s various virtual guilds.  
The League similarly could provide tools for creating local 
land-based currencies, in cases where Community Land Trusts or 
SEZs were ready to share ground lease revenues. As accelerating 
technologies make it possible to drive the costs of most goods and 
services toward free, land values will rise sharply in areas that 
best facilitate this process. Zones and startup communities 
offering plenitude to residents will find that their local land-based 
currencies will be in high demand, especially if holders can convert 
them into the rights to visit and/or live in the community for the 
lengths of stay indicated on the currency notes. 
7. Public Sector Resets 
As nation states come under mounting internal strains, 
needs are growing for public officials to understand—and act 
upon—opportunities to evolve in more responsive and decentralized 
directions. Gift bundles offered by the New Hanseatic League could 
contain digital resources for public officials to explore and 
understand options that lead to rewarding transitions. 
The Public Sector Reset package could include multimedia 
tours and Skype sessions with officials of areas that have 
successfully moved away from bureaucratic and corruption prone 
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systems towards more transparent systems, especially through 
the vehicle of SEZs. Innovations such as Singapore’s Flexiwage for 
increasing public sector salaries (in step with economic growth 
rates),242 and Hong Kong’s postwar success in generating more 
than $100 billion in revenue from leasing government-owned 
land,243 can be among the innovations highlighted. 
The League also could prepare a range of revenue-generating 
eGovernment solutions as part of the Public Sector Reset package. 
Turn-key eGovernment modules can draw upon global best 
practices, adaptable with the help of virtual guilds and in-country 
partners to local needs. Modules can be created for streamlined 
investment approvals, preparing build-operate-transfer deals with 
privately-funded infrastructure providers, open tendering of SEZ 
development concessions, auctioning of long-term leaseholds on 
publicly-owned sites, and introducing online systems for company 
registry, eResidencies and visas, and work permits.  
The New Hanseatic League could globally promote ULEX as 
an interface for creating world-class SEZ enabling acts and 
implementing regulations. An open source initiative launched by 
Chapman University Fowler School of Law professor Tom W. Bell, 
ULEX makes it possible to integrate best practices from the 
statutes of a range of highly successful SEZ, as well as from 
established nation states, and apply them in small demonstration 
sites that can be designed to scale up to areas comparable to 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Dubai in size.244
In almost all cases, the value of digital donations and support 
offered via a “lead with a gift” initiative would be keyed to evidence 
of local progress. Uploads by grassroots allies of videos to the 
Blockchain would confirm when pre-defined milestones had been 
reached. Each major milestone would unlock higher levels of 
support from a New Hanseatic League and its guilds of volunteers. 
These benefits would flow directly to neighborhood residents and 
to active self-help groups, in the form of microvouchers to access 
eLearning and eHealthcare, free cell phone minutes, and higher 
matching ratios in guild-assisted global crowdfunding campaigns 
to assist local projects. Smart contracts, also grounded in the 
242 See PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, supra note 133. 
243 See Shirley Zhao, Does Hong Kong’s land sale system need a new lease of life?, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/economy/article/2088556/does-hong- 
kongs-land-sale-system-need-new-lease-life [http://perma.cc/LT73-DVQ7] (last updated 
Apr. 19, 2017). 
244 See Tom W. Bell, Introducing ULEX: Towards Open Source Law for New Nations,
VOICE & EXIT (May 15, 2015), https://www.voiceandexit.com/introducing-ulex-towards-
open-source-law-for-new-nations/ [http://perma.cc/R5Z6-H6KX]. 
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Blockchain, could be used to remove any question over whether 
enriched gift bundles would flow as local skills spread, land 
registries of undisputed properties were created, and deed-based 
neighborhood associations were formed. 
The greatest gift bundles could be reserved for residents of 
areas where policymakers transferred idle public properties to 
community land trusts—and agreed to policy reforms that would 
rapidly boost their value. In this way, a New Hanseatic League 
and its virtual allies would spread seeds for initially small, but 
scalable, SEZs to emerge. Grants of expansion areas to community 
land trusts in many economically-lagging regions could be 
substantial, paving the way for phased development of SEZs that 
could come to rival Singapore, Hong Kong, Dubai, and Shenzhen 
in size. Revenues generated by holding tenders to attract private 
developers in each phase could be shared with residents, local 
self-help organizations, public sector bodies (including Flexiwage-
style bonuses for their personnel), and global virtual volunteers 
who had made contributions highly rated by the community.  
SEZs created by this process would become full members 
of a New Hanseatic League, entering a community of 
virtually-frictionless hubs for innovation and wealth creation. As 
exponential technologies spread, all nodes in the New Hanseatic 
League network could become beneficiaries of a UBI—through 
radical reductions in the costs of now-scarce goods and services.245
Peter Diamandis has referred to this trend as a manifestation of 
market-generated “technological socialism,” in which machines 
rather than governments provide a wide range of free education 
and health care resources wherever Internet connections exist.246
With regard to education, any individual who joined directly as an 
associate or full member of a New Hanseatic League community 
in the near future could receive personalized learning—delivered 
through mutual learning networks, free courseware, and AI 
tutors—highly attuned to their individual interests and needs. 
Over time, agreements on “sojourner visas” akin to those proposed 
by futurist James C. Bennett in The Anglosphere Challenge could 
be reached that give residents in good standing the ability to visit 
or live in other areas that have joined the League’s network.247
245 See Peter Diamandis, Demonetized Cost of Living, DIAMANDIS TECH BLOG (July 18, 
2016), http://www.diamandis.com/blog/demonetized-cost-of-living [http://perma.cc/T78T-4ABX]. 
246 Id. 
247 JAMES C. BENNETT, THE ANGLOSPHERE CHALLENGE: WHY THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
NATIONS WILL LEAD THE WAY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 149–56 (2004). 
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This can lead to a rise in opportunities and living standards for 
residents of New Hanseatic League communities across the globe.  
B. “Stretch Goals” for a New Hanseatic League 
A New Hanseatic League also could advance human freedom, 
prosperity, and wellbeing in other ways. With the help of 
volunteers in virtual guilds working to free areas from political 
rent-seeking, the League can bring fundamentally new kinds of 
SEZs into being, adapting to the opportunities and challenges 
created by advanced technologies. 
1. Advanced Forms of SEZs and Startup Societies 
Over the millennia, SEZs have evolved. They have gone from 
small tax-free areas for storage and transshipment of goods, to 
campus-sized areas for manufacturing and services operations, to 
large freeports and Shenzhen-style zones with diversified 
economies and millions of residents. A New Hanseatic League can 
help launch a new generation of SEZs and innovative startup 
communities. These can cater to the exponential technologies that 
increasingly will enable radical advances for humanity in 
self-governance and in opening new frontiers.248
The League could engage global volunteers and work with 
leading NGOs, private developers, and infrastructure providers 
in coming years to establish the following new kinds of 
contract-based SEZs and startup communities: 
a. World Cities  
As developed nations move to block entry by migrants and 
refugees, opportunities are growing to establish new Hong Kong 
or Singapore-scale areas that can welcome immigrants who 
possess language and technical skills and value cultural 
pluralism.249 World Cities open to such pools of talent also could 
draw upon the best elements of existing SEZ statutes and 
248 See Frazier, supra note 50.
249 Mark Frazier, Creation of World Cities: An Opportunity for Economies in 
Transition 3 (Feb. 16, 1992) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.academia.edu/2894 
4734/Creation_of_World_Cities_An_Opportunity_for_Economies_in_Transition_1992_original_ 
study_; see also Frazier, supra note 227. A point system for entry visas into World 
Cities could be developed, keyed to an applicant’s demonstrated understanding of: 
(1) transcultural values of individualism, and (2) demonstrated success in spreading these 
values among family members and friends whom accepted immigrants also could directly 
sponsor for visas. Before moving, individuals could gain many extra points by earning high 
reputations—and revenue—in global freelance markets such as www.Upwork.com, 
www.Fiverr.com, and www.Guru.com. 
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regulations worldwide when creating their policy environments, so 
as to establish unsurpassed environments for investment and 
entrepreneurship.250 Private developers may compete to win rights 
to develop World Cities of this kind without need for subsidy, given 
confidence in the economic reforms as well as in sites offered by 
the host country for lease on a long-term basis. Rent-sharing 
agreements and build-operate-transfer concessions signed by 
developers of World Cities can produce notable revenue and asset 
gains for the government and citizens of the countries. The market 
opportunity for creating multiple World Cities is enormous—a 
2009 Gallup survey concluded that 700 million people on Earth 
would like to move permanently to other countries.251 Virtual 
guilds interested in promoting examples of depoliticized 
communities and in alleviating hardships experienced by those 
fleeing wars and failed states could make potentially historic 
contributions by helping to launch and spread World Cities. 
b. Seasteads  
Global talent similarly can be tapped on a large scale for 
creating “Seasteads”—floating startup communities that operate 
with a high level of freedom—on the world’s oceans. Already, 
organizations such as the nonprofit, Seasteading Institute, and 
Blue Frontiers, its companion for-profit venture, have found a 
vibrant response from volunteers to initial Seasteading 
opportunities offered in the Pacific.252 The success of an initial 
Seastead is likely to lead to generate waves of subsequent interest 
in sea-based communities. Many of these are likely to seek SEZ 
status or full-fledged autonomy and independence from political 
bodies. As described in Seasteading, a new book by Patri Friedman 
and Joe Quirk, Seasteads offer perhaps the most inspiring near-
term prospects for volunteers from all countries to help create and 
spread globally visible examples of new forms of extrastatecraft.253
250 Bell, supra note 116, at 188. 
251 Nelli Esipova & Julie Ray, 700 Million Worldwide Desire to Migrate Permanently,
GALLUP NEWS (Nov. 2, 2009), http://news.gallup.com/poll/124028/700-million-worldwide-
desire-migrate-permanently.aspx [http://perma.cc/6G9H-AW2T]. 
252 Floating City Project: A fresh start on a floating community by 2020, SEASTEADING 
INST., https://www.seasteading.org/floating-city-project/ [http://perma.cc/ZU9R-ZCJW].
253 JOE QUIRK & PATRI FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING NATIONS WILL 
RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT, ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND LIBERATE HUMANITY 
FROM POLITICIANS 31 (2017). 
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c. Earthports  
Another opportunity to inspire New Hanseatic League 
volunteers is the prospect of creating large new SEZs that 
accelerate humanity’s leap into space. Rapid plunges in launch 
costs are now making it possible for international space freeports, 
first proposed during the 1970s by the Sabre Foundation, to 
become economically as well as politically feasible.254 Given the 
introduction of Hong Kong-class incentives at prime launch sites 
(ideally located near the equator for maximum launching 
efficiencies), and at nearby areas attractive to a range of investors, 
ground lease revenues could reach hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually. A portion of these revenues could be applied to prepare 
off-planet human settlements governed by contractual agreements 
rather than political bodies. 
d. Communities in Space  
The prospect of mass movements of people into space is no 
longer a remote prospect. Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, has 
recently announced his intent to develop a city on Mars with one 
million residents before 2067.255 He’s planned the first manned 
Mars mission in 2023.256 In view of this timeline, volunteer guilds 
assisting a New Hanseatic League could make valuable input 
regarding the potential for contractual governance systems to help 
new settlements on Mars minimize or avoid the kinds of recurring 
political dysfunctions that have scarred Earth. 
These areas can be grounded in a philosophy of free 
institutions that respect a self-organizing “freeorder” contractual 
basis for civilizations. The next generation of SEZs and startup 
communities in a New Hanseatic League can be grounded in 
covenants to depoliticize relationships among sovereign 
individuals of all creeds, countries of origin, and biological lineages. 
2. Uses of Common Heritage Resources 
A New Hanseatic League can extend a revolution in 
governance in another way. It could lead in preparing 
extrastatecraft agreements for the development of resources in 
254 Michael A.G. Michaud, REACHING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER: THE AMERICAN PRO-
SPACE MOVEMENT 1972-84, at 247–70 (1986). 
255 Sarah Knapton, Elon Musk: We’ll Create a City on Mars with a Million Inhabitants,
TELEGRAPH (June 21, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/ 2017/06/21/elon-
musk-create-city-mars-million-inhabitants/ [http://perma.cc/MXD5-HZ5L].  
256 Id.
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Outer Space. International treaties recognize space as “common 
heritage” frontier whose resources are to be developed on a basis 
that benefits all humankind.257 The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
forbids ownership claims by nations as well as corporations.258
The treaty has had a positive aspect. It creates room under 
international public law for depoliticized frameworks to globally 
share the commercial benefits of resources found on humanity’s 
ultimate frontier. In the five decades since the Outer Space 
Treaty was adopted, however, little headway has been made in 
opening space for the benefit of all of humanity. The 107 
ratifying nation states have deadlocked over ways to 
commercially develop common pool resources of outer space in 
accord with the treaty provisions. 
A New Hanseatic League may overcome the impasse by 
introducing new contractual systems for developing space 
resources for the benefit of all humanity. These can be grounded 
on the insights of Elinor Ostrom and Chris Cook, who have 
respectively mapped the potentials for non-governmental user 
associations and “nondominium” legal frameworks to encourage 
commercial development of common pool resources.259 In both 
cases, agreements are created for stewardship, rather than for 
ownership of commercially-valued resources. (The nondominium 
legal vehicle would enable stewards to set transparent tenders for 
private investors to bid on commercial development opportunities, 
with escrowing of paid-in fees and royalties until all who wished 
to benefit from the common pool resource have come to unanimous 
agreement on how to use the funds.)260 A New Hanseatic League 
could create covenants for communities to use such frameworks to 
escrow leasehold fees paid by developers, as a means of respecting 
the Treaty’s ban on land ownership claims. 
The League could go a step further to ensure that every 
human being can share in commercial development of space 
257 Valnora Leister, Economic Governance and Space Law: Emerging Foundations for 
Development of “Common Pool Resources” in Outer Space, 3 INDIAN J. INT’L ECON. L., 64, 
66–67 (2010). 
258 Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? Space Law & Outer Space Treaties,
SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.space.com/33440-space-law.html. 
259 See Leister, supra note 257, at 64; Nondominium: establishing consensus and 
collaboration for the Caspian nations, UCL RESILIBLOG (Oct. 4, 2011), http://blogs. 
ucl.ac.uk/resilience/2011/10/04/nondominium-establishing-consensus-and-collaboration-
for-the-caspian-nations/ [http://perma.cc/74LG-K2UQ].
260 Valnora Leister & Mark Frazier, From Local to Global Commons: Applying 
Ostrom's Key Principles for Sustainable Governance, CONFERENCE ON EARTH SYSTEMS
GOVERNANCE 18 (2012). 
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resources. Startup entrepreneurs who join New Hanseatic League 
could use the liberalized business climates established by member 
zones and startup communities to fund their ventures, by 
initiating global Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) and equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. Ventures funded by this means could 
include a set-aside for a success-sharing innovation proposed by 
Trent McConaghy, who has suggested a way to broadly “tokenize” 
shares in enterprises conducting ICOs.261 By contractual 
agreement with League and/or any of its supporting guilds, a small 
portion of the tokens issued by each spacefaring ICO could be 
escrowed for a future global “airdrop,” building on recent 
international precedents.262 (In the New Hanseatic League 
covenants, each person on Earth would have a Blockchain-
recorded birthright to a direct pro rata sliver of the tokens 
reserved for this success-sharing purpose by spacefaring 
ventures.) Over time, the value of such set-asides could rise 
significantly given the magnitude of the wealth waiting to be 
created on the new frontier. Escrowed funds for individuals would 
be released by New Hanseatic League smart contracts upon the 
first of the following conditions to occur: the value of the escrowed 
funds reach a League-set threshold level, or any nation state 
individually requests the League to release the escrowed funds 
directly to its citizens.
In the vacuums left by failures of nation states to act, Jurgen 
Brauer and Robert Haywood have identified ways for global civil 
society organizations to move forward as “non-state sovereign 
entrepreneurs” and “non-territorial sovereign organizations.”263
Their paper, published by United Nations University in 2010, gave 
as examples the cases of ICANN, the nongovernmental body 
responsible for ground rules applying to all Internet domain 
registries, and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(“IASB”), a similar nonpolitical body which sets global standards 
for financial reporting. Brauer and Haywood conclude that 
“state-based global governance is unlikely to succeed” in creating 
effective, peaceful and just responses to looming challenges.264
Another form of governance in their view holds far more hope—one 
261 Trent McConaghy, Tokenize the Enterprise . . . And Melt It Into the Community. 
Rinse, Repeat., BIGCHAIN DB (June 6, 2017), https://blog.bigchaindb.com/tokenize-the-
enterprise-23d51bafb536 [http://perma.cc/4DJX-7BPJ].  
262 See Global Bitcoin Airdrop 2017 Will Take Place in Six Countries, ALTCOINTODAY (July 
29, 2017), http://www.altcointoday.com/bitcoin-airdrop-2017/ [http://perma.cc/F48J-NK4D]. 
263 Jurgen Brauer & Robert Haywood, Non-state Sovereign Entrepreneurs and Non-
territorial Sovereign Organizations 9, 12 (UN Univ., Working Paper No. 2010/09), 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2010-09.pdf. 
264 Id. at 9. 
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created by civil society and by business organizations that have 
transcended state boundaries. A New Hanseatic League can help 
fill the void created through nation state failures by following the 
precedents of ICANN and IASB to build a similar global sovereign 
non-state enterprise for contractual governance. 
VI. SHARING THE UPSIDES
Given adoption of favorable policies, zones of extrastatecraft 
have the potential to awaken trillions of dollars in now-dormant 
land values on Earth, as well as to open immense off-planet 
sources of wealth. The prospect of enabling such gains can help a 
New Hanseatic League reward governments and residents in 
sponsoring countries, incentivize guilds of virtual volunteers, tap 
talents of refugees and other at-risk populations, and create 
options for funding new global rounds of catalytic gifts to expand 
the number of success-sharing zones and startup communities 
affiliated with the League. 
A. Enriching Sponsoring Nations 
Host countries assisted by the New Hanseatic League can 
reap substantial revenues and land value gains, proportional to 
the size and quality of sites conveyed and the strength of policy 
reform commitments. SEZs and startup communities operating 
on long-term land leases could become an especially rewarding 
opportunity. One way to enrich host countries would be through 
a Hong Kong-inspired system in which the host government 
retains ownership of all land and arranges global auctions and 
tenders to attract bids by risk-taking private investors that seek 
long-term (fifty-year) leases. Hong Kong has reaped more than 
$100 billion over four decades in revenues from auctions and 
tenders given the exceptionally favorable tax and regulatory 
environment it has maintained for investors and entrepreneurs.265
The upsides of this approach need not go to the government alone. 
Shares of the annual lease revenue generated on publicly-owned 
sites benefiting from SEZ status also could flow directly each 
year to residents, following the precedent of Macau’s UBI 
“Wealth Partaking” system. 
Other revenue-generating opportunities for host countries can 
arise through introduction of eResidencies and online company 
registry systems after the successful models of Estonia and of 
Delaware in the United States.266 Substantial further earnings 
265 See Zhao, supra note 243. 
266 See MEDIUM, supra note 160. 
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could be realized through introduction of Dubai-style online visa 
and work permits, as well as new “green lane” eGovernment 
services that offer fast-turnaround processing of forms and 
permits in return for a web-based user fee. 
A further way for host countries to profit is through 
build-operate-transfer concessions. In these, private bidders seek 
rights within an economically liberalized area to develop airports, 
ports, road, electric, and/or water/sewer systems. The chosen 
concessionaire then can profitably recoup its investments through 
user fees over a pre-agreed period, normally in a twenty to 
fifty-year range. During this period, the concessionaires 
progressively transfer ownership of the infrastructure to local 
counterparts, who at the end of the agreed term hold full or almost-
full ownership of the physical assets built by foreign risk-taking 
capital and ongoing income from user fees. 
B. Rewarding Volunteers and their Guilds 
A New Hanseatic League could offer rewards for individuals 
and guilds of their choosing that provide tools and services valued 
by communities and countries. Creators of open source eLearning 
resources, crowdfunding tools, policy reform packages, 
eGovernment apps, lease auction and tendering systems, and 
online support services could be rewarded with “Freedompoints,” 
a new League-issued reputation currency. Freedompoints could be 
earned by any volunteer earning overall high feedback ratings 
from participating communities, and/or by being credited by these 
communities for making valued specific contributions to achieving 
crowdfunding goals, policy reform targets or market-based 
successes for specific projects. Local allies in the same way might 
earn Freedompoints by uploading video clips confirming active 
contributions to neighborhood improvement efforts over a 
sustained period and/or launching community land trusts and 
securing policy reforms. All holders of Freedompoints might 
convert them into microvouchers or other digital resources of value 
to themselves, to their friends and families, and/or to others in 
their guilds. Recipients also would have options to donate 
Freedompoints to local or global good causes of their choosing 
aligned with New Hanseatic League values and pilots of 
extrastatecraft. In areas where local communities so agreed, 
Freedompoints might convert into shares for guilds in ground 
lease revenues generated by the land trusts and SEZs that their 
members had helped in early stages. The prospect of earning a 
share in the ground rents of future Hong Kongs and Singapores 
could be a powerful incentive for virtual guilds to effectively 
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volunteer. Visa costs also might be discounted by League-
affiliated communities to ease future entry by volunteers and 
their families into the global network of League-affiliated SEZs 
and startup communities. 
C. Helping At-Risk Populations 
At present, the challenge of dealing with sixty million 
migrants, refugees, displaced people, and stateless persons is 
overwhelming the capabilities of nation states and international 
organizations. A New Hanseatic League may be able to make 
urgently needed contributions. Virtual guilds of volunteers could 
directly assist refugees and others in gaining skills, absorbing 
transcultural values, entering online telework markets, and 
earning reputations through small work-study freelance gigs. 
High performing individuals then could be invited to join guild 
teams volunteering to help formative projects for SEZs and 
startup communities in impoverished or other troubled areas. 
These projects especially would aim to help seed and support 
immigration-friendly World Cities. Those who received positive 
feedback ratings for their volunteer work could earn 
Freedompoints for themselves and their families. Outstanding 
volunteers also could receive donations of frequent flier miles from 
their guilds, and/or employer-sponsored visas to locate in Dubai or 
other SEZs in the New Hanseatic League network that offer 
liberal entry for guild members in good standing.267
D. Funding New Rounds of Catalytic Gifts 
Before beginning volunteer efforts to help formative SEZs and 
startup communities, the League also might invite local 
counterparts to enter into pay-forward agreements, keyed to the 
future upsides generated. Such agreements might apply to 
expansion areas linked to small initial sites chosen for pilots of 
extrastatecraft. Such pay-forward provisions would be activated in 
cases where the local community asked the League to organize 
global tenders to attract private developers for the large-scale 
expansion areas. An agreed small portion of the upfront fees paid 
by the top bidder could help the New Hanseatic League seed more 
contractually-governed communities. (The rest would flow 
267 For a fuller description of this Freedompoints-related opportunity, see Mark 
Frazier, Seeds of Change Challenge Offers, OPENWORLD (2014), http://www.openworld.com/ 
accessing-openworld-challenge [http://perma.cc/33VM-E7TS]. Income earned from projects 
in online freelance markets (or from virtual volunteering through the League’s virtual 
guilds to awaken land values for specific projects) would provide further resources for 
refugees and migrants in the course of resettling.  
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primarily to local stakeholders, plus any of the League’s guilds that 
the local counterparts felt had made notable contributions.) The 
pay-forward funding would enable the League to extend further 
“lead with a gift” offers of digital donations and seed more 
voluntarily-governed areas.  
A possible incentive might give added reason for local projects 
to support a global pay-forward fund. The League could track the 
flow of funds committed by each project for this wider purpose. As 
future revenues came into the New Hanseatic League, it could vest 
each of the contributing communities on a pro rata basis as 
beneficiaries. The revenue streams could be generated via 
performance-linked contracts, under which the League would hold 
global tenders to attract private investors to develop World Cities 
and other large new extrastatecraft ventures, both on and off the 
planet. As these new privately-funded communities contribute to 
the pay-forward agreements, they in turn would benefit from the 
creation of further areas of extrastatecraft. 
VII. A STRATEGY FOR LAUNCHING THE NEW HANSEATIC LEAGUE
The heart of the New Hanseatic League’s strategy is to 
mobilize online talent and SEZs in partnerships that spread 
contractual systems of governance across the planet. Immutable 
agreements—such as those offered by the Blockchain and by 
Ethereum-based smart contracts—could ensure sharing of the 
resulting land value gains. Ultimately, the League’s strategy can 
vest all people on Earth as shareholders in newly-created 
depoliticized areas. The following are steps to achieve this outcome. 
A. Startup Scenario 
1. Creating the Working Group 
With support from highly regarded, technologically 
advanced SEZs—prospective Lübecks and Hamburgs for a 
globalized New Hanseatic League—a Working Group meets and 
refines the aims and values for the new venture. It designs a 
transparent, capture-proof, and politically nonaligned founding 
agreement to sustain peer-to-peer relationships among present 
and future zones of extrastatecraft. 
Practical issues resolved by the Working Group include 
choosing a legal vehicle and domicile and inviting a global network 
of supporters to join as founding members of the League. They 
design incentive frameworks for virtual guilds and others to 
provide in-kind inputs to SEZs and startup communities. The 
Working Group also engages a global core management team to 
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approach aligned organizations and potential funders, begins a 
world-wide publicity campaign, and launches a crowdfunding 
drive to attract resources for the League.  
2. Activating Partners 
Open source communities form League-affiliated virtual 
guilds to prepare toolkits and provide online help for new SEZs 
and startup communities. Highly regarded NGOs and 
technology research and development ventures offer plans to 
pilot exponential technologies in learning, healthcare, power, 
transportation, and government. 
3. Developing Orientations and Starter Toolkits 
Virtual volunteers go to work on creating orientations that 
can help individuals see the scope of opportunities. They develop 
downloadable materials in multiple languages to build skills and 
credentials for students and jobseekers to successfully enter online 
freelancing markets. Similar packages are created for local groups 
in poor areas to create private land registries, strengthen 
neighborhood self-help abilities, and map paths for creating land 
trusts and scalable SEZs. Orientations for public officials on 
success-sharing zones also are completed. 
4. Preparing Global Prizes and “Lead with a Gift” 
Challenge Offers 
Global crowdfunding campaigns enable the League to 
announce contests for communities to win “Lead with a Gift” 
challenge offers of digital donations. These gift offers of 
microscholarships, vouchers for telemedicine services, and 
introductory telework gigs go to localities that agree to explore 
SEZ and startup community opportunities. An annual global prize 
also is funded to benefit communities that go the farthest in 
launching extrastatecraft initiatives. 
5. Sparking Local Projects and Virtual Volunteering Initiatives 
A test project offers catalytic donations to pilot communities 
in poor areas on each continent. These flow to residents once a 
target number has viewed New Hanseatic League orientations on 
tools and support services created by League-affiliated guilds of 
volunteers. Higher levels of donations and volunteer support are 
unlocked as and when local residents move ahead with any of the 
tools. Progress uploads from the pilot villages prompt release of 
further donations and online help, including guild support for 
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global crowdfunding drives to back their locally-chosen 
extrastatecraft pilots.  
As videos from successful pilot projects are uploaded, the 
League raises new funds for its member guilds to expand challenge 
offers of digital donations. The League activates the first annual 
regional and global competitions to recognize and reward 
grassroots breakthroughs. 
6. Amplifying the Best Examples 
Virtual volunteers and local allies prepare documentaries and 
short courses showing highlights and lessons learned from the best 
extrastatecraft projects. These become part of learning resources 
and toolkits for subsequent projects. Freedompoints are awarded 
to all co-creators of highly rated materials, as well as to volunteers 
who lend outstanding virtual or onsite help to exemplary local 
initiatives (based on local feedback ratings). 
7. Launching Large SEZs and Startup Communities 
As local successes grow, the League mounts further global 
contests to support large-scale SEZ and startup community 
projects. Communities around the world are invited to commit 
vacant sites plus policy reforms to launch the next generation of 
Singapores and Hong Kongs. Contingent pledges of more than 
$500 million are raised from crowdfunding campaigns, 
philanthropists, and others for a World City competition to create 
a SEZ with liberalized visa policies. Guest worker visas are 
granted to 100,000 refugees and economic migrants who have 
earned outstanding reputations for their projects in global 
freelance markets and passed tests confirming world-class 
language skills and an appreciation of transcultural values. 
Within three years of operation, the first World City is 
prospering and the New Hanseatic League repeats the process. 
Private developers bid for concession rights to develop and 
operate the next World Cities under land rent-sharing and 
build-operate-transfer infrastructure agreements that directly 
benefit governments and citizens of the host countries. 
8. Opening New Frontiers for Voluntary Governance 
The New Hanseatic League reaches agreements with 
entrepreneurial launch companies to work towards creating 
international space launch areas—Earthports—as tax-exempt 
freeports for opening humanity’s next frontiers. Several of the 
sites offered by countries for the project include large land grants 
with SEZ incentives. Annual land lease revenues are shared 
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equally between the host government, citizens of the country, and 
civil society organizations working with entrepreneurs to create 
future off-planet communities. 
A similar process unfolds with League assisted Seasteading 
initiatives. Virtual guilds of volunteers work with nonprofit and 
for-profit firms to establish land-based SEZs in tandem with 
Seasteading concessions. A pre-agreed share of the annual ground 
lease revenues produced by the land-based “Endowment Zones” 
goes to fund eLearning and eHealthcare vouchers for all residents 
of adjacent communities. 
B. Issues to Resolve 
Early in its activation, the New Hanseatic League can deal 
with a range of open questions. The following are initial ideas on 
how the League and the global guilds of virtual volunteers may 
choose to answer them. 
1. What could the League do for already established SEZs and 
contract-based communities?
A key challenge for established zones and contractually-
governed communities will be dealing with the demonetizing and 
job-destroying aspects of new technologies. Zones that rely on 
labor-intensive means of production will be vulnerable to 
disruption as automation advances and rapidly deflates the prices 
of goods and services in open markets. Rather than depend on 
yesterday’s models, such areas can use toolkits and volunteer 
services offered by the New Hanseatic League to press for policy 
reforms that accelerate introduction of exponential technologies. 
The League also could help established zones and communities in 
identifying expansion area opportunities for established 
developers by pressing governments to convey sites into 
“Endowment Zone” community land trusts and apply policy 
reforms to increase their value. Owners, residents, and workers in 
the original SEZs and contractual communities could become 
shareholders in the land value uplift from such expansion zones 
as new technologies drive goods and services towards free. 
2. How will the League help new extrastatecraft areas expand 
from small pilots?
The League could provide model contracts that create 
dynamics for pilot areas to grow substantially over time. 
Initiators, investors, and providers of in-kind services in small 
startup zones could receive shares in the land value gains from 
each expansion area associated with the original project. Workers 
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and/or residents who came in during the first “quickstart” phase 
of SEZ development also might invest in shares of the lease 
revenues from development of later phases. Those who joined and 
helped during the second phase of development would reap 
rewards from a share in the lease earnings in third as well as 
subsequent expansion phases. In this way, “race conditions” could 
be established that incentivize all to contribute to pilot phase 
successes and to press thereafter for continuing expansion. Broad 
vesting of residents and workers in this way would create powerful 
economic and political pressures on policymakers to steadily 
enlarge zones of extrastatecraft.268
3. Can a New Hanseatic League contribute to easing refugee 
and migrant crises?
Virtual volunteers could engage refugees and migrants in 
co-creating curricula aligned with New Hanseatic League values 
of pluralism, transculturalism, and respect for personally-chosen 
destinies.269 Volunteers also could draw on refugee talent to 
prepare online platforms that help large numbers of students and 
jobseekers enter and find work in fast-growing global freelance 
markets such as www.Fiverr.com and www.Freelancer.com. 
Migrants and refugees could further help the League’s guilds in 
preparing toolkits, business plans, asset-awakening policies, and 
model concession agreements for future Hong Kong and 
Singapore-scale World Cities. Augmented Reality and Virtual 
Reality walkthroughs could give prospective in-country allies and 
global crowdfunding supporters a preview of the opportunities. 
The League’s virtual guilds also could extend enriched online 
support for migrants and refugees who gain international 
language skills, accept a live and let live ethos, and earn positive 
feedback ratings in global telework markets. Through such means, 
the New Hanseatic League could bring near- and medium-term 
opportunities to those who have fled failing states and are 
searching for new safe havens, as well as to those who may wish 
to return home and apply extrastatecraft innovations.  
268 Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”) the arms of a Community Land Trust could 
also offer reverse mortgages for private landowners. They would transfer their land to the 
trust but could retain lifetime ownership of their dwellings. In return for transferring land, 
they would receive upfront payment plus a pre-set share in earnings from ground leases in 
commercial areas of later zone expansions. The SEZ provisions would exempt upfront 
payments and later ground lease sharing from all tax burdens. 
269 Such learning resources can include virtual tours of leading free zones and contractual 
communities, examples of extrastatecraft found in global works of imaginative fiction, and 
introductions to seminal works on “freeorder” and on the philosophy of free institutions.  
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4. How will nation states react to new areas of extrastatecraft?
SEZs could help stagnating and fragile regimes. China went 
from a sclerotic state-dominated economy to the most dynamic 
economy in history following the introduction of economically 
liberalized zones as proving grounds for market-based reforms. A 
New Hanseatic League can help spread SEZs in brittle nations 
with now-stagnating or collapsing economies as a relatively safe 
path to more open and sustainable economic systems. The League 
also can offer appealing transitions for countries and communities 
where market forces remain suspect and where inflexible labor 
laws are entrenched. In such cases, the League and its guilds can 
propose models of SEZs based on social ownership of land, 
following Hong Kong and Singaporean precedents. Workers in 
zones where land is socially owned could receive direct shares in 
the lease auction revenues generated by rapidly appreciating 
areas of extrastatecraft. In return for such wealth-sharing, new 
labor code flexibility can be introduced in the zones as a means of 
boosting investor demand in the associated dividends from land 
rents to workers and their families. The New Hanseatic League 
would urge statist regimes of all kinds to move from their current 
(political) rent-seeking system to a more durable and lucrative 
alternative: land rent-seeking through (politically-designated) 
zones of extrastatecraft. 
Rewards for countries that opt for pilots of extrastatecraft will 
rise to the degree that other nations do not allow them. States 
refusing to pilot deep reforms will divert global flows of investment 
and talent into more welcoming areas established by other 
societies. Ironically, on a personal basis, rulers who block zones of 
extrastatecraft in their own realms also are likely to favor the 
success of economically liberalized areas and tax havens in other 
jurisdictions, as a means of parking their wealth.270
5. Will a New Hanseatic League be prone to capture by 
nation states?
Great powers, as well as smaller nation states, throughout 
history have used SEZs as an instrument of expanding political 
270 Bribery and corruption is a $3.6 trillion annual industry according to 2016 United 
Nations’ estimates. See 2017 Theme: United against corruption for development, peace and 
security, UN (2017), http://www.un.org/en/events/anticorruptionday [http://perma.cc/UGT5-9FXH]. 
Given the scale of wealth stolen by politicians and their allies, it is unlikely that political 
regimes will let offshore havens be extinguished. As global investment advisor Harry 
Schulz noted in the 1976 international investment newsletter titled the Harry Schultz 
Letter, crooks need honest bankers to ensure the safety of their assets, as well as places to 
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and economic spheres of influence. There is a risk that similar 
dynamics may arise in coming decades. 
In the United States, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich 
has advocated for bilateral treaties to establish a network of new 
“Free Cities” around the world to spread American values and 
economic opportunities.271 The new Free Cities would be backed 
by United States security assurances.272 China is currently 
pursuing bilateral agreements to finance and co-develop its own 
network of SEZs. Questions have been raised about whether scores 
of proposed new Chinese zones in Pakistan will be open to firms 
and workers from other countries. “There is no provision to protect 
Pakistani interests, with Pakistani businessmen barred from 
investing in the SEZs,” reports Gopalaswami Parahasarathy, 
India’s former High Commissioner to Pakistan.273 “There are no 
assurances that the Chinese would utilize Pakistani labour in any 
meaningful manner.”274 If the reports prove true, a number of 
Chinese-funded SEZs may be following the unfortunate model 
established by the original Hanseatic League’s network of tax-free 
zones, which excluded or restricted foreign merchants, workers, 
and investors. 
A New Hanseatic League could take steps to avoid capture by 
existing SEZ-promoting nation states (and/or by state-backed 
private developers), and instead encourage global civil society 
support for inclusive zones and startup communities. It can do so 
by encouraging volunteer guilds to engage with any extrastatecraft 
projects of their choosing—and reciprocally, for communities to 
freely invite any League-affiliated volunteer guilds they would like 
to engage. The only stipulation would be that League-affiliated 
projects assisted by volunteers must be peaceful in nature and 
non-transgressive with regard to the persons and property of 
others. A Freedompoints reward system offered to virtual and 
onsite volunteers also would be used only for extrastatecraft 
projects that were inclusive in nature—specifically, privately 
developed zones and communities that did not discriminate 
which they and their families can comfortably retire or flee. Rulers of many nation 
states, and their cronies, can be expected to wield their power in nonpublic ways to 
protect safe havens. 
271 Newt Gingrich & Ken Hagerty, Free Cities, AM. ENTER. INST. (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.aei.org/publication/free-cities/ [http://perma.cc/J4U4-DYMY].
272 Id.
273 G. Parthasarathy, Checkered into Debt and Bankruptcy, HINDU BUS. LINE (Mar. 22, 
2017), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/checkered-
into-debt-and-bankruptcy/article9596452.ece [http://perma.cc/2RFR-F76H].
274 Id.
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against individuals based on creed, national background, or 
biological heritage. 
Under such a system, volunteers from SEZ-sponsoring 
nations would be welcome to participate in helping current and 
proposed zones of extrastatecraft. This help could include applying 
extrastatecraft innovations originating from any part of the 
world—including from Singapore, Uruguay, China, Europe, Israel, 
Dubai, the United States or any other nations—in global projects of 
each individual’s or guild’s choosing. Frameworks such as ULEX, 
an interface for remixing legal provisions from multiple sources, 
would enable grassroots allies embarking upon extrastatecraft 
initiatives to assemble innovations as they deemed best. 
A framework of this kind would make it hard for any nation 
to capture the New Hanseatic League’s network for helping SEZs 
and startup communities. Yet it is important to also note that the 
self-chosen paths taken by extrastatecraft projects and virtual 
guilds may gravitate towards certain models. A particular set of 
Chinese innovations, for example, might inspire global virtual 
volunteers and local project initiators active in South America (or 
vice versa). As an open and self-organizing system, there is no way 
to know at the outset which models will emerge to become the most 
widely adopted and influential. Therefore, great powers and 
nations of any size have an opportunity to “win” as this open 
system evolves. But they can do so only via the soft power of 
volunteers, the facilitation of private capital flows, and the appeal 
of their legal and institutional examples—rather than through 
attempts to capture and assert control over an inherently 
decentralized system. 
6. Could a global network of SEZs and startup communities 
prompt a populist reaction?
Another risk to a New Hanseatic League may come in the 
form of public reaction to moves by the ultra-wealthy to create 
self-governing enclaves as nation states decline. Thomas Frey, a 
well-known futurist, has predicted that the world’s wealthiest 
individuals and their families may turn to establishing, within the 
Westphalian legal framework, well-defended nation states with 
fully-privatized functions.275 This scenario easily could come to 
pass with the advent of a deep global financial crisis. As the crisis 
hits, billionaires and others might cement deals with rulers of 
275 Thomas Frey, Owning Your Own Country, FUTURIST SPEAKER BLOG (Nov. 
26, 2008), http://www.futuristspeaker.com/business-trends/owning-your-own-country/ 
[http://perma.cc/EPN3-TBMQ]. 
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failing states to secure near or full sovereignty over a portion of 
existing national territories. To flourish financially, these areas of 
extrastatecraft in many cases could establish transparent legal 
systems and attract others seeking safe haven for their persons 
and their wealth.  
Over the long term, such initiatives could have positive 
effects on global governance by promoting competition among 
polities—thereby increasing pressures on regimes to forego 
political rent-seeking in favor of land rent-funded systems of 
governance. Yet, in the short term, the effect likely would be to 
stoke popular anger towards the ultra-rich and their havens of 
extrastatecraft. Popular envy and resentment against them could 
spike as people in once-successful nation states experience 
wrenching fiscal strains, economic collapse, and widening 
unemployment. Demagogues could try to turn public hostility into 
support for mounting direct and indirect shakedown attempts 
against self-governing enclaves of the wealthy.  
A New Hanseatic League and its virtual guilds might help 
such scenarios to boomerang. Via the Internet, the League could 
hollow out the support base of transgressive demagogues. They 
could do so by offering resources for communities to become more 
self-reliant as national leaders tried to consolidate power. They 
also could extend challenge offers to individuals and communities 
to explore early wins via extrastatecraft. The League’s outreach 
especially could focus on finding local allies and exemplary sites 
for future Endowment Zones and on publicly challenging 
gatekeepers at all levels in a belligerent regime to end corrupt 
political rent-seeking practices in these areas. The offer to create 
areas of transparency could include offers of policies and tools and 
support systems to ensure rapid asset awakening in specific 
localities, with lease revenue shares flowing directly to struggling 
residents. Public opinion could pivot as the regime strove to 
explain refusals to accept such a challenge. 
7. What can a New Hanseatic League do about global 
environmental and other challenges?
A Brazilian observer, Robert Muggah, has succinctly stated 
the overriding challenge facing nations today:  
Global commitments are urgently required to reverse global warming, 
curb the threat of pre-emptive nuclear attack, prevent pandemics and 
superbugs, and respond to population dislocation and the protracted 
wars giving rise to it. As the global mood sours, grudging half measures 
are all that nation states seem prepared to muster. Not surprisingly, the 
international institutions created to address these challenges—chief 
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among them the United Nations Security Council—are paralysed to 
act. For their part, economically powerful cities are stepping up, but 
still lack the political power to take their place at the global 
decision-making table.276
A New Hanseatic League could make strides to fill this gap. A 
global network of contract-based communities can spread 
examples of innovations for radically reducing environmental 
impacts, such as Blue Frontiers Seasteading proposals in the 
Pacific, the America Free Zone in Costa Rica, and Songdo in Korea. 
Members of its virtual guilds can also help new areas of 
extrastatecraft pilot and spread exponential technologies for 
microfarming, relocalized manufacturing, solar microgrids, and 
virtual workspaces. 
The League could help as well to bring Dominant Assurance 
Contracts to bear on what now appear to be intractable global 
problems. George Mason University economist Alex Tabarrok, a 
pioneer of early online crowdfunding solutions, has taken the 
concept of contingent pledges to a higher level. As he sees it, this 
level will be home to crowdfunding campaigns launched and 
sponsored by risk-taking entrepreneurs.277 Enterprises with 
technologies to effectively and profitably tackle a global problem 
will post an offer to solve it once contingent funding pledges have 
reached a minimum target level. The corporate sponsor also posts 
a bond to guarantee that each person who pledges support in the 
crowdfunding campaign will receive a (small) direct payment if the 
campaign fails to reach the target needed to trigger actual release 
of the pledged and escrowed funds. This incentive gives everyone 
a direct financial incentive to join in pledging to support a solution 
that will benefit all. “In a dominant assurance contract if the group 
goal is not met then everyone who offered to contribute is given 
their money back plus a bonus,” Tabarrok writes.278 “It turns out 
that it then becomes a dominant strategy to contribute and the 
public good is always provided!”279
In the case of climate change, members of the League might 
opt to put Dominant Assurance Contracts into action. A technical, 
276 Muggah, supra note 223. 
277 See Alexander Tabarrok, Assurance Contracts, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (May 13, 
2005, 7:10 AM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2005/05/assurance_ 
contr.html [http://perma.cc/5ZXJ-W929].  
278 Id.
279 Id. For a full-length introduction to the approach, see Alexander Tabarrok, The 
Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts, 96 PUB. CHOICE 345 
(1998), https://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/Private Provision.pdf [http://perma.cc/LS4J-LQX2]. 
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cost-effective solution is within reach for global warning: private 
jets can be equipped to infuse the upper atmosphere with sulfate 
aerosols that could slow down or even reverse global warming. The 
aerosols would reflect back about one percent of the sunlight that 
now hits Earth. Effects would dissipate in a year as the sulfates 
broke down, requiring retreatments only for as long as needed for 
runaway warming to be abated.280 This solution to climate change 
could be sparked by a bond posted by an Elon Musk or Richard 
Branson to incentivize crowdfunders across the planet to pledge 
contributions towards the funding threshold. 
By linking global crowdfunding to the energies and 
capabilities of internationally-admired entrepreneurs, a New 
Hanseatic League could increase the ability of people around the 
world to resolve environmental, public health, and other 
challenges that long have been thought to be the responsibility of 
nation states and taxpayer-funded international organizations. 
8. What about security challenges?
Accelerating technologies also have transformed global 
security challenges. They are shifting the balance in favor of what 
author John Robb has called “open source insurgencies.”281 Yuval 
Harari, an Israeli military historian, agrees. In a recent essay 
entitled “Why It’s No Longer Possible for Any Country to Win a 
War,” he observes: 
In 2017, global elites don’t know what a successful war even looks like. 
They may have read about them in history books and seen fanciful 
recreations in Hollywood blockbusters, but they have good reason to 
suspect that this type of war has gone extinct . . . . In the past, if you 
defeated your enemy on the battlefield, you could easily cash in by 
looting enemy cities, selling enemy civilians in the slave markets and 
occupying valuable wheat fields and gold mines. Yet in the twenty-first 
century, only puny profits could be made that way. Today, the main 
economic assets consist of technical and institutional knowledge — and 
you cannot conquer knowledge through war. . . . Cyber warfare makes 
things even worse for would-be imperialists. . . . [I]f the U.S. now 
attacks a country possessing even moderate cyber warfare capabilities, 
280 See David Rotman, A Cheap and Easy Plan to Stop Global Warming, MIT TECH.
REV. (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/511016/a-cheap-and-easy-plan-to-
stop-global-warming/ [http://perma.cc/8S3G-VUHK]. 
281 See David de Ugarte, John Robb, from the open-source insurgency to the “Direct 
Economy,” LASINDIAS BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013), https://lasindias.blog/john-robb-from-the-open-
source-insurgency-to-the-direct-economy [http://perma.cc/E7QE-BXL8].
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malware and logic bombs could stop air traffic in Dallas, cause trains to 
collide in Philadelphia and bring down the electric grid in Michigan.282
In the twenty-first century, a network of city states and SEZs 
may become a source of innovative, soft power-based defense 
strategies. A New Hanseatic League could make nonlethal approaches 
a cornerstone of its mutual self-help strategy, rather than turning to 
military solutions. A sample of this strategy is brilliantly portrayed 
by science fiction author Bruce Sterling in short story called “Maneki 
Neko,” wherein unfortunate consequences cascade upon any person 
who uses or threatens violence—consequences that themselves never 
rise to the level of violence.283 A New Hanseatic League, committed 
to a live-and-let-live ethos and capable of attracting world-class 
technical talent, could potentially respond in similar ways to a host 
of security risks.  
Outward-reaching soft power initiatives might pay dividends 
as well. Virtual guilds aligned with the New Hanseatic League 
could quietly extend offers in radicalized areas to enable 
alternative paths. These might take the form of cryptocurrency-
based microscholarships for people to build globally marketable 
skills, human capital investments to support their entry into online 
freelance markets, and the introduction of Blockchain based 
opportunities for the informal sector to bypass predatory rulers.  
Over time, one of the most crucial contributions of a New 
Hanseatic League to world peace could come through the creation 
of a metasystem that enables a wide range of voluntary 
communities to flourish. At present, rampant politicization of life 
in many nations produces win-lose battles for power. By contrast, 
zones of extrastatecraft can encourage a variety of communities to 
emerge through nonpolitical means. Volunteers around the world 
can help their favorite kinds of actual communities succeed, 
without privileging some and subordinating others. Virtual guilds 
might be formed to assist a range of what have tended to be 
politically opposed types of communities, including: those based on 
open source models versus those based on intellectual property; 
those animated by communalist values versus those inspired by 
highly individualistic forms of capitalism; those building on 
Singapore-style incentivized public sectors versus those that are 
entrepreneurially-run for a full range of services; and those that 
282 Yuval Noah Harari, Why It’s No Longer Possible for Any Country to Win a War,
TIME (June 23, 2017), http://time.com/4826856/russia-trump-north-korea-china-war/ 
[http://perma.cc/T95B-ZQ69].
283 See Bruce Sterling, Maneki Neko, LIGHTSPEED MAG. (Apr. 2011), http://www.light 
speedmagazine.com/fiction/maneki-neko [http://perma.cc/5V3T-YSKX]. 
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are religiously cohesive versus those embracing heterogeneous 
faiths along with secular lifestyles. A New Hanseatic League could 
encourage within its network a full range of such peaceful soft 
power competitions, as long as all commit to transparency and to 
sharing experiences.  
CONCLUSION
As nation states fall into dysfunctions, the world is entering 
what Michael Strong, a leading advocate of Special Economic 
Zones and Seasteading, has termed a “Cambrian explosion in 
government.”284 Increasing decentralization and experimentation 
is generating legal, political, institutional innovations of value to 
all communities seeking better systems of governance. 
SEZs and startup communities can go well beyond the 
innovations and levels of prosperity they have created to date. 
In coming years, they can be catalysts for peaceful and 
asset-awakening reforms in systems of governance across the 
planet. A New Hanseatic League of free zones and startup cities, 
backed by an army of virtual volunteers from all countries 
committed to a future of peaceful and inclusive innovation, can 
spread economic opportunities and spark transformations in 
governance on a global scale. 
A New Hanseatic League could be a conduit for fast-growing 
online communities—what Robert Muggah has termed “Net 
States”—to help zones of extrastatecraft fill the huge gaps left by 
the increasingly dysfunctional responses of national governments 
and international organizations.285 Virtual teams working with a 
new generation of free areas can bring about creative, self-funding, 
and scalable solutions to most, if not all, of the deepest challenges 
facing humanity.  
Volunteers and funders who help grassroots pilots succeed 
will be seeding transcultural trust and respect even as exponential 
technologies help free people from misrule. In doing so, the world 
may move closer to what the Japanese-American philosopher 
Yasuhiko Genku Kimura has termed an “omnicentric” era for 
284 See Michael Strong Talk: Free Zones and the Cambrian Explosion in Government,
LET A THOUSAND NATIONS BLOOM (Nov. 12, 2009), http://athousandnations.com/ 
2009/11/12/michael-strong-talk-free-zones-and-the-cambrian-explosion-in-
government/ [http://perma.cc/C9CA-9LKT].
285 See Muggah, supra note 223. 
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human civilization, one based on a deep respect for the sovereignty 
of all individuals and their rights to consent-based governance.286
A New Hanseatic League can be a springboard for initiatives 
that have been held back by political rent-seeking. Today, new 
systems of trustworthy law can spread out far faster and more 
widely than did Lübeck Law eight centuries ago. Although 
methods of communication have transformed since then, the value 
of peer-to-peer relationships that sustained the original Hanseatic 
guilds and cities remains an enduring legacy. Depoliticized 
relationships of trust enabled the first League to thrive for 
centuries in an era also filled with hazards. Today, we have new 
tools to build more lasting trust networks among free peoples in a 
New Hanseatic League that offers onramps to all on our planet. 
286 Yasuhiko Genku Kimura Interview / What is the Omnicentric Mind, YOUTUBE (Aug. 
25, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RdKLIeRdJsI. 
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APPENDIX
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The Political Economy of Special Economic 
Zones: Lessons for the United States 
Lotta Moberg*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a policy change that could spur economic 
development without costing a dollar. A change that could increase 
employment in selected areas of a country through the growth of 
the industries of policy makers’ choices. The change in question is 
the special economic zone (“SEZ”). This article explores the 
benefits and downsides of SEZs, and analyzes their economic and 
political impact on the United States. It argues that, though 
widely implemented in the country, SEZs have likely done more 
harm than good for the United States.  
SEZs are areas where a government chooses to have different 
rules from the rest of the country. The zones are usually designed 
to attract investors in various industries with the aim to increase 
exports, employment, and production. SEZs are credited with 
promoting development in numerous countries, from the large-scale 
zones of China to the small industry parks scattered throughout 
Latin America and Asia.1 In the past few decades, several African 
countries have introduced SEZ legislation, often with the hope of 
emulating the rapid industrialization of the Asian “Tigers.”2
 * Lotta Moberg is the author of The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones: 
Concentrating Economic Development. She has published articles on targeted tax 
benefits, municipal bankruptcy, and tax harmonization in addition to special economic 
zones. She is part of the Dynamic Allocations Strategies Team at William Blair and 
advisor at Politas Consulting. She thanks Tom W. Bell and Brian D. Singer for their 
valuable comments and suggestions. 
1 See, e.g., Hooshang Amirahmadi & Weiping Wu, Export Processing Zones in Asia,
35 ASIAN SURV. 828, 828–29 (1995); ANTOINE BASILE & DIMITRIOS A. GERMIDIS, INVESTING 
IN FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 11 (1984); Gokhan Akinci & James Crittle, Special
Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development 32
(World Bank Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Working Paper No. 45869, 2008); 
ROBERT C. HAYWOOD, Free Zones in the Modern World, WEPZA 3 (2000); Thomas Farole & 
Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING 
CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4–5 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011); 
Jin Wang, The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese 
Municipalities, 101 J. DEV. ECON. 133, 145–46 (2013). Most of these sources also note some 
of the problems with the SEZ model. 
2 THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE 
AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 166–67 (2011). 
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SEZs are not without their controversies, and as this article 
argues, the United States has largely failed to implement them in 
a way that promotes economic growth. The World Bank proposed 
in the early 1990s that SEZs are inferior to “economywide” 
reforms.3 Some zones have failed to attract investors, despite 
generous incentives. Clearly, the policy does not always succeed. 
SEZ success, as discussed below, is also commonly misunderstood 
and can be defined in many different ways. 
Most of the early SEZs, which focused on reshipping and 
warehousing, were found primarily at ports and airports, and 
served as spaces for tariff relief. The shipping and warehousing 
industries rely on importing and exporting goods. If the government 
imposes tariffs to protect its domestic industries, this clearly hurts 
the import-dependent industries. In this environment, SEZs can 
allow the shipping and warehousing industries to flourish. As long 
as they cannot buy their wares domestically, allowing them to 
import tariff-free causes no harm on the domestic producers that 
enjoy tariff protection. 
SEZs have been around in their modern form at least since 
the 1950s. One of the first modern SEZs came about as the scope 
of the free zone at the Shannon Airport in Ireland was expanded. 
The airport had previously relied on air traffic in need of refueling 
airplanes on their way across the Atlantic.4 The introduction of the 
jet engine made this business model obsolete.5 The zone authority 
therefore decided to lure production to the zone as well, thus 
growing the town of Shannon and inducing air traffic for more 
reasons than mere transit.6
The Shannon zone represented an early version of the export 
processing zone, which is the form of SEZs that has prevailed ever 
since.7 Export processing zones take the form of industrial parks, 
which means that they only contain production facilities, as 
opposed to also including residential areas.8 They are generally 
small enough to fit within a few blocks. Governments often require 
that most or all zone investor production be exported—hence the 
label of the zone. Some SEZs are even smaller. So-called single 
factory zones9 may host a single company and occupy one floor in 
an office building. 
3 THE WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 1 (1992).  
4 BRIAN CALLANAN, IRELAND’S SHANNON STORY: A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL AND 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 47 (2000). 
5 Id.
6 Id. at 50. 
7 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 25. 
8 Id. at 24. 
9 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 3. 
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The variation, size, and form of SEZs—from the multimillion-
people zones of China to one-company schemes—implies that 
there is no one answer to the question of whether SEZs represent 
good policy. Depending on their size, regulations, and institutional 
context, they will function very differently and come with very 
different problems and benefits, as this article explores. 
The United States introduced free zones in 1934 in response 
to the Smooth-Hawley tariffs.10 This new-found protectionism 
threatened the U.S. warehousing and reshipping industry, and 
the zones isolated this segment of the American economy from 
much of this protectionism regime. Since then, SEZs have 
proliferated in the country and now amount to around 750, 
including smaller zones.11
Despite their ubiquity, the U.S. zones have had little impact 
on economic development in the country.12 This paper applies a 
political economy analysis to SEZs and shows that the reason for 
their limited influence in the United States lies both in the nature 
of the zones themselves and in the institutional context in which 
they are introduced. It also suggests how to make American zones 
more successful, and explains what lessons can be drawn from 
SEZs of the past. 
The next Part explains why a political economy analysis best 
assesses the costs and benefits of SEZs. Part II presents a 
framework for comparing SEZs to the status quo. Part III 
discusses whether SEZs are better than their political alternative. 
Part IV explores how SEZs can perform at their best. The paper 
concludes in Part V with a discussion of the implications for the 
SEZs in the United States. 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO SEZS
Most scholarly literature on SEZs applies a misleading 
perspective when assessing their success. Commonly stated goals 
of SEZs include increased exports, production, and employment in 
10 Matthew Grant, Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate 
Across Importers 8–9 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://drive.google.com/file/ 
d/0B_4Z5rmKH1P5VE0yV1QxZ0JaZTg/view. 
11 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial Charters, 
to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 969–70 (2016); Grant, supra
note 10, at 7–8; Benjamin Chris Zissimos, Summary of the 4th InsTED / 9th EESP-FGV 
Workshop, INSTED INSTITUTIONS TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (May 31, 2017),
http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/insted/2017/05/31/summary-of-the-4th-insted-9th-eesp-fgv-workshop/ 
[http://perma.cc/XN2A-9V8X]; How many zones exist now?, U.S.FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD,
https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/zonestats.html [http://perma.cc/6UVD-PX7G] (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
12 Susan Tiefenbrun, U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, Tax-Free Trade Zones of the World, 
and Their Impact on the U.S. Economy, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L., Spring 2013, at 214. 
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the area of the zone. Such outcomes are fairly easy to measure, but 
are unfortunately quite unhelpful in determining whether a zone 
policy is actually beneficial.13
Instead of looking only at outcomes, scholars should apply a 
cost-benefit analysis to SEZs and focus as much attention to the 
costs of the policy as to the benefits. To understand the impact of 
SEZs, one must take a political economy perspective that looks 
both at the incentives they promote and their most common 
unintended consequences. The political economy perspective 
reveals that the main costs of SEZs are political, rather than 
economic. The most severe costs are not easy (and often impossible) 
to measure with macroeconomic data. This perspective also reveals 
that the main benefits of SEZs are political too, rather than the 
economic outcomes for which the zones are commonly praised. 
There have been attempts to perform cost-benefit analyses of 
SEZs, but these are limited in scope and rely on various 
quantitative approximations. Scholars have attempted to count 
company profits, wages, and the like in an SEZ. These benefits are 
then compared with the costs of the resources used in the zone, 
which must be based on prices and wage levels in the country at 
large. If, for instance, 100 zone workers earn $10 per hour, while 
their wage elsewhere is $5, the zone adds $500 of benefits per hour 
in wages. If the return on a piece of capital, like a machine or 
natural resource, is $1 per day in the zone and eighty cents outside 
the zone, the daily value created by the zone through capital use 
is twenty cents per piece of capital. Because of the complication of 
such estimates, this type of cost-benefit analysis can apply only to 
smaller zones with simple production and no residential property. 
Even then, the costs can only be approximated, and any dynamic 
benefits, such as technological transfers from foreign investors to 
domestic firms, must be excluded.14
A political economy analysis considers that policy makers 
cannot know the ultimate outcome of a policy. The analysis also 
accounts for the risk of a policy being abused by both businesses 
and policy makers. Any policy, SEZs included, look good on paper 
when any such political economy problems are assumed away. 
When policy makers always know the exact effect of the changes 
they introduce and govern with the best for society in mind, most 
13 LOTTA MOBERG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
CONCENTRATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (2017). 
14 Peter G. Warr, Export Processing Zones: The Economics of Enclave Manufacturing,
4 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 65, 77 (1989); Kankesu Jayanthakumaran, Benefit-Cost 
Appraisals of Export Processing Zones: A Survey of the Literature, 21 DEV. POL’Y REV. 51, 
61–62 (2003). 
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policies are beneficial. Alas, the reality is that policy-makers 
inevitably have a poor understanding of the market conditions 
that they seek to affect. Just like businesses, they are also 
motivated by their own wellbeing. Under the wrong incentive 
structures therefore, they will take advantage of their positions to 
the detriment of society at large. Whether policy makers will act 
as if they are informed and selfless will depend on the institutional 
environment in which a policy is introduced.  
Classical economic models generally assume away political-
economy related frictions stemming either from the ignorance or 
distorted incentives of government officials. These models assume 
that policy makers aim to maximize social welfare, have perfect 
knowledge, and that the system is free of fraud or corruption. Alas, 
reality is famously fraught with such imperfections, an insight 
that a political economy analysis takes into account. 
An assessment of SEZ success must also account for political 
economic benefits that standard macroeconomic studies generally 
overlook. Political influence can be for the better if it leads to 
beneficial policy changes. If these spread beyond the SEZ, they can 
catalyze beneficial change in the country as a whole.  
SEZs should be deemed successful if they have long-term 
beneficial impacts on the broader host economy. Focusing only on 
one or a few macroeconomic variables as indicators of success is 
too narrow. Yet “beneficial” can have a different meaning, 
depending on the reference point. As such, SEZs may be seen as 
beneficial in three different ways: 
1. Compared to the status quo: 
  Would the country be better off without them, assuming 
  all else stays the same in their absence? 
2. Compared to their political alternative: 
  Would the economy be in worse shape with the policies  
  that would be introduced in the absence of SEZs? 
3. Compared to their best possible outcome: 
  Are the SEZs living up to their full potential? 
The following three Parts discuss these levels of SEZ success 
in turn. 
II. COMPARING SEZS TO THE STATUS QUO
SEZs famously have many advantages. By attracting 
investors, they increase economic activity in the designated area 
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and provide employment for the local population.15 They may also 
increase the demand for local products. When looking only at these 
benefits, SEZs seem like a winning proposition for any economy.  
Unfortunately, SEZs can also come at great costs that, in a 
bad scenario, overshadow the benefits. While it is true that 
market-friendly SEZ policies generally increase economic 
activity in the country as a whole, the investments needed to 
make this happen may come at too high a price to make the 
policy worthwhile. 
The most obvious cost of SEZs is government spending on zone 
infrastructure.16 When planners envision an SEZ, its visible 
features usually come to mind most vividly. Governments 
commonly make sure that their visions are fulfilled by building the 
structures and offices that they expect investors to demand.17
While that ambition is admirable, more spending on 
infrastructure means that the government must either spend less 
on other programs, raise taxes, or borrow money. In one way or 
another, the people of the country pay the bill for the zone project. 
While infrastructure costs are easily measured, SEZs also 
come with several hidden costs that are harder to estimate. One 
is the loss of revenue that the government incurs from granting 
fiscal incentives to zone investors.18 Domestic investors contribute 
more in taxes directly when located outside an SEZ. If they move 
from other parts of the country into the zones without increasing 
their production, the move constitutes a mere transfer of 
government revenue to company profits. Alas, this seems often to 
be the case for the U.S. zones. If domestic investors do expand 
and employ more people as they become SEZ investors, they can 
contribute to government revenue through income taxes, for 
instance. To account for the full impact on government finances, 
one must estimate how many more people domestic companies 
employ in the zone and what that implies in terms of increased 
income tax revenues. 
The picture is equally as complicated for foreign SEZ 
investors. It is often assumed that they would not have chosen to 
come to the country in the absence of fiscal incentives.19 If this is 
the case, no tax revenue is lost as it would not have been collected 
without a zone either. However, that will not always be true. If 
they would have invested in the country anyway, the government 
15 See id. at 63. 
16 MOBERG, supra note 13, at 8. 
17 Id. at 9. 
18 Id.
19 See id. at 2. 
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is foregoing revenues by offering them tax exemptions. Yet the 
government can always claim that the SEZ policy is the reason for 
any investments that enter the country, since nobody can ever 
prove the counterfactual.  
Another hidden cost is the alternative cost of domestic 
resources employed in an SEZ.20 Foreign investors may bring 
some of their employees and capital with them, but they generally 
take advantage of domestic resources too, which are removed from 
other parts of the economy. Domestic workers benefit as foreign 
companies compete for their loyalty by raising their wages, but 
this imposes costs, both on the domestic firms they leave, and on 
all firms that must meet higher wage requirements.21 To claim 
that SEZs “create jobs” is therefore partially misleading. SEZs do 
benefit workers, but as long as not all of them were previously 
unemployed, SEZ investors hire people at the expense of 
domestic companies. 
This logic applies similarly to production inputs and other 
forms of capital. As foreign investors bid up prices, they inevitably 
impose costs on other companies. In a functioning market 
economy, resources seldom lie idle. It is good for the producers of 
these production inputs that prices rise, but this is far from the 
full story. 
The value of the alternative use of either labor or capital 
cannot be measured with any precision. Attempts have been 
made for simpler forms of SEZs, as was previously mentioned, 
but such analyses will always remain best guesses rather than 
proven costs. 
Because several of these costs are difficult to measure, it is 
hard for a government to know whether the zones they are 
promoting actually benefit the economy. In their pursuit to 
increase growth and economic activity, they cannot ever be sure 
this is actually accomplished. Most analyses of SEZs presume that 
if a zone attracts investors and functions well, it has been a good 
project. However, knowing about the hidden costs of SEZs, a 
proper analysis must obviously be more complicated. 
A. Policy Implications 
A government initiating SEZs should consider how it can best 
lower its cost in relation to the benefit of any SEZ. Government 
spending on infrastructure may be necessary to attract investors 
to a zone, but will be profitable only in certain circumstances. For 
20 Id. at 9. 
21 Id.
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one, any SEZ must be placed in areas where investors want to go. 
Numerous SEZ projects have been poorly located, resulting in 
unused infrastructure and office space. Such “white elephants” 
present obvious examples of SEZ failure.22
In the less obvious case of failure, SEZs attract investors, but 
at a price not worth paying for the people of the country. Any 
location might be attractive to investors when endowed with 
enough government resources. By choosing a proper location, the 
government can minimize how much it has to “compensate” 
investors by paying them to come.23
Infrastructure investments must also be suitable for the kind 
of production that is located in the zone. In order not to waste 
resources, the government must choose carefully what kind of 
production they target with its incentives and regulations. 
All of this may seem to impose an insurmountable burden on 
policy makers introducing SEZs. Yet, rather than requiring them to 
know the perfect location and policy framework for every zone, 
people in power are better off recognizing that they are not 
omniscient, and should therefore prudently set policies accordingly. 
SEZs work by rearranging economic activity in a country, with 
the goal of increasing economic activity as a whole.24 As such, there 
are inherent problems of assessing the cost of any changes in the 
current market structure. Companies in the country are located at 
particular spots for a reason. If they enter the SEZs, they are 
generally leaving a naturally optimal location for an inferior one, 
lured by fiscal incentives. It is also likely that international 
investors would not prefer the location of an SEZ, but are 
nevertheless incentivized to invest in the zone. 
Governments may get around the problem of resource 
misallocation by allowing for a more market-driven process in 
finding an SEZ location. If a government relies on private parties 
for SEZ development, people with better understanding of market 
conditions seek out the most lucrative location to establish an SEZ. 
The private zone model works as follows. The government 
announces the SEZ legislation, including the incentives offered 
and what kind of activities are permitted in the zones. Private 
developers must then buy or lease land and make all the necessary 
investments to establish the SEZs. A zone developer can then lease 
space to zone investors, who are willing to pay for the fiscal 
benefits, the infrastructure and services in the zone, and for the 
22 See id. at 36. 
23 See id.
24 See id. at 25. 
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proximity to peers and suppliers. The government need not be part 
of the location selection, but can still claim credit for the success 
of the policy. 
In addition to zone location, it is also unlikely that the 
government will know what the best industries will be for its 
SEZs. The government may think that it is textile production if 
that has traditionally been a widely spread type of production in 
the country. In fact, the economy may be better off diversifying 
into other types of manufacturing, more sophisticated agriculture, 
or high-technology production.25 The reverse is probably an even 
more common mistake. A government might believe that the 
economy should take unrealistic leaps into high-tech areas of 
production.26 In fact, what a country is already producing likely 
reflects its inherent comparative advantage, implying that it 
should focus on those industries going forward. Targeting the 
wrong industry can be a costly mistake for the government. 
Fortunately, private zone developers can also address the 
problem of finding the right kind of production. Private developers 
have both the incentive and expertise to assess what industries 
should fit for a particular location in a particular country. If 
potential investors are unknown, they can delay infrastructure 
investments until later, or work together with interested investors 
to provide the required business environment.27 For private 
investors, the costs of poorly targeted infrastructure investments 
are more immediate. As a result, they are more prone to step 
carefully in finding a successful zone model. 
Importantly, when private developers do make mistakes and 
fail to attract investors, it does not impose large costs on the 
country’s tax payers. SEZs may thus fail by not attracting 
investors, but may still be neutral from a cost-benefit perspective 
to the host country. The reason governments are often reluctant to 
rely on private SEZs is that they cannot claim credit for 
introducing a job-creating policy if the zones fail to grow. When 
areas designated as SEZs are left idle, this constitutes political 
failure, even if the attempt to establish zones imposed costs only 
on private developers and not on the country’s tax payers. 
For this reason, a government may prefer that zone 
development be in the hands of a public authority. If so, it should 
consider decentralizing the process down to the local level. The 
United States has adopted this model to a large extent. American 
25 See id. at 5–6. 
26 See id. at 38. 
27 See id. at 56. 
416 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
zones are often developed by county or city governments or their 
subdivisions, such as port authorities.28 This is a politically safe 
model, which is less likely than a centralized model to waste 
resources. Yet, even with decentralization, government-developed 
SEZs are prone to waste if the targeted locations or SEZ activities 
are suboptimal. However, in some cases, U.S. zones can be 
privately developed as well.29 In these cases, the federal 
government stays out of involvement in zone development and 
leaves this up to the local entities. 
Local politicians are more knowledgeable about the 
immediate business environment of any given area and are thus 
more likely to make informed decisions. They may also perceive 
and react to zone failure more rapidly and adjust policies 
accordingly. In addition, with fiscal decentralization, it becomes 
harder for local politicians to conceal the costs of an SEZ. While 
this means costs are more concentrated and can thus do more 
harm locally, it also makes it less likely for those costs to rise 
beyond proportion. As such, while decentralization does not 
ameliorate the problem with SEZ failure ultimately becoming a 
burden on tax payers, it is at least a second-best solution after 
zone privatization. 
B. SEZs and Rent-Seeking 
Besides policy makers not having sufficient information to 
create the perfect SEZ policy, they may also lack the will to do so. 
One inherent problem with SEZs is that they offer various kinds of 
opportunities for rent-seeking. It is the nature of a discriminatory 
policy that it offers people or businesses special treatments. This 
inevitably creates the incentive for private-sector actors to land on 
the right side of the policy.30 Even more destructively, policy 
makers have the incentive to introduce policies that make it easier 
for businesses to engage in policy manipulation by offering the 
policy makers various gifts and favors.31
SEZs offer beneficial tax, tariff, and regulatory conditions for 
the businesses granted the privilege to enter.32 As long as there is 
any kind of selection between investors, there is an opportunity for 
28 See Who Can Apply?, U.S. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade. 
gov/ftzpage/info/applicant.html [http://perma.cc/N85T-BU8J] (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
29 Id.
30 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT
INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY 3 (1998); Anne O. Krueger, The 
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–92 (1974). 
31 John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 23, 50–51 
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006). 
32 Id.
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rent-seeking.33 Businesses may bribe policy makers outright, 
lobby for the rules to change in their favor, or induce policy makers 
to make exceptions for them if they do not fulfill the criteria.34
Bribe-taking may not impose an obvious cost on the people of 
the country. After all, policy makers are benefiting at the expense 
of companies, and not directly at the expense of the people of the 
country. However, as businesses incur higher costs for entering 
the zones, they have less money for capital expenditures and for 
hiring people. As a result, they will produce, export, and benefit 
the country’s workers to a lesser extent. Rent-seeking through 
SEZs thus transfers resources from workers and the 
governmentwhich loses out on income tax revenuesto
individual officials. 
Even if the SEZ legislators try honestly to make the policy 
work, rent-seeking can occur in various levels of the government 
bureaucracy. The more agencies a business must pass to obtain 
their SEZ entrance, the larger is the risk of bureaucrats 
extracting rents along the way, thus diminishing the benefits of 
zone investing.35
Rent-seeking is more likely to occur in certain kinds of SEZs. 
In short, the smaller and simpler the zones, the easier it is to use 
them as vehicles for corruption.36 The smallest kind of zone is 
the single-factory zone, which includes only one company.37
Single-factory zones make it easy for government to select 
particular investors for fiscal benefits. Governments often 
motivate these schemes with the need of certain businesses to be 
located in particular spots, such as in the center of cities, where 
one cannot set up regular SEZs. While this is a sound argument, 
the problem with introducing single-factory zones is that they 
easily serve as ways to give favors to specific companies. If a policy 
maker wants his uncle to benefit, for example, he can designate 
the uncle’s business as an SEZ, prompting the government to 
provide a source of extra profits. 
It is understandable that such a scheme would often be 
confused with simple government favoritism and targeting of 
benefits of individual companies. In practice, there is 
little difference. There will also be no agglomerative effects with 
33 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46. 
34 Krueger, supra note 30, at 292. 
35 See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 247 (2002) (arguing that low-level 
corruption creates a tragedy-of-the-commons problem as bureaucrats maximize their gains 
from implementing policies that benefit companies).  
36 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 56–57. 
37 Id. at 6, 43. 
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single-factory zones, even though this is a common rationale for 
SEZs. Despite these drawbacks, single-factory zones are found in 
numerous countries with SEZ policies, the United States among 
them. It is certainly possible that rent-seeking in some cases 
drives their proliferation.
The more zone benefits that emanate from the government, 
the harder it will be for to rid an SEZ scheme of rent-seeking. 
The more opportunities for businesses to gain from lobbying 
and graft, the more resources will be wasted on such activities. 
The best a government can do in that case is to distance itself 
from the provision of favors, through infrastructure provisions 
and selection of SEZ investors. That is, it can allow for private 
zone development. 
In addition to solving problems of finding the right location 
and zone production, private SEZs can also solve several problems 
related to rent-seeking. Private developers profit from the rents 
they charge investors. They have little incentive to extract 
additional rents illegally from private zone investors, as this 
diminishes the ability of those investors to pay rents the legal way. 
Private zone development thus means that there are fewer 
incentives for rent-seeking and less opportunity to trade rents for 
fiscal benefits. 
Private developers can reap higher profits only by using their 
resources in more efficient ways. They can, for instance, find more 
cost-efficient forms of infrastructure, they can provide better 
services and charge higher rents, and plan for agglomerative 
effects that will help improve investor profits. All of these are ways 
to create value and thus increase the probability of a successful 
SEZ. By contrast, the government’s main tool to attract investors 
is to increase fiscal incentives.38 This does not necessarily imply 
a better way of organizing production more efficiently in a 
zone—which is the way private developers are incentivized to do. 
The larger and more diversified the zones, the less likely rent-
seeking will be a major problem. With zones the size of cities, 
where people work, live, and study, the government cannot 
possibly attract investors by providing all the buildings. It must 
rely on private planning and investment to make the zone 
function. The larger the zones, the more open they must be for 
people to enter and invest. This limits the government’s ability to 
target benefits to certain sectors. Finally, larger zones make it 
harder to target specific companies. Because it will be difficult to 
benefit a specific company, fiscal incentives must be offered to 
38 Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 12. 
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everyone in the zone, which is more expensive the larger the 
zone is. As a result, large zones are harder for governments to 
use as vehicles for rent-seeking, for which single-factory zones 
are so suitable.39
Decentralization may solve some of the problems with rent-
seeking, albeit less effectively than private zone development.40 At 
least in a democratic system, local policy makers are more 
incentivized to promote the economy through their policy-making. 
It is easier for the people to see the connection between their 
actions and social welfare. Come next election, policy makers risk 
losing their power if they fail to live up to expectations. Thus, when 
managing an SEZ scheme, they are less likely than central 
government officials to engage in graft at the expense of economic 
success of the program. 
The incentive to avoid corruption does not, however, apply to 
less accountable officials. Bureaucrats dealing with SEZ 
applications, for instance, are seldom held accountable for poor 
economic performance and can therefore engage in graft (as long 
as they are not caught) without major repercussions.41
Decentralization with checks and balances, therefore, is only a 
partial solution to the rent-seeking problem, and will alleviate the 
problem only in particular circumstances.  
In conclusion, SEZs do introduce some efficiencies to the 
economy. But because of their discriminatory nature, they also 
present problems related to insufficient knowledge and distorted 
incentives. In the worst case, these problems render SEZs worse 
for an economy than the status quo. That is, even a country with 
high barriers to trade, taxes too high even to maximize 
government revenue, and a prohibitive business climate may be 
better off keeping such policies and shunning SEZs. 
The main solution to these problems is private zone 
development. This zone model has been recognized as producing 
better results than public zones and is becoming increasingly 
popular as a result.42 Yet policy makers are often reluctant to cede 
control over a program to the private sector. They may want to 
benefit a particular part of the country or take credit for 
introducing a particular industry in the country. As a result, 
government-developed zones remain common throughout the 
world. Any SEZ study should therefore account for the extent of 
39 MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46. 
40 See id. at 42. 
41 See id. at 50. 
42 See FAROLE, supra note 2, at 37–39; Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 4. 
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privately-driven investments in the zone. This may give a first clue 
about whether the scheme is even better than the status quo. 
C. Case Studies of Zone Failure 
Throughout the history of SEZs, numerous programs have 
either failed to attract investors or been so infused by 
mismanagement, miscalculations, and inefficiencies that any 
benefits they generated failed to compensate for the costs. This 
Section explains how SEZ schemes can look successful, but 
nevertheless fail to benefit the country as a whole due to hidden 
costs. In some cases, failure is obvious as SEZs fail to take off 
despite government investments in infrastructure and facilities. 
One vivid example of this is the Calabar zone in Nigeria. The 
location of the zone looked completely rational, primarily because 
of its proximity to the Calabar port.43 The plan was to dredge the 
port so that it could serve ships that would export the 
manufactured goods of the Calabar SEZ.44 However, for several 
years, the authorities tasked with the dredging failed to fulfill this 
mission. Goods were therefore shipped by truck to the port of 
Lagos at high costs. The Calabar zone is close to the Cameroonian 
border and not connected to any of Nigeria’s highways. The 
government ran the zone and chose not to privatize it. Power 
supply to the zone was unreliable, which forced businesses to run 
generators for electricity.45 It is no wonder that the number of 
investors was a small share of the capacity of the zone.46 As a 
result, much of the SEZ infrastructure was left idle.47
Nigeria’s SEZs have seen most investments in oil-related 
industries.48 Most SEZ incentives have thus been given to oil 
extraction and production. Because oil is a lucrative and established 
industry in Nigeria, these SEZ incentives may not have done much 
to increase production and employment in the country.49
Another case of obvious failure is the SEZ of Bataan in the 
Philippines. The area was the site of a former U.S. military base, 
and the plan was to use the existing infrastructure to create a zone 
43 FAROLE, supra note 2, at 204. 
44 See id.
45 Id. at 219. 
46 See id. at 211–12. 
47 Id. at 187; Martin Norman, Have ‘Special Economic Zones’ Entered the 21st Century 
Yet? A Tale of Two Cities, WORLD BANK (Mar. 28, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/have- 
special-economic-zones-entered-21st-century-yet-tale-two-cities [http://perma.cc/ULZ9-BRUA].
48 FAROLE, supra note 2, at 78.  
49 Ebehi Iyoha, Nigerian Free Trade Zones: As Simple as SEZ, STEARS BUS.
(June 22, 2017), https://www.stearsng.com/article/nigerian-free-trade-zones-as-simple-as-sez 
[http://perma.cc/7GFK-H4D2]. 
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attractive to investors. The government invested hundreds of 
millions of dollars in the zone in the 1970s and 1980s.50 The port 
was upgraded as the bridges and roads connecting the zone to 
highways and the like were inadequate. 
Nevertheless, the business potential for the zone remained 
weak and investors stayed away. The zone was allegedly too 
remote. Thus, in this case, even substantial government spending 
in the zone did not make it grow. Sixteen years after its founding, 
the Bataan zone actually became a case of failure that made the 
international community question the zone model.51 With time, 
the government spent even more money on the zone. It now hosts 
investors, so it is considered a success. However, this remains a 
case where the zone benefits for the economy can hardly live up to 
all the public investments made throughout the years. 
Because of their obvious failures, SEZs such as Nigeria’s 
Calabar zone and Bataan of the Philippines get the worse press. 
Yet they are likely not as costly for a country as zone schemes that 
look successful enough to continue without meaningful reforms, 
while relying on large investments from the government coupled 
with generous fiscal incentives. Thus, in contrast to the Calabar 
and Bataan SEZs, most unsuccessful SEZs in the world are likely 
not recognized as such. These are the zones that attract investors, 
but at a cost that cannot be justified on the basis of the benefit 
they bring to the country as a whole. 
As mentioned previously, there have been attempts at 
cost-benefit analyses for functional SEZs. These get to the question 
of whether zones are actually better than the status quo and do not 
just take it for granted whenever a zone attracts investors. Warr 
lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis of export processing 
zones.52 Building on Warr’s work, Jayanthakumaran assesses the 
net benefit of zones.53 Their evaluations of specific SEZ schemes 
indicate that the zones in the Philippines were a net negative for 
the economy, while those in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, and China were beneficial.54
India’s SEZ present a prominent example of a scheme that 
was maintained despite its high costs. The rest of this chapter will 
therefore look closer at this case. India introduced its first zone in 
50 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 36. 
51 See Peter G. Warr, Export Promotion via Industrial Enclaves: The Philippines’ 
Bataan Export Processing Zone, 23 J. DEV. STUD. 220, 238–39 (1987); MOBERG, supra note 
13, at 36. 
52 Warr, supra note 14, at 77–81. 
53 Jayanthakumaran, supra note 14, at 53–56. 
54 Id. at 58. 
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1965, but it took another eight years to establish a second one.55
In 2002, the country still had only seven SEZs.56 To put this in the 
context of the county’s development, India saw increased GDP 
growth in 1980, and even more so in the 1990s, after economically 
liberal reforms.57 This was a turnaround period for India, which 
previously had seen the so-called “Hindu rate of growth” of only 
around 1.7% in real terms between 1950 and 1985.58
The SEZs seem to have played no part in this success. In 1984, 
around the time that the economy started to take off, India had 
only two SEZs.59 The share of Indian exports stemming from the 
zones never exceeded four percent before 1996 and reached five 
percent only in 1998.60 Also, while Indian growth relied primarily 
on services, the SEZs were more manufacturing oriented.61
Why, then, did the scheme show such poor results? Was it a 
matter of poor knowledge of government officials or distorted 
incentives? Alas, it seems, the answer is both. It is therefore worth 
taking a closer look at these issues, one at the time. 
Much of the knowledge problem for Indian SEZs stemmed 
from the centralized nature of the scheme. The zones were 
government funded and thus came at a cost for the Indian 
taxpayers.62 In addition, from the start of the program until 1994, 
only the central government could set up a zone, after which state 
governments, agencies, and private investors could take on SEZ 
projects.63 SEZ policies were in the hands of a unit of the ministry 
of commerce. Furthermore, the task of approving investors 
55 Aradhna Aggarwal, Export Processing Zones in India: Analysis of the Export 
Performance 4 (Indian Council for Res. on Int’l Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 148, 
2004), http://icrier.org/pdf/wp148.pdf [http://perma.cc/AL53-9TUM]. 
56 Id. at 14. 
57 Id. at 12. 
58 Penn World Table: The Database, UNIV. OF GRONINGEN, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/ 
productivity/pwt/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017). This growth increased to 4.6% between 1985 
and 2010. IMF data suggests that the growth 1985–2010 was 5.3%. See World Economic 
Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/ 
2016/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). For reference to “Hindu growth,” 
see Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, From “Hindu Growth” to Productivity Surge: The 
Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition 193–94 (International Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper, May 2004). 
59 Aggarwal, supra note 55, at 5. 
60 Id. at 5, 10, 13; Penn World Table: The Database, supra note 58. For discussion on 
the Penn World Table methodology, see Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar & Marcel 
P. Timmer, The Next Generation of the Penn World Table, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3150, 
3150 (2015). 
61 Ashok Kotwal, Bharat Ramaswami & Wilima Wadhwa, Economic Liberalization 
and Indian Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1152, 1168–69 (2011). 
62 Triyakshana Seshadri & Virgil Henry Storr, Knowledge Problems Associated with 
Creating Export Zones, 23 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 347, 351 (2010). 
63 Ram Krishna Ranjan, Special Economic Zones: Are They Good for the Country? 8 
(Ctr. for Civil Soc’y, Working Paper No. 156, 2006). 
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centralization of government institutions.”71 However, while such 
a concentration may be unwise, a more local authority is at least 
more likely to understand the local market conditions, and can 
better design SEZs commensurate to the development potential of 
any area. Still, the main authority accepting applications for 
approval to establish new SEZs remains a central-government 
function.72 India has thus gone only some of the way to a 
decentralized system for its SEZs. 
Indian land policy contributes to SEZ-related misallocation of 
resources. In an unregulated market, land owners could sell land 
to prospective SEZ developers if the latter are willing to pay more 
than the land is worth for the land owners, many of whom are 
farmers. This exchange would signal that the land had a higher 
potential value as an SEZ than for its current use. However, in 
India, land prices do not reflect supply and demand because they 
are set by the state government. This price must, by law, reflect 
the value of the current use of the land, and can thus not exceed 
the value of the land derived from farming.73 Such a system 
discourages land transactions from ever taking place.  
The government’s solution to the potential dearth of land 
transactions is eminent domain. By law, the government has the 
right to expropriate land “for ‘any public purpose or for a 
company.’”74 The opportunity to seize land for SEZ use is further 
enhanced as zones are designated as public utility services, which 
per definition, are useful for social welfare.75
Fair or not, the system disguises the information that is 
embedded in market-derived prices. It thus makes it even harder 
for the government to determine the economic benefit of 
establishing an SEZ.  
It is still unclear whether the new SEZ law sufficiently deals 
with the flaws of the previous system, but in the absence of change 
in the land laws, this is doubtful. The increasing number of private 
SEZ developers will need to turn to the state government to free 
up land for them, thus discouraging the investors to make the 
71 Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 69; see also Gopalakrishnan, supra note 70, at 148. 
72 Introduction, supra note 70. 
73 Triyakshana Seshadri, The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones in India 
79 (Spring Semester 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University), 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/868552266?pq-origsite=gscholar. 
74 SHRUTI RAJAGOPALAN & ALEXANDER TABARROK, LESSONS FROM GURGAON, INDIA’S
PRIVATE CITY 203 (2014), https://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/Lessons%20from%20Gurgaon.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/M3CJ-ZCV5]. 
75 GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF COM. AND INDUSTRY, SEZ RULES INCORPORATING 
AMENDMENTS UP TO JULY, 2010, ch. 2 (2006), http://sezindia.nic.in/upload/uploadfiles/files/ 
14_SEZ_Rules_July_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/WSU5-8NUJ]. 
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proper cost-benefit analysis. It is therefore worth looking into 
whether the new system is more likely to solve the incentive 
problems that plagued the SEZ policies of the past. 
One prominent feature of the early SEZ scheme was the wide 
use of the single-factory model, which was introduced in 1981.76 As 
previously discussed, such zones are potent tools for rent-seeking 
and lack the positive cluster-effects that are a prominent rationale 
for setting up SEZs. By the year 1998, 1210 single-factory zones 
were operational, and by 2009, as many as 2600.77 As the selection 
process for companies designated as single-factory zones is not one 
based on competitive potential, it is not surprising that these 
companies seem not to live up to their export goals.78
Encouragingly, the new SEZ law aims to create larger zones, 
which should steer the country away from the single-factory 
model. However, an initial minimum zone size of 1000 hectares 
was soon compromised down to 500 hectares, with exemptions for 
agriculture and IT companies.79 By 2008, only six percent of the 
zones were larger than 300 hectares, and forty percent were 
smaller than twenty hectares.80 The government even chose to set 
a maximum SEZ size of 5000 hectares due to land disputes.81 For 
perspective, the Chinese pioneering SEZ of Shenzhen covered 
32,750 hectares in 1980, a year after its founding.82
While smaller zones are generally more prone to incentive 
problems, additional problems are introduced in India because of 
its land laws. With suppressed land prices combined with eminent 
domain, SEZ developers are incentivized to lobby officials to seize 
land on their behalf. Land will thus be found in the hands of those 
with the largest political influence, rather than those able to create 
the most value. 
76 Export Oriented Unit Scheme, EOU INDIA, http://eouindia.gov.in/eou_scheme.htm 
[http://perma.cc/3KXL-9JGB] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
77 Facts and Figures, EOU INDIA, http://eouindia.gov.in/fact_figure.htm 
[http://perma.cc/56NB-H3TD] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
78 Niloptal Goswami & Pravakar Sahoo, Why have export-oriented units in India failed 
to deliver?, BRUEGEL (Oct. 22, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/10/why-have-export-oriented-
units-in-india-failed-to-deliver/ [http://perma.cc/Z4BC-PAAR]. 
79 Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 66–67; Letter from Rajeev Arora, Joint Sec’y to the 
Gov’t of India, to The Chief Sec’ys of States/UTs 1 (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.sezindia.nic. 
in/writereaddata/rules/Amendment%20rules.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GDU-VZMZ].
80 PARTHA MUKHOPADHYAY & KANHU CHARAN PRADHAN, LOCATION OF SEZS AND 
POLICY BENEFITS WHAT DOES THE DATA SAY? 70–71 (2009), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/24333/1/MPRA_paper_24333.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8P2-LNDA]. 
81 See Gopalakrishnan, supra note 70, at 144. 
82 April A. Herlevi, What’s so Special about Special Economic Zones? China’s National 
and Provincial-Level Development Zones 14 (June 18, 2016) (unpublished research paper), 
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/3a83092a-
cbfa-4526-85d7-3ca39931b3b4.pdf [http://perma.cc/83F5-AM6Y]. 
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Another problem that has plagued India’s SEZ scheme for 
many years is bureaucratic corruption.83 Companies wanting to 
invest in a zone would previously have to pass through numerous 
authorities. This provided opportunities for rent-seeking as 
bureaucrats could demand unofficial payments for their services. 
A survey from 2004 found that sixty percent of responding SEZ 
companies claimed to have made “irregular payments”payments 
not registered in the booksto the SEZ-related bureaucracies.84
The aim of the new scheme is to streamline the application 
and approval process with a so-called “single window” facility.85
Yet it has taken time for such an institution to be set up. Admitting 
as much, the central government appealed in 2010 to state 
governments to set up their own single window facilities.86 By 
2015, a survey found that sixty-four percent of SEZ firms reported 
that no such facility existed in the state.87 SEZ investors are thus 
still faced with several steps through the bureaucracy to obtain 
approval. The bureaucratic problems with SEZs have contributed 
to the de-notification of SEZs. While in 2013, India had 580 
approved zones, there were only 405 in late 2016 and have since 
risen to 424 by July 2017.88
In conclusion, while the Indian SEZ scheme is moving in the 
right direction on some margins, it is yet to be seen whether this 
will be enough to improve it significantly. Insufficient 
decentralization and flawed land legislation will likely keep 
causing problems related to governments not having enough 
information to properly design an SEZ that would benefit the 
country as a whole. Those same land laws, combined with a 
burdensome SEZ bureaucracy and wide use of single-factory 
zones, create distorted incentives that further discredit the claim 
that the SEZs are meant to benefit the people. 
83 See, e.g., S.R. Keshava, The Effect of FDI on India and Chinese Economy; A 
Comparative Analysis 18 (Feb. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1089964 [http://perma.cc/U45U-V7PL].
84 Aggarwal, supra note 55, at 32. 
85 See Dohrmann, supra note 70, at 66; Introduction, supra note 70. 
86 BS Reporter, Create single-window clearance for SEZs: Govt tells states, BUS.
STANDARD (Feb. 11, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/create-single-window-clearance-for-sezs-govt-tells-states-110021200075_1.html 
[http://perma.cc/5JNL-68RV]. 
87 PROGRESS HARMONY DEV. RES. BUREAU, SEZS IN INDIA: CRISS-CROSS CONCERNS
43 (2015). 
88 See Set up a single-window clearance system for speedy approvals of special 
economic zones: ASSOCHAM Plea to Govt., THE ASSOCIATED CHAMBERS OF COM. &
INDUSTRY OF INDIA (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.assocham.org/newsdetail.php?id=5357 
[http://perma.cc/JT4Z-FU2W]; Approved SEZs in India, SPECIAL ECON. ZONES IN INDIA
[http://perma.cc/N5T7-S3QU] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
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More private zone development should enhance the scheme. 
During its decades of existence, the dominance of government 
investment in India’s SEZs has imposed high costs that are 
ultimately borne by the Indian taxpayer. The conclusion must 
therefore be that India did not live up to the lowest bar of SEZ 
success, in that the scheme was not even better than the political 
status-quo. 
III. COMPARING SEZS TO THEIR POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE
Even if SEZs are better than the status quo, they might still 
not benefit a country if a superior set of policies could prevail in 
their absence. For example, policy makers might feel compelled to 
liberalize the economy and consider a cut in tariffs across the 
board. As they ponder their options, they might learn about SEZs 
and find them an attractive policy alternative. With SEZs, policy 
makers can look as though they are actively promoting trade and 
development for the country. A zone is a clearly-defined space 
where policy makers claim credit for the economic activity that 
they host. They can count the amount of foreign investors and 
employees in the zone and win praise for how much capital it 
attracted and how many jobs it created.89 There will obviously be 
no mention of the public resources that the project consumed or 
how many investors simply moved within the country to enjoy the 
zone’s fiscal benefits. 
Besides the political point-scoring, SEZs have another feature 
that is even more attractive for protectionist-minded policy 
makers. SEZs allow for a dual trade system, in which the country 
as a whole can remain protectionist while opening up for imports 
only in limited spaces. Governments often protect certain sectors 
by limiting foreign competition.90 In exchange for this favor, they 
can earn rents from the protected companies, in the form or 
political support, favors, or outright bribes.91 Trade liberalization 
89 See Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and 
Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1093 (2011). 
90 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Economics Versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy 
Advice, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 189 (2013). 
91 See, e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, supra note 90, at 186–87; Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, 
The Argentine Tariff, 1906–1940, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 75, 95 (1967); Krueger, supra
note 30, at 291–92; J.J. Pincus, Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs, 83 J. POL. ECON.
757, 757–58 (1975); Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of Protectionism, in IMPORT 
COMPETITION AND RESPONSE 263, 278 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1982); Robert E. Baldwin, 
The Political Economy of Trade Policy, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 125, 130 (1989); Arye L. 
Hillman, Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 1180, 1181, 1185 (1982); Giulio M. Gallarotti, Toward a Business-Cycle Model of 
Tariffs, 39 INT’L ORG. 155, 166–67 (1985); James H. Cassing & Arye L. Hillman, Shifting 
Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 522 
(1986); Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, in
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threatens such relationships. If interest groups no longer receive 
support from the government, they will be unwilling to offer 
anything in return. 
While this suggests that policy makers should never consider 
trade liberalization, they may be forced to do so in the face of 
pressure from other interests. Potential investors in the country 
can complain about the lack of opportunity and widely declare that 
the country is losing jobs by keeping foreign investors away. 
Economists may write articles and speak out about how 
protectionism is impoverishing the country’s people. Foreign trade 
representatives may pressure the country to open up. 
Such demands present the dilemma for the protectionist 
government between yielding to the pressure and siding with its 
protected interest groups. SEZs offer a way out of the situation. As 
policy makers introduce zones, they can claim to pursue 
liberalization. Meanwhile, they are still protecting the interest 
groups from threatening imports by maintaining the protectionist 
regime elsewhere. Foreign investors will be happy to enter the 
zones, where they enjoy exemptions from tariffs and taxes, and 
economists and foreign government representatives may accept 
the partial liberalization as adequate, albeit not perfect. 
In this way, SEZs can be a tool to avoid trade liberalization, 
and thus serve a very different function from that with which 
they are generally associated. They may improve on the status 
quo. Yet they may not benefit the economy when the status quo 
is not the relevant comparison. In the absence of SEZs, the policy 
makers would likely need to liberalize the economy more broadly 
in the face of pressure to do so. As a result, SEZs primarily benefit 
policy makers and protected industries at the expense of the rest 
of the society. 
To understand whether SEZs are better than the status quo, 
one must consider the political context and understand the 
incentives of policy makers and the policy alternatives that they 
face. Any counterfactual scenario will remain a hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, this approach to assess SEZ benefits is superior to 
the naïve assumption that policies will remain the same in their 
absence. The very fact that a government introduces SEZs 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 37,
37–38, 46 (Jeffry A. Frieden & David A. Lake eds., 4th ed. 2000); Avinash Dixit & John 
Londregan, Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 856, 858 
(1995); Dani Rodrik, Political Economy of Trade Policy, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMICS 1457, 1468–69 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 1995); Gene M. 
Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 REV.
ECON. STUD. 265, 283–84 (1996); Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, Trade Barriers and 
Trade Flows Across Countries and Industries, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 372, 372–73 (1997). 
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suggests that their incentives are not directly aligned with social 
welfare. The officials may have suddenly awoken to the benefits of 
economic openness. However, if the SEZs come in response to 
pressure to liberalize trade, they may be a mere tool to avoid any 
radical reforms. 
A. The Case of the Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic provides an example of SEZs 
introduced as a response to pressure to liberalize the economy 
broadly. The zones allow companies to import tariff-free and enjoy 
tax exemptions. Meanwhile, these SEZs remain small enough not 
to threaten the trade protection enjoyed by companies outside the 
SEZs’ boundaries. As a result, while the zones promoted Dominican 
exports, they also helped preserve a system of protectionism which, 
in the absence of SEZs, might have been eroded. 
In the 1960s, President Joaquín Balaguer inherited a country 
with a system of trade protectionism, government benefits to 
particular industries, and general government interventionism.92
The United States occupied the country for a while and helped 
Balaguer reach his position of power, thus putting him in a 
position of loyalty towards the American government.93
Balaguer was no natural sympathizer of free markets and 
introduced new forms of trade protection in the country. On some 
margins, though, these barriers were made more flexible.94 This, 
combined with higher prices of the crops the Dominicans exported, 
made the country wealthier, which increased the demand for 
imported goods.95 Seeing that imports could threaten domestic 
businesses, Balaguer responded by establishing even more solid 
protectionism in the country.96
92 See FRANK MOYA PONS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A NATIONAL HISTORY 371 (2010). 
93 Id. at 396, 398. 
94 See Frank Moya Pons, Import-Substitution Industrialization Policies in the 
Dominican Republic, 1925–61, 70 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 539, 561 (1990); see also EMELIO 
BETANCES, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 120–21 (1995); Andrew 
Schrank, Luring, Learning, and Lobbying: The Limits to Capital Mobility in the Dominican 
Republic, 37 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 89, 95–96 (2003). 
95 See DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: A COUNTRY STUDY (Richard A. Haggerty ed., 1989), 
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/ [http://perma.cc/AKQ5-VB3M]. 
96 See JAN KNIPPERS BLACK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN AN UNSOVEREIGN STATE 44, 63 (1986); see also PONS, supra note 92, at 396–97; Fabio 
Rafael Fiallo, Alternativas de Política Industrial en la República Dominicana [Industrial 
Policy Alternatives in the Dominican Republic], El TRIMESTRE ECONÓMICO [ETE] 159, 162 
(1973); JONATHAN HARTLYN, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 104–05 (1998); Andrew Schrank, Foreign Investors, “Flying Geese,” and the 
Limits to Export-Led Industrialization in the Dominican Republic, 32 THEORY & SOC’Y 415, 
422–24 (2003). 
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hamper their development, discourage investments, and confine 
people to poverty.102
This is precisely the context in which SEZs can function at 
their best. By changing the incentives for policy makers, 
they can set countries on a gradual path towards more 
growth-promoting policies. 
In a system where the government prefers to preserve a 
protectionist status quo, any initiative for a change will not come 
from the top, but instead from interest groups that would benefit 
from liberalization. Just as some groups will pressure the 
government to introduce growth-suppressing policies, others will 
seek exemptions from them. A leather manufacturer, for instance, 
might lobby for tariffs on leather, while a clothes manufacturer 
would prefer exemptions from the same. One way to obtain more 
general exemptions is to introduce SEZs. In contrast to specific 
exemptions, SEZs can create a dynamic that spreads economic 
liberalization throughout the country. 
This dynamic starts with initiatives from people close to the 
SEZs who will benefit from more openness. This may be business 
people seeking new opportunities or local policy makers hoping to 
expand the local government coffers through more economic 
activity. Assuming most people in power are against more 
openness, such reformers need to offer favors or bribes in exchange 
for an SEZ. The zone, while not perfect, is the best they can obtain 
in the face of strong resistance to change. 
As the SEZ grows by attracting more investors, it starts 
having an impact on the economy at large. Some local monopolies 
wither as the SEZ inflicts more competition. Other opportunities 
for rent-seeking weaken as businesses move from other parts of 
the country to the SEZ with its inviting business environment. The 
country starts gaining the reputation of a more open economy. 
All these factors change the calculation and optimal strategy 
of local policy makers. They can pursue two different strategies of 
102 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, Political Losers as a Barrier to 
Economic Development, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 126, 126 (2000); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES 
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 243–44 
(2012); Stephen Haber, Introduction: The Political Economy of Crony Capitalism, in CRONY 
CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE xi, xii, 
xv–xvi (Stephen Haber ed., 2002); DAVID C. KANG, CRONY CAPITALISM: CORRUPTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES 187 (2002); Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Introduction and Overview to INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORRUPTION xiv, xiv (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006); John V.C. Nye, Why Do Elites 
Permit Reform?, 1 ANN. PROC. WEALTH & WELL-BEING NATIONS 53, 55 (2008–2009); 
Fernanda Brollo, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti & Guido Tabellini, The Political 
Resource Curse, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1759, 1760 (2013). 
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enriching themselves: they can promote growth and benefit from 
higher tax revenue, or they can rent-seek by pursuing 
protectionism, giving monopoly rights to select companies. Thanks 
to their external effects, SEZs nudge this calculation towards more 
openness and reliance on tax revenue as opposed to rents from 
rent-seeking activities. As the first SEZ expands, more local 
leaders find they can benefit from more openness. 
As long as most leaders are against liberalization, no local 
leader can possibly convince the government to pursue nationwide 
liberalization. That would threaten too many interest groups from 
which the government draws its support. Yet they can enjoy most 
of the fruits of openness by obtaining SEZs, which are less 
threatening to rent-seeking anti-reformers. 
This process does not require a miscalculation of the impact of 
SEZs by any anti-reformist leader who accepts the zones in 
exchange for favors. The external effects come only after some 
time, perhaps several years. If the anti-reformers do not expect to 
be in power at that time, they are better off accepting the bribe 
today, at the expense of their successors who will lose out on 
rent-seeking opportunities. 
The process requires a system of fiscal decentralization, 
though, which allows local leaders to benefit from local tax 
collection. If not, they would always be better off promoting 
rent-seeking at the expense of tax collection. With fiscal 
decentralization, local leaders face a trade-off between tax 
revenues and gains from rent-seeking, as they cannot promote one 
without diminishing the other. 
The process is necessarily gradual and can take decades, 
depending on the size of the country. It may not seem like a great 
proposition for SEZs. Yet if the zones can change the equilibrium 
of rent-seeking in a country, they provide the solution to one of the 
main obstacles to economic development. 
A. How SEZs Reformed China 
China offers the most prominent example of a country that 
used SEZs to profoundly change the economic system of the 
country. As will be discussed, the SEZs worked to change the 
incentives of political leaders to promote reform in a context where 
broad liberalization would likely not have been possible otherwise. 
In the 1970s, China was a closed economy in many ways. 
Rent-seeking by government officials was widespread and there 
was little indication that the leaders of the economy would want 
to disrupt the illiberal status quo. Yet the country provided a 
beneficial institutional setting for SEZ-driven reforms. 
434 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
The most important feature was the country’s 
decentralization, both on the political and fiscal front. After the 
death of Mao, the Communist party started focusing on economic 
development in the country, as opposed to class struggle.103 The 
party leaders in Beijing pursued this through political 
decentralization and incentives to local leaders to produce 
economic growth. The central government had the power to award 
local leaders if they obtained their growth targets, and unseat 
them if not.104 Yet policy-making was to a large extent left to the 
local levels of government. Fiscal decentralization meant that local 
leaders could benefit from higher tax revenues, and hence benefit 
in two ways from local growth.105
Fiscal decentralization thus presented these officials with a 
trade-off. They could promote protectionism and benefit from 
the rent-seeking opportunities that this would provide. The 
down side of this approach, however, was suppressed economic 
growth, which lowered their tax revenues. By promoting 
liberalization in their municipality or province, local leaders 
could amass more tax revenues, albeit at the expense of limiting 
their rent-seeking opportunities.106
The extent to which local leaders pursued growth at the 
expense of rent-seeking varied, as some areas were better 
exploited for rent-seeking and others for tax revenues. Areas close 
to trading spots, such as ports with more opportunities to benefit 
from trade and foreign investments, would offer more 
opportunities of real economic growth and tax revenues. However, 
China’s closed system probably made this difficult in most cases. 
By contrast, areas close to Beijing would likely benefit more from 
central government largesse through rent-seeking schemes. Areas 
rich in extractive industries, like mining and other natural 
resources, would also incentivize officials to take the rent-seeking 
approach, by granting exploitation rights to friends and those 
offering favors in return. 
The aggregate structure of China’s economy at the time 
suggests that rent-seeking in many cases offered the most 
lucrative opportunities. In this context, a group of business people 
with connections to Hong Kong started lobbying for exemptions 
from protectionism, to make it easier for them to conduct business 
103 See Xu, supra note 89, at 1090. 
104 See id. at 1093–94. 
105 See Shaomin Li, Shuhe Li & Weiying Zhang, The Road to Capitalism: Competition 
and Institutional Change in China, 28 J. COMP. ECON. 269, 283–84 (2000). 
106 See id.
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in the then-British colony.107 They turned to Ye Fei, Minister of 
Transport, who ultimately granted them a special deregulated 
area from which they could conduct their business from Shekou in 
Guangdong Province, adjacent to Hong Kong.108 The Shekou 
Industrial zone opened in 1979, as the first SEZ of China.109
Seeing the benefit of the zone, the governor of Guangdong 
province started to promote SEZs for China.110 The first three 
zones officially labeled SEZs were thus located in Guangdong.111
One of them is Shenzhen, which was only a small fishing village 
when it was designated an SEZ.112 Its special status allowed it 
to grow into a megacity of over ten million people. With more 
SEZs being introduced, more local leaders lobbied for SEZs in 
their areas.113
The zones thus spread gradually throughout the country. 
1984 was an important year in this development, as China’s fifth 
SEZ was introduced in Hainan, together with fourteen other zones 
labeled “Coastal Cities.”114 In 1992, all provincial capitals were 
designated as SEZs, which meant that over half of all 
municipalities in China now hosted SEZs.115
It is important to understand the mechanism through which 
the SEZs proliferated. Some previous work on SEZs in China has 
described them as test-beds for policy-making. Government 
officials could see what worked in the SEZs and then implement 
those policies in the country at large.116 This theory sells the SEZs 
short, as it suggests that they were not instrumental in 
liberalizing China. The leaders had allegedly already made up 
107 GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
26 (1990). 
108 Id.
109 Victor F.S. Sit, Specials Economic Zones in China: A New Type of Export Processing 
Zone?, 23 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 69, 75 (1985); CRANE, supra note 107, at 26.
110 See RONALD COASE & NING WANG, HOW CHINA BECAME CAPITALIST 61 (2012). 
111 Id.
112 See id. at 59. 
113 See id. at 60–62; see also CRANE, supra note 107, at 26–27. 
114 CRANE, supra note 107, at 156; KAREN I. MCKENNEY, THE INDUS. COLL. OF THE 
ARMED FORCES, AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 11 (1994). 
115 See Wang, supra note 1, at 136; Payton Alexander, Laboratories for Capitalism: 
Testing the Limits of the Special Economic Zones of Mainland China 11 (2014) (unpublished 
M.A. dissertation, University of Edinburgh). 
116 See Kwan-yiu Wong & David K.Y. Chu, Export Processing Zones and Special 
Economic Zones as Locomotives of Export-led Economic Growth, in MODERNIZATION IN 
CHINA: THE CASE OF THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 1, 6 (Kwan-yiu Wong & David 
K.Y. Chu eds., 1985); CRANE, supra note 107, at 96; Wei Ge, Special Economic Zones and 
the Opening of the Chinese Economy: Some Lessons for Economic Liberalization, 27 WORLD 
DEV. 1267, 1268, 1281 (1999); Jean-Pierre Cling & Gaëlle Letilly, Export Processing Zones: 
A Threatened Instrument for Global Economy Insertion? 7 (Dévelopment et Insertion 
Internationale, Working Paper No. DT/2001/17, 2001), http://ideas.repec.org/p/dia/wpaper/ 
dt200117.html [http://perma.cc/S6TD-4XRL]; Xu, supra note 89, at 1114–15. 
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their minds and were only looking for the right policies to promote 
growth. While the SEZs were tools in this pursuit, they would 
eventually have found the liberalizing reforms beneficial. 
In this story, the SEZs were a top-down project, a notion 
that fits the common story about Deng Xiaoping making China 
an economic powerhouse through his convictions and strong 
leadership. In fact, Deng Xiaoping, like most leaders, did not 
support the SEZ policy until the mid-1980s, when they started 
to prove their worth.117 SEZs can give policy makers an idea 
about the effect of certain policies, but as test-beds for reform, 
they cannot reconstruct a system built on rent-seeking into one 
of openness. 
Another often-told story about SEZs is that they function as 
showcases for reform.118 In the case of China, Communist Party 
leaders would have introduced the zones to show either other 
policy makers or the public that liberalization could create wealth. 
However, this too is a story about policy makers seeking ways to 
maximize the wellbeing of the citizenry. If this were indeed their 
goal, they would eventually understand what kind of reforms to 
introduce in this pursuit. As with SEZs as test-beds for reform, 
SEZs as showcases can benefit the country only at the margin by 
speeding up a process toward liberalization that is set to occur in 
any case. 
The power of SEZs is instead that they can change the 
incentives of policy makers from relying on rent-seeking to 
promoting growth, and this is what seems to have happened in 
China. The new SEZs gave the country an image of newfound 
openness. China was, in practice, becoming capitalist.119 Local 
leaders thus saw two main changes that affected their incentives. 
For one, it became possible to reap the rewards of economic growth 
through openness. Second, it became harder to rent-seek, as 
businesses within the country had the opportunity to move to 
SEZs with more open business environments. The trade-off 
between rent-seeking and taxation thus tilted in the favor of the 
latter for more local leaders. As they lobbied for and obtained their 
SEZs, they made rent-seeking a decreasingly attractive strategy 
for other local leaders. 
Eventually, a majority of the ruling elite in China could 
benefit more from openness and liberalization than protectionism 
117 See CRANE, supra note 107, at 156. 
118 See George T. Crane, ‘Special Things in Special Ways’: National Economic Identity 
and China’s Special Economic Zones, 32 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 71, 76; see also COASE &
WANG, supra note 110, at 160. 
119 See COASE & WANG, supra note 110, at 164–66.  
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and rent-seeking. At that point, China truly had relieved itself 
from its previous destructive status quo. By 2008, ninety-two 
percent of all Chinese municipalities hosted SEZs.120 China still 
suffers from corrupt practices throughout their official 
institutions, but no more so than the United States did at a similar 
stage of development.121
In addition to opening up the country to the world, the SEZs 
in China have avoided many of the problems that plagued the 
Indian zones. For one, political decentralization meant that 
decisions about the zones were taken on the local level by people 
who were familiar with prevailing business conditions. As a result, 
fewer mistakes were made regarding zone location and nature of 
production. Also, Chinese policy makers had little reason to use 
the zones for rent-seeking. They owe their seats to the elites in 
Beijing, who reward them for high GDP growth and can demote 
them if they fail to reach the growth targets.122 If granted an SEZ, 
they have the opportunity to secure their jobs and advance their 
careers by boosting economic growth. In many cases, the rewards 
that come from the top are larger than the rents they may extract 
by trading SEZ privileges. Similar to a democracy, China’s system 
incentivizes local leaders to promote economic prosperity, as this 
rewards them politically. 
China shows that SEZs can help profoundly change a country 
stuck in a rent-seeking disequilibrium. Still, it does not provide an 
example for how “governments” can use SEZs to promote growth. 
Had China’s ruling elite wanted to reform the country, they could 
have done so much faster than through SEZs. The zones served 
instead as tools from the people at the bottom of the hierarchy to 
promote changes that initially were against the interest of the 
majority of rulers. 
There may be no other policy that can promote such change 
so forcefully. For this to happen, though, conditions must be 
right, with sufficient decentralization and heterogeneity 
between municipalities, so that some can lead the SEZ reform 
while others follow. Alas, while it happened in China, it is 
unclear whether other countries will see a similar SEZ-led 
restructuring in the future. 
120 Wang, supra note 1, at 136. 
121 See Carlos D. Ramirez, Is Corruption in China “out of control”? A Comparison with 
the US in Historical Perspective, 42 J. COMP. ECON. 76, 77–78 (2014). 
122 See Xu, supra note 89, at 1093, 1102. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SEZS IN THE UNITED STATES
A thorough understanding of the political economy of SEZs 
allows for an analysis of the benefits and flaws of the SEZs of 
the United States. Labeled “foreign trade zones,” these were 
introduced in 1934 as a response to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act that came about as a reaction to the Great Depression.123
Today, there are around 750 zones, which offer investors tariff 
and tax exemptions.124
These fiscal incentives allow zone companies to be more 
profitable by reducing the cost of doing business and encouraging 
regional commerce.125 To the extent that taxes and tariffs 
discourage the productive use of resources, SEZs in the United 
States create wealth by offsetting them. However, the zones are 
not without their critics, who primarily seem to focus on the 
limited impact the zones have on the economy as a whole. 
Tiefenbrun, for instance, points out that exports from the zones 
are only 2.6% of the total126 (this figure was closer to 2.7% by 
August 2017).127 Therefore, she concludes that the zones have done 
little to promote U.S. exports.128
As was previously discussed, this is a flawed metric by which 
to judge SEZ success, as it tells us nothing about their net 
impact.129 The U.S. zones may be small, but as long as their costs 
are smaller than their benefits, they still constitute a good policy 
for the country. However, as will be argued here, the United States 
relies far too much on small zones, and would be better off with 
larger, more diversified SEZs that include residential 
developments and offer investors more regulatory incentives. 
There are some arguments for SEZ success in the United 
States. To start, the SEZs are largely decentralized. The federal 
government does not develop the zones, but leaves this to zone 
applicants. An applicant must be a “public or public-type 
corporation.”130 Zone development is thus open to private 
development, although there is likely much governmental influence 
through public companies. Because these are local, they likely have 
an adequate understanding of the business climate in which the 
123 Eichengreen, supra note 91, at 37. 
124 See How many zones exist now?, supra note 11. 
125 See Bell, supra note 11, at 974; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 221. 
126 Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 214. 
127 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. 
International Trade in Goods and Services (Oct. 5, 2017 8:30 AM), https://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/Press-Release/2017pr/08/ft900.pdf [http://perma.cc/DN2C-ESZB]. 
128 Id.
129 See MOBERG, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
130 Who can apply?, supra note 28. 
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zones are introduced. Local policy makers should also be 
incentivized to pursue successful zones, as they must answer to 
the judgment of their voters of their economic policy-making. 
Public companies, on the other hand, do not face such 
incentives, as their positions are more akin to bureaucrats who are 
not exposed to the democratic process. Thus, the decentralization 
of U.S. SEZs go only halfway in solving the knowledge and 
incentive problems associated with centralization. Moreover, if 
public companies fail in their SEZ project, they will sometimes do 
so at the expense of the local government and hence, its tax payers. 
While the public involvement in SEZ development is a 
concern, the main problem with U.S. SEZs lies in the incentives 
they create for the actors involved. The country has unfortunately 
relied to a large extent on single-factory zones for the expansion of 
its zone scheme. SEZ developers can apply to expand their benefits 
to affiliated “subzones,” which are single companies that need not 
be located adjacent to the main zone. There are twice as many of 
such “subzones” than the 250 “general-purpose zones.”131
The subzones are predominantly focused on manufacturing, 
and thus are likely private in most cases.132 The problem, though, 
is that such a scheme looks much like a program of targeted fiscal 
benefits for companies. In this respect, the United States looks 
much like India, with its numerous single-factory zones. This 
set-up contrasts sharply with China’s diverse SEZs with millions 
of residents. Single-factory zones incentivize companies to lobby 
for SEZ designation. They also prompt policy makers to make 
the scheme flexible enough that such lobbying is attractive. As 
a result, public resources are spent on a politically driven 
process of companies seeking benefits and officials responding 
to their demands. 
Initially, only ports could become SEZs, which would at least 
have limited lobbying to that sector. In 1950, as manufacturing 
was allowed in the zones, the opportunities they provided became 
available to a much larger part of the U.S. economy.133 With the 
introduction of single-factory zones in 1954, the field was ripe for 
widespread lobbying, as firms no longer had to relocate to obtain 
the benefits.134 Although these zones must be affiliated with 
131 How many zones exist now?, supra note 11; see also Where can a Zone be Located?, U.S.
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/adjacency.html 
[http://perma.cc/7MQ7-SAEC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
132 Who can apply?, supra note 28. 
133 Grant, supra note 11, at 8, 10. 
134 Id. at 10. 
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general-purpose zones, they can potentially be located anywhere.135
Most SEZ-based manufacturing now takes place in subzones, 
while general-purpose zones engage primarily in distribution 
and wholesaling.136
Grant finds a significant lobbying activity surrounding the 
SEZs.137 “Industry groups, individual producers, local and state 
governments, unions, congressmen and senators, and individual 
SEZ governing bodies all lobby.”138 The board that approves SEZ 
applications often cites the lobbyists’ arguments for its decisions.139
When a government offers fiscal benefits to single companies, such 
lobbying should be expected. The single-factory component of the 
SEZ scheme is therefore primarily a net waste of resources to the 
economy at large. Lower tariffs and taxes across the board for 
the county’s manufacturers would clearly be more beneficial. 
Thus, the zones are hardly better than such a political 
alternative. Yet, even compared to the status quo, the fact that 
the system relies on lobbying suggests that the costs of the 
scheme outweigh its benefits. 
The general-purpose zones, too, are hardly better than an 
alternative policy of lowering tariffs and taxes in a less 
discriminatory fashion. Still, these look more like traditional 
zones, and thanks to the decentralized system, they may well 
bring prosperity to the country. While ports also must lobby to 
become SEZs, the benefits brought about in applying the fiscal 
incentives over a larger area and for more companies can 
override the negatives. Whether the benefits of general-purpose 
zones outweigh the costs of the single-factory zones is 
nevertheless questionable. 
For SEZs to benefit the United States, they must be made 
larger, more inclusive, and dominated by private developers. The 
smaller the zones, the larger the incentive problems become. 
Larger and more inclusive zones can also have dynamic effects 
that spread prosperity beyond the zone borders. Rather than small 
industrial parks, the United States should allow for larger areas 
with residential developments that can offer not only fiscal but 
also regulatory exemptions. Regulatory incentives not only cost 
less for the government to provide but also open up new 
opportunities for businesses, as opposed to merely lowering 
their expenses. 
135 See Where can a Zone be Located?, supra note 131. 
136 Grant, supra note 11, at 10. 
137 Id.
138 Id. at 12. 
139 Id. at 10. 
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The SEZ scheme in the United States came about as a 
response to heightened tariffs. In that light, there are three main 
roads that the United States can take. First, the government can 
reduce the fiscal burden from which companies seeking SEZ status 
are trying to alleviate themselves. A reversal of a mistake that 
caused the problem in the first place seems logical. Alas, although 
tariffs are not as high now as in the 1930s, recent administrations 
have not done much to lower them further. Second, the 
government can maintain the current SEZ system, which most 
likely will remain a burden for the economy. Third, the 
government can reform the SEZ scheme to make it more likely 
to succeed in enhancing welfare. Seeing that the program is 
unlikely to ever be abolished, the last option has the best chance 
of coming about. 
CONCLUSION
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of SEZs. 
Decades of experience have shown which models promote 
prosperity and which come with too many burdensome costs. 
However, to understand what makes a successful SEZ, one needs 
a political economy perspective, which accounts for institutional 
contexts and recognizes the problems caused by limited knowledge 
and distorted incentives of the policy makers involved. Experience 
and logic show that an SEZ is a potent tool, which can do much 
good and much harm, depending on how it is used. With an 
increased appreciation of the political economy perspective of 
SEZs, more zone practitioners may promote the kinds of zone 
models that most likely promote welfare in any given 
institutional context. 
The United States can also hope to learn from the rich 
experiences of the SEZs of the past. So far, the U.S. zones have 
hardly benefited the country, but that does not mean that they 
might not do so in the future. With large, privately developed 
zones, the United States can establish an SEZ policy that not only 
is better than the status quo, but also even better than its political 
alternative. In the best case, the U.S. zones may even promote 
countrywide reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION
In an age where information has become as significant as 
any natural resource, data remains fiercely constrained by 
protectionism. Whether out of genuine, yet misunderstood, 
concerns for privacy and cybersecurity or because of simple, 
unabashed protectionist instincts, countries around the world 
have pursued policies designed to impede cross-border data flows, 
localize data, and stifle digital trade. These digital trade 
barriers—such as, requiring data on citizens of a country to be 
stored in country rather than on overseas servers—increase 
costs, cut against competition (especially for small Internet-based 
businesses), and frustrate innovation. 
As countries continue to erect digital trade barriers, the 
value of the global information flow diminishes. While a recent 
report by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimates 
that the Internet improves the productivity of digitally intense 
industries by 7.8% to 10.9%,1 barriers from the European Union 
(“EU”) to China pose a direct challenge and potential impediment 
to that productivity. Data localization requirements and 
restrictions on cross-border data flows, perhaps more than any 
other digital trade barrier, impede the next generation of 
international trade facilitation—cloud computing. In recent 
years, cloud traffic has increased from 3.5 to 5.6 zettabytes2 and 
will reach 10.4 zettabytes by 2019.3 Cloud computing is 
particularly useful because it “provides portability” and “allows 
for more seamless upgrades and transitions to new or multiple 
devices, because content does not need to be laboriously copied 
from one device to another.”4
However, the success of cloud computing, and electronic 
commerce at large hinges on a global distribution of servers. 
Lack of servers and enormous distances between them can be the 
cause of lethargic delivery times, which undermines international 
trade.5 Therefore, restrictions on digital trade frustrate the 
 * The views expressed herein belong solely to me. I would like to thank Patrick 
Holvey, Al Gidari, Bill Watson, and Carolyn Iodice for their advice and wisdom. 
1 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC 
Pub. 4485, at 65 (Aug. 2014) (Final). 
2 A zettabyte is one trillion gigabytes. See Thomas Barnett, Jr., The Zettabyte 
Era Officially Begins (How Much is That?), CISCO BLOG (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://blogs.cisco.com/sp/the-zettabyte-era-officially-begins-how-much-is-that 
[http://perma.cc/X8YT-QFDB]. 
3 Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin, Exporting Internet Law Through 
International Trade Agreements: Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age, 24 
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH 317, 333 (2016). 
4 Id. at 334. 
5 See Steven R. Swanson, Google Set Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and 
International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 715, 741 (2011). 
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distribution of the global network needed to make e-commerce and 
Internet-enabled international trade successful. Since it would be 
difficult for a state to block access to individual users, 
governments instead seek to control the flow of data higher up 
the chain, usually at the level of certain intermediaries like 
Internet Service Providers.6 While reducing these barriers is a 
useful and necessary tool towards protecting free Internet-
enabled commerce, it is also a traditional solution.  
This article proposes an unconventional solution to the 
problem of digital trade restrictions: digital trade zones. Digital 
trade zones would be areas in which a country would forbear 
from jurisdiction over certain Internet and privacy laws in order 
to permit innovative arrangements between countries as a means 
of circumventing otherwise impeding digital trade restrictions. 
To date there has not been any discussion of creating special 
jurisdictions for the trade and treatment of data.7
This article lays a foundation for such a discussion. Part I 
highlights the key impediments to digital trade. Part II discusses 
the theoretical foundation of digital trade zones, analogizing this 
framework to both maritime law and Foreign Trade Zones 
(“FTZs”) in the United States, each a key ingredient needed to 
make digital trade zones function. Part III anticipates successes 
and problems posed by digital trade zones in practice by 
presenting some of the potential mechanics of digital trade zones 
in the United States. Specifically, it proposes two types of 
zones—experimental zones and waystation zones—addressing, 
respectively, the impediments created by restrictions on cross-
border data flows and data localization. Part III also contains a 
discussion of the ways in which digital trade zones offer answers 
to some common intellectual property rights violations frequently 
encountered in the course of trade. The Conclusion summarizes 
the work and proposes next steps to further the discussion. 
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO DIGITAL TRADE
From galleons to gigabytes, international trade has come a 
long way.8 Producers and consumers can be instantaneously 
connected, and the flow of information across the globe has 
facilitated a commercial revolution. While the world is more 
6 See id. at 719. 
7 A single article does discuss treating the emerging internet ecosystem broadly as a 
single “digital free trade zone.” See Kristi L. Bergemann, A Digital Free Trade Zone and 
Necessarily-Regulated Self-Governance for Electronic Commerce: The World Trade 
Organization, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20 JOHN 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595, 629 (2002). 
8 From pieces of eight to 8-bit also hits the tone I am going for. 
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connected than ever, barriers to digital trade are being erected at 
an alarming pace. Despite the myriad of challenges facing 
individuals and industry engaging in e-commerce, three of the 
most common digital trade restrictions are data localization, 
restrictions on cross-border data flows, and intellectual property 
rights infringement.9
A. Data Localization 
Data localization refers to mandates that require companies 
to engage in digital trade-related activities inside of the 
particular country in order to do business in that country.10
Sometimes called “data nationalism,” data localization is an 
extreme attempt by a government to restrict the flow of data 
from escaping beyond its control and its borders. Data 
localization can be contrasted with historical Internet border 
controls; while previous controls were mainly designed to keep 
information from entering a country, localization efforts build on 
this by preventing data from leaving.11
The most common localization efforts require that data 
storage facilities house data in the country or jurisdiction that 
originates the data.12 For example, in 2015, Russia required that 
data collected by companies on Russian citizens be both 
processed and stored within Russia.13 While there is still 
uncertainty about how the law will be implemented, the outlook 
for such localization requirements is not good. This is because 
Russia currently lacks the server capacity to shoulder the 
demand for data storage as required by the law.14
China also has localization restrictions aimed at cloud 
computing. Given its geographic agnosticism, cloud computing is 
frequently an unfortunate first casualty of data localization. In 
China, cloud computing is closed to foreign-invested companies 
and the country is presently seeking to limit foreign companies 
from offering cloud computing services if they are cross-border 
9 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT 
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2017) [hereinafter NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT]
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/NTE/2017%20NTE.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/YL6U-DT56]. 
10 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, Inv. No. 332-531, USITC 
Pub. 4415 (July 2013) (Final). 
11 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 
679 (2015). 
12 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, KEY BARRIERS TO DIGITAL TRADE 
(Mar. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/march/key- 
barriers-digital-trade [http://perma.cc/BWV4-VU7A].
13 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 382. 
14 Id.
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services.15 But localization is not limited to tyrannical regimes. 
Even Canada has caught the localization bug. British Columbia 
and Nova Scotia both have laws that require that personal 
information possessed by public institutionssuch as schools, 
universities, or hospitalsmust be stored and accessed only 
in Canada.16
Localization requirements such as these can be incredibly 
costly to service providers and consumers. Since, at its most 
extreme, localization could require a provider to construct 
physical data infrastructure in every jurisdiction where it does 
business, one can begin to imagine the expense that such 
requirements place on the private sector and the limitations 
they pose for global investment and business expansion. In 
Brazil, for example, a data center costs on average $60.9 
million.17 Even in the United States, construction of a data 
center can exceed $40 million.18 In countries with more 
burdensome regulatory environments, construction costs could 
be even higher. For example, Chinese localization efforts could 
cost as much as 1.1% of the nation’s gross domestic product.19
B. Cross-Border Data Flow Restrictions 
Less extreme than data localization, restrictions on the flow 
of data across borders encompass a host of activities and 
regulations designed to impede information exchange. By 
limiting what types of data can be exported and how data flow 
restrictions can frustrate a broad range of e-commerce activities, 
banks may be unable to transfer data between international 
branches, and big data analysis may be limited by turning off the 
information spigot to companies that rely on cutting-edge 
marketing strategies.20 Even individuals can be implicated by 
cross-border data flow restrictions. Consider that fifty-eight 
percent of eBay revenue comes from outside the United States 
and that Airbnb operates in more than 65,000 cities and 191 
countries.21 Consumers and companies in the United States are 
15 Id. at 89. 
16 Id. at 72. 
17 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the 
Global Internet (Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 378, 2014). 
18 See id.
19 Matthias Bauer et al., The Costs of Data Localisation: Friendly Fire on Economic 
Recovery, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON. 2 (2014). 
20 See RACHEL G. FEFER, SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG.
RES. SERV., R44565, DIGITAL TRADE AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 13 (2017). 
21 Craig Smith, 70 Amazing eBay Statistics and Facts, DMR, https://expanded 
ramblings.com/index.php/ebay-stats/ [http://perma.cc/6UME-GT3R] (last updated Feb. 3, 
2018); About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [http://perma.cc/7DHL-67JP]
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
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connecting with international markets in a variety of innovative 
ways; they too can be entrepreneurially constrained by digital 
trade restrictions. 
Restrictions on cross-border data flows are varied. Many are 
already familiar with China’s Great Firewall, which blocks 
websites such as Twitter, Google, and Facebook.22 In a recently 
issued policy, “On Cleaning up and Regulating Internet Access 
Services Market,” China prohibits telecommunications carriers 
from permitting consumers access to virtual private network 
connections to contact data centers abroad.23 The European 
Union is considering proposals on contract rules for digital 
content, such as streaming services and for goods sold online. 
Ostensibly designed to address “defective” content purchased 
online, it remains to be seen how this will limit the ability of U.S. 
providers to conduct digital business in Europe or lead to a 
bifurcation of service into separate geographic zones. These are 
just a handful of the numerous international limitations on data 
flows that threaten the free exchange of information throughout 
the world. 
The numerousness of limits on cross-border data flows make 
the costliness of compliance with such efforts unsurprising. The 
Great Firewall blocks eleven of the top twenty-five global 
websites, and estimates place the total number of blocked sites at 
3000.24 This costs individuals and organizations countless dollars 
a year in lost business. Given the acceleration of cloud 
computing—twenty-two percent of OECD-based businesses25 use 
cloud computing services—limiting the ability of the cloud to 
serve different populations easily is an expensive proposition.26
Moreover, much of the value that comes from data is increasingly 
made by gleaning insights from data in real time.27 Curtailing 
that real time analysis means placing an upper limit on a core 
part of data’s intrinsic usefulness. Imagine a farmer relying on 
Internet-enabled equipment to plant crops more precisely. If that 
farmer is located in a country which limits his access to the 
cloud, the data he is simultaneously producing as he plants 
cannot be easily transformed from raw to useful information to 
make his activity more precise. Or consider the aircraft 
22 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 90. 
23 Id. at 89. 
24 Id. at 90. 
25 OECD stands for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
26 Expanding U.S. Digital Trade and Eliminating Barriers to Digital Exports: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 
3 (2016) (statement of Robert D. Atkinson, President, Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation) [hereinafter Atkinson Testimony]. 
27 Id. at 2. 
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manufacturing industry. A Boeing 737 engine produces twenty 
terabytes of data per hour.28 Boeing utilizes this enormous 
amount of data to enhance safety and reduce flight delays. 
Boeing’s Airplane Health Management system is used by 
commercial airlines that operate Boeing aircraft in real time to 
assess and mitigate potential aircraft problems.29 Given that 
crossing borders is core to an aircraft’s purpose, the success of 
this entire endeavor is rooted in Boeing’s ability to move 
enormous amounts of data around the globe quickly and 
effortlessly. It is estimated that the Internet of Things, such as 
Boeing’s engines, other industrial machines, and consumer 
electronics, will yield $11.1 trillion per year in economic impact.30
Data flow limitations cut directly into that figure, threatening 
one of the largest potential additions to economic productivity in 
the coming years. 
C. Intellectual Property Rights Infringement 
Internet-enabled trade has simultaneously created new 
markets for intellectual property rights (“IPR”) and caused a 
great proliferation of IPR infringement. Frequently, Internet 
piracy is named as a key trade barrier, including foreign 
countries hosting websites that post pirated content or connect 
people to such stolen content.31 According to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, who issues lists of countries that are serial IPR 
violators, the countries on the “priority watch list” span the 
globe, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela.32
Infringement of IPR can take many forms. Often times, 
foreign websites will host pirated or stolen content. For example, 
MP3VA.com is a site based in Russia and Ukraine that sells 
unauthorized U.S. audio recordings.33 The site registers more 
than 860,000 visits per month, with most of the visits coming 
28 See John B. Maggiore, Remote Management of Real-Time Airplane Data, BOEING
(2007), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_3_07/AERO_Q307_ 
article4.pdf [http://perma.cc/T9BS-GL4Z]; Paul Mathai, Big Data: Catalyzing Performance 
in Manufacturing, WIPRO 3 (2011), https://www.wipro.com/content/dam/nexus/en/industries/ 
process%20and-industrial-manufacturing/latest-thinking/2606-Big%20Data%20-%20Copy.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KXA4-M89Y]. 
29 Atkinson Testimony, supra note 27, at 6. 
30 Id. at 3. 
31 FEFER, AKHTAR & MORRISON, supra note 20, at 16. 
32 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2017) 
[hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special 
%20301% 20Report%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/LW35-7L6X].
33 Id.
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from the United States.34 A similar website is uploaded.net, 
which gives users access to different kinds of copyrighted 
content, such as movies, music, and books. Hosted in the 
Netherlands, uploaded.com uses a creative arrangement to make 
money whereby users receive greater compensation for the 
greater size of the file they pirate and load to the website.35
Another website is taobao.com, an e-commerce platform that sells 
many counterfeit products. Taobao.com is one of the top websites 
in China.36 Another example of IPR infringement is the theft of 
trade secrets. China is a repeat offender on this issue. While 
China has taken steps to address the theft of trade secrets, 
including amendments to the General Provisions of the Civil Law 
in March 2017 that extended civil intellectual property protection 
to trade secrets, there remains a long way to go.37 This includes 
improving options for the use of preliminary injunctions and 
protections against frivolous trade secret litigation claims which 
can be used to gain advantage in unrelated disputes.38
Given the expansiveness of the Internet and the ease with 
which it facilitates IPR infringement, IPR infringement is 
exceptionally costly. Some estimate that Internet-enabled IPR 
infringement could be greater than the total volume of sales 
“through traditional channels such as street vendors and other 
physical markets.”39 An OECD study places trade in fake goods 
at $461 billion or 2.5% of global trade, and it has been noted that 
“the total magnitude of counterfeiting and piracy worldwide in all 
forms appears to be approaching, if not surpassing, the trillion 
dollar mark.”40
D. Motivations to Limit Digital Trade 
The motivation to limit digital trade to prevent violations of 
IPR may appear the most straightforward—preventing the raw 
profiteering from the sale of stolen goods. However, when it 
comes to other barriers to digital trade, the motivations are 
somewhat more opaque. Data flow restrictions and associated 
34 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF 
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 9 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Notorious Markets] https://ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/ files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf [http://perma.cc/LMT2-RZ6K].
35 Id. at 14. 
36 See id. at 12. 
37 See SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 32, at 30. 
38 Id.
39 Id. at 13. 
40 OFFICE OF THE INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, U.S. JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT FY 2017–2019, at 20 (2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/2016jointstrategicplan.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U68K-6FUQ].
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localization requirements have been enacted for a myriad of 
reasons by various countries. 
The most common rationales respond to fears that sharing 
data abroad will open such data up to surveillance by foreign 
governments. This public motivation stems from dual desires to 
protect the privacy of the country’s own citizens and a 
protectionist motivation to stimulate domestic technology and 
Internet companies. In the wake of the Snowden revelations, 
countries, including India and the EU, have pursued various 
efforts to guard against U.S. surveillance.41 Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa (collectively known as the “BRICS 
countries”) have also sought to create a series of global 
transmission cables intended to be “a network free of U.S. 
eavesdropping.”42 From a civil liberties perspective, some have 
commented that centralizing data within certain countries only 
makes it easier for domestic agencies and law enforcement to spy 
on their own citizens by concentrating citizens’ data more 
closely.43 The veracity of claims that localization and data flow 
restrictions are primarily rooted in concern over foreign 
surveillance belongs in a paper all its own, and it is worth noting 
that some have pushed back against this notion by arguing that 
surveillance concerns are a veneer for what is ultimately digital 
protectionism against mostly American companies.44
Regardless of motivations, these efforts have demonstrated 
protectionist effects. Governments may believe that by limiting 
foreign competition, which is often American competition given the 
United States’ technological and commercial dominance, a 
domestic technology industry may flourish. However, governments 
around the world have worried about the impediments this logic 
poses to the information economy globally. The OECD has asked 
countries to abstain from “barriers to the location, access and use 
of cross-border data facilities and functions” in order to “ensure 
cost effectiveness and other efficiencies.”45 In a survey of domestic 
companies, the Swedish National Board of Trade concluded that 
“trade cannot happen without data being moved from one location 
to another.”46
41 See Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 10, 28. 
42 Id. at 28. 
43 See id. at 30. Chander and Le refer to this as the “Honeypot” problem. Id. 
44 See Christopher Kuner, Data Nationalism and its Discontents, 64 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 2089, 2094–95 (2015). 
45 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON 
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNET POLICY MAKING 7 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
sti/ieconomy/49258588.pdf [http://perma.cc/BA4E-LLDA].
46 The National Board of Trade, No Transfer, No Trade – the Importance of Cross-
Border Data Transfer for Companies Based in Sweden, 1 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM 23 (2014). 
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II. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN THEORY
Digital trade zones possess two core theoretical 
tenets—freedom from data nationalism and existence as 
jurisdictions legally “outside” the territory of a country. Since 
digital trade zones do not presently exist, examination and 
understanding of these concepts is best done by analogy. The 
first tenet is demonstrated, in its purest form, on the high seas 
where nations are unable to exercise restrictions on the 
movement of Internet information. The second tenet is more real. 
FTZs in the United States offer a well-tested and successful 
framework to understand some of the basic mechanics of digital 
trade zones. 
A. The High Seas 
At their core, digital trade zones (just like all special 
jurisdictions) are areas with unique rules. While these are 
manmade creations, the distinction of being an original special 
jurisdiction belongs to the open ocean. Since there are no 
established digital trade zones from which to highlight, this 
Section returns to the sea in order to share by analogy how 
digital trade zones might be arranged. 
1. The Precedent of Pirate Radio 
In response to content restrictions imposed by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, disc jockeys and music promoters 
started what was known as pirate radio and began to pipe rock n’ 
roll music into Great Britain from vessels stationed in 
international waters.47 These vessels, and some old naval forts 
located outside British territorial waters that were used for 
broadcasting, were usually anchored to the seafloor and supplied 
by tenders from the mainland.48 In 1966, the most popular pirate 
broadcasters, Radio Caroline and Radio London, boasted an 
audience of over eight million listeners.49 And Britain was not 
alone; the Netherlands had its share of pirate stations as well.50
At the time the pirate broadcasters were operating, 
controlling law was the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
47 See Kimberley Peters, Taking More-Than-Human Geographies to Sea: Ocean 
Natures and Offshore Radio Piracy, in WATER WORLDS: HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE 
OCEAN 177, 178–80 (Jon Anderson & Kimberley Peters eds., 2014). 
48 See id. at 182–83. 
49 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting: A Test 
Case of the International System for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 75 (1982). 
50 See id. at 76. 
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Seas.51 This agreement did not approve or prohibit an explicit 
right to broadcast from the high seas.52 In fact, the Convention 
only lists four core nautical freedoms: navigation, fishing, 
laying of pipelines and cables, and flight.53 Some argue that so 
long as broadcasting or any other activity did not interfere 
with any of these four freedoms, it would be permissible under 
the Convention.54
Despite the apparent security offered under the Geneva 
Convention, pirate broadcasters were still targets of British and 
European authorities. To circumvent these authorities, the pirate 
broadcasters were known to fly a flag of convenience. These flags 
belonged to states that lacked the ability or will to hold pirate 
broadcasters accountable for their transmissions.55 Coastal 
countries, like Great Britain, could not exercise authority over 
pirate broadcasters flying flags of convenience because only the 
flag state possesses sole jurisdiction over its vessels.56 Early on, 
pirate radio learned the vital lesson that finding flags of 
convenience was necessary to avoid collapsing into the 
jurisdiction of the country which the pirates were attempting to 
avoid. Similarly, an embryonic digital trade zone—embodied in 
an oceangoing data center—would need to find a suitable flag of 
convenience to be able to exist apart from the onerous trade 
restrictions it seeks to evade. 
In an effort to punish pirate broadcasters, the 1965 
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts 
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories 
(“European Pirate Radio Agreement”) required “that signatory 
flag states punish pirate broadcasters found on their own 
ships.”57 The European Pirate Radio Agreement did not 
establish a new form of jurisdiction, however. Instead, it aimed 
to strengthen enforcement by targeting “acts of collaboration,” 
such as the provision or maintenance of the vessels, the 
provision of supplies to the broadcasters, and the provision of 
advertising to fund the pirate stations.58 Even though the 
vessels and transmitters were themselves beyond reach of 
51 Id. at 79. 
52 See id.
53 See Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas]. 
54 See Robertson, supra note 49, at 79. 
55 See Robert C. F. Rueland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High 
Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1161, 1225 (1989). 
56 See Swanson, supra note 5, at 739. 
57 Id.
58 Robertson, supra note 49, at 95. 
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European governments, the network of logistical, financial, and 
human support for pirate radio was not. 
Pirate radio was effectively extinguished in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 
Article 109 gives states, even those who are not the flag states 
of a broadcasting vessel, power to arrest “any person or 
ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the 
broadcasting apparatus.”59
Pirate radio represents an inchoate, primitive digital trade 
zone. Seeking to circumvent impediments to the flow of 
transmitted information, individuals took to the seas. In 
international waters, these pirate broadcasters were able to 
successfully carve out space and challenge state-owned radio 
corporations, much in the same way digital trade zones seek 
to challenge the protectionist impulses of data localization 
and cross-border data flow restrictions, but this time with 
state approval. 
2. The Legal Status of Oceanic Data Centers 
Pirate radio offers an instructive case study about the 
potential, as well as the limits, of using the ocean as a means of 
bypassing territorial laws limiting the flow of information. 
However, to understand the theory that gives purpose to digital 
trade zones, the pirate radio analogy must be improved by 
considering the effect of putting servers on the seas. Can 
territorial restrictions on the flow of information be circumvented 
by placing the data on a vessel in the ocean? 
For a time, Google pursued barge-based server farms that 
would deliver computing power throughout the world. In 2009, 
Google was granted a patent for a “water-based data center.”60
Using the ocean to power and cool a data center could potentially 
mean operating the facility much more cheaply at sea than on 
land. While there are doubts about the technological feasibility of 
such server ships, it may nonetheless be possible for a data 
center to maintain a degree of independence from national 
Internet restrictions by remaining at sea.61
59 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. At present, the United States has signed but not ratified 
UNCLOS and treats parts of the agreement as customary international law. 
60 U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009). 
61 See Tim Worstall, Google’s Offshore Data Centres Won’t Be Out of the NSA’s Reach, 
Nor the US Government’s, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2013, 9:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2013/10/27/googles-offshore-data-centres-wont-be-out-of-the-nsas-reach-nor-
the-us-governments/#3e87c3787536 [http://perma.cc/6GGG-25VH]. 
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Such was the case when the Swedish website, Pirate Bay, 
attempted to purchase an old British naval fort located outside 
the country’s territorial waters in order to avoid law enforcement 
attempts to shut down the website.62 While this attempted 
acquisition was for nefarious purposes, it underscores the 
interest in, and potential of, efforts to find places where digital 
restrictions do not apply. The fort, known as Sealand, had been 
previously used as a pirate radio base and claims a modicum of 
sovereignty.63 Referred to as “a near-perfect embodiment of 
a data haven,” Sealand has already tested its independence 
in cyberspace by hosting HavenCo, a provider of online 
gambling services.64
Building upon the lessons learned by pirate broadcasters and 
Sealanders alike, floating data centers would have to adhere to 
two important requirements at minimum. These vessels would 
have to remain on the high seas and would need to fly the flag of 
some nation. 
UNCLOS applies several degrees of territoriality to the 
ocean.65 Of these several degrees, only the finalthe high 
seasoffers sufficient freedom from the prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction of national governments to be of use in 
the intellectual development of digital trade zones. The high seas 
begin where a country’s exclusive economic zone ends; 200 miles 
from the shore.66 On the high seas, a state that is not the flag 
state of the vessel in question can exercise jurisdiction over a 
ship in international waters only in very limited circumstances 
such as if the ship is engaged in piracy or poses a specific threat 
to national security.67 One would hope that operating a cloud 
computing service at an offshore data center would not fall into 
62 See Jan Libbenga, The Pirate Bay plans to buy Sealand, THE REGISTER
(Jan. 12, 2007, 2:44 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/12/pirate_bay_buys_island/ 
[http://perma.cc/LHZ8-W3DY]. 
63 See Kevin Fayle, Sealand Ho! Music Pirates, Data Havens, and the Future of 
International Copyright Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 261 (2005). Since it 
lacks the permanent population and capacity to pursue diplomatic relations, Sealand is 
unable to fully achieve sovereign recognition. Id. However, Sealand has been 
acknowledged to have a degree of sovereignty. Id. An English court found that Great 
Britain did not have jurisdiction over Sealand, and in 1978, the residents of Sealand lost 
the fort to German and Dutch nationals before they were able to recapture the fort in an 
air assault. Id. The Dutch and German invaders were then held as prisoners of war. Id.;
see also Andrew H. E. Lyon, The Principality of Sealand, and Its Case for Sovereign 
Recognition, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 637, 642–43 (2015). 
64 Fayle, supra note 63, at 262. 
65 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea specifies these zones as internal 
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, the continental shelf, 
and the high seas. Swanson, supra note 5, at 727–38. 
66 UNCLOS, supra note 59, at 40. 
67 See id. at 53–54. 
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these categories, though countries such as China, which have 
highly restrictive Internet regimes, may argue otherwise. 
While the high seas offer a forum free from territorial data 
protectionism, a floating data center would also need, just like 
the pirate radio broadcasters of yore, to identify with a flag state 
in order to be protected against unwanted boarding and seizure. 
International law is explicit that a ship not flying the flag of a 
country is considered to be operating beyond the law.68 The flag 
state, to the contrary, enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel 
flying its flag, thus “[h]aving a nationality actually protects the 
ship from other states’ jurisdiction and lets the flag state exercise 
diplomatic protection over the vessel.”69
Therefore, the operator of an oceangoing data center would 
want to select a flag state under which to operate the vessel. 
Options are not just limited to the United States or a company’s 
nation of incorporation, but also a host of nations offering their 
flags for sale. Countries offering flags of convenience include 
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.70 Organizations 
usually select flags of convenience because of the light-regulatory 
touch and low taxes found in these nations.71 However, in order 
to access markets with greater Internet regulatory schemes, 
especially when it comes to privacy, the operators of a floating 
data center may wish to choose a country that mimics the data 
protection regime of the jurisdiction within which they hope to 
conduct business. As such, operators of floating data centers may 
wish to affiliate with EU member states or Canada. 
3. Applicability to Digital Trade Zones 
The hypothetical treatment of data on the high seas offers 
two instructive lessons for digital trade zones. First, in order to 
be successful, a digital trade zone should attempt to mimic the 
legal conditions found on the high seas as much as possible. The 
digital trade zone should be a space free from territorial 
regulation on the flow of data; the digital trade zone should serve 
as a neutral zone separate and apart from domestic data 
restrictions. Just as it is for other special jurisdictions, 
extraterritoriality is important, and given the difficultly of 
operating data centers out in the ocean, replicating those legal 
conditions on land is core to the digital trade zones project. 
Second, digital trade zones still must be located somewhere in 
68 See Sean Hickman, Flagging Options for Seasteading Projects, THE SEASTEADING 
INSTITUTE 3 (Mar. 2012). 
69 Swanson, supra note 5, at 735–36. 
70 Hickman, supra note 68, at 8. 
71 Id. at 3. 
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order to benefit from a broader rule of law. This is similar to how 
a floating data center would need to select a flag state to avoid 
the predations attendant to being a stateless vessel on the high 
seas. Just as some flag states are more convenient for different 
operations, the United States likely offers the best conditions for 
digital trade zones, as it possesses a history of well-regarded 
privacy protection, a vibrant Internet industry, a strong rule of 
law, and a history of operating special jurisdictions. The 
advantages conferred on the first mover in this field would also 
be substantial, and policy makers may wish to work towards 
capturing these benefits. 
B. U.S. Foreign Trade Zones 
While the high seas offer an analogous way to think about 
the legal status of digital trade zones, FTZs in the United States 
offer direct insight into the mechanics of their digital trade 
counterparts. Created by the U.S. Congress in 1934, FTZs permit 
the occupants of the zone to defer customs duties and excise 
taxes on goods brought into the zone.72 FTZs have proven to be 
successful special jurisdictions in the United States and as such 
offer a template from which to model their digital cousins. 
1. The Purpose of Foreign Trade Zones 
The purpose of FTZs is to prove an incentive for siting 
certain manufacturing functions within the United States. FTZs 
promote “importation for the purpose of conditioning or 
combining foreign goods with domestic products prior to 
exporting the finished products to foreign markets, rather than 
retaining them for domestic consumption.”73 At present, most 
activity in FTZs is manufacturing. Since their creation, the 
number of FTZs has proliferated. Before 1970, there were only 
ten cities with zones.74 Today, there are over 200 approved 
zones.75 Domestic inputs into zones account for fifty-eight 
percent of inputs while forty-two percent of inputs come from 
foreign sources.76
72 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (2012). 
73 Barbara M. Sheppard, Foreign Trade Zones – International Business Incentives, 7
GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 669, 670 (1977). 
74 See John J. DaPonte, Jr., The Foreign Trade Zones Act: Keeping Up with the 
Changing Times, BUS. AM., Dec. 1997, at 22.  
75 See US Foreign Trade Zones, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.export.gov/ 
article?id=US-Foreign-Trade-Zones [http://perma.cc/MR9K-8G4Z]. 
76 MARY JANE BOLLE & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42686, U.S.
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2013). 
458 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
2. The Structure of Foreign Trade Zones 
The most unique factor of FTZs is that they exist outside of 
U.S customs territory.77 This allows FTZs to offer duty deferral 
on goods entering the zones. Customs duties are only paid when 
the imported goods are actually transported into U.S. customs 
territory.78 In this way, FTZs represent more of a “procedure” 
than an actual physical demarcated place.79 While all the zones 
are exempt from the same customs procedures, the zones are 
hardly homogenous, ranging from large, sprawling facilities to 
single warehouses.80
Applications for FTZs are reviewed by the Foreign Trade 
Zones Board. Located within the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
the Board is made up of the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Secretary of the Treasury.81 The Board has an Executive Secretary 
to lead the daily operations.82 The Board examines and, where 
appropriate, approves applications for new FTZ designations and 
then grants the designation to local governments or non-profit 
corporations, which then create and maintain the zone as a public 
utility.83 Customs and Border Protection oversees all activities and 
collects all revenues from FTZs.84
3. Foreign Trade Zones Meet Digital Trade Zones 
FTZs offer an established model for digital trade zones. 
Proposed digital trade zones in the United States would be 
established via federal legislation, and organizations would 
petition a Digital Trade Zones Board—perhaps also including the 
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury as 
leaders—for inclusion in the program. Digital trade zones would 
be areas where instead of deferring duty collection, the United 
States would forbear from various Internet and privacy-related 
jurisdictions providing participating organizations the ability to 
self-regulate in ways that would satisfy the requirements of 
international data markets. Thus, digital trade zones would, 
similar to their foreign trade progenitors, be procedures rather 
than standard physical locations. Digital trade zones could 
be permitted to take a variety of forms and sizes; from the 
77 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial 
Charters, to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 982 (2016). 
78 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 11. 
79 DaPonte, supra note 74, at 206. 
80 Sheppard, supra note 73, at 670. 
81 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 13. 
82 See NAT’L ASS’N OF FOREIGN TRADE ZONES, THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONES 
PROGRAM – PROMOTING TRADE, JOB CREATION & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2013). 
83 Id.
84 See id.
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largest of data centers to the most unusual of Internet 
communication arrangements. 
III. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN PRACTICE
While there may be other applications of digital trade zones, 
and their enacting legislation should anticipate and encourage 
alternative uses, this article contemplates two practical uses. 
These two applications consider digital trade zones as 
experiments and digital trade zones as waystations. Both types of 
zones would adhere to the general procedures and structures in 
Part II. By permitting a country, in this analysis the United 
States, to forbear from jurisdiction over a defined area for the 
purposes of establishing law governing the Internet or other data 
uses unique to the zone, both experimental and transitory zones 
would be able to bypass restrictions on cross-border data flows 
and data localization requirements. 
A. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments 
Digital trade zones could also be used to detour around 
restrictions on cross-border data flows. This could be done by 
creating zones where companies could participate in different 
experimental arrangements designed to safeguard consumer 
privacy and work towards developing more beneficial 
arrangements for the transfer of data across borders. 
Digital trade zones as experimental areas are perhaps most 
applicable to the relationship between the United States and the 
EU. In 2012, U.S. digital exports to the EU were worth $140.6 
billion, representing seventy-two percent of all services exports to 
the EU.85 Total U.S.–EU trade in goods and services totaled $1 
trillion, and U.S. foreign direct investment in the EU amounted 
to $2.4 trillionfifty-six percent of total U.S. direct investment 
worldwide.86 There are several ways in which the flow of data 
across the Atlantic creates such exceptional value. For instance, 
many businesses in Europe sell products to and engage 
customers in the United States, European firms receive 
investment advice from U.S. consultancies, and companies share 
data internally from their international subsidiaries.87 This is 
similar to how Boeing tracks engine operating data throughout 
85 Joshua P. Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic Data Flows 
for U.S. and EU Trade and Investment 12 (Brookings Inst. Glob. Econ. & Dev., Working 
Paper No. 79, 2014). 
86 See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU
DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (2016). 
87 See Meltzer, supra note 85, at 8. 
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the world and shares it through its company and with 
commercial airlines. 
1. Attempts to Preserve U.S.–EU Cross-Border Data Flows 
Despite the incredible amount of data driven commerce 
between the United States and the EU, the EU’s exceptionally 
rigorous data privacy requirements has been a thorn in the side 
of U.S.–EU trade relations when it comes to cross-border data 
flows. In October 1995, the EU adopted the Data Protection 
Directive (“DPD”) to create a unified, comprehensive framework 
for data protection.88 The DPD mandates that data on EU 
citizens can only leave the EU (and DPD’s protections) if the 
destination jurisdiction has a sufficient data protection regime.89
The EU assesses how adequate foreign data protections are by 
reviewing the circumstances governing the transfer of data.90
This initially posed problems for the United States, which 
lacks the same kind of comprehensive data protection law. 
Consumer privacy protection laws in the United States are 
“industry specific and vary by sector, with different laws 
governing the collection and disclosure of financial data, 
health-related data, student information, and motor vehicle 
records.”91 Some commentators have noted that, while less 
comprehensive on the whole, the alleged patchwork protections 
found in the United States form a much more nimble and flexible 
response to consumer privacy than the European approach, a 
view shared by the Department of Commerce, which maintains 
that “[t]he sum of the parts of U.S. privacy protection is equal to 
or greater than the single whole of Europe.”92
Despite these reassurances, and in order to maintain 
transatlantic data flows, the U.S. and the EU agreed to the Safe 
Harbor Agreement in 2000.93 The Safe Harbor Agreement was 
the result of negotiations between both sides in order to find an 
88 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 
95/46/EC]. 
89 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 2.  
90 Id. The EU also focuses on “the nature of the data, the purpose and direction of 
the proposed processing operations, the countries of origin, and the final destination of 
the data, and that country’s laws, rules, and security measures.” Id.; see also Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 88, at arts. 25–26. 
91 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 3. 
92 Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-protection-laws-an-
ocean-apart.html. 
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK; A GUIDE TO SELF-
CERTIFICATION 3 (2009). 
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arrangement that satisfied the “adequate level of protection” for 
data mandated by the DPD.94 At its peak, about 4500 U.S. 
companies participated in the framework established by the Safe 
Harbor Agreement. Participation was open to any U.S. 
organization that was regulated by the Federal Trade 
Commission and, separately, airlines, even though they are 
regulated by the Department of Transportation. This restriction 
did limit the Safe Harbor Agreement to these regulated 
industries and notably, it did not include U.S. financial or 
telecommunications companies.95
The serenity found under the Safe Harbor Agreement was 
dashed when in October 2015, the European Court of Justice 
struck down Safe Harbor Agreement as insufficient under the 
DPD.96 First, the court found that a European Commission 
finding that a foreign country—the United States—had sufficient 
privacy protections does not supersede and reduce the powers of 
EU authorities to assess data privacy protections.97 The 
European Court of Justice also determined that because the 
European Commission did not investigate “the domestic laws or 
international commitment of a third country prior to making a 
determination on the adequacy of their data privacy protection,” 
the Commission decision adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement 
was invalid.98
The bombshell decision was followed by the U.S. and the EU 
scrambling to find a new mechanism to protect privacy and then 
facilitate transatlantic movement of data as quickly as possible. 
In February 2016, the U.S. and the EU announced a replacement 
to the Safe Harbor Agreement: the Privacy Shield Framework.99
The Privacy Shield Framework is meant to be a more robust 
version of the Safe Harbor Agreement. The Privacy Shield 
Framework is characterized by several changes, including 
stronger enforcement measures administered by the Department 
of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, improved 
redress for citizens who believe their data has been compromised, 
and greater commitments by participating U.S. companies, such 
as more detailed notice obligations, prescriptive access rights, 
94 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 5. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 See Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the 
EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J.
DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2–3). 
97 See Mira Burri & Rahel Schar, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: 
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 6 J. INFO.
POL’Y 479, 486 (2016). 
98 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 7. 
99 Id. at 9. 
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and data retention limits.100 Currently, 2500 organizations 
participate in the Privacy Shield Framework.101
In October 2017, the European Commission released a report 
announcing that the Privacy Shield Framework continues to 
provide sufficient protection under EU law.102 However, this 
positive development should not obfuscate concerns that the 
Privacy Shield Framework, like the Safe Harbor Agreement 
before it, will be eternal. Even at its inception, the EU recognized 
“shortcomings” with the framework,103 and with the DPD’s 
forthcoming replacement by the General Data Privacy Directive 
(“GDPD”) in 2018, questions may once again arise about the 
survival of data flow arrangements between the U.S. and the 
EU.104 The GDPD has a somewhat more expansive scope 
than the DPD—particularly when it comes to territoriality, 
data-subject rights, and personal data processing, to name a 
fewwhich may mean the currently accepted Privacy Shield 
Framework protections will be suddenly out of date when the 
GDPD comes into force next year.105 And even without this 
worry, litigation relating to another tool available for U.S. 
business compliance with the DPD—standard contractual 
clauses—has been unceasing since the invalidation of the Safe 
Harbor Agreement. Given that this litigation, centered on the 
acceptability and protective adequacy of the standard contractual 
clauses will continue regardless of the GDPD issue, the Privacy 
Shield Framework will continue to face active threats and 
challenges for the foreseeable future.106
100 The Judicial Redress Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2015), which was signed into law by 
President Obama in February 2016, improved transatlantic trust regarding data flows. 
Broadly, the Act aims to include citizens of foreign countries or organizations (like the 
EU), which the United States has an agreement with to promote privacy protections. 
Similar to the promise offered by digital trade zones, passage of the Judicial Redress Act 
was hailed as a turning point in U.S.–EU data relations. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra
note 86, at 10, 13. 
101 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross 
Welcomes Release of European Commission Report on EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur- 
ross-welcomes-release-european-commissions [http://perma.cc/Z7NZ-PLFB]. 
102 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
First Annual Review of the Functioning of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield, at 2, COM (2017), 
611 final (Oct. 18, 2017). 
103 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 11. 
104 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data 
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221, 
222 (2017). 
105 Id. at 222, 225. 
106 See Catherine Muyl, EU Updates on Schrems II and the Privacy Shield, SECURITY,
PRIVACY AND THE LAW (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2017/ 
10/eu-updates-on-schrems-ii-and-the-privacy-shield/ [http://perma.cc/LCU6-BC4L]. There 
is also litigation in France challenging the Privacy Shield Framework. See Les Exégètes 
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2. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments 
The tense history, and continued fragility, of U.S.–EU data 
privacy agreements offers an opportunity for proposed digital 
trade zones to shine. While digital trade zones could be viewed as 
experimental zones in a variety of ways, this article focuses on 
one prominent way in which digital trade zones could be valuable 
areas of trade innovation. Currently, any data privacy 
arrangement between the U.S. and the EU has to be negotiated 
in great detail and would apply to the entirety of both 
jurisdictions. The stakes are also exceptionally high; a single 
agreement must be, at least at the time of its adoption, near 
perfect, or face invalidation.107 And even where an agreement is 
successful at fending off legal challenges, these challenges still 
undermine the agreement’s stability until resolution, potentially 
forestalling quick adoption of the framework. 
Digital trade zones could be designed to permit organizations 
to experiment with different data privacy arrangements. The 
United States could forbear from standard privacy laws in 
specified zones. The governing principle in the zones would be a 
hybrid privacy regime: U.S. law contextualized by EU 
requirements. This would allow several places to experiment 
with data privacy arrangements. There are three benefits to 
using digital trade zones to experiment with privacy 
arrangements in order to circumvent impediments to the 
international flow of data. One way this might function would be 
if parties, such as the U.S. and EU, negotiated a variety of data 
privacy arrangements and then specified specific zones in which 
the arrangements would apply. Much like FTZs, these digital 
trade zones would be limited to the geographic area around 
single companies or server complexes. Interested organizations 
would be able to apply to the Department of Commerce to be the 
guinea pigs for different privacy arrangements. For participating 
companies, the benefits would be clear: access to European 
markets that would otherwise be beyond reach. Just as 
companies apply to participate in the FTZ program because it 
gives them more efficient and less costly access to difficult to 
source inputs, companies handling big data would be motivated 
to participate in a digital trade zone by the inverse: access to 
difficult to reach overseas markets. 
Amatuers, Privacy Shield, LES EXÉGÈTES AMATEURS (2016), https://exegetes.eu.org/ 
dossiers/privacyshield/index.html [http://perma.cc/W324-QP7H].
107 See Graham Greenleaf, International Data Privacy Agreements after the GDPR 
and Schrems, 139 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 6, 8 (noting that a less than perfect 
Privacy Shield Framework invites litigation designed to destroy the agreement). 
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There are three benefits to using digital trade zones to 
experiment with privacy arrangements in order to circumvent 
impediments to the international flow of data. 
First, experimental digital trade zones would reduce the 
currently high stakes of every data protection agreement 
negotiation. Since the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Privacy 
Shield Framework apply to the entire United States, companies 
do not have a choice of participating in some other arrangement. 
This means that the stakes are exceptionally high during a 
negotiation over a new arrangement or when considering 
updating an arrangement. If there were numerous arrangements 
in place, any of which could be applied for and to specific local 
jurisdictions, the stakes would be lower for each individual 
agreement. The U.S. and the EU might be more willing to 
experiment with different types of arrangements, perhaps even 
limiting the initial number of organizations which could 
participate during pilot programs, and would be more likely to 
approach agreements in an iterative process, adopting lessons 
learned from test agreements and adjusting to developments in 
U.S. and EU privacy law. 
Relatedly, these zones could act as fail safes in the event 
certain regimes were invalidated. With lower stakes and more 
experimental agreements spread over different jurisdictions, the 
numerousness of digital trade zones would guarantee that if a 
single arrangement was invalidated by a U.S. or EU court, other 
agreements would still be in place. Indeed, if digital trade zones 
are permitted to “stack” agreements, conforming to the most 
stringent aspects of every agreement, even where one of the 
jurisdiction’s agreements is invalidated, the jurisdiction is still 
able to function under other agreements. Consider the creative 
commons license system. Just as licensors are able to select 
different types of licenses that give them the desired level of 
attribution, commercial reuse, and derivativeness, organizations 
operating in a digital trade zone would be able to select the data 
privacy and legal arrangements that best suit their organization 
and the market access it hopes to achieve.108 Modularity means 
longevity for transatlantic data agreements. The dispersed 
nature of the zones’ agreement frameworks would no longer 
necessitate hurried negotiation for global replacements where a 
prior regime is withdrawn. Even without an agreement stack, 
there would already be other types of model agreements in place 
108 See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
[http://perma.cc/87JF-EMJP] (last visited Nov. 10, 2017). 
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that the parties could draw upon to replace a failed or 
invalidated experimental arrangement. 
Third, digital trade zones would inject market forces into a 
currently bulky, and non-market process. By marketizing data 
privacy arrangements, digital trade zones would be more 
responsive to consumers while giving greater choice to policy 
makers. Right now, consumers can only choose to do U.S.–EU 
business with companies complying with the Privacy Shield 
Framework. Consumers are not able to choose amongst 
companies that might protect their privacy even better under an 
experimental arrangement, and companies are not efficiently 
incentivized to offer greater or lesser, but more targeted, 
protections. Given the privacy concerns that form the basis of 
many people’s desire to remain offline or minimize their online 
presence, this consumer choice is critical.109 Businesses will also 
be interested in such a proposal because it offers a chance to 
improve their reputations vis a vis consumers’ privacy desires, 
likely in a certification-style manner.110 In this way digital trade 
zones can help organizations seeking to operate in Europe, while 
also giving consumers a voice in what types of data privacy 
arrangements they prefer. 
B. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations 
While data localization policies are difficult to surmount 
because the policies are designed to prohibit the international 
movement of data entirely, digital trade zones can still offer an 
answer to data localization problems when used as waystations. 
These types of digital trade zones would exist to hold data in 
transition and would be aimed at addressing localization 
initiatives, such as those found in Canada. 
1. Data Localization in Canada 
As mentioned previously, the Canadian provinces of British 
Columbia and Nova Scotia both have serious localization 
requirements for public data. Both provinces require that 
personal information held by a public organization, such as a 
university, hospital, school, or public department, be held in 
Canada.111 Moreover, these public entities are prohibited from 
using U.S.–based services if there is the chance the data 
109 See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and 
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J.
INT’L. L. 1, 37 (2000). 
110 See id. at 35–36. 
111 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72. 
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covered by the laws could be “stored in or accessed from the 
United States.”112
British Columbia’s localization requirement comes from the 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”), 
an act governing the protection of public information.113 Section 
30.1 of FIPPA mandates that “a public body must ensure that 
personal information in its custody or under its control is 
stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”114 There 
are three exceptions: (1) if the individual consents to their 
information being stored in or accessed from another 
jurisdiction; (2) if the data is stored in or accessed from another 
jurisdiction “for the purpose of disclosure allowed under this 
Act”; and (3) if the information was disclosed in order make a 
payment or resolve an issue surrounding a payment to “the 
government of British Columbia or a public body.”115 “Under 
FIPPA, a ‘record’ includes books, documents, maps, drawings, 
photographs, letters, vouchers, papers and any other thing on 
which information is recorded or stored by graphic, electronic, 
mechanical or other means.”116
In Nova Scotia, the Personal Information International 
Disclosure Protection Act (“PIIDPA”) forms the core of the 
province’s localization requirement, since PIIDPA focuses on the 
unauthorized disclosure of information specifically beyond 
Canada and makes it illegal for information to be stored in, or 
accessed from, jurisdictions outside of Canada. There are 
exceptions, instances of which are detailed in a report issued by 
the government of Nova Scotia.117 For example, energy officials in 
Nova Scotia permitted twenty-four staffers to use their 
government email while traveling abroad to places like the 
United States, Norway, and China.118 The explanation provided 
for this exemption from PIIDPA is innocuous and standard: “staff 
may be required to monitor their email and voicemail for 
business continuity purposes.”119 Almost all the other entries in 
112 Id.
113 OFFICE OF THE INFO. & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR B.C., GUIDE TO ACCESS AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTION UNDER FIPPA 3 (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter FIPPA GUIDE]. 
114 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 165 R.S.B.C. § 30.1 (1996). 
115 165 R.S.B.C. §§ 30.1, 33.1(1). 
116 FIPPA GUIDE, supra note 113, at 7. 
117 See Ian Wallace, Privacy: what laws apply in Atlantic Canada?, STEWART MCKELVEY,
http://www.smss.com/abcnewsletter/AEC/2014_Summer/A1.html [http://perma.cc/ML8K-MGG8]
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017). 
118 N.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE 
PROTECTION ACT: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (July 2015). 
119 Id. 
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the report detail similar situations of staff bringing laptops and 
phones outside of Canada on official or personal trips.120
2. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations 
In this conception of digital trade zones, waystations are 
locations where data is transitory. Information will flow through 
the zone but not be accessed there. Data may be stored there as 
long as necessary until it is repatriated back to the jurisdiction 
with the localization requirement. The waystation model would 
work by creating space where organizations would be permitted 
to add additional privacy and cybersecurity protections to meet 
the protection thresholds necessary to handle the data coming 
out of a localized jurisdiction. However, the waystation would not 
be physically located in that jurisdiction and may even be 
situated in a foreign country. 
In the case of Canada, the United States could create digital 
trade zones that exist as spaces outside of U.S. jurisdiction for 
the purposes of privacy laws, similar to how FTZs exist “outside” 
the U.S. for the purposes of duty collection on initial imports. In 
these zones, organizations would be able to build and operate 
servers to handle public data from British Columbia or Nova 
Scotia. Since the zones would be outside the jurisdiction of the 
United States for the purposes of privacy law, the zones would be 
able to be sealed from intrusion by host jurisdiction surveillance 
agencies. Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
also known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), would 
not apply. Law enforcement would not be able to use a warrant 
issued under the SCA to access data stored outside the United 
States.121 The individual whose data is being stored remains 
inviolate because the organization storing the individual’s 
information is merely a “caretaker.”122 The right to the data 
remains with the individual, in this case in Canada, and the 
server itself remains in the digital trade zone thus technically 
outside the borders of the United States. With ensured privacy 
protection from the United States, organizations operating in the 
zone would still need to certify to the relevant province that they 
had met the necessary privacy and cyber protection to handle the 
province’s public data. Furthermore, the data would not be able 
to be accessed in these zones. It would simply be stored there 
120 See generally id.
121 In re Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and 
Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d. Cir. 2016). 
122 Andrew J. Pecoraro, Drawing Lines in the Cloud: Implications of Extraterritorial 
Limits to the Stored Communications Act, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 75, 95 (2017). 
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until the data was requested back in Canada, at which point it 
would be transmitted back to the originating province. 
The benefit of the waystation model is that it may be easier, 
more cost-effective, and less burdensome to construct, maintain, 
and operate a collection of servers in jurisdictions that are not 
subject to the localization requirement. In the U.S.–Canada 
example, it may be easier to build and operate servers in the 
United States, or another country, than it is in Nova Scotia. 
For example, in Toronto it costs $1580 per square meter to 
build a high-tech factory, the closest type of structure to a data 
center mentioned in a recent report on comparative construction 
costs.123 Presumably it may be even more expensive to do such 
construction in places outside of Canada’s largest city, such as 
Nova Scotia. While all U.S. cities in the report were listed as 
having higher construction costs than Toronto, numerous other 
cities did have lower costs, potentially making them ripe 
candidates for using digital trade zones as waystations. Some 
notable cities where construction costs are lower than Toronto 
include Seoul, Singapore, and Brisbane.124 However, data centers 
are different from generic high-tech factories, and so these 
general numbers might not encompass the exact cost of 
construction for such a specialized facility. In the United States, 
it costs on average $43 million to build a data center.125 Costs are 
even higher in Brazil ($60.9 million) and Chile ($51.2 million).126
Directly comparable data was not available for Canada. However, 
data center construction costs in Brazil and Chile were higher 
than the United States, even though construction of high-tech 
factories in both of those countries were considerably cheaper 
than such construction in the United States.127 This suggests 
that there is something intrinsic about the construction of data
centers that makes such construction cheaper in the United 
States than abroad. To the extent that such construction is 
cheaper in the United States rather than British Columbia 
or Nova Scotia, digital trade zones can serve as a way to 
promote the domestic construction industry, while also 
123 TURNER & TOWNSEND, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKET SURVEY 2016, at
26 (2016) (comparing construction costs on numerous global cities—Toronto was the only 
Canadian city included and U.S. cities covered by the report were New York City, 
Houston, San Francisco, and Seattle). 
124 See id. at 13. 
125 Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 36.  
126 Id.
127 See TURNER & TOWNSEND, supra note 123, at 24, 28, 78. Construction costs for a 
high-tech factory was $1300 in Brazil and $3500 in Chile. Id. at 24, 28. Comparatively, 
according to the report, the city with the lowest cost of construction of a high-tech factory 
was Houston at $4272. Id. at 78. 
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bringing U.S. organizations in closer proximity to Canadian 
information markets. 
Construction is not the only driving cost of data centers. 
Data centers are exceptionally energy intensive,128 with energy 
costs accounting for three-quarters of a data center’s cost of 
operation.129 In Canada, data centers use approximately one 
percent of the entirety of the country’s energy consumption.130
And, since Canada actually has more expensive electricity than 
the United States, small businesses pay, on average, eight 
percent more and industrial businesses pay thirty percent more 
per kilowatt hour than their southern neighbors.131 Cheap 
electricity in the United States may be a reason why businesses 
would want to site their data centers in the United States rather 
than in Canada. While Canada has 164 data centers, the costs of 
operating those centers can be reduced by siting those centers in 
the U.S., or by contracting with U.S.–based centers to handle 
provincial public information.132 Waystation digital trade zones 
would help enable this cross-border data storing to be realized. 
C. Digital Trade Zones and Intellectual Property Rights 
The practical proposals of digital trade zones as experiments 
and waystations only addresses two of the three main types of 
digital trade barriers. Digital trade zones could also help advance 
national interests in protecting intellectual property. While the 
potential for digital trade zones to seriously mitigate intellectual 
property rights infringement is reserved for future works, it is 
worthwhile to mention one particular way that digital trade 
zones guard against intellectual property rights infringement, 
even only examining the simple applications presented in the 
present work. 
The Trade Related Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) 
Agreement, which was created along with the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) at the Uruguay Round, requires 
participating states to establish minimum intellectual property 
rights standards.133 However, some view the TRIPS Agreement 
128 Swanson, supra note 5, at 715. 
129 Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 37. 
130 Data Centres, NAT. RESOURCES CAN., https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/products/ 
categories/data-centres/13741 [http://perma.cc/4HZKLFQA] (last modified Jan. 19, 2018). 
131 See Gerry Angevine & Kenneth P. Green, Paying More for Power: Electricity Costs 
in the US and Canada, FRASER INST. iii (May 2014), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/ 
sites/default/files/paying-more-for-power-rev.pdf [http://perma.cc/M59X-8EJ4].
132 Colocation Canada, DATA CTR. MAP, http://www.datacentermap.com/canada/ 
[http://perma.cc/22JL-RGUS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
133 See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking 
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2011). 
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minimum standards as insufficient. For example, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires that countries make available “enforcement 
procedures” against intellectual property rights violations.134
This language stops short of any “affirmative obligation to stop 
acts of infringement.”135 This suggests that digital trade zones 
may be able to fill gaps in the TRIPS Agreement by denying 
violators an opportunity to purloin intellectual property. 
One example from a country mentioned in this article is 
Canada. Canada remains on the U.S. Trade Representative’s 
Special 301 Watch List for a variety of reasons.136 Canada does 
not give customs officials authority to “detain, seize, and destroy 
pirated and counterfeit goods.”137 Presumably, this limitation 
could be extended to goods in digital form, although there 
remains a debate about the proper classification of e-products 
under the WTO.138 As digitally neutral territory that retain (or 
even improve upon) the intellectual property rights regimes of 
their host country, digital trade zones offer safe havens for digital 
content to be stored without fear of piracy. While the data may be 
subject to piracy if it moves across borders and outside the digital 
trade zone, digital trade zones can offer intellectual property 
protection for the data they hold. 
CONCLUSION
In a world with non-tariff restrictions on trade, there is a 
truism that speaks to those who desire to negotiate around 
these restrictions: to play the game, participants must 
give something up. That is, to engage in commerce across borders, 
participants—whether they be countries or organizations—must 
be prepared to find some compromise. In the context of digital 
trade zones this thinking also holds true. Countries seeking to 
expand their digital markets might forbear from some jurisdiction 
over their territory, internet laws, and surveillance authority in 
order to promote the creation of digital trade zones and the 
proliferation of e-commerce by domestic organizations. Countries 
seeking to protect their domestic technology sectors should also be 
134 Agreement Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S 299. 
135 Brewster, supra note 133, at 22. 
136 Special 301 Report, supra note 32, at 62. 
137 Id.
138 See Sam Fleuter, The Role of Digital Products under the WTO: A New Framework 
for GATT and GATS Classification, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 153, 158–59 (2016). For the 
domestic version of the debate over the classification of digital goods, see ClearCorrect 
Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission, 810 F.3d 1283, 1289–99 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), finding that the International Trade Commission lacks authority to exclude patent 
infringing digital goods under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See also Sapna 
Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1924–25 (2015). 
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prepared to give up some of the artificial advantage created by 
protectionist policies. Privacy remains protected at the level 
required by the home jurisdiction and data-based commerce flows 
more easily in a trusted environment in the host jurisdiction.
This article has provided some initial thoughts to start a 
conversation on digital trade zones; many additional inquiries on 
this topic and opportunities for exploration yet exist. A further 
investigation of the ways in which digital trade zones could 
protect intellectual property rights, especially as data flows 
through jurisdictions that do not contain digital trade zones, is 
vital. It would also be worthwhile to consider what digital trade 
zones might look like in other, non-common law countries. This 
article proposed a particular conception of digital trade zones 
based off of international maritime law blended with the 
procedures of FTZs in the United States. Given the expansiveness 
of special jurisdictions throughout the world, what other types of 
special jurisdictions could serve as models to improve the 
usefulness of digital trade zones or tailor them to even more 
specific applications of situations? And is there a different base 
framework better suited to the general foundation of the digital 
trade zone? 
While digital trade zones may never be deployed in the real 
world, the underlying principles which would motivate their 
consideration and adoption is worth noting. The forbearance of 
jurisdiction that would be required to occur in digital trade 
zones represents an inherently pro-commerce approach. Where 
governments can be persuaded to forbear from protectionist 
policies generally, and limit other impeding regulations in certain 
narrow cases or jurisdictions, private industry, organizations, and 
entrepreneurs can leverage this freedom to create value for the 
communities in which they are based. 
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INTRODUCTION
For at least two decades, many medical organizations have 
openly supported stricter gun regulations, with some even 
stressing a complete ban on firearms.1 More recently, at least 
eight professional health organizations (“Professional Health 
Organizations”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) have 
resolutely recognized firearm-related injuries and deaths as a 
major public health problem.2 As such, these organizations have 
adopted official policy positions, which include the practice of 
physicians screening and counseling patients on firearms.3
Many doctors routinely ask their patients about potential 
dangers to their health, including drugs, swimming pools, 
household chemicals, and firearms.4 Additionally, some doctors 
educate certain patients on the risks of firearms in the home 
and firearm safety.5
In 2011, in reaction to patients’ complaints about firearm 
screening and counseling by doctors in Florida, Florida became 
the first state to pass a law curtailing physicians’ ability to 
inquire about whether patients own firearms and to counsel 
1 See, e.g., En Banc Brief of Amici Curiae Second Amendment Foundation & 
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep & Bear Arms Supporting Appellants & 
Reversal at 21, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 649 Fed. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 12-14009), 2016 WL 1642979, at *21 [hereinafter Second Amendment Foundation 
Amicus Brief]. 
2 Steven E. Weinberger et al., Firearm-Related Injury and Death in the United 
States: A Call to Action From 8 Health Professional Organizations and the American Bar 
Association, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 513, 513 (2015). 
3 Id. at 513–14. 
4 See Brief Amicus Curiae of American Medical Ass’n et al. Submitted in Support of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees at the Rehearing En Banc & Urging Affirmance at 3, Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Florida, 649 Fed. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 12–14009), 2016 WL 
3011481, at *3 [hereinafter American Medical Ass’n Amicus Brief]. 
5 See id. at 3–4. 
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patients on firearm safety.6 Less than a month after Florida 
passed the Florida’s Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (“FOPA”),7
physicians and physician interest groups challenged the law in 
court as violating the First Amendment.8 On February 16, 2017, 
after five years of litigation, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit struck down major parts of the law as 
unconstitutional.9 In its en banc ruling, the Circuit found that 
FOPA’s provisions were content-based restrictions on speech, 
and thus strict scrutiny should apply.10 The Circuit decided, 
however, it need not determine whether the provisions would 
withstand strict scrutiny, because three out of four of the 
provisions did not survive heightened scrutiny.11 Applying 
heightened scrutiny, the Circuit held most provisions were 
unconstitutional because they did not advance a substantial 
government interest and were not narrowly drawn to achieve 
that interest.12
Wollschlaeger was a landmark ruling for health organizations, 
firearm interest groups, and many state legislatures. The 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision essentially solidified a doctor’s right to 
screen and counsel patients on firearms. Consequently, this 
precedent may lead to more aggressive policies and practices by 
physicians and healthcare providers regarding firearms.13 States 
may even create laws to encourage this practice based on the 
policy recommendations of many health organizations.14 On the 
other hand, some state legislatures may look for a way to 
6 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255, 1258–59 (S.D. Fla. 2012), 
rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 
1195 (11th Cir. 2014), opinion vacated and superseded on reh'g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 
2015), opinion vacated and superseded on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 649 Fed. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016), on reh'g en banc, 848 
F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger I]. 
7 FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2011). 
8 Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1251. 
9 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) 
[hereinafter Wollschlaeger 2017]. 
10 Id. at 1307. 
11 Id. at 1311 (finding the three provisions that could not survive the heightened 
scrutiny standard are the “record-keeping” provision, the “inquiry” restriction provision, 
and the “anti-harassment” provision); see also infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
12 Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d at 1311–12. 
13 See Bethany L. Strong et al., The American College of Preventive Medicine Policy 
Recommendations on Reducing and Preventing Firearm-Related Injuries and Deaths, 51 
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 1084, 1084–86 (2016); see also M. Denise Dowd et al., Firearm-
Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS 1416, 1421 (2012). 
14 See Wendy E. Parmet et al., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida—The First 
Amendment, Physician Speech, and Firearm Safety, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2304, 2306 
(2016); see also Garen J. Wintemute, Yes, You Can: Physicians, Patients, and Firearms,
165 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 205, 206–07 (2016).
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constitutionally restrict physicians from asking questions and 
educating patients on firearms.15
Even if there is no immediate reaction by state legislatures 
to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, doctors are arguably 
restrained in implementing this practice in other ways. 
Because many physicians have no formal firearm safety 
training or education, patients may be legitimately concerned 
about doctors’ qualifications for providing firearm-related 
health advice.16 This dynamic creates a potential for 
inadequate or harmful medical advice, which in turn calls into 
question the physician standard of care for firearm screening 
and counseling.17
As a relatively innovative practice, at least for some 
healthcare providers, firearm screening and counseling does not 
have well established standards beyond the general policy 
recommending physician intervention to prevent firearm-related 
injuries and deaths in patients.18 This Note attempts to answer 
the following question: in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling 
that states cannot prohibit physicians from screening and 
counseling patients on firearms, how should physicians, the 
professional health community, and state legislatures proceed? 
Although the ruling struck down major parts of FOPA, the 
arguments for and against the law and the practice of firearm 
screening and counseling are still relevant to shaping the 
legislation and standards that should apply to the practice. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly explains the 
background of FOPA, its litigation, and how the Eleventh Circuit 
addressed the main arguments for and against FOPA. Part II 
delves into the argument that storing firearms in the home 
is a threat to the health of household members. Relatedly, 
Part II shows why the professional health community considers 
firearm-related deaths and injuries to be a major public health 
problem. This part also presents data showing that out of all 
15 See, e.g., Marla Spector Bowman, Docs. v. Glocks: Speech, Guns, Discrimination, 
and Privacy—Is Anyone Winning?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1455, 1469–70 (2015). 
16 Id.; see, e.g., Paul J. D. Roszko, et al., Clinician Attitudes, Screening Practices, and 
Interventions to Reduce Firearm-Related Injury, 38 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 87, 104–06 
(2016) (emphasizing the inconsistent education and training of physicians on firearm 
safety and the need for additional training to improve intervention by physicians). 
17 See En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Unified Sportsmen of Florida, Inc., 
Supporting Appellants & Reversal at 13–16, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 649 Fed. 
App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 12-14009), 2016 WL 1642980, at *13–16 [hereinafter 
Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief].
18 See Weinberger et al., supra note 2, at 513–16 (discussing physician gag laws and 
intervention and treatment of mental and substance use disorders, but not laying out 
specific standards for doing so); see also Roszko et al., supra note 16.
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firearm related deaths, a high percentage takes place in the 
home, and that suicide or homicide by firearm is a leading cause 
of death for all ages. Finally, Part II includes data on firearm 
safety and shows the correlation between firearm access 
regulations and reduction in firearm-related deaths and injuries.  
Part III delves into the strongest arguments for why 
physicians should not be encouraged, or even allowed, to screen 
and counsel patients on firearms. Proponents of FOPA fear that 
through the practice, doctors are promoting a political agenda 
posing as medical advice and that doctors may not be qualified to 
render advice on firearms to patients.19 For both contextual 
and argumentative purposes, Part III presents statistics on 
non-firearm-related dangers and leading causes of fatal and 
nonfatal unintentional injuries. Additionally, Part III discusses 
one legitimate motivation behind firearm ownership, namely 
self-defense, and the possible consequences of diminishing 
this purpose. 
Part IV concludes that physicians, the professional health 
community, and state legislatures should take measures to 
reduce the risk of physicians using firearm screening and 
counseling as a way to promote a political agenda and of 
unqualified physicians giving advice on firearm safety. While this 
Note does not cover concerns of harassment and discrimination 
by physicians based on a patient’s firearm ownership status, it 
explores the dynamics of firearm screening and counseling, the 
standard of care, and medical malpractice. Part IV proposes that 
the professional health community should establish strict 
standards of expert knowledge regarding firearms, and in turn, 
physicians should accurately communicate that knowledge to 
patients. Finally, Part IV calls for more extensive research on 
who should be questioned and advised on firearms, and explores 
the best practices for firearm screening and counseling. 
I. FOPA AND ITS DOWNFALL
In 2011, Florida passed a law, known as FOPA, which 
created Florida Statute section 790.338, entitled “Medical privacy 
concerning firearms.”20 FOPA’s legislative record includes several 
anecdotes involving complaints where doctors threatened to end 
the physician-patient relationship or to refuse treatment to 
patients based on the patient’s answers to the doctor’s questions 
19 See infra Sections III(B) and III(D). 
20 Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
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about the patient’s firearm ownership.21 The Florida Legislature 
identified these anecdotes as a primary influence leading to the 
enactment of FOPA.22 The statute includes the following four 
provisions concerning the conduct of licensed health care 
practitioners or facilities: 
a)  The “record-keeping provision” prohibits practitioners 
from recording any information regarding a patient’s 
firearm ownership in the patient’s medical record, if the 
practitioner knows the information is not relevant to the 
patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others. 
b)  The “inquiry restriction provision” prohibits practitioners 
from inquiring about a patient’s firearm ownership 
status, unless the practitioner in good faith believes the 
information is relevant to the patient’s medical care or 
safety, or the safety of others. 
c)  The “antidiscrimination provision” prohibits practitioners 
from discriminating against a patient based solely on 
firearm ownership. 
d)  The “anti-harassment provision” prohibits practitioners 
from unnecessarily harassing a patient about firearm 
ownership.23
The Florida legislature originally passed FOPA to protect the 
Second Amendment and privacy rights of patients, and to 
regulate the doctor-patient relationship.24 Less than a month 
after FOPA’s enactment, physicians and physician interest 
groups challenged the law in the District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida, alleging FOPA violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.25 In 2012, the 
district court applied strict scrutiny and found FOPA’s provisions 
were unconstitutional as violating free speech.26
The case made its way to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, where a three-judge panel upheld the 
law in three different opinions, each vacating the one before it on 
21 See Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2017) (“A state 
representative said that his daughter’s pediatrician inquired if he owned a firearm, and 
then asked him to remove the firearm from the home. An email described how a mother 
‘was separated from her children while medical personnel . . . interrogated’ them about 
firearm ownership and put information about such ownership in their medical records. 
One doctor refused to treat a child because he wanted to know if there were firearms in 
the home.”) (internal citations omitted). 
22 Id.
23 Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1255; FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2011). 
24 See Wollschlaeger I, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 
25 Id. at 1259. 
26 Id. at 1261–62, 1267. 
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different grounds.27 Upon the plaintiffs’ motion, the Court of 
Appeals agreed to rehear the case en banc to determine the 
propriety of applying strict scrutiny to this case and whether the 
State “has a sufficiently compelling interest, such that the Act 
can withstand strict scrutiny.”28 On February 16, 2017, eight 
months after oral arguments, the Circuit issued its opinion that 
struck down the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment 
provisions of FOPA as violating the First Amendment, but 
upheld the anti-discrimination provision.29
The Eleventh Circuit held that FOPA’s provisions were 
content-based restrictions of speech by medical providers on 
firearm ownership, and “[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech 
normally trigger strict scrutiny.”30 However, the Circuit 
declined to decide whether strict scrutiny should apply, because 
the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions 
could not survive the less stringent standard of heightened 
scrutiny.31 Under heightened scrutiny, state officials must 
show, at minimum, that the provisions directly advance a 
substantial government interest and are narrowly drawn to 
achieve that interest.32
Substantial scholarly attention focuses on the constitutional 
issues of FOPA and its litigation.33 An in-depth analysis of those 
issues is beyond the scope of this Note. The arguments for and 
against FOPA, however, are relevant to the public and social 
policy debate surrounding firearm screening and counseling by 
physicians, including its relation to medical malpractice. As such, 
this Note will next lay out Florida’s arguments in defense of 
FOPA and how the Eleventh Circuit addressed them. 
27 See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
Wollschlaeger II]; see also Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) 
[hereinafter Wollschlaeger III]; Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159 (11th 
Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger IV]. 
28 Maryanne Tomazic, Docs v. Glocks: Restricting Doctor’s Professional Speech in the 
Name of Firearm Owner Privacy—Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 41 AM. J.L. &
MED. 680, 682 (2015). 
29 Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d 1293, 1311, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2017).
30 Id. at 1307–08. 
31 Id. at 1311. 
32 Id. at 1311–12. 
33 See generally, e.g., Michelle Foody, Comment, Docs Versus Glocks: N.R.A. 
Takes Aim at Florida Physicians’ Freedom of Speech: Leaving Patients’ Health, Safety, 
and Welfare at Risk, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 228 (2013); Tomazic, supra note 
28; Harrison Blythe, Physician-Patient Speech: An Analysis of the State of Patients’ 
First Amendment Rights to Receive Accurate Medical Advice, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
795 (2015). 
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A. Protecting the Second Amendment 
According to Florida, FOPA is necessary to protect “the 
Second Amendment right of Floridians to own and bear firearms” 
from “private encumbrances.”34 Further, Florida argued “that 
doctors and medical professionals should not ask about, nor 
express views hostile to, firearm ownership.”35 The Eleventh 
Circuit rejected this argument, saying that even if there were 
any “actual conflict between the First Amendment rights of 
doctors and medical professionals and the Second Amendment 
rights of patients,” it would not be significant enough to justify 
FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions.36
First, there was no evidence that firearm screening and 
counseling of patients had infringed on patients’ Second 
Amendment rights, beyond the six anecdotes included in FOPA’s 
legislative record.37 Further, heightened scrutiny does not allow 
Florida to “burden the speech of others in order to tilt public 
debate in a preferred direction,”38 especially given the necessity 
of open and honest dialogue between doctors and patients about 
firearms and firearm safety.39 The court conveyed that the 
“profound importance of the Second Amendment does not give 
the government license to violate the right to free speech under 
the First Amendment.”40
B. Protecting Patient Privacy 
The second interest Florida asserted in defense of FOPA was 
the need to protect a patient’s privacy from the public eye.41
Although the Eleventh Circuit conceded that “individual privacy 
is a substantial government interest,” it rejected this argument 
as a valid defense of FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-
harassment provisions.42 The crux of the Circuit’s finding on this 
issue was based on an unchallenged provision of FOPA, section 
790.338(4), which allows patients to refuse to answer doctors’ 
questions about guns.43 Because Florida failed to give any 
reasons why this provision does not sufficiently protect patient 
privacy, this interest failed to satisfy heightened scrutiny.44
34 Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d at 1312 (internal marks omitted). 
35 Id. at 1313–14. 
36 Id. at 1313. 
37 Id. at 1312. 
38 Id. at 1314 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011)).
39 Id. at 1313. 
40 Id. at 1327 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
41 Id. at 1314. 
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
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Florida also argued FOPA protects “the privacy of patients’ 
firearm ownership from the chilling effect of disclosure and 
record-keeping.”45 According to the Eleventh Circuit, Florida’s 
current limits on disclosure of a patient’s medical information 
provides sufficient protection, and “there [was] no evidence that 
doctors or medical professionals [had] been improperly disclosing 
patients’ information about firearm ownership.”46 Moreover, the 
Circuit explained it could not base its decision under heightened 
scrutiny on hypothetical dangers, such as hacking, theft, or 
some other intrusion of electronically stored information.47
Consequently, Florida’s interest in protecting the privacy of 
patients could not carry FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and 
anti-harassment provisions under heightened scrutiny.48
C. Protecting Patients from Discrimination or Harassment 
The Eleventh Circuit held that, besides FOPA’s 
anti-discrimination provision, the challenged provisions were not 
narrowly tailored to further Florida’s interest in “ensuring access 
to health care without discrimination or harassment.”49 The 
Circuit noted that Florida law still allows a doctor to terminate 
his or her relationship with a patient as long as “the patient has 
reasonable notice and can secure the services of another health 
care provider.”50 It also rejected Florida’s argument that the 
power imbalance between doctors and their patients was enough 
to warrant protection of a “vulnerable listener” from offensive 
speech, because “where adults are concerned the Supreme Court 
has never used [this] rationale to uphold speaker-focused and 
content-based restrictions on speech.”51 Again, Florida law gives 
patients the right to refuse to answer offensive questions, and 
there was no evidence to show that offended patients were 
“psychologically unable to choose another medical provider.”52
D. Protecting the Public by Regulating the Medical Profession 
As its final defense of FOPA, Florida asserted its interest in 
regulating “the medical profession in order to protect the 
public.”53 Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed Florida has a 
general interest in regulating the medical profession, that 
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 1319. 
49 Id. at 1314. 
50 Id. at 1315. 
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1316. 
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interest does not justify FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and 
anti-harassment provisions, “[g]iven that the applicable standard 
of care encourages doctors to ask questions about firearms” and 
the provisions were not narrowly tailored to address such 
interest.54 The Circuit additionally stated:
There is no claim, much less any evidence, that routine questions to 
patients about the ownership of firearms are medically inappropriate, 
ethically problematic, or practically ineffective. Nor is there any 
contention (or, again, any evidence) that blanket questioning on the 
topic of firearm ownership is leading to bad, unsound, or dangerous 
medical advice.55
Because there was no evidence to show firearm screening 
and counseling was negatively affecting the doctor-patient 
relationship or medical treatment for patients, this interest could 
not withstand heightened scrutiny.56
In sum, FOPA’s record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment 
provisions could not pass heightened scrutiny for determining 
constitutionality, and thus would certainly fail strict scrutiny, 
which is normally applied to content-based restrictions.57 Many of 
Florida’s arguments in support of FOPA failed due to insufficient 
evidence to support Florida’s contentions. For example, Florida 
presented no evidence that questions and counseling about 
firearms amounted to ineffective or dangerous medical advice.58
However, that is not to say that these complaints should be 
forgotten or ignored by state legislatures and the professional 
health community because these concerns have the potential to 
become real detriments to adequate medical care. This idea will be 
explored further in Parts III and IV. Part II will lay out the 
professional health community’s argument that guns are not only a 
danger to members of a household, but also a public health 
problem. This perception is what led to the policy encouraging 
doctors to ask questions about firearms, or what the Eleventh 
Circuit called “the applicable standard of care.”59
II. FIREARMS AS ADVERSE HEALTH RISKS
Joined by the ABA, the Professional Health Organizations 
collectively declared a policy to address firearm-related deaths 
and injuries based on their conclusion that the effects of 
firearm-related deaths and injuries pose a serious public health 
54 Id. at 1317. 
55 Id. at 1316. 
56 See id.
57 See id. at 1311.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1317; see also Weinberger et al., supra note 2, at 514. 
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problem.60 To deal with this problem, these organizations 
recommend doctors do the following: counsel their patients about 
gun safety, intervene when patients may be at risk for initiating 
or becoming victim to gun violence, and document conversations 
and information regarding a patient’s gun ownership status in 
the patient’s medical record.61
Rather than reiterating the data relied upon by the 
Professional Health Organizations in support of their conclusion 
and polices, Part II will use data from the National Violent Death 
Reporting System (“NVDRS”)62 and the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s (“CDC”) Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and 
Reporting System (“WISQARS”),63 supplemented by studies from 
various literature on firearm safety and storage practices.  
This Part will begin by attempting to rectify the varying 
claims coming from both sides of the gun debate on how 
significant firearm-related deaths are compared to other leading 
causes of death due to injury. For example, in their call to action, 
the ABA and Professional Health Organizations identify firearms 
as being the “second-leading cause of death due to injury 
after motor vehicle crashes for adults and adolescents.”64 One 
well-known anti-gun organization, Everytown for Gun Safety 
Support Fund (“Everytown”), suggests that federal data 
“substantially undercount[s]” the number of unintentional 
shootings in children.65 According to Everytown, “[f]rom December 
2012 to December 2013, at least 100 children were killed in 
unintentional shootings.”66 On the other side of the debate, the 
National Shooting Sports Foundation found that “[f]irearms are 
involved in less than 1.4 percent of unintentional fatalities among 
60 Weinberger et al., supra note 2, at 513. 
61 Id. at 514; see En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae the America Prof’l Soc’y on the 
Abuse of Children in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees & Affirmance at 10, Wollschlaeger v. 
Governor of Florida, 649 Fed. App’x 647 (Fla. 2016) (No. 12-14009), 2016 WL 3011483, at 
*3 [hereinafter America Prof’l Soc’y on the Abuse of Children Amicus Brief]. 
62 NVDRS uses information from death certificates, medical examiner or coroner 
records, law enforcement records, and crime laboratory records from seventeen 
participating states to compile data on violent death, including the circumstances 
surrounding these deaths. Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing 
Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. L.J. 150, 163 (2015). 
63 WISQARS is an online database that provides fatal and nonfatal injury, violent 
death, and cost of injury data from a variety of sources, including NVDRS, the National 
Vital Statistics System, and CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics. See Welcome to 
WISQARS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/ 
injury/wisqars/index.html [http://perma.cc/FX3D-YQGW]. 
64 Weinberger et al., supra note 59, at 513. 
65 Innocents Lost: A Year of Unintentional Child Gun Deaths, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN 
SAFETY SUPPORT FUND 3 (June 2014), http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/ 
04/innocents-lost.pdf [http://perma.cc/3DMP-ZG2M].
66 Id.
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children 14 years of age and under and are among the least likely 
causes of unintentional fatality.”67
A. Leading Causes of Death Due to Injury 
According to the CDC data on the leading causes of death 
due to injury in 2015 for all ages, suicide by firearm was the 
fourth leading cause of death due to injury, making up 10.2% 
(22,018 deaths of the 216,694 total injury deaths).68 Homicide by 
firearm was the fifth leading cause at 6% (12,979 deaths).69 The 
number one leading cause was unintentional poisoning at 21.9% 
(47,478 deaths), followed by motor vehicle traffic at 16.7% 
(36,161 deaths).70 Homicide by cut/pierce made up 0.7% (1622 
deaths) as the fifteenth leading cause of death due to injury.71
For ages 10 to 44, the number of firearm-related deaths due 
to injury was slightly more significant than for all age groups.72
There were 86,235 total injury deaths. Homicide by firearm was 
the third leading cause at 12.1% with 10,454 deaths, and suicide 
by firearm was the fourth leading cause at 10.1% with 8670 
deaths.73 Again, unintentional poisoning was the number one 
leading cause at 29.9% with 25,767 deaths, and motor vehicle 
traffic was the second leading cause at 21.1% with 18,212 deaths 
for this age group.74 The data from the state of Florida on the 
leading causes of death due to injury virtually mirrors the 
national data.75
67 Firearms-Related Injury Statistics, NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. 1 (2013), 
http://www.projectchildsafe.org/sites/default/files/2014_InjuryIIR_2015.pdf. 
68 Leading Causes of Death Reports, 1981 – 2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcause.html (last updated Feb. 19, 
2017) (To generate the statistics for leading causes of death due to injury, select “2015” to 
“2015” for “Year(s) of Report”; select “Top 20” for “Number of Causes”; select “All Injuries” 
for “Categories of Causes”; leave all other report options unchanged; then follow “Submit 
Request.” To view the statistics for all ages, follow the link for “All Ages” in the last 
column of the generated table.). 
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. (To generate the statistics for leading causes of death due to injury for ages 10 
to 44, select “2015” to “2015” for “Year(s) of Report”; select “Top 20” for “Number of 
Causes”; select “All Injuries” for “Categories of Causes”; select “Custom Age Range” for 
“Age Group Formatting” and input “10” to “44”; leave all other report options unchanged; 
then follow “Submit Request.” To view the statistics for ages 10 to 44, follow the link for 
“10–44” at the top of the generated table.). 
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. Out of 15,225 total injury deaths for all age groups in Florida, suicide by 
firearm was the fourth leading cause (11% or 1630 deaths). Id. Homicide by firearm was 
the fifth leading cause (6% or 880 deaths). Id. Unintentional poisoning was the number 
one leading cause (19.3% or 2938 deaths), followed by motor vehicle traffic (19% or 2896 
deaths). Id.
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Based on these numbers, the ABA and the Professional 
Health Organizations’ claim that firearms were the 
“second-leading cause of death due to injury after motor vehicle 
crashes for adults and adolescents” needs clarifying. If the 
number of firearm-related suicides and homicides are combined 
into one category of firearm-related deaths by injury, they would 
amount to 34,997 deaths, which still falls below the number of 
both poisoning and motor vehicle traffic deaths. However, for 
ages 10 to 44, the combined firearm-related deaths by injury 
would amount to 19,124 deaths, surpassing motor vehicle traffic 
as the second leading cause. It is unclear what the ABA and the 
Professional Health Organizations meant by “adults and 
adolescents” and whether it was their intention to combine 
firearm-related suicides and homicides into one category. 
With that being said, multiple injury-causing mechanisms 
or forces consistently lead to more deaths per year than 
firearm-related deaths due to injury. For example, unintentional 
poisoning and motor vehicle traffic-related injuries are deadlier 
than firearms for all age groups. Despite this fact, we must 
recognize while injuries and deaths from poisoning and motor 
vehicle crashes pose a greater risk overall than firearm-related 
deaths due to injury, motor vehicle and poisoning deaths cannot 
be alleviated in the same way injuries and deaths from firearms 
can be alleviated. First, nine out of ten American households 
have access to a motor vehicle, while less than a third contain a 
gun.76 Second, poisoning deaths—the leading cause of injury death 
in the United States—primarily involve both pharmaceutical and 
illicit drugs and occur when a person accidentally takes or gives 
too much of a substance.77 While there are certainly ways to 
prevent and reduce motor vehicle crashes and drug overdoses, 
motor vehicles and prescription drugs are essential in homes. 
Guns, while constitutionally protected, are arguably not necessary 
in a household and are certainly not ubiquitous to households. 
B. Violent Firearm Deaths in the Home 
The percentage of violent firearm-related deaths that take 
place in the home, as reported in the NVDRS, is particularly 
76 Gun Deaths Compared to Motor Vehicle Deaths, VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., 
http://www.vpc.org/regulating-the-gun-industry/gun-deaths-compared-to-motor-vehicle-deaths/ 
[http://perma.cc/HAC3-UUTD] (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
77 See NCHS Data on Drug-poisoning Deaths, NAT’L CNTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/factsheets/factsheet_drug_poisoning.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/L7FD-JPGF]; see also Poisoning, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/poisoning/ 
index.html [http://perma.cc/6N3P-AHTR]. 
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relevant to the discussion on firearm screening and counseling of 
patients by physicians. The NVDRS defines a violent death “as a 
death resulting either from the unintentional use of physical 
force or power against oneself, another person, or a group or 
community.”78 Manners of violent death include suicide, 
homicide, unintentional firearm, undetermined intent, and legal 
intervention.79 An unintentional firearm death is a death from a 
gunshot where “the shooting was not directed intentionally at the 
decedent” or “the person causing the injury did not intend to 
discharge the firearm.”80
According to the NVDRS, out of 4486 total homicides in 
2013, 67% (3021 deaths) were firearm-related homicides.81 Out of 
all firearm-related homicides, 48% (1443 deaths) took place in 
the home.82 The percentage of unintentional violent-firearm 
related deaths that take place in the home is also significant. Out 
of 125 total unintentional violent firearm deaths in 2013, 70% (87 
deaths) took place in the home.83 There are certainly many 
78 Sharyn E. Parks et al., Surveillance for Violent Deaths — National Violent Death 
Reporting System, 16 States, 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 3 (Jan. 17, 
2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6301.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q932-4JQX].
79 Id.
80 Id. at 3–4. 
81 National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (Jan. 24, 2017), https://wisqars.cdc.gov:8443/nvdrs/nvdrsDisplay.jsp (To 
generate the statistics for total number of homicides, select “Homicide” for “What was the 
intent or manner of the injury based on the abstractor-assigned manner of death?”; select 
“2013” as “Year(s) of Report”; leave all other report options unchanged; then follow 
“Submit Request.” To generate the statistics for total number of firearm related-related 
homicides, select “Homicide” for “What was the intent or manner of the injury based on 
the abstractor-assigned manner of death?"; select “Firearm” as “What was the cause or 
mechanism of the injury based on the abstractor-assigned manner of death?”; select 
“2013” as “Year(s) of Report”; leave all other report options unchanged; then follow 
“Submit Request.” The percentage of firearm-related homicides was calculated by dividing 
3021 (total firearm-related homicides) by 4486 (total deaths).). 
82 Id. (To generate the statistics for total number of firearm-related homicides that 
took place in the home, select “Violent Death Counts and Percentages by KNOWN 
CIRCUMSTANCES of DEATH, Place of Injury . . .”  as the “Victims of Violence” report 
type (the first report input option); select “Homicide” for “What was the intent or manner 
of the injury based on the abstractor-assigned manner of death?”; select “Firearm” as 
“What was the cause or mechanism of the injury based on the abstractor-assigned manner 
of death?”; select “2013” as “Year(s) of Report”; leave all other report options unchanged; 
then follow “Submit Request.” The percentage of firearm-related homicides that took 
place in the home was calculated by dividing 1443 (total firearm-related homicides that 
took place in the house, apartment, including driveway, porch, and yard) by 3021 (total 
firearm-related homicides).). 
83 Id. (To generate the statistics for total number of unintentional violent-firearm 
related deaths that took place in the home, select “Violent Death Counts and Percentages 
by KNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES of DEATH, Place of Injury . . . ” as the “Victims of 
Violence” report type (the first report input option); select “Unintentional firearm” for 
“What was the intent or manner of the injury based on the abstractor-assigned manner of 
death?”; select “Firearm” as “What was the cause or mechanism of the injury based on the 
abstractor-assigned manner of death?”; select “2013” as “Year(s) of Report”; leave all other 
report options unchanged; then follow “Submit Request.” The percentage of unintentional 
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explanations for why almost half of all firearm-related homicides 
and more than half of unintentional violent firearm deaths take 
place in the home, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Note.84 Whatever the reasons may be, these rates have led 
medical organizations to believe that the best way to prevent gun 
violence is by removing guns from the home.85
Based on this data, the ABA and the Professional Health 
Organizations’ recommendation for physicians to ask patients 
about firearms and counsel patients on firearm safety is not 
unreasonable. Because most violent firearm-related deaths occur 
in the home, it is logical to highlight the firearm-related health 
problem by targeting those firearm-related deaths and injuries 
that occur in the home. After all, doctors talk to patients about 
many other potential household health risks as part of the 
practice of preventive medicine.86 Furthermore, there are 
statistics suggesting that the presence of firearms in the home 
increases the likelihood of firearm-related deaths or injuries,87
and safe storage practices have shown to be effective at reducing 
these incidents.88
C. Prevalence and Effect of Firearm Safety and Storage Measures 
The American College of Preventive Medicine is one health 
organization that has encouraged counseling of patients on 
firearm safety, as well as stricter laws regulating child access to 
firearms.89 Child Access Protection (“CAP”) laws, which hold the 
adult gun owner criminally responsible if a minor uses a gun that 
has been stored insecurely, are one such form of regulation.90
CAP laws are relevant to the discussion of firearm screening and 
violent-firearm related deaths that took place in the home was calculated by dividing 87 
(total unintentional firearm deaths that took place in the house, apartment, including 
driveway, porch, and yard) by 125 (total unintentional firearm deaths).).
84 For further discussion on this point, see America Professional Society on the 
Abuse of Children Amicus Brief, supra note 61, at 6–10, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 
649 Fed. App’x 647 (Fla. 2016) (No. 12-14009), 2016 WL 3011483, at *3. See generally
Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084 (1993); Eric J. Crossen et al., Preventing Gun Injuries in 
Children, 36 PEDIATRICS REV. 43 (2015). 
85 See Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1416 (“The absence of guns from children’s 
homes and communities is the most reliable and effective measure to prevent firearm-
related injuries and children and adolescents.”). 
86 See America Professional Society on the Abuse of Children Amicus Brief, supra
note 61, at 3. 
87 See, e.g., Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1419 (“Research in several US urban areas 
indicates that a gun stored in the home is associated with a three-fold increase in the risk 
of homicide and a fivefold increase in the risk of suicide.”).
88 See infra notes 95, 104 and accompanying text. 
89 See Strong et al., supra note 13, at 1086. 
90 Id.
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counseling of patients due to the overlapping goals of CAP laws 
and firearm screening and counseling. The purpose of CAP laws 
is to make guns inaccessible to children while still providing 
accessibility to adults.91 Similarly, the public health community’s 
policy promoting firearm screening and counseling is aimed at 
maximizing firearm safety regulations, while staying consistent 
with the Second Amendment.92 Therefore, members of the public 
health community and legislatures concerned with doctors 
talking to patients about firearms should consider the effect CAP 
laws may have on reducing nonfatal firearm-related injuries. 
Twenty-eight states have child access prevention laws as of 
2014.93 These laws range from statutes imposing criminal liability 
when a child gains access to a firearm as a result of negligent 
firearm storage (strictest CAP regulation) to laws preventing 
people from providing firearms to minors (least strict CAP 
regulation).94 A recently published study, based on annual 
hospital discharge data from 1998 to 2003, suggests CAP laws are 
associated with a decrease in nonfatal gun injuries.95 The study 
found that the existence of any type of CAP law is associated with 
a total average annual 26% reduction in self-inflicted gun injuries 
among youth.96 For the strictest type of CAP regulation, negligent 
storage laws, the average annual reduction was 30%.97 For non-
self-inflicted injuries—encompassing assaults, unintentional 
injuries, and injuries of undetermined intent—CAP laws are 
associated with a 5% reduction.98
Why do CAP laws matter to the discussion of FOPA and the 
general practice of firearm screening and counseling by doctors? 
Doctors who ask patients about firearm ownership are arguably 
effectuating the purpose of CAP laws and other access protection 
regulations.99 Take a Florida CAP law, for example. Florida’s 
Title XLVI section 790.174(1) provides that a person who 
91 See Jeffrey DeSimone et al., Child Access Prevention Laws and Nonfatal Injuries, 
80 S. ECON. J. 5, 6 (2013). 
92 Weinberger et al., supra note 2, at 514. 
93 States with Firearm Laws Designed to Protect Children, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/firearms-and-children-legislation/?current 
Timeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%D 
[http://perma.cc/2KN3-RDUV] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).  
94 Summary of State Child Access Prevention Laws, WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE
(Dec. 2012), http://leg.wa.gov/Senate/Committees/LAW/Documents/SummaryOfStateChild 
AccessPreventionLaws.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9B9-MJ96]. State definitions of minor vary 
from children under age fourteen to those under age eighteen. Id. 
95 DeSimone et al., supra note 91, at 5, 22. 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. 
99 See Bowman, supra note 15, at 1459. 
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reasonably knows a minor may gain access to a firearm “shall 
keep the firearm in a securely locked box or container or in a 
location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure.”100
This statute is based on access by a minor to a negligently stored 
firearm, which is the strongest type of CAP law.101 While state 
legislatures are in a better position to regulate firearms, doctors 
still play an important role in promoting safe storage practices. 
The number of households that store unlocked and/or 
unloaded guns in the house lends further support for why 
preventive measures and CAP laws are needed. A 2002 study 
estimated that 248,430 children and youths in Florida were 
being raised in a household with at least one loaded gun.102
Approximately half of those households contained a firearm that 
was both unlocked and loaded.103 There are reliable studies to 
show that keeping a gun locked and unloaded have significant 
protective effects with regard to risk of both unintentional 
injury and suicide for children and teenagers.104 Therefore, 
primary care physicians should, at the very least, ask whether 
patients keep firearms in the home and provide them reliable 
safety advice accordingly. 
III. THE DANGERS OF DOCTORS DISCUSSING FIREARMS 
WITH PATIENTS
This Part lays out the strongest arguments for FOPA and 
against the practice of firearm screening and counseling, 
including those made in support of FOPA in its litigation. It will 
first attempt to put firearm related injuries and deaths into 
perspective by introducing data on fatal and nonfatal 
unintentional injuries. Next, it will discuss the argument that 
doctors use this practice to promote their politics and that most 
doctors are not qualified to give advice on firearms. Lastly, this 
Part evaluates the self-defense motivation behind keeping a 
100 FLA. STAT. § 790.174(1) (2017). 
101 Summary of State Child Access Prevention Laws, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE 3 
(Dec. 2012), http://leg.wa.gov/Senate/Committees/LAW/Documents/SummaryOfStateChild 
AccessPreventionLaws.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9B9-MJ96]. 
102 Catherine A. Okoro et al., Prevalence of Household Firearms and Firearm-Storage 
Practices in the 50 States and the District of Columbia: Findings From the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2002, 116 PEDIATRICS 370, 373 (2005). This study was 
compiled from the 2002 cross-sectional Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
survey of 240,735 adults from randomly selected households with telephones in the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia. Id.
103 Id.
104 See Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1420 (“A multisite study found that keeping a 
gun locked and keeping a gun unloaded have protective effects of 73% and 70% 
respectively, with regard to risk for both unintentional injury and suicide for children 
and teenagers.”).
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firearm in the home and presents statistics on the incidence of 
gun use for self-defense. All of these arguments tie into the 
overarching idea behind FOPA that firearms are not an 
appropriate conversation topic in the doctor’s office. 
A. Firearms and Unintentional Injuries 
Perhaps surprisingly, the briefs in support of FOPA and the 
State of Florida do not appear to challenge the conclusion that 
firearms pose a public health problem, but they do argue that 
firearm screening and counseling is not as crucial to protecting the 
public health as the Professional Health Organizations portray it 
to be.105 Although not mentioned in the briefs, a possible factor 
contributing to this belief is the WISQARS data on the leading 
causes of both fatal and nonfatal unintentional injuries. 
For all ages, unintentional injury was the fourth leading 
cause of death in the United States in 2015, accounting for 5.4% 
of all deaths.106 Out of the 146,571 total unintentional injury 
deaths, firearm-related injury was only the sixteenth leading 
cause at 489 deaths (0.3% of fatal unintentional injuries).107
Poisoning-related injury was the number one leading cause at 
32.4% (47,478 injuries), followed by motor vehicle traffic at 24.7% 
(36,161 injuries).108 Unintentional drowning-related deaths caused 
3602 deaths, which is over seven times more deaths than 
unintentional firearm-related injuries.109 Falls, suffocation, 
drowning, fire/burn, and machinery all caused more unintentional 
injury deaths than firearms.110
For ages 10 to 44, unintentional injury was the number one 
leading cause of death.111 Out of the 50,890 total unintentional 
injury deaths for this age group, firearm-related injury was the 
thirteenth leading cause at 274 deaths (0.5% of fatal 
unintentional injuries).112 Again, poisoning-related and motor 
vehicle traffic injuries were the first and second leading causes of 
unintentional injury deaths.113 For this age group, unintentional 
drowning-related injuries caused approximately five times more 
105 See, e.g., Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17. 
106 Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, Leading Causes of Death Reports, 
1981–2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 24, 2015), https://webappa. 
cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcause.html [http://perma.cc/DH57-8XG6]. 
107 Id. (choose “Unintentional Injuries Only” for “Categories of Causes”). 
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. (choose 10–44 as the “Custom Age Range” and choose “Unintentional Injuries 
Only” for “Categories of Causes”). 
113 Id.
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deaths than firearms. Falls, suffocation, drowning, and fire/burn 
all caused more fatal unintentional injuries than firearms.114
Based on this data, firearms are not a top-ten leading cause 
of fatal unintentional injuries, nor are they a top-ten leading cause 
of nonfatal unintentional injuries.115 Nonfatal unintentional injury 
data includes “injuries and poisonings described as unintended 
or ‘accidental,’ regardless of whether the injury was inflicted 
by . . . another person.”116 WISQARS compiles nonfatal injury data 
from hospital emergency departments.117 In 2015, there were 
29,608,581 nonfatal unintentional injuries, with firearm-gunshots 
causing only 0.1%, (17,311 injuries) making firearm-gunshots the 
twentieth leading cause of nonfatal unintentional injury.118 Other 
causes, such as falls, cut/pierce, poisoning, bite/sting, fire/burn, 
machinery, and suffocation, all preceded unintentional firearm 
gunshot injuries on the list.119
Does the data on unintentional injuries suggest that firearm 
related deaths and injuries are not, in fact, a public health 
problem? Not necessarily. Remember that both suicide and 
homicide by firearm were in the top-five leading causes of death 
due to injury.120 Furthermore, homicide by firearm accounts for 
over 60% of all violent deaths.121 Even though firearms only 
account for 0.5% of unintentional injury deaths for ages 10 to 44, 
that is still 274 children and adults who lost their lives to 
the unintentional use of a firearm by or against them.122
Firearm-related injuries may appear insignificant compared to 
other causes of fatal and nonfatal unintentional injuries, but that 
does not mean the professional health community is wrong in 
focusing its policies on preventing firearm violence. 
While poisonings and motor vehicle accidents are obviously a 
public health concern, we cannot completely eradicate these 
forces due to the ubiquity of medicines, toxic products, and motor 
vehicles. Among the CDC’s “Key Prevention Tips” for preventing 
114 Id.
115 See id.; infra note 118; see also Definitions for WISQARS Nonfatal, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 21, 2007), https://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/ 
nonfatal/definitions.htm [http://perma.cc/A39M-2HFG] (defining a nonfatal unintentional 
injury as “bodily harm resulting from severe exposure to an external force or substance” 
not inflicted by deliberate means). 
116 Definitions for WISQARS Nonfatal, supra note 115. 
117 Id.
118 20 Leading Causes of Nonfatal Unintentional Injuries, United States, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 19, 2017) [http://perma.cc/2WGK-3G85]. 
119 Id.
120 See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
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poisonings in the home are to “[s]afely dispose of unused, 
unneeded, or expired prescription drugs and over the counter 
drugs, vitamins, and supplements,” and “[k]eep medicines and 
toxic products, such [as] cleaning solutions and detergent pods, in 
their original packaging where children can’t see or get them.”123
With regard to motor vehicle safety, the CDC recommends health 
professionals “[e]ncourage patients to make wearing a seat belt a 
habit”124 and parents “[i]nstall and use car seats and booster seats 
according to the seat’s owner’s manual or get help installing them 
from a certified Child Passenger Safety Technician.”125
These tips embrace the reality that potentially poisonous 
products and motor vehicles, while dangerous, are necessary to 
most households and families. That is why doctors often ask 
patients with children whether they have toxic chemicals in the 
home and whether they implement seatbelts and/or car seats, 
and counsel them on safe storage and use of these products. On 
the other hand, firearms are not ubiquitous to most homes and, 
according to some health organizations, are not necessary 
either.126 It does not make sense that doctors should continue to 
counsel parents on the safety benefits of using car seats and 
securing chemicals, while simultaneously remaining silent on 
firearm safety. 
However, as will be discussed in the rest of this Note, 
firearms are a complicated issue, and thus the standard for 
firearm screening and counseling must submit to special 
considerations. Firearms are constitutionally protected and have 
strong political connotations. There are also many legitimate 
motivations behind owning firearms, such as self-defense. 
Additionally, many physicians lack knowledge of or training on 
firearm safety, which opens the door to liability for harmful 
medical advice. 
B. Hidden Political Agendas 
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in District of Columbia 
v. Heller (where the Court struck down a statute banning 
handgun possession in the home)127 and the more recent case of 
McDonald v. City of Chicago (where the Court struck down 
123 Poisoning Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/safechild/poisoning/index.html [http://perma.cc/5RVF-8EHU].
124 Adult Seat Belt Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 4, 2011), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/seatbeltuse/index.html [http://perma.cc/FN3k-Q9HX].
125 Child Passenger Safety, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 18, 
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/features/passengersafety/index.html [http://perma.cc/5H2V-BX7M].
126 See Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1416. 
127 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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comprehensive local and statewide firearm bans),128 certain 
medical organizations advocate for the strongest possible 
legislative and regulatory approaches to prevent firearm injuries 
and deaths.129 For this reason, supporters of FOPA believe the 
policies of these organizations demonstrate “an institutional 
motivation in unrestrained political advocacy for gun control, up 
to and including firearm bans.”130 For example, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) openly advocates for the removal 
of guns from homes and communities as “the most reliable and 
effective measure to prevent firearm-related injuries in children 
and adolescents.”131
In fact, each amicus curiae brief supporting the State of 
Florida in Wollschlaeger contains a similar argument regarding 
the political motivations behind physicians questioning and 
advising patients on firearms.132 The Unified Sportsmen of 
Florida underscored the importance of protecting patients and 
regulating the medical profession because “[p]atients see 
physicians for medical advice and treatment, not to be harangued 
about politics[.]”133 Supporters of FOPA contend FOPA actually 
protects the public health by “(1) strengthen[ing] the integrity of 
the doctor-patient relationship by taking politics out of the 
examination room and (2) stym[ying] politicized efforts to deter 
people who wish to own arms for public-safety reasons.”134
While the “politicization of medical care” is theoretically 
concerning,135 this should not be a basis for prohibiting firearm 
screening and counseling for several reasons. First, these briefs 
present little to no data to bolster their argument that physicians 
who engage in firearm screening and counseling “desire to push 
an anti-gun message” and “are clearly placing their own interests 
above their patients.’”136 According to the Eleventh Circuit, “the 
Florida Legislature, in enacting FOPA, relied on six anecdotes 
and nothing more. There was no other evidence, empirical or 
otherwise, presented to or cited by the Florida Legislature.”137
Florida may have been preemptively attempting to prevent the 
128 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
129 See Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1416, 1421. 
130 Second Amendment Foundation Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 21.  
131 Dowd et al., supra note 13, at 1416. 
132 See id. at 1421; see also Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 20–22; 
En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. in Support of Appellants 
and Reversal at 21, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 649 Fed. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 12–14009), 2016 WL 1642981, at *11–12 [hereinafter Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Amicus Brief].
133 Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 22. 
134 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Amicus Brief, supra note 132. 
135 Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 6. 
136 Second Amendment Foundation Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 24, 25. 
137 Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d 1293, 1312 (11th Cir. 2017).  
494 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
politicization of medical care by enacting FOPA, but in reality, 
Florida effectively “pick[ed] ideological winners and losers” 
without any meaningful facts to support its conclusions.138 Thus, 
Florida clearly overstepped its boundaries. 
Another reason political-agenda prevention is not a valid 
basis for prohibiting physicians from questioning and advising 
patients on firearms is that patients can refuse to answer these 
questions or they can find a new doctor.139 The topic is not so 
sensitive as to require a statutory ban, especially when a doctor 
may terminate his or her relationship with a patient in most 
circumstances.140 Given these conditions, restricting the “potentially 
unpopular speech” on firearms is far less necessary than Florida 
and FOPA’s supporters allege.141
However, one argument in support of FOPA deserves further 
consideration and ultimately forms the basis of the overall 
proposal of this Note. Namely, there is a legitimate concern that 
a physician’s advice on firearms “is given with complete 
disregard for personal or family decisions about home defense, 
matters that physicians are dangerously unqualified to advise 
on.”142 To effectively evaluate this proposition, it is important to 
understand the patterns of gun ownership and usage for 
self-defense purposes, which this Note will discuss next. 
C. Second Amendment and Self-Defense 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller
solidified an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep a 
handgun in the home for self-defense.143 A pre-Heller study
determined that approximately one-third of America’s privately 
held firearms were handguns.144 About three-fourths of handgun 
owners reported owning a handgun for self-protection purposes.145
While a clear majority of handgun owners say their primary 
motivation for having a gun is self-protection, the actual incidence 
of gun use for self-defense against crime is unclear.146 One very 
commonly cited report on the use of guns in self-defense 
asserts there are 2.2 to 2.5 million episodes of defensive gun 
138 Id. at 1328 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
139 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
141 Wollschlaeger 2017, 848 F.3d at 1328 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
142 Second Amendment Foundation Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 23. 
143 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). 
144 Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows From a 
Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1046 (2009). 
145 Id. at 1046 n.21. 
146 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 702 (2006). 
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use per year.147 Briefs in both Heller and Wollschlaeger cite 
these results.148
However, these estimates differ significantly from estimates 
of the National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”), a “large 
government-sponsored in-person survey that is generally 
considered the most reliable source of information on predatory 
crime[.]”149 Based on the NCVS data from 2007 to 2011, there 
were 235,700 incidents of a victim using a firearm to threaten or 
attack an offender.150 Based on this estimate, victims used 
firearms in about 1% of all nonfatal violent victimizations in the 
five-year period.151 This is compared to 44% of nonfatal violent 
crimes where the victim offered no resistance, 26% where the 
victim used non-confrontational tactics (e.g., yelling, running, or 
arguing), 22% where the victim attacked or threatened without a 
weapon, and 1% where the victim used another type of 
weapon.152 The 235,700 estimate means that an average of 
47,140 incidents of defensive gun use occurred each year from 
2007 to 2011, which is about four or five orders of magnitude 
smaller than Kleck and Gertz’s figure. 
Before considering the significance of the NCVS data, it is 
important to understand why the various estimates for episodes 
of defensive gun use are grossly inconsistent. Kleck and Gertz 
have challenged the NCVS data as underestimating the true 
count of defensive gun use.153 Kleck and Gertz based their study 
on one-time telephone surveys, while NCVS involves in-person 
interviews.154 The Kleck and Gertz telephone method likely 
includes many false positives due to the use of open-ended 
questions, which allow “telescoping, confusion, a desire to 
impress the interviewer, and other causes.”155 The NCVS data 
147 Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature 
of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995). 
148 Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 21; Brief for the Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n and the NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 32, District of Colombia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 
WL354081, at *32. 
149 Cook & Ludwig, supra note 146. 
150 Michael Planty & Jennifer L. Truman, Firearm Violence, 1993–2011, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE 12 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7HG-2FAN].
The estimates of nonfatal violent victimizations in the NCVS data are based on 
“information on nonfatal crimes against persons age 12 or older reported and not reported 
to the police from a nationally representative sample of U.S. households.” Id. at 2. 
151 Id. at 12. 
152 Id.
153 See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A 
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 73 (1996). 
154 See Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the 
Trenches, 42 CRIME & JUST. 19, 42 (2013). 
155 Id.; COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 153, at 85–86. 
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attempts to deal with the potential for false-positives by only 
asking respondents about defensive gun use if they first say they 
were the victim of a crime.156 This means some NCVS 
respondents “fail to report a defensive gun use,” because they are 
never asked about it, leading to some false-negatives in the 
NCVS figure.157
Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig undertook to resolve the 
discrepancies in the numbers by organizing a comparable 
telephone survey to the one used by Kleck and Gertz in terms of 
instrument, sampling procedure, and interviewing method.158
Cook and Ludwig’s study suggests there are about 1.5 million 
defensive gun users per year.159 If we accept the 1.5 million 
figure, we would be “led to conclude that . . . guns are used far 
more often to defend against crime than to perpetrate crime.”160
However, “if we reject these estimates in favor of those based on 
NCVS data, the reverse is true.”161 Cook and Ludwig ultimately 
concluded their 1.5 million figure, and Kleck and Gertz’s 2.5 
million figure, include a significant amount of false-positives and 
that the “NCVS is closer to a truly representative sample of U.S. 
adults than are telephone surveys.”162 What this means is that 
while the NCVS data might be lower than the true number of 
defensive gun uses per year, “[t]he 2.5 million figure [that] has 
been picked up by the press and now appears regularly 
in newspaper articles, letters to editorials, and even in 
Congressional Research Services briefs for public policymakers” 
is greatly exaggerated.163
D. Risks of a Doctor’s Advice on Firearm Removal 
With the self-defense data as background, this Section 
briefly presents the argument that if a patient follows a 
physician’s advice on firearms, the advice “could lead to adverse 
personal consequences” for patients.164 In its amicus curiae brief 
in Wollschlaeger, the Unified Sportsmen of Florida posits that 
the practice of firearm screening and counseling is usually devoid 
of informed consent.165 The brief argues that informed consent 
requires a physician “to render objective advice about the 
156 COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 153, at 86. 
157 Cook, supra note 154, at 42. 
158 See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 153, at 61. 
159 See id. at 62. 
160 Id. at 68. 
161 Id.
162 Id. at 73. 
163 Id. at 57, 70. 
164 Unified Sportsmen Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 17. 
165 Id. at 13–15. 
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alternatives in order to obtain an informed consent.”166 It poses 
the questions: 
Of the physicians who pursue an anti-Second Amendment agenda 
under the pretension of rendering medical advice, how many advise 
patients that not having a firearm in the home could render the 
patient defenseless in the event of a burglary, home invasion, or 
attempted rape? And how many obtain a written consent with 
objective warnings to patients to undergo the “treatment” of removing 
firearms from their homes and becoming defenseless?167
Thus, informed consent will not exist where doctors merely 
discuss one viewpoint on firearms and reject another. According 
to this amicus curiae, physicians must evaluate the claim that a 
gun “would be an effective protection against violent intrusion or 
deadly force in the home” and must relay this information to a 
patient in order for the patient to “weigh[ ] the risks and benefits 
of gun ownership.”168
Consider a situation where a physician advises a patient to 
remove a gun from her household, but omits any information 
about the use of guns for self-protection. If that patient follows 
her doctor’s advice, gives up her gun, and subsequently becomes 
the victim of robbery or rape in her home without her gun for 
protection, she may have a claim against her doctor for medical 
negligence. She could argue that “but for the physician’s advice, 
she would have been armed at the time of the attack, and her 
being armed would have prevented the injury.”169 The validity of 
this claim would depend on proximate cause and the 
foreseeability of the attack on the patient, but it is possible that a 
court would find that “the physician’s negligent counseling 
created a foreseeable risk that the patient would be the victim of 
a crime by impairing her ability to defend herself.”170
The potential harm to patients and the expansion of liability 
for physicians are very legitimate concerns. As such, the 
professional health community must soon develop a standard of 
care for firearm screening and counseling if they are to continue 
to encourage the practice in their official policies and 
recommendations. Next, Part IV discusses generally how a 
standard of care is developed, the current standard of care for 
firearm screening and counseling, and possible ways to improve 
this practice. 
166 Id. at 14–15. 
167 Id. at 15. 
168 Id. at 21–22. 
169 Id. at 21. 
170 Id.
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firearm safety screening and counseling.218 Consequently, this 
lack of consensus causes physicians to hesitate to intervene at all. 
Thus, the most persistent barrier to rounding out the 
standard of care for firearm screening and counseling is a lack of 
consistent guidance and reliable evidence on determining exactly 
when and in what setting the duty to screen and counsel on 
firearms should apply. The proposals in this Section should serve 
as a starting point for the professional health community in 
developing an appropriate standard of care; but first and 
foremost, there is a need for a stricter focus on studying effective 
injury prevention practices and identifying who is at risk. 
CONCLUSION
In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent ruling that states 
cannot prohibit physicians from screening and counseling 
patients on firearms, the professional health community must 
develop an applicable standard of care for this practice to 
safeguard patients against unadvised counseling. The standard 
of care should be evidence-based, focusing on data about the 
following: firearm-related deaths and injuries; firearm safety and 
storage practices and their effects; defensive uses of firearms; 
and qualifications and training of healthcare providers on 
firearms. Further, although FOPA is no longer in effect, the 
arguments for and against the law and the practice of firearm 
screening and counseling can provide guidance to the 
professional health community in developing the standard. 
The data presented in Part I showed that firearm-related 
injuries are a leading cause of death for all age groups. 
Additionally, firearm-related homicides account for 67% of all 
violent deaths, a large majority of which take place in the home. 
Even though the data presented in Part II showed that 
firearm-related injuries are not a top-ten leading cause of fatal 
and nonfatal unintentional injuries, the data presented in Parts I 
and II, taken as a whole, supports the conclusion that firearm 
violence is a public health problem. Although a public health 
approach to prevention of firearm injuries and deaths is 
advisable, the standard applicable to this sort of preventive 
treatment must take into account the legitimate use of guns 
for self-defense and the risks of doctors advising patients 
without having adequate education or training on firearm safety 
and counseling. 
218 Id. at 106; see also Roszko et al., supra note 16, at 106. 
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As it currently stands, the standard of care for firearm 
screening and counseling is ill-defined, and most healthcare 
providers lack the minimum training necessary to effectively 
identify at risk patients and implement intervention practices. 
This causes reluctance in health care providers to engage in the 
practice because they fear malpractice liability as well as 
overstepping into an unfamiliar area of practice. At this juncture, 
the crucial next step for the professional health community is to 
implement more uniform and formal training on firearm 
screening and counseling and research on clinical interventions 
to prevent firearm-related injuries, focusing on best practices and 
recognition of persons at risk. 
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The End of Smuggling Hearsay: How 
People v. Sanchez Redefined the Scope of 
Expert Basis Testimony in California 
and Beyond 
Marissa N. Hamilton* 
INTRODUCTION
It is a well-settled principal that expert witnesses may give 
testimony in the form of an opinion, relying all or in part on 
sources that are hearsay.1 An expert may explain to the jury on 
direct examination the matters upon which the expert relied in 
forming that opinion, even if those matters would ordinarily be 
inadmissible.2 But when that matter is otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay, how much substantive detail may the expert relate to 
the fact-finder,3 and, further, how may the fact-finder consider 
such evidence in evaluating the expert’s opinion?4
The California Supreme Court recently weighed in on these 
questions in People v. Sanchez and clarified the proper application 
of the hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.5
The Sanchez court issued a strict bright-line test, putting an end 
to the prior paradigm in California: 
When any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements, and treats the contents of those statements as true and 
accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay. 
It cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being 
admitted for their truth.6
 *  J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2018. Thank you to 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General Scott Taryle and Deputy Attorney General 
Nicholas Webster for bringing the Sanchez case and its importance to my attention, 
Professor Scott Howe for his guidance and kind words of encouragement in writing this 
Comment, and the Editors of the Chapman Law Review for their hard work throughout 
the editing and publication process. 
1 CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017).  
2 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 
329 (Cal. 2016). 
3 Can the expert relate all substantive details or just the general kind and source? 
4 Can the evidence be considered as substantive evidence or only for the limited 
purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion? 
5 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
6 Id. at 334. 
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California courts have long paid lip service to the rule that 
experts may not “under the guise of reasons [for their opinions] 
bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.”7 However, 
prior to Sanchez, California courts allowed experts to testify to 
hearsay statements as the basis for their opinions on the grounds 
that such statements were being offered for a non-hearsay 
purpose, and mitigated any potential hearsay problems with the 
use of a two-pronged test.8 California’s two-pronged test was an 
attempt to balance the “jury’s need for information sufficient to 
evaluate [the] expert opinion” with the “accused’s interest in 
avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay.”9
Under this two-pronged test, the courts would “cure” hearsay 
problems by issuing a limiting instruction that matters admitted 
through an expert go only to the basis of the expert’s opinion and 
should not be considered for its truth.10 Thus, so as long as a 
limiting instruction was provided to the jury, the expert could 
testify to the hearsay details forming the basis of the expert’s 
opinion.11 In situations where the court found a limiting 
instruction not be enough to “cure” hearsay problems, the court 
could elect to exclude, under California Evidence Code section 
352, any hearsay with a potential for prejudice from the misuse 
of the hearsay statements outweighed the probative value of 
assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion.12
Under California Evidence law, expert testimony concerning 
general background information, even if technically derived from 
hearsay, has generally not been subject to exclusion on hearsay 
grounds because experts assist the jury in understanding 
subjects that are sufficiently beyond common experience.13 By 
contrast, experts have traditionally, at least under common law, 
been precluded from relating case-specific facts to the jury, since 
the expert lacked independent knowledge of the facts.14 However, 
under the pre-Sanchez two-pronged test paradigm, there was no 
longer a need to distinguish between an expert’s testimony 
concerning background information and case-specific facts 
because the admissibility inquiry instead turned on whether the 
7 People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (Cal. 1985); see also People v. Linton, 302 
P.3d 927, 969 (Cal. 2013); People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 910 (Cal. 1991); N. Am. 
Capacity Ins. Co. v. Claremont Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225, 244 (Ct. App. 2009). 
8 See, e.g., People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (Cal. 1993); People v. Gardeley, 
927 P.2d 713, 721–22 (Cal. 1996). 
9 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299. 
10 Id; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
11 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
12 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
13 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017); Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327. 
14 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327–28. 
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jury could follow the court’s limiting instruction regarding the 
nature of the case-specific out-of-court statements.15 The use of a 
limiting instruction was sanctioned because it instructed the jury 
that the hearsay contents could only be considered for the sole 
purpose of evaluating the expert’s credibility, and not for the 
truth of the matter asserted (i.e., not as independent substantive 
proof of fact).16 However, such limiting instruction may “never 
[be] tied to particular evidence, and the jury’s attention [may] 
never [be] drawn to specific hearsay information disclosed by 
expert witnesses which should only be considered as a basis for 
evaluating their opinions.”17
What resulted was that the pre-Sanchez paradigm effectively 
amounted to a hearsay exception, even though no such hearsay 
exception existed.18 The blurring of this line between general 
background knowledge and case-specific facts has, arguably, 
opened the door to abuse; namely, expert witnesses being used as 
conduits to transmit inadmissible hearsay that does not 
otherwise fall under a statutory exception as assertions of fact to 
the jury.19 With such a liberal approach to admissibility, there is 
a risk that damaging inadmissible evidence, which would be 
unable to make its way to the jury through the proper channels, 
could be smuggled to the jury through the expert; or worse, 
parties may offer expert testimony simply to place such 
damaging evidence before the fact-finder disguised as expert 
basis testimony.20 The Sanchez rule curbs this potential for abuse 
with its bright-line rule prohibiting an expert from relating all 
case-specific hearsay statements forming the basis of the expert’s 
opinion, unless such hearsay statements fall under an applicable 
hearsay exception or are properly admitted independent of the 
expert’s testimony.21
15 Id.
16 See Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299 (stating “matters admitted through an expert go 
only to the basis of [the expert’s] opinion and should not be considered for their truth”).  
17 Id. at 1299–1300. 
18 Cf. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE – EXPERT 
EVIDENCE 190 (2d ed. 2010). 
19 See Patrick Mark Mahoney, Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in 
California Gang Prosecutions; Did Gardeley Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 
386–87 (2004) (arguing the Gardeley court erred in permitting the expert to relate 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence as the basis of the expert’s opinion, and the 
California Supreme Court missed a critical opportunity to emphasize a restrictive view of 
expert testimony and the importance of judicial gatekeeping); see also People v. Zavala, 
No. H036028, 2013 WL 5720149, at *58 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (Rushing, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “rote application of the not-for-truth rationale to police gang 
experts has opened the gates to a veritable flood of incriminating hearsay”). 
20 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 170–71. 
21 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333–34 (Cal. 2016). 
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While the Sanchez hearsay ruling does not change the basic 
understanding of the definition of hearsay, it does restore the 
restrictive common law approach in dealing with the scope of 
expert basis testimony, which has substantial implications for 
California trial practice both in criminal and civil contexts. 
California courts may no longer overrule a hearsay objection on 
the grounds that the hearsay is being considered solely for 
explaining the basis of the expert’s opinion, and experts may no 
longer be asked to assume case-specific facts and opine on the 
significance of such case-specific facts, if such facts have not 
been, or will not be, independently admitted into evidence. Since 
the paradigm of allowing a limiting instruction to justify the 
admittance of expert basis testimony is no longer tenable under 
Sanchez, trial counsel will be forced to shift their focus to 
ensuring they have established a proper evidentiary basis for 
admission of case-specific facts forming the basis of expert 
opinion testimony. This may include calling more witnesses to 
properly authenticate and introduce evidence that trial counsel 
wishes the expert relate to the jury. But if that’s not possible, 
trial counsel may be unable to present such evidence all together. 
This Comment explores the various trial contexts the 
Sanchez hearsay rule will likely affect. Part I discusses the facts 
of Sanchez and summarizes the California Supreme Court’s 
lengthy hearsay discussion and ruling. Part II explores both the 
criminal and civil implications of the Sanchez ruling in California 
trial practice. Part II also surveys various states that do not 
follow a restrictive approach to the scope of expert basis 
testimony, and exposes the problems surrounding such a liberal 
approach, thereby urging states to adopt and follow a 
Sanchez-like rule. Lastly, Part III examines the differences 
between California’s Sanchez approach and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence related to the scope of expert basis testimony. Part III 
also surveys the variances in interpretation and application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, namely, the ongoing controversy 
as to how much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may 
relate to the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony in both federal 
courts and legal scholarship. Finally, this Comment also argues 
that other state courts, as well as federal courts, should follow 
California’s restrictive Sanchez approach to hearsay as it relates 
to the scope of expert basis testimony. Sanchez was a criminal 
case and therefore also addressed Confrontation Clause 
concerns;22 however, this Comment focuses solely on the 
implications of the hearsay ruling. 
22 See infra notes 38, 39, 76, 80 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION:
PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ
In the June 30, 2016 case, People v. Sanchez, the California 
Supreme Court considered the application of the hearsay rule as it 
relates to case-specific out-of-court statements offered as the basis 
of an expert’s opinion.23 The Sanchez court took the opportunity to 
“revisit and revamp” the proper application of California Evidence 
Code sections 801 and 802, specifically the application of the 
hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.24 The 
court issued a bright-line test in an attempt to restore the common 
law distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury case-
specific out-of-court statements, and treats the contents of those 
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, 
the statements are hearsay.”25
A. Facts and Procedural History  
On October 16, 2011, the defendant, Marcos Arturo Sanchez, 
was charged with various criminal felonies coupled with gang 
enhancements, including active participation in and commission of 
a felony for the benefit of the Delhi gang.26 At trial, David Stow, a 
police detective, testified for the prosecution as a gang expert.27
The expert testified generally about gang culture, in particular, 
the Delhi gang’s culture and pattern of criminal activity.28 The 
expert’s testimony then turned to the defendant specifically, 
regarding the details of defendant’s STEP notice,29 FI card,30
23 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
24 John T. Brazier & Katherine Frank, Hearsay, the Experts Say!, L.A. DAILY J. (Nov. 
21, 2016), http://www.cgdrblaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Hearsay-The-Experts-
Say.pdf; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
25 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328, 334. 
26 Id. at 324. 
27 Id.
28 Id. at 325.  
29 STEP notices, or the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 
are issued by police officers to individuals associating with known gang members. Id. at 324 
n.3. The purpose of STEP notices is two-fold; they provide, as well as gather, information. Id.
at 324. The STEP notices provide notice to the recipient that they are associating with a 
known gang, the gang engages in criminal activity, and, if the recipient commits certain 
crimes with gang members, the recipient may face enhanced penalties for the crimes. Id.
The STEP notices also gather information (such as the date and time the notice was given) 
and identify information (such as descriptions of tattoos, identification of the recipient’s 
associates, and any statements made at the time of the interaction). Id. at 324–25. 
30 FI cards, or field identification cards, are small reports prepared by police officers 
that record the police officer’s contact with the individual. Id. at 325. FI cards record the 
date and time of the contact; personal information about the individual, associates, 
nicknames; and any statements made at the time of the interaction. Id.
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previous police contacts, and prior police contacts while in the 
company of known Delhi gang members.31
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked the expert a 
lengthy hypothetical in which the expert was asked to assume 
the out-of-court statements from the STEP notice, FI card, and 
previous police contacts.32 Based on these assumed out-of-court 
facts, the expert opined the defendant’s conduct indicated that he 
was a member of the Delhi gang and committed the crime for the 
benefit the Delhi gang.33
On cross-examination, the expert admitted that he had never 
met defendant, was not present when defendant was given the 
STEP notice, and was not present during any of defendant’s 
other police contacts.34 Further, the expert stated that his 
knowledge of defendant’s prior police contacts while in the 
company of known Delhi gang members were derived solely from 
police reports and FI cards prepared by other officers.35
The jury convicted defendant on all charges, including the 
gang enhancement charges.36 The Court of Appeal reversed 
defendant’s conviction for active gang participation, but otherwise 
31 Id. at 325. The expert testified the defendant had received a STEP notice earlier 
in 2011, in which “the defendant indicate[d] to the police officer . . . that the defendant for 
four years had kicked it with the guys from Delhi,” and that the defendant “got busted 
with two guys from Delhi.” Id. The prosecutor questioned the expert about four other 
contacts that defendant had with police officers between 2007 and 2009. Id. The expert’s 
testimony relayed detailed statements from police documents, including: (1) that on 
August 11, 2007, defendant’s cousin, a known Delhi member, was shot while defendant 
stood next to him and that defendant grew up in the Delhi neighborhood; (2) that on 
December 30, 2007, defendant was with a documented Delhi member when that member 
was shot from a passing car by a rival gang member; (3) that on December 4, 2009, an 
officer contacted defendant in the company of a documented Delhi member and completed 
an FI card; and (4) that on December 9, 2009, defendant was arrested in a garage with 
two known Delhi members where police officers found a surveillance camera, Ziploc 
baggies, narcotics, and a firearm. Id. at 325. 
32 The hypothetical question was:  
(1) a Delhi gang member, ‘who’s indicated to the police he kicks it with Delhi 
and has been contacted in a residence where narcotics and a firearm have been 
found in the past,’ is contacted by police in Delhi territory on October 16, 2011; 
(2) that gang member ‘grabbed something, and then grabs his waistband’ as he 
runs up the stairs into an apartment; and (3) he runs into the bathroom and 
police later find a loaded firearm and drugs on a tar outside the bathroom 
window. 
Id.
33 The expert reasoned that the defendant was “willing to risk incarceration by 
possessing a firearm and narcotics for sale in the Delhi’s turf,” and that the defendant’s 
conduct “created fear in the community redounding to Delhi’s benefit.” Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 326.  
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affirmed the criminal and other gang enhancement convictions.37
The California Supreme Court granted review to clarify the proper 
application of California Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 
regarding the scope of expert witnesses concerning case-specific 
hearsay content in explaining the opinion basis.38
B. California Supreme Court Analysis and Holding 
The defendant contended the expert’s testimony detailing 
descriptions of defendant’s past contacts with police officers was 
offered for its truth and, therefore, constituted hearsay.39 The 
Attorney General claimed the statements made by the expert 
were not admitted for their truth, but rather to aid the jury in 
evaluating the expert’s testimony, and therefore not hearsay.40
The California Supreme Court provided an in-depth 
discussion on hearsay, from its historical common law 
development to its modern status as it relates to expert basis 
testimony.41 California Evidence Code section 1200 defines 
hearsay as “evidence of a statement that was made other than by 
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated,” and provides that hearsay 
is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.42 The Court 
noted that, as a matter of practicality, the hearsay rule has 
traditionally not barred an expert from testifying about general 
background knowledge in the expert’s field of expertise, even if 
that expert’s general knowledge comes from inadmissible 
hearsay evidence.43 This is because “the common law recognized 
that experts frequently acquired their knowledge from hearsay,” 
and “to reject . . . some facts to which [the expert] testifies are 
known to [them] only upon the authority of others would be to 
37 Id. The reversal was based on precedent that established the substantive offense 
of active gang participation required the defendant commit an underlying felony with at 
least one other gang member. Id. at 326 n.5. 
38 Id. at 324. The court also granted review to consider the degree to which the 
Crawford rule, concerning the Confrontation Clause, limits an expert witness from 
relating case-specific hearsay content as the basis for the expert’s opinion when the basis 
involves testimonial hearsay. Id.
39 Id. at 326. The defendant further argued that admission of the expert’s testimony 
violated the Confrontation Clause because the statements were testimonial hearsay. Id.
40 Id. The Attorney General further contended that even if the expert’s statements 
were admitted for their truth, the expert’s statements were not testimonial and thus not 
in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
41 See generally id. at 326–30. 
42 Id. at 326. The Senate Committee comments to California Evidence Code section 
1200 provide that a statement “offered for some purpose other than to prove the fact 
stated therein is not hearsay,” and thus usually admissible. Id.
43 Id. at 327. 
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ignore the accepted methods of professional work and to insist on 
impossible standards.”44
However, the court continued, “an expert has traditionally 
been precluded from relating case-specific facts about which the 
expert has no independent knowledge.”45 Generally, parties 
establish the facts on which their case relies by calling witnesses 
who have personal knowledge of the case-specific facts.46 Then, a 
party calls an expert witness to testify as to generalized 
background information to help the fact-finder understand the 
significance of the case-specific facts and to provide an opinion on 
what the case-specific facts might mean.47
The use of hypothetical questions also honors the common 
law distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts because under “this technique, other witnesses 
suppl[y] admissible evidence of the facts, the attorney ask[s] the 
expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts, 
and the expert testifie[s] to an opinion based on the assumed 
facts.”48 The common law strictly followed the rule that “[i]f no 
competent evidence of a case-specific fact has been, or will be, 
admitted, the expert cannot be asked to assume it.”49
The Sanchez court acknowledged that the modern treatment 
of an expert’s testimony as to general background information 
and case-specific hearsay has become “blurred.”50 Recognizing the 
common law justifications51 for exceptions to the general rule 
barring disclosure of and reliance on otherwise inadmissible case-
specific hearsay—mainly practicality and judicial economy—the 
Legislature generalized these justifications in the enactment of 
44 Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the 
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 965 (2011) (quoting 1 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 665 (2d ed. 1923)); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327. 
45 Id. The court defines case-specific facts as “those relating to the particular events 
and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” Sanchez, 374 P.3d 
at 327. 
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 328 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Gordian Knot of the Treatment 
of Secondhand Facts Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 Governing the Admissibility 
of Expert Opinions: Another Conflict Between Logic and Law, 3 U. DEN. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 
5 (2013)). 
49 Id. at 328. 
50 Id.
51 These justifications included: (1) “the routine use of the same kinds of hearsay by 
experts in their conduct outside the court;” (2) “the experts’ experience, which included 
experience in evaluating the trustworthiness of such hearsay sources;” and (3) “the desire 
to avoid needlessly complicating the process of proof.” Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 155). 
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the California Evidence Code in 1965.52 Under California Evidence 
Code sections 801(b)53 and 802,54 “reliability of the evidence is a 
key inquiry in whether expert testimony may be admitted.”55 The 
rationale in allowing an expert to rely on information that is of a 
type generally relied upon by experts in that field is that it 
“assures the reliability and trustworthiness of the information 
used by experts in forming their opinions.”56 Therefore, to explain 
his or her basis to a fact-finder, “an expert is entitled to explain to 
the jury the ‘matter’ upon which he [or she] relied, even if that 
matter would ordinarily be inadmissible.”57
Naturally, courts have grappled with how much substantive 
case-specific hearsay an expert may provide to the jury and how 
the jury may consider this evidence.58 The California Supreme 
Court has long held that “an expert may not ‘under the guise of 
reasons [for an opinion] bring before the jury incompetent 
hearsay evidence.’”59 In an attempt to resolve this problem, 
California has followed “a two-pronged approach to balancing ‘an 
expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury’s need 
for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion’ so as not 
to ‘conflict with an accused’s interest in avoiding substantive use 
of unreliable hearsay.’”60
The first prong involved the use of a limiting instruction to 
“cure” hearsay problems, whereby the judge instructed the jury 
that matters admitted through an expert should go only to the 
basis of the expert’s opinion and should not be considered for its 
truth.61 The second prong was applicable in instances where a 
limiting instruction may not be enough to “cure” the hearsay 
52 Id.
53 California Evidence Code section 801(b) provides that an expert witness may 
render an opinion “[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known 
to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that 
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter 
as a basis for his opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374 
P.3d at 329. 
54 California Evidence Code section 802 states that an expert “may state on direct 
examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an 
expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is 
based, unless he is precluded by law in using such reasons or matter as a basis for his 
opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
55 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
56 Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2016) (Law Revision Commission Cmt.)). 
57 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (1985)). 
60 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)). 
61 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
518 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
problems.62 In this situation, the court would apply California 
Evidence Code section 352, the balancing test that allows the 
court to exclude from an expert’s testimony any hearsay whose 
irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs the 
probative value of the expert’s testimony.63
The court stated that, “under this paradigm, there was no 
longer a need to carefully distinguish between an expert’s 
testimony regarding background information and case-specific 
facts” because “[t]he inquiry instead turned on whether the jury 
could properly follow the court’s limiting instruction in light of 
the nature and amount of the out-of-court statements 
admitted.”64 The court “conclude[d] this paradigm is no longer 
tenable because an expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an 
opinion must be considered for its truth by the jury.”65
The Sanchez court acknowledged that other courts have 
avoided hearsay issues entirely by finding that statements 
related by experts are not hearsay because they are not admitted 
for their truth, but rather “go only to the basis of [the expert’s] 
opinion.”66 However, the Sanchez court disagreed with this 
“not-for-truth” rationale, calling it a logical fallacy.67 The court 
reasoned that “[w]hen an expert relies on hearsay to provide 
case-specific facts, considers the statements as true, and relates 
them to the jury as a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion, it 
cannot logically be asserted that the hearsay content is not 
offered for its truth.”68 This is because “the validity of [the 
expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] on the truth of . . . [the 
hearsay] statement . . . if the hearsay that the expert relies on 
and treats as true is not true,” then “an important basis for the 
opinion is lacking.”69
Further criticizing the “not-for-truth” rationale, the court 
noted that when an expert witness is not testifying in the form of 
a proper hypothetical question and evidence of the case-specific 
facts the expert is testifying to has not, and will not, be properly 
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 329–30. While the court concluded the old paradigm is no longer tenable, 
the rationale the court provides suggests the old paradigm was never tenable to begin 
with. Thus, it is interesting to note that essentially nothing about the actual rule has 
changed, other than the courts implementation and opinion on how it should be applied 
and policed in practice. 
66 Id. at 330 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)).
67 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 332. 
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Williams v. Illinios, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2258 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis removed). 
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admitted independent of the expert’s testimony, “there is no 
denying that such facts are being considered by the expert, and 
offered to the jury, as true.”70 In this case, the jury was 
instructed that they “must decide whether information on which 
the expert relied was true and accurate,”71 while at the same 
time instructed that “the gang expert’s testimony concerning ‘the 
statements by the defendant, police reports, F.I. cards, STEP 
notices, and speaking to other officers or gang members’” should 
not be considered for their truth.72
The court opined that “[j]urors cannot logically follow these 
conflicting instructions” because the jury “cannot decide whether 
the information relied on by the expert ‘was true and accurate’ 
without [first] considering whether the specific evidence 
identified by the instruction, and upon which the expert based 
his opinion, was also true.”73 To admit the case-specific basis 
testimony as nonhearsay, presented solely to aid the jury in 
evaluating the expert’s testimony, would be “to ignore the reality 
that jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of 
the truth of the expert’s basis.”74
The California Supreme Court’s ruling75 restores the 
traditional common law distinction between an expert witness’s 
testimony regarding general background information and 
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury case-
specific out-of-court statements, and treats the content of those 
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, 
the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be maintained 
that the statements are not being admitted for their truth.”76
The court expressly disapproved of its prior decisions that 
held: (1) an expert’s basis testimony is not offered for its truth; 
(2) a limiting instruction coupled with the court balancing 
the prejudicial effect versus probative value sufficiently 
addresses hearsay issues; and (3) an expert may testify to 
70 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333. 
71 Id. (quoting Judicial Counsel of California Criminal Jury Instruction § 332 
(Oct. 2017)). 
72 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333 (quoting jury instructions used at trial). 
73 Id.
74 Id. (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80). 
75 The California Supreme Court made clear the ruling in Sanchez does not change 
the basic understanding of the definition of hearsay. See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 326. 
76 Id. at 334. The court’s rule also went on to state that in the context of criminal 
cases, “[i]f the case is one in which a prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial 
hearsay, there is a Confrontation Clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of 
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or 
forfeited that right by wrongdoing.” Id. at 334–35. 
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case-specific out-of-court statements when no applicable 
hearsay exception applies.77
The court summarized what an expert can do and what an 
expert cannot do in light of its ruling in Sanchez. An expert 
witness can “still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion” and can 
tell the jury “in general terms” that he or she did so by 
“relat[ing] generally the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon 
which his [or her] opinion rests.”78 What an expert cannot do, the 
court explained, is relate case-specific facts asserted in hearsay 
basis statements as true, unless those case-specific facts are 
proven independently by competent evidence or are covered by 
an applicable hearsay exception.79
The California Supreme Court concluded the admission of 
the gang expert’s hearsay testimony relating the case-specific 
statements concerning the defendant’s gang affiliations were 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Accordingly, the 
court reversed the findings on the defendant’s criminal street 
gang enhancements.81
II. APPLICATION OF SANCHEZ BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 
CRIMINAL GANG CONTEXT
While Sanchez dealt with criminal gang enhancements, and 
thus addressed Confrontation Clause concerns, the court’s ruling 
on the proper application of the hearsay rule as it relates to case-
specific out-of-court statements offered as expert basis testimony 
applies equally to other criminal, as well as civil, contexts.82
Section A discusses the extension of the Sanchez rule to other 
criminal contexts in California, including drug possession cases 
and Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually 
Violent Predator (“SVP”) proceedings. Section A also looks at how 
other states apply the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court 
statements offered as expert basis testimony in these criminal 
77 See id. at 334 n.13. 
78 Id. at 334. 
79 Id. For example, the court stated the length of a skid mark measured at an 
accident scene is a case-specific fact, while how skid marks are left on the pavement and 
the fact that the speed of the vehicle can be estimated based on the skid mark is general 
background information. Id. at 328. A witness who measured the skid mark at the 
accident scene could establish this case-specific fact. Id. The proper subject of an expert’s 
opinion in this situation could include that the car that left the skid mark had been 
traveling at about eighty miles an hour when the brakes were applied. Id.
80 Id. at 344. The court further held the police reports and STEP notice the expert 
relied upon in describing the basis of his opinion recited testimonial hearsay, and thus 
violated the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 340–44. The court held the FI card may be 
testimonial, but did not rule definitively on the issue. See id. at 342–44. 
81 Id. at 344. 
82 See infra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
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contexts. Section B explores how the Sanchez rule will likely 
affect civil cases in California, including product and strict 
liability, negligence, medical malpractice, personal injury, and 
valuation cases. Section B also discusses how other states apply 
the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court statements offered 
as expert basis testimony in these civil contexts. This Part also 
urges other states to adopt a Sanchez-like rule in determining 
the admissibility and scope of expert basis testimony. 
A. Other Criminal Contexts 
California courts have applied the Sanchez rule in criminal 
cases outside of the gang enhancement context, namely in drug 
possession cases and MDO and SVP proceedings.83 Other states, 
however, have not applied a restrictive Sanchez-like approach 
to the scope of expert basis testimony relating inadmissible 
hearsay in these criminal contexts, but should adopt a 
Sanchez-like rule.84
1. Drug Possession  
In a criminal context, the Sanchez ruling will have a sizeable 
impact on drug possession cases. In a case decided shortly after 
Sanchez, People v. Stamps,85 a California Appellate Court 
extrapolated the hearsay rule in Sanchez and applied it to a 
criminal drug possession case. In Stamps, the defendant, who 
was convicted of multiple drug possession offenses, argued on 
appeal the trial court improperly admitted the case-specific 
hearsay testimony of a criminalist expert witness.86 At trial, the 
expert testified that her identification of the drugs in pill form 
was based solely on a visual comparison of the shape, color, and 
markings of the seized pills to those on a website called “Ident-A-
Drug.”87 The defendant argued the expert should not have been 
allowed to testify as to the case-specific contents of the Ident-A-
Drug website because the expert’s testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay the jury considered for its truth and used as direct 
evidence of the charged offenses.88
83 See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2). 
84 See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2). 
85 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2016). 
86 Id. at 829. 
87 Id. at 830–31. The Ident-A-Drug website allows a user to enter the color, shape, 
markings, class, brand, or other descriptions on a pill in order to identify what 
substance the pill is likely to contain. See Therapeutic Research Center, IDENT-A-DRUG 
REFERENCE (Oct. 21, 2017, 7:56 PM), http://identadrug.therapeuticresearch.com/home 
[http://perma.cc/GR5Q-P5AN].
88 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 830. 
522 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
&# !-2/1"'0!200#"	 ',"#.1&,"&#*" 1&1 “'1 '0
1&# ,-,
 0.#!1 -$ 	 1&1 !-+#0 ',1- .*6 ',
1&'0 !0#”&# !-2/1011#" “$1#/	 /#*' '*'16 '0,-
*-,%#/ 1&# 0-*# 1-2!&01-,# -$ "+'00' '*'16 4&#/# #5.#/1
1#01'+-,6 1- &#/06 '0 1 '002#” ," 0 02!& “',!-/.-/1#"
4'1&', 1&# 	 /2*# '0  ,#4 *'1+20 1#01 1&1
"#.#,"0-,4&#1&#/1&#+11#/1&#./-0#!21'-,0##)01-#*'!'1'0
‘!0#0.#!'$'! &#/06’ -/ ./1 -$ 1&# #5.#/1’0 ‘%#,#/*
 !)%/-2,"',$-/+1'-,’”
..*6',% 	 1&# !-2/1 /#3#/0#" 1&# "#$#,",1’0
!-,3'!1'-,-$.-00#00'-,-$1&#"/2%0',.'**$-/+	&#!-,1#,10-$
1&# "#,1/2%4# 0'1# !-2*" ,-1  # ',"#.#,"#,1*6 "+'00' *#
 #!20#1&#011#+#,104#/#&#/06
,"1&#./-0#!21'-,$'*#"
1- -$$#/ ,6 &#/06 #5!#.1'-, 1&1 4-2*" /#,"#/ 1&# 4# 0'1#
011#+#,10"+'00' *#2/1&#/1&#!-2/1!-,!*2"#"1&#"#,1
/2% &#/06 011#+#,10 4#/# “"+'11#" 0 ./--$ -$ 1&#
3#/6%/3+#, -$ 1&# !/'+# 4'1& 4&'!& 1&# "#$#,",1 40
!&/%#"” ," !*#/*6 4#/# !0#0.#!'$'! $!10 /#,"#/',% 1&#
#5.#/1’0 0'01#01'+-,6',"+'00' *#2,"#/	
&# $!12* !'/!2+01,!#0 ',  /#  6 ,- +#,0 
-,#1'+#-!!2//#,!#,1&#
	*'$-/,'!0#
1&#!-2/140$!#"4'1&0#1-$$!10,#/*6'"#,1'!*1-1&-0#',
 ,  &-4#3#/ 1&# *'$-/,' ..#**1# -2/1
/#!&#" 1&# -..-0'1# !-,!*20'-, -, 1&# "+'00' '*'16 -$ 1&#
  
at 833 n.5 (stating “[t]he 
*',#-$!0#0&0,-"'/#!1..*'!1'-,&#/#
because the challenged hearsay was not testimonial”).
  
1–
 	 
1 ,"#1#/+',',% '10 /#3#/0* 1&# !-2/1*0-4#,1 1&/-2%&&/+*#00
error analysis. The court determined the expert’s Ident––/2%4# 0'1# 1#01'+-,640
1&#-,*6#3'"#,!#1&11&#.'**0',"##"!-,1',#"1&#"/2%0!&/%#","1&#/#$-/#!-2*"
not be dismissed as “carrying little weig&14'1& 1&# (2/6 -/  #',% "2.*'!1'3# -$ -1&#/
evidence.” 
 1  0 , 0'"# 1&# !-2/1 $$'/+#" 1&# .-00#00'-, !-,3'!1'-, -$ 1&#
"/2%0',!/601**',#$-/+ #!20#1&#./-0#!21'-,./-3#"1&#!&#+'!*!-+.-0'1'-,-$1&#
!/601**',#"/2%01&/-2%&1&##5.#/14'1,#004&-.#/$-/+#""#1'*#"!&#+'!*,*60'0
-, 1&# !/601**',#"/2%0 ," 1&20 1&#/#40,-	 3'-*1'-,4'1& /#0.#!1 1- 1&'0
#3'"#,!#
1
 
 
at 834 n.6 (stating that, based on the expert’s testimony, the Ident/2%
4# 0'1# “provided photographs of the pills, together with sufficient text to 
!-++2,'!1#that the photograph depicted a specified pharmaceutical,” thus “this 
!-+ ',#" !-,1#,1!-,01'121#" , -21-$court ‘statement’ of a ‘person’ (the person
4&-#,1#/#" 1&# ',$-/+1'-, -, 1&##  0'1# 0-0 1- /',% '14'1&', 1&#"#$','1'-, -$
hearsay” under California evidence law).
  
1–
  
1
  #-.*# 3-%,- 	 
	 	 1 	 *1 ../ 	

	,1&#"#$#,",1*')#',40!&/%#"4'1&.-00#00'-,-$"/2%0',
 -1&!/601**',#,".'**$-/+,"1&##5.#/1/,!&#+'!*,*60'0-,*6-,1&#"/2%0',
!/601**',#$-/+
0$-/'"#,1'$6',%1&#"/2%0',.'**$-/+1&##5.#/13'02**6'"#,1'$'#"
1&# .'**0  6 #,1#/',% 1&# !-*-/ 0&.# ,"+/)',%0 -$ 1&# .'**0 -, 1&# "#,1/2%
4# 0'1#

2018] The End of Smuggling Hearsay 523 
expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug hearsay 
contents.96 Instead, the court’s Ident-A-Drug testimony analysis 
focused on reliability of the website’s contents as being the 
“preliminary fact[or]” of admissibility.97 The Logan court opined 
the Ident-A-Drug hearsay statements were admissible because 
the website constituted a material that was “of the type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in [the expert’s] field,” and 
any challenge as to whether the expert’s identification of the 
pills was faulty went “to the weight of [the expert’s] testimony, 
not its admissibility.”98
If Logan, or a factually similar case, was presented to a 
California court post-Sanchez, the Sanchez (and Stamps) rulings 
indicate the prosecutor would not be able to get the website 
contents before the jury unless the prosecutor called another 
witness to properly authenticate and admit the evidence, or it fell 
within an applicable hearsay exception. However, proper 
independent admission in most cases is unlikely given the 
anonymity of many Internet sources and courts’ general 
skepticism towards the reliability of Internet sources.99
Other states, such as Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, Ohio, and 
Washington, have been generally consistent in allowing experts 
to testify to case-specific hearsay contents in the context of drug 
identification cases.100 In criminal drug possession cases, states 
96 Id. at *4–5. 
97 Id. at *3. The court determined that even though the expert did not know the 
particular details about the Ident-A-Drug website (e.g., the website author, who 
maintained the website, how often it was updated), it did not mean that the website 
contents were “speculative, conjectural, or lacking a reasonable basis.” Id. at *4. 
98 Id. It should be noted the court determined that the admissions hearsay exception 
would, in this particular case, render the expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug 
website contents admissible even if the court determined the trial court erred in allowing 
the testimony. Id. (stating the defendant himself admitted to the same evidence offered by 
the expert). However, what is significant is that the court found that disclosing the 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis was allowed, regardless of whether such evidence 
was properly independently supplied or whether an applicable hearsay exception was 
present. Id.
99 See People v. Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 834–35 (Ct. App. 2016) (stating that 
courts continue to view the Internet “‘warily and wearily’ as a catalyst for ‘rumor, 
innuendo, and misinformation’” because “[t]he Internet ‘provides no way of verifying the 
authenticity’ of its contents”). The court went on to state, websites are unreliable because 
“[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet,” websites are not “monitored for accuracy and 
nothing contained therein is under oath,” and “hackers can adulterate the content.” Id.
100 See, e.g., Pineda v. State, No. 13-13-00574-CR, 2015 WL 5311237, at *4–5 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 2015) (where the expert testified as to the chemical composition and weight 
of the seized pills based solely on a visual comparison on “Drugs.com”); State v. Murphy, 
28 So.3d 496, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (where the expert testified as to the identification of 
the seized pills solely by a visual examination and comparison of the pills’ characteristics 
with a website called “Just Drug Identification”); State v. Garnett, No. 12CA0099-M, 2013 
WL 6021467, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013) (where the expert testified as to the 
identification of the seized pills based solely on her use of the Ident-A-Drug database, 
instead of testing the milligram composition of the pills); State v. Sandoval, No. 1CA-
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should follow the restrictive Sanchez (and Stamps) approach to
determine the admissibility of expert basis testimony when 
case-specific hearsay is at issue.101 Even putting aside issues 
related to unreliability of anonymous Internet sources, the 
admission of this kind of case-specific hearsay presents 
problems. As the Stamps court recognized, no special expertise 
is required to enter the characteristics of a pill onto a website 
and interpret the results provided by the website; so in 
instances such as this, the expert’s testimony “[does] not reveal 
any special expertise . . . beyond ordinary visual acuity . . . so as 
to make it an integral part of some larger opinion.”102 By 
presenting hearsay evidence solely through the expert, the court 
is “allow[ing] [the expert] to place case-specific non-expert 
opinion before the jury, with the near certainty that the jury 
[will] rely on the underlying hearsay as direct proof of the 
chemical composition of the pills.”103 In this type of factual 
circumstance, the expert is the only source of the identification 
evidence presented to the jury; the expert unavoidably becomes 
a “mere conduit” for the hearsay contents.104 Absent the expert 
testimony proffering the case-specific hearsay to the jury, these 
convictions likely would not stand.105 Therefore, other states 
CR14-0242, 2015 WL 1035236, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015) (where the expert 
testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on the use of a website that 
law enforcement used to gather information about drugs and by a conversation with a 
non-testifying pharmacist at Walgreens); State v. Carter, 981 So.2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 
2008) (where the expert testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on 
a visual inspection and comparison of the pill’s characteristics with a book); State v. 
White, No. 24174–2–III, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 2006) 
(where the expert testified as to the identification of a seized pill capsule based solely on a 
conversation, in which the expert described the pill’s characteristics and logo, with a non-
testifying poison control center employee). 
101 Note, I am not proposing that a chemical analysis must be conducted in order for 
there to be a conviction. Many states, including California, have explicitly held that a 
defendant may be convicted of drug possession without a chemical analysis of the drugs. 
See, e.g., People v. Camp, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating the court does 
not know of any case precedent that holds a chemical analysis of a substance is required 
for a possession conviction); People v. Sonleitner, 228 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that the fact the prosecution did not conduct a chemical analysis on the 
substance did not warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction because “the nature of a 
substance, like any other fact in a criminal case, may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence”); White, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3 (“A chemical analysis of a suspected controlled 
substance is not essential to a conviction in a criminal trial proceeding . . . .”); Carter, 981 
So.2d at 745 (“An expert may identify a controlled substance without chemical analysis.”) 
(quoting Sterling v. State, 791 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). 
102 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831 n.2. 
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 998 (“We conclude it is reasonably probable the jury would have 
acquitted [the defendant] of the charges based on pill possession in the absence of the 
Ident-A-Drug testimony.”). For other state courts which have concluded similarly, see, 
e.g., People v. Hard, 342 P.3d 572, 579 (Colo. App. 2014), which found the admission of 
the expert’s testimony regarding visual identification of the pills via “Drugs.com” was not 
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should follow California’s Sanchez hearsay rule in drug 
possession cases to uphold the intent of the rule against hearsay 
and curb convictions resulting largely based on inadmissible, 
unsubstantiated, and unreliable hearsay.106
2. Mentally Disordered Offenders and Sexually Violent 
Predator Proceedings 
Another criminal context107 the Sanchez ruling will have a 
large impact on is MDO108 and SVP109 proceedings. In MDO and 
SVP cases, defendants convicted of serious crimes meeting 
statutory requirements face civil commitment, and prosecution 
experts are called to opine on defendants’ mental status and 
harmless because the expert’s “testimony . . . was the only evidence presented at trial to 
identify some of the pills” and thus the court could not “say with fair assurance that the 
erroneous admission of [the expert’s] testimony did not substantially influence the 
verdicts in this case.” 
106 Many legal scholars agree the reason for the rule against hearsay is that hearsay 
is untested by cross-examination, and that prohibiting hearsay assists the fact-finder in 
ascertaining an accurate picture of the truth. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 381–82 (1992); 
Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 893, 898 (1992). 
107 While Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually Violent Predators 
(“SVP”) proceedings are technically civil proceedings (because they determine whether a 
defendant is to be civilly committed), I am discussing them in the criminal context section 
because the proceedings are criminal in nature, since the MDO and SVP defendants are 
afforded many of the same procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants (e.g., 
the right to court-appointed counsel and experts, the right to a unanimous jury verdict, 
the right to testify in one’s defense, and the right to have the prosecution prove the SVP 
or MDO status beyond a reasonable doubt), and the adjudication of MDO or SVP status is 
related to the defendant’s criminal convictions. See Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 538 
(Cal. 2010). While this Comment focuses only on the hearsay implications of Sanchez, not 
the Confrontation Clause issues, it is still important to note that because MDO and SVP 
proceedings are considered civil proceedings, there is no right to confrontation under the 
state and federal Confrontation Clause in MDO and SVP trials, only a right under the 
due process clause measured by the standard applicable to civil proceedings is due to an 
MDO or SVP defendant. See People v. Nelson, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 194 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citing People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1069 (Cal. 2001)). 
108 The MDO Act, enacted in 1985 (codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–81 (2017) 
and regulated in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2570–80 (West 2017)) “requires that offenders who 
have been convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue 
to pose a danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after the 
termination of their parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission.” In re
Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 227 (Cal. 2004) (finding the purpose of the MDO Act is to treat the 
MDO, while also protecting the general public from the danger posed by the MDO). 
109 The SVP Act (codified in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–09 (West 2017)) 
“targets a select group of convicted sex offenders whose mental disorders predispose them 
to commit sexually violent acts if released following punishment for their crimes” and 
“confines and treats such persons until their dangerous disorders recede and they no 
longer pose a societal threat.” Moore, 237 P.3d at 536–37 (finding the SVP Act applies 
only to the “most dangerous offenders” who have been convicted of an enumerated 
sexually violent offense against two or more victims, and who has a diagnosed mental 
disorder that poses a danger to society of reoffending). 
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likelihood of reoffending if released.110 Often times, the experts 
are not the defendants’ treating doctors, and thus the experts’ 
testimonies rely entirely on the hearsay statements of treatment 
personnel and law enforcement.111 California Appellate Courts 
have applied the Sanchez rule to both MDO112 and SVP cases. 
In the post-Sanchez California Appellate Court case People v. 
Burroughs, the defendant appealed a jury verdict adjudicating 
him an SVP, arguing the court violated the Sanchez rule by 
allowing the prosecution’s experts to testify to a large amount of 
case-specific hearsay.113 The case-specific hearsay facts the 
defendant challenged included details about the defendant’s 
uncharged sex offenses and details about the defendant’s 
behavior while in state custody, which were gleaned from 
documents, such as police reports, probation reports, and 
hospital records.114
The court, applying Sanchez, determined that much of the 
case-specific facts testified to by the experts were hearsay and not 
independently admitted at trial, nor did they fall within a hearsay 
exception.115 The details of the reports, testified to by the experts, 
were the only sources in the record that included the details about 
defendant’s uncharged offenses.116 Moreover, the experts’ 
testimony regarding the defendant’s uncharged offenses was 
described in “lurid detail” and was “exceedingly inflammatory.”117
110 See, e.g., Deirdre M. Smith, Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumption, and the 
Failed Experiment of “Sexually Violent Predator” Commitment, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 619, 623 
(2015) (stating that “trial courts permit prosecution experts to offer diagnoses and 
predictions of risk” to support the experts’ opinions on whether to civilly commit 
defendants). 
111 Id. at 696–97 (“[E]xperts testif[y] as to their diagnostic opinions of [defendant] and 
their assessments of . . . volitional impairment solely on the basis of information complied 
and furnished to them by government attorneys without ever having examined the 
[defendant]. . . . Government experts, in such cases, typically review criminal 
investigation reports and alleged victims’ statements (including information that would 
be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding) and utilize these accounts of conduct to identify 
‘symptoms.’”). 
112 See, e.g., People v. Belin, No. E064815, 2017 WL 944210, at *10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 10, 2017). The court applied the Sanchez rule in a MDO case, but found a reversal 
was not warranted because the expert was the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, and 
consequently much of the expert’s basis testimony was based on the expert’s own personal 
knowledge. Id. The small amount of case-specific hearsay facts testified to by the expert 
was inconsequential because defendant confirmed such facts during the defendant’s own 
testimony. Id.
113 People v. Burroughs, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 660, 677 (Ct. App. 2016). 
114 Id. at 677, 680. The trial court allowed extensive testimony on these subjects on 
the ground that the content formed the basis of the experts’ opinions, and gave a limiting 
instruction that the jury consider the content for that limited purpose only. Id. at 678. 
115 Id. at 684. 
116 Id. at 682. 
117 The expert’s hearsay testimony described in detail numerous sex offenses that 
defendant was not charged with or convicted of, including the repeated sodomy of a young 
boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a woman. Id. at 684. The expert’s hearsay 
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Thus, the court found the “improperly admitted hearsay 
permeated the entirety of [the defendant’s] trial and 
strengthened crucial aspects of the [prosecution’s] case.”118
Because the admission of the experts’ case-specific hearsay 
testimony violated the Sanchez rule, and the court determined 
the admission was not harmless error, the court reversed 
defendant’s SVP commitment.119
Pre-Sanchez, California courts in MDO and SVP proceedings 
have disagreed on the admissibility of expert basis testimony that 
is hearsay. Interestingly, regardless of the courts’ determination 
on this hearsay issue, the case-specific testimony still found its 
way to the jury one way or another. Courts that determined the 
testimony was admissible did so based on the “not-for-truth” 
rationale, i.e., the testimony is not hearsay because it is not 
coming in for the truth, but rather to evaluate the expert’s 
credibility.120 On the contrary, courts that determined the 
testimony was hearsay nevertheless admitted the testimony, so 
long as it was followed by a limiting instruction to the jury.121
Neither of these outcomes are tenable post-Sanchez.122
testimony also provided that defendant was a gang member and described bizarre and 
“lethal” behavior that defendant allegedly engaged in while in custody. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. (holding there was a reasonable probability the jury would not have committed 
defendant as a SVP but for the hearsay evidence). 
120 See, e.g., People v. Welch, No. H035567, 2012 WL 1107925, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 3, 2012) (allowing the expert in a SVP trial to testify as to the “hearsay” statements 
because the court determined the statements were not hearsay, as they were “not offered 
for the truth of the matters asserted but instead for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining 
the bases for the expert’s opinions”). 
121 See, e.g., People v. Dean, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 486–90 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowing 
expert basis testimony in SVP trial disclosing details of defendant’s hospital and 
institutional records because such testimony was coupled with multiple limiting 
instructions to the jury to consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of assessing 
the expert’s credibility). 
122 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. While outside the scope of this 
Comment, it is interesting to note that it remains unclear whether the Sanchez rule will 
affect MDO and SVP trials (or any trials for that matter) when the proceeding is a bench 
trial, rather than a jury trial. The analysis in Sanchez, in criticizing the “not-for-truth” 
rationale, focuses heavily on the issue that juries cannot logically follow the conflicting 
instructions given to them (i.e., the jury must decide whether the information relied on by 
the expert was true and accurate, while, at the same time, not considering the evidence 
for its truth). See supra Section I(B). However, California courts have contemplated the 
idea that courts (judges) are able to correctly reconcile the conflicting ideas, and consider 
the expert’s hearsay testimony solely for the purpose of assessing the expert’s credibility. 
For example, in People v. Martin, 127 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 179–80 (Ct. App. 2005), a 
MDO bench trial, the court allowed expert testimony reciting hearsay statements from 
probation reports that were not independently admissible. The court stated that, because 
this proceeding was tried before the court and not a jury, “[w]e must assume . . . the 
court . . . considered the testimony . . . solely for the proper purpose of assessing the 
experts’ credibility, and not as independent proof of the facts contained therein.” Id. at 
180. Based on this logic, one could argue the Sanchez rule does not apply to bench trials. 
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Other states that have MDO and SVP proceedings or similar 
proceedings, such as Illinois, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Washington, have somewhat consistently allowed 
experts to testify to the details of the hearsay contents forming 
the basis of the expert’s opinion.123 The impact of the Sanchez
ruling is likely to be highly pertinent in MDO and SVP cases 
because, in many instances, expert opinion is the only evidence 
supporting commitment presented by the prosecution.124 MDO 
and SVP trials generally make liberal use of hearsay evidence 
embedded in expert testimony, and thus allow extrinsic hearsay 
evidence to be introduced to the fact-finder.125 The evidence is also 
often highly prejudicial because the prosecution experts, who are 
proffering opinions on the ultimate issue (i.e., whether the 
individual is dangerous and at risk of reoffending), relate hearsay 
details gleaned from, inter alia, institutional records, criminal 
reports, and conversations with treatment professionals that are 
graphic in nature.126 Allowing experts to relate inflammatory 
123 See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 780 N.E.2d 342, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating 
expert testimony recounting details from reports in an SVP trial are admissible because 
“[a]lthough reports made by others are not substantively admissible, an expert is 
nonetheless allowed to reveal the contents of the materials upon which the expert has 
reasonably relied to explain the basis of his or her opinion”); Commonwealth v. Miller, No. 
702-WDA-2016, 2017 WL 908315, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (allowing the expert to 
testify as to hearsay details on the grounds that the hearsay content was not being offered 
for its truth, but rather to show what information the expert relied upon in forming her 
opinion); In re Manigo, 697 S.E.2d 629, 633–34 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the expert in 
a SVP trial could testify as to the details of the expert’s conversation with the defendant’s 
non-testifying treatment provider, even though it was hearsay, because the testimony 
went to the basis of the expert’s opinion); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 
554–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing the expert to testify as to the hearsay details of 
defendant’s past uncharged offenses from inadmissible reports to explain the basis of the 
expert’s opinion because a limiting instruction was given to the jury); In re Detention of 
Leck, 334 P.3d 1109, 1119–20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing the expert to relate 
hearsay details from a report because the report contents were used as part of the basis of 
the expert’s opinion and a limiting instruction was given to the jury). 
124 See Heather E. Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: 
Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of 
Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 142 (2015); see also 
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Ct. App. 1999) (“In civil commitment cases, 
where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is . . . likely to 
be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available.”). 
125 See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of 
Sexual Abuse, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2004); John L. Schwab, Due Process 
and “The Worst of the Worst”: Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil 
Commitment Proceedings, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 912, 914 (2012). 
126 See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 684 (Ct. App. 2016) (where 
the expert’s basis testimony disclosed details of defendant’s uncharged offenses, “in lurid 
detail” including “the repeated sodomy of a young boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a 
woman”); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 547–48 (where the expert’s basis 
testimony disclosed victim statements from uncharged offenses, including those from 
defendant’s own teenage daughter, who stated “her father had masturbated in front of 
her, and made her sit naked while he fondled her breasts and genitals”); see also Smith, 
supra note 110, at 696–700 (stating that victim statements in criminal reports and 
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hearsay details concerning, for example, a defendant’s uncharged 
sex offenses or lewd behavior while in custody, tempts the 
fact-finder to commit the defendant just to punish past 
wrongdoings.127 Significantly, MDO and SVP civil commitment 
trials implicate liberty interests; the trials are not limited by 
double jeopardy and ex post facto protections, meaning liberal 
admission of hearsay contents have serious consequences for 
defendants.128 To ensure the liberty interests of defendants are 
protected, other states should follow a restrictive Sanchez-like
approach to policing the scope of expert basis testimony in MDO 
and SVP proceedings.  
B. Civil Contexts  
The Sanchez hearsay ruling is equally applicable in civil 
contexts.129 In Sanchez, the court noted that it intended to 
“clarify the proper application of Evidence Code sections 801 and 
802, relating to the scope of expert testimony.”130 California 
Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 govern the admission of 
expert testimony in both criminal and civil cases.131 Nothing in 
the Sanchez opinion indicates the court intended to limit its 
ruling regarding expert basis testimony to criminal cases only.132
In regards to California civil cases, the Sanchez ruling likely 
will not have as extensive of an impact as it expectedly will in 
criminal cases. This is because California courts have already 
reports of uncharged crimes are often used by experts). Also, experts often do not examine 
the defendant themselves because the defendant may refuse to be examined. Id. at 696. 
127 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 684 (stating the evidence testified to by the 
expert was “exceedingly inflammatory” because it “depicted [defendant] as someone with 
an irrepressible propensity to commit sexual offenses, and invited the jury to punish him 
for past offenses”). 
128 MDO offenders are committed for one-year periods and thereafter can be released 
unless the prosecution petitions for recommitment and, each time, proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt the offender should be recommitted for another year. See Lopez v. 
Super. Ct., 239 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Cal. 2010). SVP offenders are committed for an indefinite 
period of time, with annual examinations to determine whether the SVP status 
qualifications continue to be met (subject to continued/recommitment hearings). See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6604.1, 6605 (West 2017); see also People v. McKee, 223 
P.3d 566, 570–72 (Cal. 2010). “In particular, individuals designated as SVPs are rarely 
released ‘and placement within SVP programs typically amounts to a [life] sentence.’” 
Schwab, supra note 125, at 914 (quoting Corey R. Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on 
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 448 (2010)). 
129 The Sanchez ruling related to the Confrontation Clause will not apply in civil 
contexts because it is based on the state and federal right to confrontation, which only 
applies to criminal defendants and has not been extended to civil cases. See People v. 
Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1070 (Cal. 2001). 
130 People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 324 (Cal. 2016). 
131 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 2017) (“[T]his code applies in every action before 
the Supreme Court or a court of appeal or superior court . . . .”). 
132 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 678 n.6. 
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been following a Sanchez-like rule in many civil contexts133 based 
on the holding in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp.134 In Continental Airlines, the expert, an aircraft repair 
estimator, was to testify about the costs of repair for an airplane 
that had been severely damaged in a landing accident.135 The 
expert did not prepare the cost-analysis report he relied upon in 
forming his opinion, but rather two of his employees actually 
gathered and compiled the specific information into the report.136
The court did not allow the expert to testify as to the specific 
contents of the employees’ report.137
The Continental Airlines court recognized the distinction 
between allowing “an expert [to] state on direct examination the 
matters on which he relied in forming his opinion,” while at the 
same time, not allowing an expert to “testify as to the details of 
such matters if they [were] otherwise inadmissible.”138 The 
court relied on the rationale that an expert “may not under the 
guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay 
evidence.”139 Further, the court stated that an expert “may not 
relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as independent 
proof of fact.”140
While the court in Continental Airlines did not touch on 
the distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts, the hearsay analysis is effectively the same as 
in Sanchez.141 California courts have followed the rule recognized 
by Continental Airlines in a number of civil contexts, including 
133 While beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting that a more restrictive 
approach to the scope of expert basis testimony has been applied in California civil cases 
than in criminal cases pre-Sanchez. It is curious that criminal defendants have been 
receiving less protection than civil parties, especially considering the differing 
consequences in criminal versus civil cases, namely liberty interests versus mere 
pecuniary interests. 
134 Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 
1989). Continental Airlines was a civil suit that alleged negligence, strict liability, deceit, 
breach of warranty, and breach of contract based on an airplane crash involving an 
aircraft that was sold from McDonnell Douglas to Continental Airlines. Id. at 782–83. 
135 See id. at 792. 
136 See id. The expert stated that he had seen the report, but did not verify the data 
and numbers or “review them hard” because “[t]hey looked like they were in the 
ballpark.” Id.
137 Id. at 794. 
138 Id. at 793 (quoting Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 369 (Ct. App. 
1981)). 
139 Cont’l Airlines, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 793. 
140 Id. at 794 (quoting Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct. 
App. 1987)) (“It is proper to solicit the fact that another expert was consulted to show 
the foundation of the testifying expert’s opinion, but not to reveal the content of the 
hearsay opinion.”). 
141 See Brazier & Frank, supra note 24. 
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product liability, strict liability, and negligence cases.142
However, the Sanchez rule may have a noticeable impact on two 
civil contexts in California: (1) certain medical professional 
expert testimony in medical malpractice, and (2) personal injury 
cases, and cases involving valuation of property or services. 
Generally, California courts have not allowed physician 
experts to testify to the hearsay statements of other non-testifying 
physicians in medical malpractice and personal injury cases.143
But, California courts have allowed a physician expert to testify as 
to the out-of-court opinions of other non-testifying physicians if 
certain “limited admissibility”144 requirements are met.145
Application of the limited admissibility doctrine has been held to 
be appropriate “in situations where the out-of-court doctors’ 
opinion is truly ‘on a parity with a patient’s history . . . given to 
[the patient’s] physician’ and is ‘a part of the information’ used by 
the physician in ‘diagnosis and treatment.’”146
Legal scholars have theorized that application of the limited 
admissibility doctrine to physician basis testimony is warranted 
because the testifying doctor relied on the opinions of the other 
doctors in their medical treatment of the patient, and thus the 
law should not prevent the physician from doing the same at 
142 See, e.g., Cantu v. Hermansen, No. B257534, 2015 WL 5008279, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 24, 2015) (finding the trial court erred in permitting the expert to testify 
concerning the content of medical records when the medical records were not properly 
admitted independently); Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 834 (Ct. App. 
1992) (holding the expert could not testify regarding the details of hearsay statements 
from an informal survey the expert conducted about hotel maintenance practices); 
Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The opinions of the 
six outside experts were unquestionably hearsay opinions. Experts may rely upon hearsay 
in forming opinions. They may not relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as 
independent proof of fact.”). 
143 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Roth, 519 P.2d 588, 603 (Cal. 1974) (finding the expert 
doctors could not testify as to the out-of-court statements of other non-testifying doctors to 
show the basis of the experts’ opinions because the statements of the non-testifying 
doctors were hearsay); Jamison v. Lindsay, 166 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding the court properly precluded the expert from testifying to the hearsay statements 
of a non-testifying doctor, stating “[o]pinions of out-of-court experts are not admissible to 
show the basis of a testifying expert’s opinion if the witness did not use the opinions of the 
out-of-court [doctor] in the course of treatment or diagnosis of the plaintiff”); Williams v. 
Rizvi, No. F038590, 2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (holding that it 
was proper to preclude the expert physician from testifying as to the hearsay contents of 
the excluded portions of an operative report). 
144 When referring to the doctrine of limited admissibility, I am referring to the 
doctrine as it was applied to physician basis testimony in Kelley v. Bailey, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
448, 454–55 (Ct. App. 1961), not the general application of the doctrine of limited 
admissibility as stated in CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 2017). 
145 It should be noted that this limited admissibility applies only to expert witnesses 
testifying as treating doctors, not to doctors who are consulted solely to render expert 
opinions. See Trannguyen v. Laska, No. B172741, 2004 WL 2498279, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 8, 2004). 
146 Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 603 n.26 (quoting Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455). 
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trial.147 However, the logic behind the Sanchez rule would seem 
to render evidence that falls within the doctrine of limited 
admissibility inadmissible in the post-Sanchez world. This is 
because the expert medical professional’s testimony is relating 
case-specific hearsay from a different (non-testifying) medical 
professional.148 Further, relating the non-testifying doctor’s 
opinion, which is identical to the expert’s opinion, naturally 
bolsters and fortifies the opinion of the testifying expert.149
When the doctrine of limited admissibility is applied, a 
limiting instruction is given instructing the jury to consider the 
evidence for the “narrow and limited purpose” of disclosing the 
“information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and 
treatment [on],” and “not as independent proof of the facts.”150
While the Sanchez court did not address medical expert basis 
testimony detailing case-specific statements of a non-testifying
physician, the Sanchez rule likely now dictates exclusion of such 
testimony, since admission of case-specific out-of-court statements 
coupled with a limiting instruction mirrors the exact paradigm 
the Sanchez court rendered untenable. 
In regards to expert basis testimony concerning valuation of 
property and services, California courts have somewhat 
consistently allowed property valuation experts to testify to the 
details upon which the expert’s opinion is based, even if such 
details are hearsay.151 Often, a valuation expert’s testimony will 
147 See Volek, supra note 44, at 966–67. 
148 The court’s rationale for allowing the evidence in this limited capacity is because 
the evidence “stands on a parity with a patient’s history of an accident and ensuing 
injuries given to his physician. It is admissible not as independent proof of the facts but as 
a part of the information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and treatment, if 
any.” Springer v. Reimers, 84 Cal. Rptr. 486, 494 (Ct. App. 1970) (allowing an expert to 
testify to the contents of hearsay statements from a non-testifying doctor’s report based 
on the limited admissibility doctrine rationale). 
149 Cf. Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 604 (stating the testimony of the testifying doctors “as to 
the views of the 54 [non-testifying] doctors they respectively consulted was actually 
offered to establish the opinion of such latter doctors”); Williams v. Rizvi, No. F038590, 
2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (“[T]he only purpose in plaintiff’s 
expert testifying to the excluded portions of [the non-testifying doctor’s] operative report 
would be to bolster the opinion of plaintiff’s expert.”). 
150 Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455. 
151 See, e.g., Appel v. Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263–64 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing an 
architect expert to testify as to the details of a cost estimate report performed by a non-
testifying cost estimator); McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 436–37 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1934) (allowing an accounting expert to testify as to the details of the hearsay information 
he based his property valuation on); see also Burow v. JTL Dev. Corp., Inc., 2d Civil No. 
B227256, 2012 WL 34384, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2012) (allowing the expert to 
testify as to the details of data and laboratory tests conducted by a non-testifying engineer 
in opining on a measurement of future soil consolidation); Blakenbaker v. Ingram, No. 
E033930, 2005 WL 40033, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2005) (finding an accident 
reconstructionist expert’s testimony relating the measurements of crush damage to a car 
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be derived from predominantly inadmissible hearsay sources.152
Therefore, in order to inform the fact-finder of the information 
relied upon to assist in weighing the expert’s credibility, 
California courts have held that an expert “should, so far as is 
practicable, detail the facts upon which his conclusion or 
judgment is based even though the facts upon which he relies 
would be incompetent to affect value in the particular case.”153
The California courts’ rationale in finding the hearsay facts are 
reliable is that the valuation expert evaluates the hearsay and 
“gives the sanction of his general experience.”154
In Sanchez, the court pointed out that under the common 
law, property valuation experts were one of the exceptions to 
the general rule barring disclosure of otherwise inadmissible 
case-specific hearsay.155 The justification for this exception was 
threefold: (1) the hearsay was of routine use by the expert in 
their conduct outside the courtroom; (2) the expert had 
experience in evaluating the hearsay sources’ trustworthiness; 
and (3) the court did not want to needlessly complicate the 
process of proof.156 The legislature’s codification of the California 
Evidence Code generalized this common law exception with 
courts employing reliability as the key inquiry as to whether 
expert basis testimony may be admitted.157
However, under Sanchez, a more cut-and-dry rule has 
emerged; reliability is no longer the key determination as to 
whether disclosure of the case-specific facts will be permitted.158
Sanchez dictates that “[i]f it is a case-specific fact and the witness 
has no personal knowledge of it, if no hearsay exception applies, 
and if the expert treats the fact as true, the expert simply may 
not testify about it.”159 Sanchez made no indication that it 
intended to leave the traditional common law exceptions in place, 
taken by a non-testifying individual to opine on the speed of a vehicle admissible to show 
the basis of the expert’s opinion). 
152 See McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436. In property valuation cases, the basis of the 
expert’s opinion may be based on inquires made of others, commercial circulars, 
correspondence, newspapers, market quotations or reports, price lists, current prices, 
comparable sales, relevant sales known to the expert, and other secondary sources. See 31 
CAL. JUR. 3D EVID. § 712 (2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 328 (Cal. 2016).  
153 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436). 
154 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing McElligott, 33 P.2d at 437). 
155 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328. The court stated the other common law exception was 
physicians who relied on patients’ hearsay to form diagnoses. Id. at 329.
156 Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 155). 
157 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
158 Id.; see also Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (Ct. App. 2016) (“After Sanchez,
reliability is no longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where expert testimony to 
hearsay is at issue. Admissibility—at least where ‘case-specific hearsay’ is concerned—is 
now more cut-and-dried.”). 
159 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834. 
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and thus its holding suggests that the practice of allowing basis 
disclosure, in its entirety, is no longer tenable because the 
“expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an opinion must be 
considered for its truth by the jury.”160
Accordingly, it appears the Sanchez rule encompasses the 
disclosure of case-specific facts forming the basis of a valuation 
expert’s opinion. The expert’s valuation price of the property or 
services is inarguably case-specific, since it is often the ultimate 
issue in a case and is the principal matter the expert was called 
to give an opinion on.161
Of course, the Sanchez rule does not alter the established rule 
that valuation experts may rely on hearsay sources that would 
otherwise be inadmissible, provided that it is of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the given field.162 However, Sanchez
arguably dictates that valuation experts can now do no more than 
generally state what they relied upon in forming the basis of their 
opinions; meaning the experts cannot disclose the case-specific 
details of such hearsay information—which could include, for 
example, reports or price lists prepared by others, conversations 
with others, and newspaper advertisements—unless such 
information falls under a hearsay exception or has been properly 
admitted independent of the experts’ opinions.163 Therefore, 
post-Sanchez, a valuation expert will likely no longer be able to 
disclose case-specific hearsay contents forming the basis of their 
opinion. This holds true even if the hearsay is of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the given field or because it is a general 
practice in the industry to use content prepared by others without 
complying with the requirements Sanchez mandates.164
While California has generally followed a Sanchez-like rule 
in many civil contexts, other states have liberally allowed experts 
160 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 330. 
161 See McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (“[T]he testimony 
of the witness wherein he related [hearsay statements from an informal survey he 
conducted] . . . was given in response to a question which was preliminary to the matter 
upon which he was called to give his opinion.”). 
162 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an 
opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally 
the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”); see also Appel v. 
Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Ct. App. 1984) (“It has long been held in this state that 
an expert opinion on the valuation of property or services may be based in whole or in 
part on hearsay publications.”). 
163 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“There is a distinction to be made between 
allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed 
to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a 
statutory period.”). 
164 Cf. Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (finding expert’s disclosure of hearsay information 
admissible because the expert “testified that it is the general practice in his industry to 
use a cost estimator to perform the actual mathematical computation of an estimate”). 
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in civil cases to testify to case-specific hearsay facts forming the 
basis of an experts’ opinion.165 Some states’ evidence codes, 
such as Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas, statutorily 
allow for disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such testimony 
is otherwise inadmissible hearsay.166 Other states, whose state 
evidence codes are similar to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 
703, allow for the disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such 
testimony is otherwise admissible hearsay, subject to a 
balancing of the prejudicial effect versus probative value of the 
basis testimony.167
For example, states such as Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, 
Georgia, Ohio, Texas, and Washington, have allowed experts to 
testify to case-specific hearsay statements in civil contexts, 
including personal injury, negligence, medical malpractice, and 
products liability cases.168 Further, states such as Arkansas, 
165 For a comparison of states that permit an expert to testify to hearsay matters 
forming the basis of the expert’s opinion to states that do not allow the expert to testify to 
the hearsay forming the expert’s basis, see 89 A.L.R. 4TH 456, § 3–4 (2011) (originally 
published in 1991). 
166 See PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 705 (West 2017) (“If an expert states an 
opinion the expert must state the facts or data on which the opinion is based.”); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (“If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject, the underlying facts 
or data shall be admissible without testimony from the primary source.”); TEX. EVID.
CODE ANN. § 705(d) (West 2017) (“If the court allows the [expert] to disclose [the 
underlying] facts or data the court must . . . restrict the evidence to its proper scope and 
instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
167 Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be 
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their 
probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”), with e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (same as Federal 
Rule 703), and Ga. Code Ann. § 24-7-703 (West 2017) (“[F]acts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the [expert] . . . unless . . . their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). 
168 See, e.g., Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 992 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]n 
expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the factual basis for his opinion 
because the opinion would otherwise be left unsupported, and the trier of fact would be 
left with little if any means of evaluating its correctness.”); Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. 
of Tucson, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0201, 2011 WL 1998433, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May, 18 
2011) (allowing the expert to testify to the hearsay statements of a non-testifying 
individual’s unsworn written declaration, which was not otherwise admissible); Ziekert v. 
Cox, 538 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that “not only may experts consider 
medical records commonly relied upon by members of the medical profession in forming 
their opinions, but that they may testify as to the contents of those records as well” 
because the contents are admitted “not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, 
but for the limited purpose of the explaining the expert’s testimony”) (quoting Roebuck v. 
State, 586 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ga. 2003)); Thomas v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 684 
S.E.2d 83, 87–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the expert to testify as to hearsay and 
inadmissible attachments based on the rationale that “[a]n expert may base his opinion 
on hearsay and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings” because any 
hearsay issue “presents a jury question as to the weight [that] should be assigned [to] the 
opinion”); Fry v. King, 950 N.E.2d 229, 231–38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (allowing the expert 
to testify as to facts and data prepared by others because the expert verified the facts and 
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Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington, 
have allowed experts to testify to case-specific hearsay 
statements in valuation and appraisal contexts.169
Generally, these states have allowed experts to disclose 
case-specific hearsay basis testimony based on four different 
rationales: (1) the testimony is not hearsay because it is not 
coming in for the truth, but rather the limited purpose of showing 
the basis forming the expert’s opinion;170 (2) the testimony is 
hearsay, but needs to be disclosed to the jury in order for the jury 
to assign weight to the expert’s opinion;171 (3) the testimony is 
hearsay, but the expert’s experience in evaluating the hearsay 
material renders the information reliable, and thus any 
inaccuracies go to the weight of the expert’s credibility;172 and (4) 
the testimony is hearsay, but a limiting instruction and balancing 
test cures any potential hearsay problems.173
The holding in Sanchez rejects each of these admittance 
rationales. Experts are used extremely often in civil cases, almost 
data by use of Google Earth based on the reasoning that any inaccuracies go to the weight 
of the testimony, and not the admissibility); Stam v. Mack, 984 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1999) (allowing a physician expert to testify as to the details of a non-testifying 
physician’s opinion because the state evidence rules “allow a testifying expert to relate on 
direct examination the reasonably reliable facts and data on which he relied in forming 
his opinion” subject to a limiting instruction and balancing test); Allen v. Asbestos Corp., 
157 P.3d 406, 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing the expert to testify as to otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay facts because “[t]he otherwise inadmissible facts or data underlying 
an expert’s opinion [are] admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of an 
expert’s opinion, but [are] not substantive evidence”). 
169 See, e.g., Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Schell, 683 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1985) (stating that “an expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the 
basis for his opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair with little if 
any means for evaluating its correctness”); Town of Gilbert v. Freeman, No. 1A-CV09-
0660, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing the expert to testify to 
hearsay details based on the rationale that the disclosure of hearsay facts or data not 
admitted in evidence go to the credibility of the expert’s opinion, not the truth of the 
matter asserted); King v. Browning, 268 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1980) (allowing a surveyor 
expert to testify to hearsay facts because “[a]n expert may base his opinion on hearsay 
and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings”); Williamson v. Harvey 
Smith, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing the expert to testify to the 
details of a report prepared by another inspector); Martin v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 953 
So.2d 1163, 1167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Bishop v. Miss. Trans. Comm’n, 734 So.2d 
218, 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)) (allowing a valuation expert to testify to details of another 
non-testifying expert because “a witness is not a mere conduit, if the ‘expertise of the 
testifying witness is such as to permit that witness’s adoption of the statements of a 
similar expert’”); Barrack v. Kolea, 651 A.2d 149, 155–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (allowing 
the expert to testify as to the details of cost figures prepared by his non-testifying 
subcontractors); Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 215 P.3d 990, 1014 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the appraiser expert to testify as to the details of past 
appraisal reports prepared by non-testifying experts). 
170 See, e.g., Ziekert, 538 N.E.2d at 757; Town of Gilbert, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5.  
171 See, e.g., Lawhon, 992 S.W.2d at 166; Thomas, 684 S.E.2d at 88. 
172 See, e.g., Martin, 953 So.2d at 1167; Deep Water Brewing, 215 P.3d at 1014; Fry,
950 N.E.2d at 236. 
173 See, e.g., Stam, 984 S.W.2d at 750. 
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universally when it comes to quantifying value and damages, and 
are often a necessary and critical part of litigation because expert 
testimony can help the fact-finder understand complex facts and 
issues.174 Because experts offer testimony that is often central to 
the question of liability in a case,175 the need for jurors to have all 
the information forming the basis of an expert’s opinion becomes 
obvious; jurors need to assess the expert’s credibility when 
deciding the outcome of a case. 
However, Sanchez exposes the issues that arise if experts are 
permitted to relate otherwise inadmissible basis testimony to the 
fact-finder: When experts treat hearsay statements as true and 
accurate in forming the basis of their opinion, jurors must accept 
the hearsay statements as true if they believe the expert is 
credible, and thus the statements are inescapably being admitted 
for their truth.176 The Sanchez court realized that merely telling 
the jury that the expert relied on additional information in 
general terms, as opposed to reciting the details, might do less to 
bolster the credibility and weight of the expert’s opinion.177
However, this point confirms the case-specific hearsay, if 
admitted, is in fact being considered for its truth. If admittance 
bolsters the expert’s opinion, “[t]he expert is essentially telling 
the jury: ‘You should accept my opinion because it is reliable in 
light of these facts on which I rely.’”178 Because it cannot logically 
be maintained that the case-specific hearsay statements are not 
being admitted for their truth, and it is dangerously likely the 
fact-finder is considering such hearsay statements for their 
truth179, other states should follow the Sanchez rule.180
174 See Greg Eastman, Vandy M. Howell & Maria Salgado, A Primer on When to 
Use Expert Witnesses and How to Find Them, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.bna.com/a-primer-on-when-to-use-expert-witnesses-and-how-to-find-them/ 
[http://perma.cc/R45D-UUDX]. 
175 See id.
176 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 New York, for example, already follows a Sanchez-like rule based on the reasoning 
in the 2005 case People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 729–33 (N.Y. 2005), which 
disallowed a physiatrist expert from testifying to the details of interviews with third 
parties forming the basis of the expert’s opinion regarding the defendant’s sanity. The 
New York court reasoned: 
We do not see how the jury could use the statements of the interviewees to 
evaluate [the expert’s] opinion without accepting as a premise either that the 
statements were true or that they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was 
to buttress [the expert’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously wanted and 
expected the jury to take the statements as true. 
Id. at 732. 
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III. SANCHEZ AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
California’s restrictive Sanchez method in policing the scope 
of expert basis testimony differs from the current federal method. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 currently states: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the 
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in 
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or 
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible 
for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise 
be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the 
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the 
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.181
Thus, the current federal rule, while taking an approach that 
favors exclusion, allows experts to relate case-specific hearsay for 
the purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s 
opinion if the hearsay content’s probative value in assisting the 
jury in weighing the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs the 
risk of prejudice resulting from the jury’s potential misuse of the 
information.182 If the court determines the hearsay contents can 
be admitted, Rule 703 requires a limiting instruction, upon 
request, instructing the jury not to use the information as 
substantive evidence.183
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the same 
hearsay issue that was presented in Sanchez—the admissibility 
of expert basis testimony disclosing inadmissible hearsay—albeit 
in a federal Confrontation Clause context in Williams v. 
Illinois.184 Williams was a criminal rape prosecution in which the 
identity of the offender was a central issue.185 DNA evidence was 
collected from the victim and sent to an outside laboratory for 
analysis.186 Independent of the rape case, the defendant’s DNA 
was in the state’s police database.187 The prosecution called an 
expert who testified that she compared the DNA sample from the 
outside laboratory to the known DNA sample of the defendant, 
concluding the two DNA samples matched.188 The issue 
presented to the Court was whether the details of the outside 
laboratory’s DNA analysis report, forming the basis of the 
181 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added). 
182 Id. (advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment). 
183 See id.
184 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012). 
185 Id.
186 Id. at 59. 
187 Id.
188 Id. at 60. 
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expert’s opinion, were inadmissible hearsay.189 A four-member 
plurality opined the expert’s testimony regarding the contents of 
the outside laboratory’s DNA report was non-hearsay, and thus 
admissible, since it was admitted to help the fact-finder assess 
the expert’s testimony, and not for its truth.190 However, five 
justices (a four-member dissent and a one-member concurrence 
writing separately) specifically rejected the plurality’s “not-for-
truth” rationale.191 Justice Thomas’s concurrence stated that the 
expert’s testimony did not merely reveal the opinion basis 
because the validity of the expert’s opinion “ultimately turned on 
the truth of [the hearsay] statements.”192 Similarly, the dissent 
stated, in order “to determinate the validity of the [expert’s] 
conclusion, the factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-
court statement on which it relies,” which contributed to the 
dissent’s consensus that the “not-for-truth” rationale is “very 
weak, factually implausible, nonsense, and a sheer fiction.”193 It 
is the analysis of these five justices in Williams that directly 
influenced the Sanchez court’s ruling.194
Despite the strong opinions of a majority of justices in the 
Williams case regarding the flaws of the “not-for-truth” rationale, 
189 And, further, the Court was presented with the question of whether the admission 
of the expert’s testimony violated the Federal Confrontation Clause. Id. at 57. 
190 The plurality further held this type of expert testimony does not violate the 
Federal Confrontation Clause because the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation has no 
application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. Id. A five-justice majority (the four-member plurality and Justice Thomas) 
opined that the independent laboratory report was not testimonial and thus mooted the 
Rule 703 issue. Id. at 85–86, 97 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
191 See generally id. at 103–40 (referring to Justice Thomas’s concurrence and 
Justice Kagan’s dissent, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Sotomayor joined). 
192 Id. at 108 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the “not-for-truth” rational 
“overlook[ed] that the value of [the expert’s] testimony depended on the truth of those 
very assumptions”). 
193 Id. at 125–28 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.10.1 
(2d ed. 2011)). The dissent went on to illustrate the flaw in the “not-for-truth” rationale: 
The Confrontation Clause prevented the State from introducing that report 
into evidence except by calling to the stand the person who prepared it. So the 
State tried another route—introducing the substance of the report as part and 
parcel of an expert witness’s conclusion. In effect, [the expert] testified . . . “I 
concluded that Williams was the rapist because [the outside laboratory], an 
accredited and trustworthy laboratory, says that the rapist has a particular 
DNA profile and, look, Williams has an identical one. . . .” Nothing in [the 
expert’s] testimony indicates that she was making an assumption or 
considering a hypothesis. To the contrary, [the expert] affirmed, without 
qualification, that the Cellmark report showed a “male DNA profile found in 
semen from the vaginal swabs of [the victim].” 
Id. at 111–30. 
194 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 330–33 (Cal. 2016) (discussing the opinions of 
the five justices in Williams who expressly rejected the “not-for-truth” rationale, stating 
“[w]e find persuasive the reasoning of a majority of justices in Williams”). 
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some federal courts have allowed experts to relate otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay evidence to the fact-finder on the grounds 
the evidence is being admitted solely to assist the fact-finder in 
evaluating the expert’s opinion.195 On the other hand, some 
federal courts have not permitted experts to testify to 
case-specific hearsay evidence on the grounds the hearsay 
contents are more prejudicial than probative under Rule 703.196
Legal scholars have also diverged on whether experts in federal 
courts should be able to testify to case-specific facts from 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay sources.197 Thus, there has been 
195 See, e.g., U.S. v. NCR Corp., 960 F. Supp. 2d 793, 834–36 (E.D. Wis. 2013) 
(allowing the expert to testify regarding the details of a report prepared by others because 
it is customary for experts in this field to rely on and adopt such reports in forming their 
opinion, even though the expert is unfamiliar with the details of how such a report is 
made); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 596–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (allowing the expert to 
testify to the hearsay details of a report, stating that “[w]hile, normally the Report itself 
would be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 as hearsay, the Court finds it 
admissible to explain the basis of [the expert’s] opinion, not as substantive evidence”); 
Geyer v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1216–18 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (allowing a 
physician expert, who did not examine the plaintiff, to testify to hearsay details of medical 
records and reports prepared by non-testifying physicians); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 
134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing Fire Marshall expert to testify to the 
hearsay details of reports made by the insurance company investigator and discussions 
with the expert’s subordinates); U.S. v. Wolling, 223 Fed. Appx. 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(allowing a defense expert to describe the hearsay contents of medical reports that were 
excluded from being admitted into evidence under the Rule 703 balancing test); In re
Amey, 40 A.3d 902, 914–15 (D.C. 2012) (allowing psychiatrist to testify to the hearsay 
contents forming the basis of the expert’s opinion, including reports and notes prepared 
by other doctors because a limiting instruction was given to the jury). 
196 See, e.g., McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (D. Haw. 2007) 
(holding that, while it is permissible for the expert to base his opinion on otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay, “the facts on which [the expert] bases his opinion are also the facts 
in dispute before the factfinder in this case” and “[f]or this reason, the probative value of 
any inadmissible facts would be outweighed by . . . the prejudicial effect of having an 
expert recite inadmissible facts as though they are established”); Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. 
v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Rule 703 was . . . not 
intended to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a witness, under the guise of giving 
expert testimony, to in effect become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose 
statements or opinions the expert purports to base his opinion.”); Mike’s Train House, Inc. 
v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that it was error to allow an 
expert to testify as to the hearsay details of another non-testifying expert’s conclusions 
and the degree to which the expert’s and the non-testifying expert’s conclusions 
overlapped); U.S. v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that it was error 
to allow the expert to recite hearsay statements from otherwise inadmissible interviews). 
197 Compare KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80 (“To admit basis testimony for the 
nonhearsay purpose of jury evaluation of the experts is therefore to ignore the reality that 
jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of the truth of the expert’s 
basis. Having invited the jury to make such an assessment, is it either fair or practical 
then to ask the jury to turn around and ignore it?”), Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as 
Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 481, 493 
(1992) (arguing that a restrictive approach to policing the bases of modern expert 
testimony should be implemented to bar “[d]etailed renditions[s] of unauthenticated 
hearsay” and to curb Rule 703 abuses), Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited 
Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1257–58 (2007) (stating that it 
seems unlikely the amended Rule 703 has resulted in fewer rulings permitting disclosure 
for the limited purpose of better understanding the expert’s reasoning because, in certain 
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much controversy over Rule 703 as it relates to the disclosure of 
expert basis testimony. 
The Sanchez rule excluding all expert basis testimony that 
relates case-specific hearsay takes a far more restrictive approach 
than the federal rule in that it completely rejects the “not-for-
truth” rationale, disallows the use of a limiting instruction, and 
eliminates the use of the balancing test in determining 
admissibility. It is unclear whether the ruling in Sanchez will 
influence the ongoing federal debate. The 2000 Amendment to 
Rule 703 favoring inadmissibility seems to suggest the Federal 
courts are at least somewhat concerned with the potential for 
jurors to improperly consider expert testimony.198 The Advisory 
Committee’s note makes clear the amendment to Rule 703 was 
intended to emphasize the “underlying information [forming the 
basis of the expert’s opinion] is not admissible simply because the 
opinion or inference is admitted.”199 Moreover, it appears the 
dominant view expressed in legal literature seems to reject the 
“not-for-truth” rationale, just as the Sanchez court did.200 Thus, 
perhaps it is just a matter of time before federal courts adopt a 
Sanchez-like bright-line approach when it comes the disclosure of 
hearsay evidence forming the basis of an expert’s opinion. 
situations, the jury’s need for the basis evidence would likely substantially outweigh the 
prejudicial effect of the hearsay in light of the court’s limiting instructions), Mark I. 
Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7 DREXEL L.
REV. 239, 286 (2015) (“The procedures adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert 
testimony violate a fundamental logical concept . . . when the factual basis is revealed by 
the expert . . . was to be ‘cured’ by the logically inconsistent, totally ineffectual, judicial 
instruction to restrict use of the factual basis evidence only to ‘evaluate the expert’s 
opinion’ and not for the truth of any of the facts relied upon.”), and Volek, supra note 147, 
at 996–97 (stating that “[t]he limiting instruction contemplated by Rule 703 is 
problematic” because “the jury must somehow use the inadmissible basis evidence to 
evaluate the expert’s opinion, without considering whether or not the inadmissible basis 
evidence is true”), with Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion 
Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1987) (arguing 
that “the introduction of the inadmissible facts or data upon which experts rely no more 
violates the hearsay rule’s spirit than do the volumes of evidence that regularly are 
introduced through the numerous hearsay rule exceptions”), and Alexander J. Toney, The
Credibility-Based Evaluative Purpose: Why Rule 703 Disclosures Don’t Offend the 
Confrontation Clause, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2015) (“Rule 703 is no sinister 
device for admitting evidence when no other provision allows it . . . . [T]he Rule’s purpose, 
to offer jurors indicia for assessing the credibility—and, by proxy, the correctness—of 
expert testimony, is a real purpose, and one that serves the interests of justice.”). 
198 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment (“The 
amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information used as 
the basis of an expert’s opinion and is not admissible for any substantive purpose, when 
that information is offered by the proponent of the expert.”). 
199 Id.
200 See Toney, supra note 197, at 984–85 (citing to treatises, law review articles, and 
Professor Richard Friedman’s amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Illinois to support the inference that the view that juries must consider basis 
evidence for its truth is the dominant view in the federal realm). 
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CONCLUSION
Prior to People v. Sanchez, California courts have long 
tolerated experts disclosing to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements forming the basis of the expert’s opinion under the 
guise that the statements were being offered for the sole purpose 
of explaining the expert’s opinion basis, and that, in most 
instances, a limiting instruction could cure any hearsay 
problems.201 Sanchez struck down this paradigm, holding the 
expert’s testimony regarding the basis for the opinion must be 
considered for its truth by the jury and the jury’s evaluation of an 
expert’s opinion requires a direct assessment of the truth of the 
basis forming the expert’s opinion.202 Post-Sanchez, an expert 
may no longer relate to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements when, to support the expert’s opinion, the expert 
treats the content of the statements as true and accurate.203 Such 
statements are hearsay and to be admissible, must fall within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception or be properly admitted 
independent of the expert’s testimony.204
What does this mean for California trial practice? Trial 
counsel now must devote greater attention to establishing a 
proper evidentiary basis for any case-specific out-of-court 
statements they intend their expert to assume, disclose, and 
opine on. California courts will have to act as stricter gatekeepers 
in policing the disclosure of expert basis testimony, and will 
likely face much stricter appellate review in such matters.205 If 
trial counsel cannot independently admit the case-specific facts, 
or the case-specific facts do not fall under an applicable hearsay 
exception, an expert will likely only be able to communicate in 
general, admittedly vague, terms the basis for their opinion, and 
hope the jury will trust and believe the expert.206 In upcoming 
cases, it is likely there will be much litigation over what 
constitutes a case-specific fact.207 Moreover, courts will likely also 
201 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
202 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333 (Cal. 2016). 
203 Id. at 334. 
204 Id. at 333 (“Like any other hearsay evidence [the out-of-court statements] must be 
admitted through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the evidence can be 
admitted through an appropriate witness and the expert may assume its truth in a 
properly worded hypothetical question.”). 
205 Of course, any Sanchez challenge must survive a harmless error analysis. 
206 See, e.g., People v. Atkins, No. B278735, 2017 WL 3587418, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 2017) (finding no Sanchez violation because the expert merely recited in general 
terms the basis for his opinion was conversations with other gang detectives, and offered 
no specific details concerning those communications). 
207 For example, in order to obtain a gang enhancement conviction, one element the 
prosecution must prove is that members of the gang have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity by committing two or more “predicate offenses” (which are statutorily 
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grapple with determining what basis testimony qualifies as 
revealing the general “kind and source of the matter” upon which 
the expert relied,208 without disclosing too much information so 
as to violate the Sanchez rule. 
The Sanchez hearsay rule implications extend and apply 
equally in both criminal and civil contexts in California.209 While 
some states, such as New York, already follow a restrictive 
Sanchez-like approach when it comes to the scope of expert basis 
testimony, many other states have rather consistently allowed 
liberal disclosure of expert basis testimony, opening the 
flood-gates to experts smuggling otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
evidence to the jury.210 In regards to federal courts, while Rule 
703 presumes inadmissibility but allows admissibility in certain 
circumstances, there has been great tension concerning how 
much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may relate to 
the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony.211 Perhaps California’s 
return to the restrictive approach to policing the scope of expert 
basis testimony will encourage other states, as well as federal 
courts, to become stricter gatekeepers, thereby curbing the 
practice of using experts to smuggle otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay contents before the ears of the fact-finder. 
enumerated offenses). See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 342–43. It is unclear from the ruling in 
Sanchez whether predicate offenses constitute general background information about the 
gang in question or case-specific facts. Can the prosecution elicit details of these predicate 
offenses when such information is not based on the expert’s personal knowledge and not 
admitted independent of the expert? If the predicate offense testimony is considered to be 
general background information about the gang, if the predicate offense happens to 
involve the specific defendant in the case, does this fact shift the testimony from general 
background information to case-specific facts? Compare e.g., People v. Vasquez, No. 
C069228, 2017 WL 3699636, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017) (holding testimony 
detailing predicate offenses were “more akin to general background information 
concerning the gang” as the predicate convictions did not involve the defendant), and
People v. Chavez, No. C074316, 2016 WL 5940068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016) 
(finding testimony regarding predicate offenses did not involve the defendant or events 
involved in the case, and thus were not case-specific, but rather general background 
information concerning the gang), with People v. Lara, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 91, 126–27 (Ct. 
App. 2017) (determining the gang expert’s testimony regarding the predicate offenses, 
which involved the defendant, were case-specific facts), and People v. Carrillo, No. 
F070459, 2017 WL 2463468, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2017) (holding testimony 
detailing predicate offenses involving defendant were case-specific facts, not general 
background information). 
208 Id. at 685–86 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and 
may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally the kind and 
source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”). 
209 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
210 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
211 See supra Part III. 
544 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
545
Whose Lien is it Anyway? A Comparative 
Analysis of Approaches to Homeowner 
Association Lien Priority 
Steven L. Rimmer
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 546
I. BACKGROUND ......................................................................... 550
II. THE THREE APPROACHES TO HOA LIEN PRIORITY ............... 554
A. First-in-Time Approach to HOA Lien Priority ....... 555
B. True Priority Super Lien Priority Statutes ............ 563
C. The Purchaser Liability Approach .......................... 570
III. A COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES IN RELATION TO 
FAIRNESS AND POLICY ...................................................... 577
A. Fairness and Equity to the Parties ......................... 578
B. The Disproportionate Value of the Liens ................ 584
C. The Value of HOAs as an Efficient Means of 
Private Governance .................................................. 587
D. Lender Willingness and Buyer Opportunity to 
Obtain Financing ...................................................... 591
E. Which Party is in the Best Position to 
Internalize the Cost? ................................................ 593
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 595
 Steven L. Rimmer, J.D. Candidate May 2018, Chapman University Dale E. 
Fowler School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Donald Kochan for his mentorship, 
guidance, and direction throughout the process of writing this Comment. I would also 
like to thank my wife, Elvia, and my children, Jerry, Steven, and Lucia, for their 
support, love, and patience. 
546 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
INTRODUCTION
No one likes to play against a stacked deck, yet both 
homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”) and banks tend to make the 
complaint that this is exactly what is happening post-foreclosure 
crisis. HOAs complain that when a bank forecloses, the 
foreclosure wipes away any chance at recovery against unpaid 
assessments. Banks claim that the priority-adjustment remedy to 
that problem deals their chances of recovery a bad hand from the 
bottom of the deck despite having what they thought was an ace 
up their sleeve: priority of time. How a jurisdiction sets lien 
priority between an HOA and lender largely determines who will 
have the winning hand. Where to set that line is an exceedingly 
difficult problem for which jurisdictions are struggling to find a 
practical solution. This Comment seeks to explore this balancing 
act in detail. 
Assume a homeowner’s residence is located within a 
neighborhood with an HOA,1 and was purchased through a first 
deed of trust with a lender. The homeowner falls on hard times 
and is unable to pay either the monthly assessments required by 
the HOA or payments on their loan to the lender. Both the HOA 
and the lender initiate separate non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings relatively close in time, but the lender’s sale is 
postponed for an unrelated reason. In the meantime, the HOA 
holds their foreclosure sale and the home is bought by a 
subsequent purchaser for much less than market value. Having 
knowledge of the deed of trust, the subsequent purchaser brings 
a quiet title action, alleging the lender’s first deed of trust was 
extinguished by the HOA’s foreclosure on its lien. 
This is the situation that confronted the Nevada Supreme 
Court in the 2014 case, SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. 
Bank.2 In a decision that “set off bank alarms,” the court held 
that according to the state’s lien priority statute, after the 
non-judicial foreclosure sale for $6000, the HOA lien, valued at 
$4542, took priority over and extinguished the lender’s $800,000 
first deed of trust.3
1 This note groups together all common interest communities (“CICs”), which 
include both planned housing communities with homeowners’ associations (“HOAs”) and 
condominium communities. While there are differences in general law between these two 
types of communities, there are no major general differences with respect to lien priority. 
Therefore, HOAs, condominium associations, and CICs will be used interchangeably 
throughout this Comment. 
2 See SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 409–10 (Nev. 2014). 
3 Mark Gardberg, HOAS vs. Banks vs. Homeowners: Nevada Shifts Ground on 
Superiority HOA Liens, NEV. LAW., June 2016, at 13, 14; see also Katie McConnell, The 
Super Priority of Homeowners’ Associations, NEV. LAW., June 2016, at 22, 23; HOA 
Foreclosures Leave Banks Empty-Handed, REALTOR MAG. (Oct. 15, 2014), 
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against delinquent members than other methods, such as 
pursuing a money judgment against the debtor.12
Nevertheless, this remedy’s potency and power is dependent 
on the laws governing lien priority in the home state of the 
foreclosing community association. In some jurisdictions, a 
lender’s lien has priority over an association’s lien.13 In such a 
jurisdiction, a lender’s foreclosure on the property first for less 
than the amount of its lien will leave no residual for the 
association to pursue.14 Similarly, a foreclosing association will 
have difficulty finding a buyer under such law because a 
purchaser would take the property with a large mortgage lien 
still attached.15 Under these circumstances, the HOA’s most 
reliable option for recovery of the delinquency is rendered 
impotent and inadequate.16 HOAs responded to these 
circumstances by joining and supporting interest groups, such as 
the Community Associations Institute (“CAI”), which lobbied in 
support of increased association lien priority under state law.17
These contrasting vignettes set the scene for the conflict: 
choosing which lien should have priority, the lien held by the 
association or the lien held by the lender. These tales of 
competing claims also raise a larger question of who should bear 
the cost of unpaid homeowner association dues when the 
delinquent owner is not a practical option. In response to 
pressure from both HOAs and lenders, states have attempted to 
find an acceptable solution to balance the competing interests 
and manage the conflict. These solutions have arguably 
sometimes fallen short in both fairness and practicality—metrics 
critical to this Comment’s evaluation of the lien priority debate. 
Nevada’s controversial statute and its judicial interpretation 
are the result of a nation-wide trend cultivated by the lobbying 
efforts of HOA interest groups to increase the priority of 
association liens in response to the financial crisis of 2008.18 That 
12 Id.
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See infra id.
15 See infra id. 
16 See infra id. 
17 See State Advocacy, CMTY. ASS’NS. INST., https://www.caionline.org/Advocacy/State 
Advocacy/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/8DZZ-KRGG] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
State governments are urged to consider and give favorable treatment to one or more of 
the uniform acts, such as the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”), which 
contains favorable provisions for community association lien priority. Id.
18 See Robert Aalberts, Super Liens Help Fix Homeowners Associations But Will 
They Survive Politically?, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 327, 327–29 (2015); see also Casey Perkins, 
Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosures Crisis on Homeowners’ 
Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 566–68, 580–81 (2010) (summarizing the recession caused 
by the 2008 foreclosure crisis). 
2018] Approaches to Homeowner Association Lien Priority 549 
trend is now being met with pushback from lenders across the 
United States.19 Experts claim that while common interest 
communities (“CICs”) have formidable allies in state legislatures, 
lending institutions and real estate brokers have just as much or 
more influence to counter this shift in transactional power.20 In 
Nevada, home of the SFR Investments decision and the epicenter 
of the debate, lenders and real estate brokers with “considerable 
resources and political experience” are currently building 
pressure for change.21
The law is far from uniform on how each state approaches 
the issue of HOA lien priority (in terms of both statute and case 
law), and states take different approaches when addressing the 
issue of what priority an HOA lien should take in relation to 
other instruments.22 For ease of analysis, this Comment has 
grouped the many variations in state law into three distinct 
categories based on the priority given to an association’s 
assessment lien. These three categories include: the first-in-time 
approach, the super lien priority approach, and the purchaser 
liability approach. 
This Comment examines how three different jurisdictions, 
each representing one of the approaches mentioned above, 
address the issue. It then discusses which approach, or 
combination thereof, most adequately and fairly balances the 
competing policy interests. In this evaluation, this Comment 
focuses its analysis on which methodology (1) better assists an 
HOA in collecting delinquent assessments without treating the 
lender’s interest unfairly, and (2) most adequately balances the 
competing public policy concerns. To better understand the 
different approaches each jurisdiction takes and frame the issue 
presented, we will first need an understanding of the general law 
that governs lien priority and the basic history of the 
development of super lien priority statutes. The next Part 
discusses that background and history. 
19 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 327–29.  
20 Id. (“But now super lien laws are under attack by more powerful forces than even 
homeowners associations might be able to withstand-lenders and real estate brokers.”). 
21 Id. However, HOA proponents dismiss this reaction as mere bluster since it would 
be impractical for lenders to stop doing business in all jurisdictions with super-lien 
priority statutes. Id.
22 See Christian J. Bromley, Encouraging Cooperation: Harmonizing the Battle of 
Association and Mortgage Lien Priority in America’s Common Interest Communities, 43
REAL EST. L.J. 255, 257–59, 276–85 (2014). Recovery by an association is dependent on 
lien priority law in the state which has jurisdiction over the property. Id. A survey of 
these jurisdictions has revealed “inconsistent approaches to determining an association’s 
priority, or lack thereof, against the liens of any mortgages.” Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
To understand the issue of which approach most fairly 
balances competing policy interests, one must understand the 
basic mechanics of lien priority law. In order to provide a 
framework for analysis, this Part provides a brief overview of the 
general law governing HOA lien priority. 
Covenants, which are created when an HOA is formed by 
recording a declaration of the community association’s 
conditions, covenants, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”), often require 
homeowners to join an association and pay dues.23 The governing 
documents of the association must provide for the collection of 
regular and special assessments from members to pay for 
community services and amenities, such as maintenance of 
common areas and facilities.24 The members’ obligation to pay 
assessments begins with the first conveyance of the subdivision, 
and this obligation is transferred to all subsequent purchasers of 
the property.25
Assessments accrued while a member owns the property are 
personal liabilities, which as a default rule, remain a personal 
liability to a debtor even after the property is transferred to 
another, whether voluntarily or involuntarily.26 However, a 
member is not liable for dues that accrue either before or after 
their ownership of the HOA property.27 Consequently, a 
purchaser at a foreclosure sale is usually not liable for a previous 
member’s delinquent dues, while that previous member remains 
personally responsible for the debt to the HOA.28
The power an association has to impose assessments on its 
members can lead to the ability of the HOA to create a lien on the 
property that runs with the land.29 Priority between an HOA lien 
and a lender’s mortgage or deed of trust is usually determined by 
first-in-time principles unless modified by statute or agreement.30
Generally, the HOA lien is perfected when the owner defaults on 
paying dues, and in some states like California, the recordation 
23 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 54.08 (Matthew Bender ed., 1995). 
24 Id. at 145–47. 
25 Tara C. Narayanan & Ella K. Gower, Common Interest Developments, in 8 MILLER 
& STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 28:93 (4th ed. 2017). 
26 Id. § 28:97. 
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE 117–19 
(3d ed. 2000). 
30 Karl E. Geier, Recording and Priorities, in 4 MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL 
ESTATE § 10.1 (4th ed. 2017). 
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of the delinquent assessment.31 Since the lien is usually not 
perfected until the assessment becomes delinquent, a properly 
recorded first mortgage or deed of trust will normally be first in 
time in relation to an HOA lien as it generally occurs at the 
purchase of the property.32
Chief Justice John Marshall in Rankin v. Scott described the 
temporal priority relationship of liens under the first-in-time 
principle in the following terms: 
The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior 
claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds, 
unless the lien be intrinsically defective, or be displaced by some act of 
the party holding it, which shall postpone him in a Court of law or 
equity to a subsequent claimant.33
Thus, the principle of first-in-time is universally recognized by 
every United States jurisdiction as a guiding principle for 
determining lien seniority that acts as a default rule absent 
modification by agreement or statute. 
As a general rule, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale takes 
title to property free of all liens that are junior to the lien under 
which the property is sold.34 However, a purchaser usually 
takes title subject to any liens that have seniority over the lien 
under which the property is sold.35 Priority establishing 
seniority of liens is often modified by state statute.36 In 
reference to the first-in-time principle discussed in Rankin
above, the Supreme Court noted the default nature of the 
principle by explaining, “[t]his principle is widely accepted and 
applied, in the absence of legislation to the contrary.”37 This 
modification by statute and judicial interpretation of such 
statute is what has precipitated the super lien priority statute 
controversy that Nevada faces today. 
A brief explanation of the developmental history of super lien 
statutes will help to better explain the nature of this controversy. 
This Part proceeds with such a summary explanation by starting 
with an analysis of an example of a common law first-in-time 
regime and moving forward in time to the creation of HOA true 
super lien priority regimes in certain jurisdictions. 
31 See NARAYANAN & GOWER, supra note 25, § 28:97; see also POWELL, supra note 
23, § 37.41. 
32 POWELL, supra note 23, § 37.41. 
33 Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827). 
34 Geier, supra note 30, § 10:1. 
35 Id.
36 See R. Wilson Fryermuth & Dale A. Whitman, Can Associations Have Priority 
Over Fannie or Freddie?, 29 PROB. & PROP., July/August 2015, at 27, 27–28. 
37 U.S. v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954) (emphasis added). 
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Currently, the laws of twenty-two states alter the general 
first-in-time rule of priority by giving HOA liens a “super 
priority” status.38 This priority status gives association liens 
superior priority to first mortgages and deeds of trust in some 
form or another, accomplishing those goals through differing 
mechanisms between jurisdictions.39 The degree of priority varies 
substantially, with some states adopting different generations of 
model and uniform laws (such as the Uniform Common Interest 
Ownership Act (“UCIOA”)) promulgated by organizations like the 
Uniform Law Commission.40
The law of community association lien priority has developed 
and diverged from the nearly universal common law principle of 
first-in-time through the adoption or rejection of different 
uniform laws by state legislatures. Over the past fifty years, 
state laws on CICs have developed from legislative incorporation 
of one of several (model or uniform) so-called “foundational” 
statutes that can be said to include: the 1958 Puerto Rican 
Horizontal Property Act or Horizontal Property Regime Act 
(“HPRA”), the 1962 Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA”) 
Model Statute for the Creation of Apartment Ownership, the 
1980 Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”), and both the 1982 
UCIOA and 1982 Uniform Planned Community Act (“UPCA”).41
Of the twenty-two states that have adopted super lien 
priority statutes, eight have adopted versions of the UCIOA,42
five the UCA,43 two the HPRA,44 and seven have “‘stand-alone’ 
statutes,” giving some type of priority to association liens.45 One 
38 Hugh Lewis, National Matrix of Association “Super-priority” Lien Legislation,
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1 (Oct. 14, 2016, 4:36 PM), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
jeburpa/CAIlienprioritymatrix2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/7R3B-SP43]. 
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1–3. 
41 Id.; Acts, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Acts.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/X9YH-UQ82] (last visited April 4, 2017). While a detailed analysis of the 
logistical workings of these uniform statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is 
sufficient to understand that the states’ incorporation of all or part of these varied 
foundational schemes is largely the basis for the wide variety of approaches taken by 
different jurisdictions in regard to association lien priority. For a detailed discussion of 
the history and the mechanics of these statutory schemes, see Andrea J. Boyack & 
William E. Foster, Muddying the Waterfall: How Ambiguous Liability Statutes Distort 
Creditor Priority in Condominium Foreclosures, 67 ARK. L. REV. 225, 244–45 (2014). 
42 Lewis, supra note 38, at 2. States that have adopted versions of the UCIOA with 
HOA lien priority include: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, 
Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
43 Id. UCA states with HOA lien priority include: Alabama, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, and Washington. Other states adopting portions of the UCA without 
the priority provision are omitted from this list. Id.
44 Id. at 2 n.3. HPRA states with HOA lien priority include: Hawaii and 
Massachusetts. Id.
45 Id. “Stand-alone” jurisdictions with HOA lien priority include: District of 
Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon. Id. 
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state has also adopted the UPCA that similarly includes a super 
lien priority statute.46 Certain states that adopted an increased 
HOA lien priority under these uniform laws came to question the 
priority’s sufficiency during the foreclosure crisis of 2008.47
During the foreclosure crisis, homeowners were defaulting 
on both their HOA assessments and mortgages.48 This “snowball 
effect” began when the housing market dropped and subprime 
loans ballooned causing homeowners, many of whom were 
speculating, to walk away from their underwater homes that 
were worth a fraction of what was owed on the mortgages.49
When these homeowners stopped paying their mortgages, many 
also stopped paying their assessment dues causing the 
associations’ reserve funds to run dry.50 The unmitigated volume 
of owners delinquent in paying their assessments—that in some 
cases were ten times higher than before the recession—was 
causing associations to become insolvent and incapable of 
providing the services they were obligated to perform.51 In 
response, HOAs in many states were able to successfully lobby 
their state legislatures and courts through association interest 
groups to increase their liens’ priority.52
One such HOA lobbying organization, CAI, seeks to 
influence state legislatures and courts to increase priority of 
HOA liens “equal to the amount of the assessments that are due 
over the term of the lien of a mortgage or first deed of trust.”53
The CAI and other similar organizations were able to convince 
legislators and courts to increase association lien priority above 
what was afforded under previous common law and statute, 
46 Id. In addition to the UCA, Pennsylvania is the only state thus far to adopt the 
UPCA that also provides for increased HOA lien priority. Id.
47 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 327–28. 
48 Kylee Gloeckner, Note, Nevada’s Foreclosure Epidemic: Homeowner Associations’ 
Super-Priority Liens Not So “Super” for Some, 15 NEV. L.J. 326, 326–27 (2014). 
49 Dennis Wagner, Skipped dues crunch home associations, USA TODAY (May 
26, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/2008-05-26-condo-fees_N.htm 
[http://perma.cc/C3RL-BUY6]. 
50 Id.
51 See Andrea J. Boyack, Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 53, 58–61 (2011) (stating that on a national level at the time the article 
was written, mortgage delinquency rates were between ten percent and thirteen percent; 
and explaining that “this precipitous rise in mortgage delinquency corresponds with an 
even steeper increase in association assessment delinquency ‘which will continue until 
solvent owners replace delinquent owners’”). 
52 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 327 (“[T]he managers of the CIC’s, are often able to 
harness significant political allies during times of need. This occurred during the depths 
of the Great Recession of 2007-2010 when HOA’s successfully lobbied state legislatures in 
22 states and the District of Colombia to pass super lien laws.”). 
53 See Lien Priority for Community Association Assessments, COMMUNITY ASS’NS
INST., https://www.caionline.org/Advocacy/PublicPolicies/Pages/Lien-Priority-for-Community- 
Association-Assessments.aspx [http://perma.cc/WRE8-YCVN] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
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including subordinating the senior liens of other lienholders such 
as lenders.54 As the real estate market gradually recovered, 
lenders in states that adopted super priority statutes began to 
respond by putting pressure on state legislatures and courts to 
rebalance lien priority.55 In a typical association response to this 
lender pressure, CAI has called upon its “State Legislative Action 
Committees” to combat the lender attacks on association’s 
increased lien priorities.56
This battle has generated a pro-HOA legislative position and 
a pro-lender legislative position, each seeking to advance 
particular interests rather than accomplishing a true balance of 
the competing interests. This Comment seeks to evaluate 
existing models to craft a framework from which a blueprint for a 
better balanced approach might be created. 
To facilitate analysis of the issue, this Comment has 
categorized the various statutory schemes into three basic 
approaches in regards to HOA lien priority.57 First, most states 
still follow a first-in-time approach and have not adopted super 
lien statutes.58 Second, there are states that have adopted super 
lien statutes where an HOA foreclosure extinguishes a lien made 
junior by the super priority status.59 Finally, some states have 
adopted super lien statutes, but first mortgages and deeds of 
trust are not extinguished.60 The next Part takes each in turn, 
analyzing one jurisdiction representing each approach. 
II. THE THREE APPROACHES TO HOA LIEN PRIORITY
This Comment’s comparative analysis will begin by 
examining how different jurisdictions have attempted to strike a 
balance between community association and lender interests. 
54 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 327–29 (“In response to these factors, some states’ 
lawmakers sought to help HOA’s by passing super lien laws.”). 
55 Id. at 328–29. 
56 See State Advocacy, supra note 17. 
57 See Lewis supra note 38, at 1–2. The legislatures of twenty-two states have 
adopted lien priority statutes that give priority to community association liens making 
these liens superior to other liens, including mortgages, to some degree. The remainder of 
the states, which are still the majority, follow a first-in-time approach to determine 
association lien priority. Florida has adopted a novel approach that deserves further 
study, and so will be included in the analysis of this Comment. Id.
58 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 244–45. Boyack and Foster explain that 
most states provide that “a first-mortgage lien on a unit is completely superior in priority 
to association liens.” Id. 
59 See SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 419 (Nev. 2014). 
60 See Christian J. Bromley, Supremacy and Superiority: The Constitution’s Effect on 
State Lien Priority Statutes, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 442, 453–55 (2016). Unlike the Nevada 
regime, the Florida HOA priority does not threaten the mortgagee’s lien with 
extinguishment and instead “the priority functions as a liability on purchasers, not as a 
lien competing with mortgages.” Id.
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California will be examined first as a prototypical first-in-time 
jurisdiction. Next, Nevada’s super lien statute will be analyzed as 
a representation of a jurisdiction where HOA foreclosure 
extinguishes a first deed of trust. Finally, this Comment will 
examine Florida’s regime shifting liability for delinquent dues to 
purchasers as an alternative to both the first-in-time and super 
lien priority approaches.
A. First-in-Time Approach to HOA Lien Priority 
The original type of regime governing lien priority—first-in-
time—will act as our control for evaluating shifts in lien priority. 
Only after understanding this common law priority system will 
one understand how and why super lien statutes have shifted the 
balance in favor of HOAs. Under the common law, the priority of 
liens was determined by a “first in time, first in right principle.”61
Today, all United States jurisdictions still follow this rule as a 
general default, but application of the principle is often modified 
by a state’s recording statute and sometimes a specific law 
granting priority to certain types of interests.62 While recording 
can affect the priority of a mortgage or HOA lien, this Comment 
focuses on when the general principal of first-in-time, assuming 
proper recording, is still further modified by statute.63
Under a first-in-time regime, a first mortgage or deed of 
trust usually remains superior to an HOA lien.64 The reason a 
first deed of trust is commonly senior to an association’s lien is 
that such instruments are generally prioritized in the order in 
which they are perfected.65 Since mortgage loans are usually 
executed prior to an HOA delinquency being assessed, a 
mortgage lien in a first-in-time jurisdiction will normally be 
prior, and thus superior, to an association lien.66 This temporal 
principle governs unless there is a statutory exception.67
61 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 516 (Aspen Law & 
Business 2001); see also ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
234–38 (1989). 
62 SINGER, supra note 61, at 516–20 (“Recording acts focus on protecting buyers who 
record first and/or purchase without notice of prior recorded claims. The major types of 
recording acts are: (1) race, (2) notice, and (3) race-notice. About half the states have 
notice statutes, and about half the states have race-notice statutes.”). 
63 Geier, supra note 30, § 10:1 (“Priority may depend upon which instrument was 
created executed or recorded first, or it may be affected by other factors, such 
as . . . specific legal priority accorded to particular interests by law[.]”) This Comment 
focuses on specific legal priority accorded to the particular interest of an HOA lien in 
relation to a first deed of trust. 
64 NATELSON, supra note 61, at 239. 
65 See Boyack, supra note 51, at 93; see also Geier, supra note 30, § 10:1. 
66 Geier, supra note 30, § 10:1.
67 Id.
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Such exceptions are provided for under state law and usually 
consist of notice under a recording act, agreement of the parties, 
“the doctrine of equitable subrogation, or specific legal priority 
accorded to particular interests by law, such as tax liens or other 
governmental lien interests.”68 HOA super lien priority statutes 
fall within the last category. However, unless state law provides 
a shift in priority, the general principal of first-in-time continues 
to govern.69 First-in-time jurisdictions do not have statutes that 
specifically modify association lien priority, and therefore do not 
create an HOA exception to the general rule.70 Most of the 
jurisdictions in the United States use this type of unmodified 
first-in-time approach in regards to HOA lien priority.71
In most cases, the first-in-time principle is applied in two 
different ways. Some first-in-time states, including California, 
have a notice requirement that provides an association must file 
a notice of delinquency on assessment dues before an HOA lien is 
perfected.72 Other states hold that lien perfection relates back to 
the time the community is formed.73 The relating back of a lien to 
community formation would normally make it prior in time to a 
first mortgage or deed of trust.74
However, the superior priority of a first mortgage or deed of 
trust is usually expressly stated in a relating back jurisdiction’s 
statute.75 When a statute does not give direction on the issue, 
courts in relating back jurisdictions have uniformly held first 
mortgages and deeds of trusts to be superior to HOA liens in 
order to support the opportunity for borrowers to obtain credit.76
68 Geier, supra note 30, § 10:1; see also Boyack, supra note 51, at 93. 
69 Boyack, supra note 51, at 94 (“In the absence of a statutory directive to the 
contrary, assessment liens follow the general first-in-time priority rule, and because 
mortgage loans are typically funded prior to assessment delinquencies, such first 
mortgage liens are senior to assessment liens.”). 
70 Id.
71 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 244–45; see also NATELSON, supra note 61, 
at 239. 
72 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 245 (“Some states require an association to 
file a notice of delinquent assessmentwhich occurs after one perfects the first-mortgage 
lienas a prerequisite step to perfecting an association lien.”) (footnote omitted). 
73 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 245 n.120. For example, Colorado’s law 
grants “granting priority over an association lien to ‘[a] security interest on the unit which 
has priority over all other security interests on the unit and which was recorded before 
the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent.’” Id. (quoting 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-33.3-316 (West 2014)). 
74 Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 245. Boyack notes that in these jurisdictions 
“an association’s lien perfects at the time of the CIC’s formation; thus, recording the CIC 
declaration is the act of perfection.” Id. 
75 Id. (“Such states’ statutes specifically provide that first-mortgage liens on 
individual units in a common-interest community take priority over the association lien, 
even though the association lien relates back to the date of the CIC declaration.”). 
76 Id. (“[I]n the few states where statutes are less clear or do not address this 
point at all, courts have uniformly acknowledged the superior priority of first 
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Although there are two types of first-in-time approaches, the 
remainder of this Comment will use California as an exemplar 
sufficient to understand the larger first-in-time grouping of 
states for comparative purposes with those that deviate from a 
first-in-time standard. 
California’s statute follows the first-in-time principle stating 
that an association’s lien “shall be prior to all other liens 
recorded subsequent to the notice of delinquent assessment[.]”77
Such association liens may be secured and foreclosed upon if the 
assessments are not paid, but only after giving the required 
period of notice and subsequent recordation of the delinquent 
assessment.78 Once the assessment has been recorded, the lien is 
imposed on the property and has priority from and after that 
date as against other interests in the property, such as a deed of 
trust.79 Even when the association’s recorded declaration 
provides for a present lien relating back to the beginning of the 
community, the lien is only imposed upon the recordation of the 
delinquent assessment.80
Under California law, the first-in-time principle puts 
associations at a disadvantage in their ability to collect 
delinquent member dues. Upon foreclosure of the lien by the 
association, deeds of trust that were recorded prior to the 
recording of the delinquent assessment “remain unaffected with 
their priority intact.”81 Conversely, when a first deed of trust is 
foreclosed on, it extinguishes all other junior liens which will 
usually include the association’s assessment lien.82 The buyer of 
the property at a mortgage foreclosure sale is not personally 
liable for any delinquent dues owed to the association by the 
homeowner.83 Instead, the former homeowner remains personally 
liable for his unpaid assessments, but this debt is unsecured.84
This structure creates problems regarding an association’s ability 
to collect, because often a foreclosure sale on the first mortgage 
will leave no residual to satisfy the association’s lien which is 
extinguished by the sale.85
mortgagees—consistent with the desire to promote the availability of mortgage 
capital.”) (footnote omitted). 
77 CAL. CIV. CODE § 5680 (West 2014). 
78 CAL. CIV. CODE § 5675 (West 2014). 
79 Narayanan & Gower, supra note 25, § 28:97. 
80 Thaler v. Household Fin. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 783–85 (Ct. App. 2000). 
81 Narayanan & Gower, supra note 25, § 28:96. 
82 Id. § 10:1. 
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1466 (West 2017). 
84 Id.
85 HYATT, supra note 29, at 121. 
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The dilemma an association faces in a first-in-time regime is 
illustrated by the result in Thaler v. Household Finance Corp.
Thaler was a purchaser of a condo at a foreclosure sale pursuant 
to an HOA lien.86 A second deed of trust had been recorded prior 
to the association’s lien under which the property was 
foreclosed.87 Thaler claimed that his interest was not subject to 
the second deed of trust even when the association lien was 
recorded after the deed of trust because the condominium’s 
declaration of CC&Rs provided for a “present lien” (at formation 
of the community) with a power of sale to secure assessments.88
While the CC&Rs provided the association lien would be 
subordinate to a first mortgage or deed of trust, they were silent 
on the HOA lien’s priority in relation to other instruments, 
including a second deed of trust.89
The court in Thaler held that, despite the CC&Rs, the second 
mortgage had priority over the assessment lien which was 
recorded after the mortgage when the homeowner defaulted on 
monthly assessments.90 The court reasoned that though the 
CC&Rs purported to create a present lien for the collection of 
assessments, the clear language of the relevant statute provided 
for a “first in time, first in right” lien priority system.91 The 
assessment lien was not perfected until the delinquent 
assessment was recorded.92 Therefore, because the second deed of 
trust was recorded prior to the delinquent assessment, it took 
priority over the assessment lien.93 As a matter of law, Thaler 
bought the property at the association’s foreclosure sale subject 
to the second deed of trust.94
As demonstrated in Thaler, a mortgage often takes priority 
over an association lien under California law because the 
association lien is not perfected until a member defaults on 
association dues and the delinquent assessment is recorded. 
Because a mortgage lien is typically placed on a property at the 
86 Thaler v. Household Finance Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 780–81 (Ct. App. 2000). 
87 Id.
88 Id. (“Thaler seems to argue that, as a result, the lien for the enforcement of the 
Homeowners’ assessment either sprang from the lien created by the CC & R’s (rather 
than the Assessment Lien), or the Assessment Lien related back to (and derived priority 
from) the CC & R’s. Thaler thus claims that [the second mortgagee] took its interest 
subject to, and therefore subordinate to, the lien by which Thaler ultimately purchased 
the property.”) Id. 
89 Id. at 781–82. 
90 Id. at 780–81. 
91 Id. at 783 (“Such lien shall be prior to all other liens recorded subsequent to the 
recordation of said notice of assessment.”) (emphasis removed). 
92 Id. at 783–85. 
93 Id.
94 Id. at 784–85. 
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time of purchase, this will usually be before that purchaser stops 
paying their HOA dues. This puts associations at a temporal 
disadvantage in relation to first mortgages that translates into a 
disadvantage in priority due to the first-in-time principle. 
In order to illustrate how the rules of a first-in-time regime 
determine the possible outcomes for each party, this Part will use 
two hypothetical situations. The first hypothetical will show 
what happens when a lender forecloses on the first mortgage lien 
or deed of trust. The second will reverse the situation with the 
association initiating foreclosure. We will return to these 
hypotheticals in Sections II(B) and II(C) to illustrate how each 
regime shapes the rational decisions of the parties and the logical 
outcome of those decisions. 
Assume the property in question is located in an HOA 
neighborhood and was purchased just prior to the 2008 recession 
through a first deed of trust with the lender in the amount of 
$885,000. During the recession, the homeowner becomes 
unemployed and is unable to keep up with both the mortgage 
payments and association assessments. The homeowner owes 
$4500 in association dues. The balance on the mortgage is 
$800,000, but the fair market value of the property has 
plummeted to $400,000. The homeowner makes a decision to 
walk away from the underwater property and pay neither the 
mortgage nor the association assessments. 
In our first scenario, the lender chooses to institute 
foreclosure proceedings before the association. The lender’s first 
deed of trust has seniority over the association lien since the 
HOA lien is not perfected until the delinquency is recorded. This 
makes the first deed of trust prior in time and superior to the 
association lien. The lender is unable to find a buyer to pay more 
than market value, and the price at the foreclosure sale is 
$400,000. The lender’s senior lien is satisfied from the proceeds 
first, and there is nothing left for the association whose junior 
lien is extinguished during the sale. 
Assume for the second hypothetical that instead of promptly 
initiating foreclosure, the lender delays initiation in order to see 
if the market makes a recovery and to avoid paying HOA dues if 
it decides to purchase the property. During this period of delay, 
no one is paying association dues on the property. The 
association waits for the lender to act for months, but finally 
decides they can wait no more. The association initiates 
foreclosure before the lender. Because the lender’s lien is senior 
to the association’s, the buyer at the foreclosure sale must take 
title subject to the lender’s $800,000 mortgage lien on the 
property. This makes it extremely difficult to find a buyer when 
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the market value of the property is worth half of the mortgage 
lien on the property. Unable to find a buyer, the association is 
forced to internalize the debt and passes the cost along to its 
remaining members with higher dues and special assessments. 
Between an association and a lender, the first-in-time 
approach appears to heavily favor the lender’s interests. As long 
as the loan is made prior to a homeowner ceasing to pay 
association assessments, a lender’s lien will usually be senior to 
an HOA lien.95 This seniority provides a lender with security in 
its interest. When a lender forecloses, its lien will be satisfied by 
the proceeds first, and the association will only be paid if there is 
a surplus. Furthermore, the lender need not fear that an HOA 
foreclosure will extinguish its interest because a lender’s senior 
lien will survive an association’s foreclosure.96
In contrast, the first-in-time approach puts community 
associations at a significant disadvantage. When a homeowner is 
in substantial debt for delinquent assessments, foreclosure is the 
more secure of the methods of recovery for an HOA.97 However, 
since both associations and lender-mortgagees hold liens on 
specific properties, these two groups are inherently in 
competition with one another when the sale proceeds cannot 
satisfy payment on both obligations.98 Under the California first-
in-time approach, a lender’s first deed of trust will almost always 
have priority over an association’s lien because the statute bases 
the priority assessment of the HOA’s lien off of the time the 
delinquent assessment is recorded.99
A California-type regime will continue to have the same 
kinds of problems identified during the Great Recession that 
motivated adoption of HOA super lien priority statutes. 
Associations under these first-in-time statutes will continue to 
struggle to collect deficient assessments during dips in the real 
estate market when association liens are extinguished by lender 
foreclosure with few viable alternative remedies for collection 
available.100 The issue of collection is compounded when lenders 
95 CAL. CIV. CODE § 5680 (West 2014). 
96 Thaler, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780–81. While a lender may not need to fear 
extinguishment of their lien under these circumstances, they do have a concern that 
association foreclosure will affect the market value of the property. This may have an 
adverse effect on their ability to maximize their return upon a foreclosure sale on the 
mortgage lien. See Courtney Newsom, Note, No Free Ride: An Equitable Remedy to 
Protect Homeowners’ Associations from Delayed Foreclosures, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 361, 
363–64 (2012). 
97 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 257. 
98 Id.
99 CAL. CIV. CODE § 5680 (West 2014). 
100 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 258; see also Boyack, supra note 51, at 78. 
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become reluctant to expedite foreclosure for financial reasons.101
Without foreclosure sales being completed, new owners who 
could pay dues and provide income to the association are not 
taking title to the zombie property.102
Lenders operating inside the rules of a first-in-time 
jurisdiction have little motivation to expedite foreclosure 
proceedings103 because lenders’ liens have almost guaranteed 
priority under this approach.104 A lender’s senior interest is not 
substantially threatened—such as when the interest could be 
extinguished—by HOA foreclosure, so a lender is not under 
sufficient pressure from the association to quickly foreclose on a 
property.105 Furthermore, a lender has little internal incentive to 
foreclose quickly in a declining real estate market. Under such 
conditions, the market value of the property is likely to be much 
less than the value of the mortgage loan.106 To maximize the 
return on their lien, lenders often prefer to wait and see if the 
market makes a recovery before foreclosing on a property.107 In 
addition, if the lender plans to be the purchaser at the 
foreclosure sale, taking title to the property would lead to the 
lender having to pay regular HOA assessments.108 Most lenders 
would prefer to avoid this additional cost if they are able, and a 
101 Newsom, supra note 96, at 367. Newsom explains that “[b]anks are able to take a 
free ride—and cause additional hardship for homeowners in an HOA—because of the 
combination of laws governing California HOAs and lien prioritization.” Id. The “free 
ride” she refers to is the ability of a lender to delay foreclosure in hopes the housing 
market will recover, allow maximization of the return on their lien during foreclosure, 
and avoid paying the additional cost of association dues.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 361 (“[A] bank will often delay foreclosure, sometimes months or even years, 
when the property is part of a homeowner’s association since the association must 
continue to insure and maintain the property regardless of whether the bank or the 
homeowner makes any contribution to the association.”). 
104 Id. at 37378. Newsom explains that in California, a lien is not perfected until 
recorded after meeting the notice requirements of the statute. This will almost always 
make an association lien subsequent and junior to a first mortgage since the first 
mortgage is perfected at the purchase of the property. Id. 
105 Id. at 378 (“Without laws to the contrary, the lender is free to take advantage of 
the HOA because there is no incentive for the bank to foreclose or pay its fair share of 
HOA expenses.”) (footnote omitted). 
106 Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, Distribution of JEB Report 
on Common Interest Assessment Lien Priority, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/jeburpa/2013aug22_JEBURPA_UCIOA%20Lien
%20Priority_Request%20for%20Comments.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3LB-5FB5] [hereinafter 
JEB Report].
107 See Newsom, supra note 96, at 377 (“Delaying foreclosures allows lenders to 
control the number of homes on the market and potentially prevent continued drops in 
value marketwide, keep the loan on the performing side of the balance sheet, and avoid 
ownership costs.”) (footnotes omitted).
108 Id.
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first-in-time regime offers lenders such an opportunity by 
allowing them to simply forestall foreclosure on their lien.109
During economic recessions, ineffective collection methods 
and lack of paying members lead to HOAs not being able to fulfill 
their core functions of neighborhood maintenance.110 The lack of 
neighborhood care and upkeep then contributes to the continued 
drop in the market value of member properties.111 If HOAs are 
unable to collect dues by foreclosure or other means of collection, 
they are often forced to increase their dues to other members in 
order to continue operating.112 As noted in the Miller and Starr 
treatise, “[t]here is a strong public policy in favor of the levying 
and enforcement of assessments in a common interest 
development as an economic necessity for the proper functioning 
of the development.”113 This public policy interest is so strong 
that the California legislature granted regular assessments of 
housing associations an exemption from the claims of creditors to 
the extent necessary for the association to perform its obligation 
to provide essential services.114
However, as illustrated by the above discussion, the 
California legislature seems to have overlooked the obstacles 
associations must contend with when collecting assessments if 
their liens must compete with other senior liens such as a first 
deed of trust. Exemption from creditor claims for assessments is 
not a significant advantage when the association cannot collect 
sufficient assessments. 
The difficulties associations face in the collection of 
assessments under the constraints of a first-in-time regime are 
the catalyst of UCIOA-type super lien priority statutes, which 
endeavor to resolve the problem. The next Section will discuss 
Nevada’s attempt to address this issue by its super lien priority 
statute and judicial interpretation that an HOA lien has true 
priority over a first mortgage. 
109 Id.
110 JEB Report, supra note 106. The report explains that during delays in foreclosure, 
“neither the defaulting unit owners nor the first mortgagee typically pay the assessments 
on the unit” because under a first-in-time regime, “the mortgagee does not become legally 
liable to pay assessments on the unit unless and until the mortgagee acquires title to the 
unit via a foreclosure sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure.” Id. at 2. 
111 See Collins, supra note 4. 
112 Newsom, supra note 96, at 361. An HOA in a first-in-time jurisdiction often has 
little recourse other than to increase dues of paying members because “[t]he bank is able 
to shed its financial obligation at the expense of the property’s innocent neighbors.” Id.
113 Narayanan & Gower, supra note 25, § 28:93 (footnote omitted). 
114 Id. (“Regular assessments imposed on or collected from unit owners are exempt 
from execution by the association’s judgment creditors to the extent necessary for the 
association to perform its obligations under the governing documents as required by 
law.”). 
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B. True Priority Super Lien Priority Statutes 
In order to address the issues encountered by HOAs in 
collecting delinquent dues in a first-in-time jurisdiction, a 
minority of states, including Nevada, have taken the position 
that an HOA foreclosure on its lien extinguishes the interests of 
“all other liens and encumbrances,” including a first mortgage or 
deed of trust.115 As previously mentioned, the laws of twenty-two 
states alter the general first-in-time rule of priority by giving 
HOA liens a “super priority” status.116 The specific priority differs 
by state, with legislatures having adopted different generations 
of uniform codes and model statutes.117 While several jurisdictions 
have held that a first deed of trust may be extinguished under its 
super lien priority statute,118 this Comment uses only Nevada’s 
statute and case law as its focal point of discussion and as an 
example to understand generally the direction chosen by states 
that fit into the super lien category.119
To understand the nature of the issues, it is helpful to begin 
with a brief summary of the history of Nevada’s super lien 
statute. Super lien priority statutes arose in response to the issue 
of HOA inability to collect delinquent assessments under a 
traditional first-in-time type regime.120 The Uniform Law 
Commission promulgated uniform model community association 
115 NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3116(2) (West 2015). 
116 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 1 (“The laws of twenty-two (22) jurisdictions contain 
provisions that afford a so-called ‘super-priority’ to the liens available to condominium 
associations and/or community associations, making such liens superior to the liens of 
mortgage loans and other types of liens, to some varying extent.”). 
117 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 244–45. Boyack and Foster explain that 
“[t]hese acts vary widely in how they address buyers’ liability and association-lien 
priority” and “[t]he statutory divide among states is traceable largely to the historical 
development of their condominium regimes.” Id. at 246. This historical development is 
mainly from “four foundational condominium-ownership statutes: (a) the Puerto Rican 
Horizontal Property Act; (b) the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Model Statute 
for the Creation of Apartment Ownership; (c) the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA); and 
(d) the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).” Id. at 246–47. 
118 See Chase Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 98 A.3d 166, 178 
(D.C. 2014); see also Summerhill Village Homeowners Ass’n v. Roughley, 289 P.3d 645, 
646 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
119 HOA Foreclosures Leave Banks Empty Handed, supra note 3. Nevada’s statute 
and case law are both at the forefront of the debate and may have “implications 
nationwide.” Id.
120 Vaughn, supra note 3, at 10. Vaughn explains: 
In response to an increase in HOAs, and a desire to help HOAs collect debt 
more efficiently, the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) developed the 
Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”) . . . . Under the UCA, HOAs were 
granted some measure of lien priority against mortgages. . . . Subsequent 
acts, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”) and the 
Uniform Planned Community Act (“UPCA”), were passed in 1982 and all 
contained language granting HOAs super-priority status. 
Id.
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statutes such as the UCA, the UCIOA, and the UPCA, all of 
which included an HOA lien priority (for six months of 
delinquent assessments) over a first mortgage or deed of trust.121
The original comments to the UCIOA stated the purpose of the 
HOA super lien priority as follows: 
[T]he six months’ priority for the assessment lien strikes an equitable 
balance between the need to enforce collection of unpaid assessments 
and the obvious necessity for protecting the priority of the security 
interests of lenders. As a practical matter, secured lenders will most 
likely pay the six months’ assessments demanded by the association 
rather than having the association foreclose on the unit.122
The comments underscore the Uniform Law Commission’s 
intent that the burden of paying for a delinquent homeowner’s 
assessment be shifted to the lender who has substantially more 
assets, and therefore, may bear the burden more easily than an 
HOA.123 However, most courts have interpreted the original 
language of UCIOA section 3-116 to suggest that an HOA lien 
should not have a true lien priority (which would extinguish a 
first mortgage), but rather a “limited priority lien” affording only 
a payment priority.124 Such a scheme provides the priority 
position of the HOA lien is split with six months of unpaid 
assessments taking priority over a first mortgage, and the 
remaining assessment deficit staying subordinate to the first 
mortgage.125 This “six-month capped ‘super priority’ portion” of 
an HOA lien is not accorded true priority in the original UCIOA 
because this portion cannot be foreclosed on by the association as 
senior to a first mortgage or deed of trust.126 Instead, such a 
limited priority lien offers priority in payment upon foreclosure 
by the lender.127
In 1991, the Nevada state legislature adopted a modified 
version of the UCIOA.128 The Nevada Uniform Common Interest 
121 See id.
122 UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 cmt. 2 (2008) (amended 
2014) (note that this language has since been removed) [hereinafter UCIOA § 3-116]. 
123 See Vaughn, supra note 3, at 1011. (“The Comments essentially suggests [sic] 
that because mortgage lenders have more money than HOAs, they should be responsible 
for the delinquent dues that stem from a common debtor.”). 
124 See Boyack, supra note 51, at 9899. Boyack explains the position of most states 
with super lien priority statutes is “[t]he six-month capped ‘super priority’ portion of the 
association lien does not have a true priority status under UCIOA since this six-month 
assessment lien cannot be foreclosed as senior to a mortgage lien.” Id. 
125 Id. at 99 n.216.  
126 Id. at 99. 
127 Id. (“Rather, it either creates a payment priority for some portion of unpaid 
assessments, which would take the first position in the foreclosure repayment ‘waterfall,’ 
or grants durability to some portion of unpaid assessments, allowing the security for such 
debt to survive foreclosure.”) (footnotes omitted). 
128 Gloeckner, supra note 48, at 329. 
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Ownership Act was enacted as NRS Chapter 116, and it included 
an HOA super lien priority statute.129 In Nevada, NRS section 
116.3116 governs HOA liens and is substantially similar to 
section 3-116 of the UCIOA.130 The relevant parts of NRS section 
116.3116 state the following: 
A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances 
on a unit except: . . . (b) A first security interest on the unit recorded 
before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became 
delinquent or, in a cooperative, the first security interest encumbering 
only the unit’s owner’s interest and perfected before the date on which 
the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent, except that 
a lien under this section is prior to a security interest described in this 
paragraph to the extent set forth in subsection 3.131
This section of the statute provides that an association lien is 
superior to all other liens on a property with the exception of a 
first mortgage or deed of trust recorded prior to the recordation of 
the delinquent assessment. The priority provided to the HOA lien 
up to this point in the statute is the same as in a common law 
first-in-time jurisdiction. However, the following section alters 
the priority of the association lien: 
A lien under this section is prior to all security interests described in 
paragraph (b) of subsection 2 to the extent of: (a) Any charges incurred 
by the association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312; (b) The 
unpaid amount of assessments, not to exceed an amount equal to 
assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget 
adopted by the association pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which would 
have become due in the absence of acceleration during the 9 months 
immediately preceding the date on which the notice of default and 
election to sell is recorded.132
According to the plain language of the statute, as drafted by 
the Nevada legislature, this section provides that nine months of 
the HOA lien’s assessments will take priority over a first 
mortgage or deed of trust.133 In the event of a foreclosure sale by 
the lender, the amount for nine month’s assessments will be 
considered senior to a first deed of trust, and the association may 
collect this amount from the proceeds of the sale before the 
lender receives their portion.134 However, there remained an 
129 Id. (“The section of the statute relevant to the HOA foreclosure issue is NRS 
116.3116, which is almost identical to section 3-116 of the UCIOA; this section governs 
liens against units for assessments.”). 
130 Id.
131 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2) (West 2015). 
132 Id. § 116.3116(3). 
133 Gloeckner, supra note 48, at 330 (“Thus, a portion of the HOA’s lien—limited to 
nine months of unpaid assessments preceding the lien—is given priority over the bank’s 
first mortgage, creating a ‘super-priority’ status.’”). 
134 Id. (“In this case, the HOA’s lien is considered ‘senior’ to the bank’s first deed of 
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To illustrate how a Nevada type regime works in contrast to 
a first-in-time jurisdiction, let us return to the hypothetical found 
in Section II(A) and apply the Nevada rules to the situation. 
Recall that the property in question is located in an HOA 
neighborhood and was purchased just before the Great Recession 
through a first deed of trust for $885,000. The homeowner is 
unable to keep up with both the mortgage payments and 
association assessments, which accrue to $4500. The balance on 
the mortgage is $800,000, but the fair market value of the 
property has plummeted to $400,000. The homeowner makes a 
decision to walk away from the underwater property and pay 
neither the mortgage nor the association assessments. 
Assume for our first scenario that the lender initiates 
foreclosure first. The association’s super priority amount for nine 
months of assessments is afforded super priority status under 
the statute. Assume that assessments for nine months in the 
community equal $1800, which is the super priority amount 
under the statute. The lender sells the property for $400,000, and 
the senior super priority amount of $1800 must be paid before 
the first mortgage is satisfied. The HOA receives $1800 from the 
proceeds while the lender gets $398,200 from the foreclosure sale.  
For the second scenario, assume that the lender decides not 
to foreclose in hopes of market recovery and to avoid paying HOA 
dues if it decides to purchase the property. During this period of 
delay, no one is paying association dues on the property. 
However, unlike in a first-in-time jurisdiction, the association 
has an ace up their sleeve under a Nevada type regime. The 
association can initiate foreclosure under their lien and the super 
priority amount of the lien is made senior to the first mortgage 
by statute. Because this portion is senior and given true lien 
priority, a foreclosure upon this senior portion of the lien will 
extinguish the first mortgage. As required by statute, the 
association provides notice to the lender of the impending 
foreclosure. The lender is allowed to pay off the $1800 super 
priority amount and save its interest on the property from 
extinguishment. But if the lender does not pay this amount 
before the association forecloses, the lender’s lien for $800,000 
will be extinguished. Furthermore, because the amount of the 
assessments is only $4500 and the $800,000 mortgage is 
extinguished, it is very likely that the association will find a 
buyer. Since the association can only satisfy $4500 worth of dues, 
it is likely the association would sell the property for an amount 
around $5000. It would then send a check for the surplus of the 
proceeds to the lender for $500. 
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Essentially, the court took what was supposed to be a limited 
payment priority under the UCIOA and instead held that it was 
a true lien priority capable of extinguishing other junior interests 
in the property.145 Under the original UCIOA as adopted by 
Nevada, the association’s lien was given limited protection 
during a lender’s foreclosure sale by allowing the HOA to collect 
six months’ worth of assessments from the proceeds before the 
lender could satisfy its own lien. But the limited priority given to 
association liens upon lender foreclosure did not solve the 
problem of lender delay in initiating foreclosure found in 
first-in-time jurisdictions. Lender delay continued to be a 
problem because the lender did not have adequate motivation to 
foreclose. A lender’s lien retained true priority over an HOA lien 
and certainly was not in danger of being extinguished. 
The Nevada Supreme Court tackled this issue with the 
nuclear solution of giving the super priority piece of the 
association lien true priority over other liens made junior by the 
statutory priority.146 Because the super priority piece of nine 
months of assessments held true priority over a first mortgage, 
an association can now foreclose on the super priority piece and 
extinguish a first mortgage. Under such a scheme, lenders must 
act to either initiate foreclosure or pay off the association lien if 
they wish to preserve their substantial interest in the property. 
The result of this interpretation of Nevada’s super lien 
priority statute is that it essentially takes away the lender’s 
advantage afforded in a first-in-time jurisdiction and gives it to 
the HOA.147 Under the Nevada-style regime, associations are 
almost guaranteed to be able to collect their unpaid dues.148 This 
can be done either: (1) from the proceeds of a foreclosure action 
by the lender since the HOA lien is senior to a mortgagee’s, 
(2) direct foreclosure by the HOA on its lien because it has 
priority, or (3) a buyout of the association lien by the lender who 
is forced to pay the assessment to avoid extinguishment of the 
mortgage lien by an HOA initiated foreclosure. 
While this scheme essentially solves association problems 
found in a first-in-time jurisdiction, the result appears to be 
significantly unfair to the lender whose substantial interest in 
145 SFR Invs., 334 P.3d at 409. 
146 Id.
147 See Bromley, supra note 60, at 453. 
148 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 328 (“With super liens an association can actually 
collect even if the property’s value is greatly underwater to the amount owed on the 
mortgage; this is in contrast to states without super lien laws where the lack of equity 
makes it generally impossible to collect.”). 
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the property can be extinguished.149 The result is unfair because 
a lender’s security interest on a property will generally be for an 
amount far greater than a few months of delinquent 
assessments.150 The ability of an HOA to wipe out a security 
interest on a million dollar loan for a few thousand dollars 
worth of dues is disproportionate and does not give the 
impression of being fair and equitable.151 This interpretation is 
arguably not in accordance with the equity originally intended 
by the UCIOA drafters, and grants far too much of the balance 
of power to associations.152
Despite the perceived failings at achieving a true balance, 
super lien priority statutes do not appear to be in danger of 
disappearing in the near future absent lenders’ successful lobbying 
of state legislatures. In 2014, the Uniform Law Commission 
updated the UCIOA to reflect the recent court holdings granting 
the super priority lien true priority status.153 In fact, against prior 
judicial interpretation of UCIOA section 3-116 holding that the 
section merely provides a payment priority, the Commissioners 
state that the original UCIOA intended a true lien priority capable 
of extinguishing junior interests.154 However, the UCIOA 
comments to section 3-116 also state that the equitable balance 
between associations and lenders contemplated by the uniform 
code was premised on the assumptions that lenders would 
foreclose quickly, and a sufficient return existed on the foreclosure 
sale to satisfy both liens.155 The comments go on to explain that 
this situation did not exist during the foreclosure crisis, and the 
language of the statute created an interpretive dispute as to 
149 Lenders’ Mortgage Liens at Risk of Being Extinguished by Condo and 
Homeowners’ Association “Super-Priority” Liens, GOODWIN PROCTOR LLP (Sept. 27, 2014), 
https://www.goodwinlaw.com/publications/2014/09/lenders-mortgage-liens-at-risk-of-
being-extinguish [hereinafter Goodwin Mortgage Liens]. 
150 HOA Foreclosures Leave Banks Empty Handed, supra note 3. 
151 See Gardberg, supra note 3, at 13. 
152 Bromley, supra note 60, at 453 (“This result lacks any of the equitable balance 
intended by the UCIOA drafters and alternately affords the association exactly what the 
UCIOA and the Nevada statute intended to avoid: absolute priority status of a mortgagee 
at the expense of unpaid associations.”). 
153 UCIOA § 3-116 cmt. 2 (“First, subsection (a) affirms the result in Summerhill 
Village Homeowners Ass’n v. Roughley, . . . and makes clear that the association’s lien 
has true priority over the lien of an otherwise first mortgage lender to the extent of 
the amount specified in subsection (c). Thus, if the association conducts a foreclosure 
sale of its association lien and the otherwise first mortgagee does not act to redeem its 
interest by satisfying the association’s limited priority lien, the mortgagee’s lien would 
be extinguished.”). 
154 Id. (“As originally promulgated in 1982, subsection (c) provided that the 
association’s lien did have priority to the extent of six months of unpaid common expense 
assessments, based on the association’s periodic budget.”). 
155 Id.
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whether the super priority lien should be a true lien priority or a 
payment priority.156
The Uniform Law Commission resolved this ambiguity in the 
UCIOA by changing the language of section 3-116(b)(3) to 
include: “[a]ny priority accorded to the association’s lien under 
this section is a priority in right and not merely a priority to 
payment from the proceeds of the sale of the unit by a competing 
lienholder or encumbrancer.”157 With this amendment to the 
UCIOA, it is now clear that the Uniform Law Commission 
intends that the priority provided to an association lien under 
section 3-116 is intended to be a true priority. What is left to be 
seen is whether the remaining states that adopted section 3-116 
will agree with the Commissioners’ intent and adopt true lien 
priority for their super priority statutes. 
Though Nevada and the Uniform Law Commission have 
essentially solved the problems encountered by associations in 
first-in-time jurisdictions, serious issues remain with true 
priority super lien priority statutes. While a first-in-time 
jurisdiction gives lenders a significant advantage, super lien 
priority statutes holding foreclosure on an HOA lien 
extinguishes a first deed of trust shift the balance completely to 
community associations. 
Both approaches result in significant disadvantages to 
whichever party is not favored under the law. Each approach 
grants priority to parties on opposite ends of the association-
lender spectrum. Either may be considered a valid approach if 
it is determined that either the lender or the association 
should hold priority in a competitive zero-sum game. However, 
it may be more fair to the parties involved to aspire to achieve 
a more balanced lien priority scheme. The next Section will 
examine an approach that falls somewhere in between these 
two polar extremes. 
C. The Purchaser Liability Approach 
Some jurisdictions have sought to craft a solution to the 
perceived imbalances created in the groups described in Sections 
II(A) and II(B) above. While the first-in-time approach greatly 
favors the lender, super lien priority jurisdictions with true lien 
priority provisions shift the advantage to associations. Florida 
takes an approach somewhere between the two. This Section 
begins with an overview of the Florida scheme and the context in 
156 Id. at 189–90. 
157 UCIAO § 3-116. 
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which it developed, followed by an analysis of the legal 
structure set forth in Florida’s approach to balancing competing 
lien interests. 
Florida was one of the states hit hardest during the Great 
Recession, which began with the foreclosure crisis in 2008.158 By 
March 2010, sixty percent of Florida CICs were reporting that at 
least half of their units or parcels were two months or more behind 
in paying their assessments.159 Homeowners that did pay their 
dues were paying for the upkeep of sometimes dozens of empty 
homes in the process of foreclosure in their neighborhoods.160 One 
community association attorney likened the situation to “getting 
stuck with the bar tab of a roomful of people you have never 
met.”161 As a result, CICs had to increase assessments and were 
sometimes unable to provide the maintenance and services they 
were obligated to perform, which further depreciated the 
neighborhood’s property values.162 Florida required an innovative 
solution to its foreclosure problem. 
Under Florida common law, the general rule governing lien 
priority is unsurprisingly “first in time is first in right,” absent 
statutory regulation otherwise.163 Florida’s recording statute 
makes it a notice jurisdiction, and the holder of a lien must 
record in order to preserve his lien’s priority against subsequent 
purchasers, creditors, and other lien holders.164 Under Florida’s 
statute, both condominium and homeowners association liens are 
158 See Daniel Goldmintz, Note, Lien Priorities: The Defects of Limiting the “Super 
Priority” for Common Interest Communities, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 28283 (2011). 
159 Rachael Lee Coleman, Desperate condo, homeowner associations thrown a lifeline,
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 7, 2010), https://www.miamiforeclosurelawyerblog.com/files/2015/07/ 
Desperate-condo-homeowner-associations-thrown-a-lifeline-03_07_2010-MiamiHerald.com_.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/H8WN-VN8M]. 
160 Rich McKay, Empty Homes Mean Others Pick Up Tab, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 
24, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-01-24/news/1001230144_1_dues-town-
homes-housing-market [http://perma.cc/ED8L-KHRT]. 
161 Id.
162 Boyack, supra note 51, at 78. Boyack provides the following example: 
Parkview Point Condominium in Miami Beach suffered a large enough loss of 
assessment revenue that it was unable to pay water bills for the building, and 
the unit owners nearly had their water cut off before solvent owners were able 
to raise funds to pay the arrearage. The lobby ceiling repairs, however, were 
stopped mid-repair, leaving wiring and ducts exposed. 
Id.
163 34 FLA. JUR. 2D § 34 (2017). In other words, “the general rule is thus that liens 
shall take precedence in the order of their creation unless the one prior in time is 
extrinsically defective or is destroyed by some act of the holder.” Id. 
164 THOMAS E. BAYNES, JR., FLORIDA MORTGAGES § 9-1 (2016). 
572 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
effective from, and relate back to the recording of the original 
declaration establishing the CIC.165
In accordance with Florida’s recording statute, the original 
declaration of the community is said to provide notice to other 
potential interest holders so long as the declaration provides that 
the CIC lien will have a higher priority than other liens.166
However, the Florida statutory scheme makes an exception for 
first mortgages, which are given an expressly prescribed priority 
higher than an association lien.167 Therefore, in relation to a first 
mortgage, the association lien becomes effective once the claim of 
lien is recorded in the county public records.168 Because only 
junior liens are extinguished in a foreclosure action, this means 
that a foreclosure action by a CIC, on its lien, will usually not 
extinguish a first mortgage since a first mortgage will normally 
be senior to a CIC lien.169
In 1992, Florida altered association lien priority by its 
partial adoption of the UCIOA super lien priority statute which 
grants association liens a six-month limited payment priority.170
However, the priority granted under this statute does not work 
in the traditional sense prescribed by the UCIOA which required 
an association lien to compete with other liens, including a first 
mortgage.171 Instead, the Florida statute allows an association’s 
lien to bypass direct competition with a first mortgage because 
the foreclosure sale purchaser is held jointly and severally liable 
with the former homeowner for unpaid association assessments.172
At an HOA foreclosure sale, a purchaser is often the lender 
because a lender will usually prefer to purchase the property 
itself rather than dealing with an unknown third party. But 
regardless of whether the purchaser is the lender or a third 
party, the association recovers directly from that purchaser 
165 See THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY LITIGATION § 5.40 (8th ed. 2016); 
Homeowner’s Association Act, FLA. STAT. § 720.3085 (2017); Condominium Act, FLA.
STAT. § 718.116 (2017). 
166 THE FLA. BAR, supra note 165, § 5.272; see also Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Busey Bank, 30 So. 3d 579, 584–85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
167 THE FLA. BAR, supra note 165, § 5.628; FLA. STAT. § 720.3085; FLA. STAT. §
718.116. 
168 FLA. STAT. § 720.3085; FLA. STAT. § 718.116. 
169 POWELL, supra note 23, § 37.41. 
170 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 284–85; see also 1992 Fla. Laws. ch. 92-49, at 444. 
171 UCIOA § 3-116 cmt. 2. 
172 See Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 258–59. Boyack and Foster note that 
Florida’s approach is unique because it “impos[es] joint and several liability on any 
foreclosure purchaser for past-due assessments of the previous owner but limit[s] such 
liability in the case of a first-priority lender to the amount of the CIC super-priority lien.” 
Id. 
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rather than collecting their super priority against the foreclosing 
mortgagee’s sale proceeds.173
Both Florida and some other states have taken a purchaser 
liability approach, but only Florida applies it to a holder of a 
first mortgage’s purchase of the property at an association’s 
foreclosure sale.174 However, the Florida statute still limits a 
lender-purchaser’s liability.175 While the lender is liable for the 
previous owner’s past due assessments upon purchase at the 
foreclosure sale, the Florida statute imposes a statutory cap on 
the lender’s liability.176 This statutory cap is restricted to the 
amount of the CIC’s super priority lien.177 Originally, the 
maximum under the Florida super priority lien statute was six 
months of delinquent assessments prior to the foreclosure 
purchase.178
During the housing crisis beginning in 2008, foreclosure 
timelines became longer as more and more property foreclosures 
inundated the judiciary.179 These timelines were especially a 
problem in states such as Florida that required judicial 
foreclosure, since judicial foreclosure typically involves longer 
wait times due to required judicial oversight of the foreclosure 
process.180 In 2010, the Florida legislature passed an amendment 
to their super lien priority statute increasing associations’ super 
priority from the six months of delinquent assessments to twelve 
months or one percent of the amount of the foreclosing 
mortgage.181 Therefore, the lender-purchaser’s super lien liability 
is now currently restricted to the lesser of either (1) twelve 
months of delinquent assessments proceeding the purchase, or 
(2) one percent of the original mortgage debt on the property.182
173 Bromley, supra note 60, at 454–55 (“Florida’s limited priority is provided through 
the statutory liability of a foreclosure sale purchaser. The statute allows a mortgagee to 
foreclose its interest and imposes liability for the priority amount on that mortgagee as a 
foreclosure sale purchaser.”). 
174 Boyack & Foster, supra note 41, at 257–59 (“Florida is the only state that imposes 
assessment liability on a lender who acquires title at a foreclosure sale, although it caps 
the amount of liability imposed on such lender.”). 
175 Id. at 255. 
176 Id. at 258–59. 
177 Id.
178 THE FL. BAR, supra note 165, § 5.628. 
179 Boyack, supra note 51, at 10708. Boyack notes, “[t]he lengthy foreclosure timeline 
is caused in part by the sheer magnitude of the increase in foreclosure volume over the 
past few years—in 2010, there were more foreclosures commenced each month than were 
typically commenced in an entire year prior to 2005.” Id.
180 Bromley, supra note 60, at 454. Bromley argues that “[t]he challenges of the 
foreclosure crisis, especially with protracted timeframes in judicial foreclosure states like 
Florida, necessitate increased priority rights for associations.” Id.
181 Fla. S. 1196, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). 
182 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2017). 
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Let us revisit the earlier hypos of Sections II(A) and II(B) to 
apply the Florida regime to those facts. Again, assume the 
property in question is located in an HOA neighborhood and was 
purchased just prior to the 2008 recession through a deed of trust 
for $885,000. The homeowner is unable to keep up with both the 
mortgage payments and association assessments, owing $4500 on 
the latter. The balance on the mortgage is $800,000 while the fair 
market value of the property is $400,000. The homeowner makes 
a decision to walk away from the underwater property and pay 
neither the mortgage nor the association assessments. 
In our first scenario the lender forecloses on their mortgage 
lien. Under the Florida approach, the lender’s lien is not in 
competition with the association’s lien. Instead, the Florida 
statute shifts responsibility for the delinquent assessments to the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale.183 Whether this is the lender or 
a third party, the purchaser must pay the cost of the 
assessments. If the lender decides to purchase the property, then 
as a purchaser, the lender would be required to pay up to twelve 
months of the assessments or one percent of the overall mortgage 
value. In this case let us assume that regular assessments are 
$200 a month. Twelve months of assessments would be $2400 
while one percent of the mortgage would be $8000. The lender 
would be responsible for the lesser of these amounts and would 
have to pay $2400 included in the purchase price. If the 
purchaser is a third party, then they would have to pay the 
entire amount of $4500 in delinquent dues included in the 
purchase price of the property. This is because the statute only 
limits the liability of lender-purchasers, not when a purchaser is 
a third party. 
For the second scenario, assume that the lender delays 
foreclosure in hopes the market recovers or to avoid paying 
HOA assessments in the event the lender decides to purchase 
the property. During this period of delay, no one is paying 
association assessments on the property. The lender is under 
some pressure during this period to institute foreclosure 
because they know the priority amount is building up to twelve 
months’ assessments. But assume they wait the full year period 
and there is no longer additional motivation for the lender to 
initiate foreclosure. The HOA waits as long as it can and then 
initiates foreclosure itself. A lender will often have motivation 
to purchase the property in this situation to avoid having to 
deal with a third-party purchaser with whom it is not familiar. 
183 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 
(West 2017). 
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Regardless of whether the lender or a third party purchases the 
property, the cost of the delinquent assessments will be 
included in the purchase price: $2400 for the lender, or the 
entire $4500 for a third-party purchaser. 
The Florida approach differs significantly from the 
previously discussed approaches in two distinct ways: (1) the 
2010 amendment doubled the priority amount from six months 
under the UCIOA to twelve months or one percent of the 
mortgage under the Florida statute, and (2) the super priority of 
the lien bypasses competition with the first mortgage and instead 
acts as a statutory liability on the purchaser.184 Some Florida 
lawyers have interpreted the plain language of the statute to 
mean that a non-lender foreclosure purchaser would be liable for 
the entire amount of delinquent assessments, though this has not 
yet been decided by a court.185 This regime is very similar in 
effect to the limited priority of an HOA lien offered under the 
UCIOA, but differs by virtually guaranteeing the eventual 
recovery of delinquent assessments via the liability imposed on 
the purchaser by the statute.186
Some have criticized this approach on the basis that, while 
it increases the overall delinquent assessment amount an 
association may recover, it does not solve the underlying 
problem that remains in both first-in-time jurisdictions and 
super lien priority statutes that act only as a payment 
priority.187 The underlying problem manifests because lenders 
have no incentive to expedite foreclosure on their lien once 
assessments have accrued to the maximum allowable super 
priority level.188 As discussed in first-in-time jurisdictions, a 
184 Bromley, supra note 60, at 454 (explaining that the lien priority of the Florida 
statute “functions as a liability on purchasers, not as a lien competing with mortgages”). 
185 See Boyack, supra note 51, at 109. Boyack notes that “[a]ccording to some Florida 
lawyers, the new law permits unlimited recovery of unpaid assessments from third-party 
buyers at mortgage foreclosure (unlimited durability of the association lien) and caps 
recovery only from lenders.” Id. at 109 n.281. 
186 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116. Boyack 
explains that “[t]he six-month capped ‘super-priority’ portion of the association lien does 
not have true priority status under UCIOA since this six-month assessment lien cannot 
be foreclosed as senior to a mortgage lien. Rather, it creates a payment priority for some 
portion of unpaid assessments.” Boyack, supra note 51, at 99 (emphasis removed). 
187 See Boyack, supra note 51, at 108. 
188 Id. Boyack explained the underlying problem of first-in-time jurisdictions in the 
following text: 
Although . . . these enhanced lien priority measures increased ultimate 
recovery by an association, they failed to solve the underlying problem that 
still plagues the six-month capped priority laws: once the designated period 
has elapsed (be it six or nine or twelve months), lenders have no further 
incentive to contribute to property upkeep or to expeditiously foreclose so that 
someone new can take title. 
Id.
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lender has little incentive to foreclose on an underwater 
property in a stagnant market when doing so would require it to 
pay HOA assessments.189
Under the Florida-type alternative, the lender has 
some incentive to move forward with foreclosure during the 
twelve-month period while assessments are building up to the 
statutory cap.190 However, once this period is over, the lender 
may continue to delay foreclosure and is still not obligated to pay 
the assessments since it has not yet taken title.191 Therefore, the 
Florida approach somewhat addresses the problem of lender 
delay in foreclosure by the increase in the statutory cap of 
assessments for which a lender-purchaser can be held 
responsible. However, the increased statutory cap does not have 
the force of extinguishment of the lender’s lien that unreservedly 
forces lender compliance under the Nevada regime. 
Others have praised this Florida-style approach as greatly 
expanding an association’s potential recovery of delinquent 
assessments.192 Bromley, for example, has posited: “This 
extension contemplates what the UCIOA drafters could not have 
foreseen decades prior.”193 Bromley believed that this expansion 
of the statutory cap under the super priority statute would 
effectively counter the financial difficulties of HOAs caused by 
the expanded foreclosure timelines in judicial foreclosure states 
such as Florida.194 Furthermore, he noted that the procedure of 
imposing statutory liability on the purchaser (often the 
mortgagee) at the foreclosure sale would probably prevent the 
inequitable results found in decisions like SFR Investments.195
Notably, these assessments of up to twelve months’ payments or 
one percent of the original mortgage debts are generally more 
generous than the recovery available even in states such as 
Nevada.196 Under Nevada law, though the regime grants absolute 
189 See supra Section II(A). 
190 A lender has increased incentive to foreclose during this period simply because the 
amount they can be liable for as a purchaser is increasing during the twelve-month 
period. The more quickly they foreclose on the property, the less of the super priority 
amount they will owe upon purchase of the property. 
191 See supra Section II(A). 
192 Bromley, supra note 60, at 45354 (arguing that “Florida separates condominium 
and homeowners’ association liens into separate statutes that greatly expand an 
association’s potential recovery”) (footnote omitted). 
193 Id. at 454 (explaining that what UCIOA drafters could not have foreseen decades 
prior were “[t]he challenges of the foreclosure crisis, especially with protracted 
timeframes in judicial foreclosure states like Florida, necessitate increased priority rights 
for associations.”). 
194 See id.
195 See id. at 453–54. 
196 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116. 
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priority to an HOA lien, the statutory super priority cap is set at 
nine months’ worth of delinquent assessments.197
At first glance, the Florida statutes appear to better balance 
the interests of the HOAs and lenders. In effect, the Florida 
regime is “effectively identical to limited priority over a 
mortgagee,” but also ensures the CIC will recover delinquent 
assessments through the imposition of liability for these unpaid 
fees on the purchaser of the property.198 While providing for the 
highest recovery for an HOA of any state discussed in this 
Comment, the method of collection of these dues is unlikely to 
reproduce the risk of unfairness to lenders imposed by a true 
priority regime with a super lien priority statute.199 Despite these 
attractive characteristics, further analysis of the positive and 
negative aspects of each approach in regards to their ability to 
fairly balance competing policy interests is still required before 
fully evaluating which system works best. Part III broadens the 
comparative assessment to consider overall fairness and 
furtherance of other policy objectives across the alternatives. 
III. A COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES IN RELATION TO 
FAIRNESS AND POLICY200
The preceding Section of this Comment have provided an 
analysis of the mechanics and consequences to the parties of each 
jurisdiction’s lien priority approach. The following Sections will 
discuss how each jurisdiction balances issues of fairness and 
achieves desired policy results. This Part will begin with a 
discussion of each jurisdiction’s effectiveness at achieving 
fairness and equity for the relevant parties. It will then proceed 
to examine each type of approach in relation to the policy 
concerns regarding (1) the disproportionate value of the liens, 
(2) the value of encouraging HOAs as a means of private 
governance, (3) the availability of credit to buyers in association 
communities, and (4) the party in the best position to internalize 
the externality of delinquent dues.
197 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116. 
198 Bromley, supra note 60, at 454.  
199 Id.
200 While this Comment recognizes the ongoing constitutional challenges to super lien 
priority statutes, this Comment will instead focus on other infirmities of these statutes in 
terms of fairness and public policy. See generally Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016); Saticoy Bay LLC v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 388 
P.3d 970, 971 (Nev. 2017). 
578 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
A. Fairness and Equity to the Parties 
An attempt to determine a superior approach to HOA lien 
priority rightly begins with a discussion of fairness and equity. 
One of the paramount concerns of property law is that an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of his or her interests in 
property will be respected and protected.201 Therefore, it is 
important that the law be settled and predictable in order to offer 
owners and potential owners of property greater certainty in their 
property rights.202 With greater certainty comes greater confidence 
in investment.203 This confidence drives our economy, which in 
turn, distributes the benefits of increased wealth to our society as 
a whole.204 This principle was summarized in the seminal case, 
State v. Shack, in which the court recognized that “[p]roperty 
rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and 
are limited by it.”205 Both fairness and equity are uniquely human 
values, and any attempted determination of a system of property 
rights must include a discussion of these principles. 
For reasons discussed previously in Part II, lenders do not 
have sufficient motivation in a bad housing market to expedite 
foreclosure proceedings. One reason for this is the lender’s hope 
of maximization on the return on their mortgage lien by waiting 
to see if the market improves. Another reason is the avoidance of 
the responsibility of paying HOA dues should the lender 
purchase the property. Regardless of the reasons for delay, this 
deliberate and calculated inaction is crippling to associations who 
have to reduce services they are obligated to provide or increase 
assessments on paying members.206 With paying members fitting 
the bill, lenders receive the benefit of the value of their collateral 
being preserved without having to pay for this advantage.207
201 See Donald J. Kochan, Dealing with Dirty Deeds: Matching Nemo dat Preferences 
with Property Law Pragmatism, 64 U. KAN. L. REV., Nov. 2015, at 1, 57. 
202 Id. at 2935 (explaining the importance of recording acts as one area of property 
law that provides “confidence in the transfer of property in a very real way because 
buyers and sellers have greater predictability in the enforcement of their conveyances”). 
203 See Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: Perspectives after the Mortgage 
Foreclosure Crisis on the Essential Role of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV.
267, 298311 (2013). 
204 Id. at 310 (“Delineation of ownership facilitates exchange. Contracting would be 
impossible if parties were unable to trade rights. Likewise, property ownership must be 
protected from aggression in order for a civil society to flourish. At a minimum, therefore, 
government must have the power to protect these institutions of property and free 
exchange.”). 
205 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
206 See Newsom, supra note 96, at 361. Newsom explains that while a “bank is able to 
shed its financial obligation at the expense [of] the property’s innocent neighbors,” an 
“association must continue to insure and maintain the property regardless of whether the 
bank or homeowner makes any contribution to the association.” Id.
207 Id. 
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Thus, the lenders were being unjustly enriched by not acting 
expeditiously in initiating foreclosure proceedings.208 They were 
receiving the benefit of preservation of their collateral’s value 
through the dues paid by other members of the community.209
The payment of these additional costs by the remaining members 
kept up the property values of the abandoned homes by 
maintaining attractive characteristics such as exterior upkeep 
and lawn care despite the lack of a steward-owner to perform 
these routine tasks. The dues also contributed towards the 
upkeep of common areas in the neighborhood that increased the 
abandoned properties’ values.  
HOA payment for these absconded member shares presented 
an inherently unfair situation to both community associations 
and to their remaining members who had to shoulder the cost. 
Lenders were receiving the value from the preservation of their 
mortgaged property without a requirement to contribute towards 
that upkeep. Both the inability of HOAs to remain financially 
solvent and unjust enrichment of lenders led to the Nevada 
Supreme Court decision affording true priority to their state’s 
UCIOA-type super lien priority statute.  
In contrast to the above examples, super lien priority 
statutes have resolved many of the problems facing community 
associations in first-in-time jurisdictions and limited priority 
UCIOA jurisdictions.210 Goldmintz argued in favor of a 
Nevada-type regime that eliminates the limited priority of the 
UCIOA in lieu of true priority for association liens.211 His 
student comment advocated that “giving associations a full 
priority over all mortgages will insure that associations recover 
all back-maintenance fees and will put their budgets back on 
track.”212 He also notes that the burden will be placed “squarely 
onto lenders,” and argues this is equitable because “lenders are 
better situated to protect against the risks of default, are better 
208 Id.
209 Id. at 363 (“The banks get a premium price for each home because the homes are 
located in a well-maintained development with a well-run HOA, even though the banks 
did not pay a dime toward the expenses of the HOA.”). 
210 CMTY. ASS’N INST., MORTGAGE BANKERS VS. LOCAL COMMUNITIES: PROTECTING 
HOMEOWNERS AND AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS (2014),
https://www.caionline.org/Advocacy/StateAdvocacy/PriorityIssues/PriorityLien/Documents
/2014_NV_Response.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN7F-VSC8] (noting that after the SFR
Investments decision in Nevada, mortgage lenders are moving more quickly to effectuate 
foreclosures and pay community associations). 
211 Goldmintz, supra note 158, at 28990. Goldmintz proposed that “[t]he limited 
super-priority should be abolished and associations should be given full priority over 
mortgagees in order to reverse the downward fiscal spiral of associations and the lenders 
that finance them.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
212 Id. at 289. 
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able to bear the burden, and have the tools and sophistication to 
maximize the value of the sale at foreclosure proceedings.”213
However, the fix to HOA issues through such a system does 
so in an arguably unfair manner at the expense of the lender, 
whose interest may be extinguished without adequate 
justification. Lenders and their supporters have stated that 
“[t]hese initiatives run contrary to the very heart and nature of 
secured lending.”214 A Nevada-style regime effectively coerces a 
lender to pay association dues by using the threat of 
extinguishing his interest (sometimes worth hundreds of 
thousands of dollars) for the act of omission of not instituting its 
own foreclosure proceedings in a timely manner.215
However, proponents of super lien priority statutes have 
argued that because notice to the lender is required to be given of 
an HOA foreclosure, the lender has adequate time and 
opportunity to ensure the security of its interest.216 In October of 
2015, in response to constitutional challenges relating to 
adequate notice, the Nevada Legislature amended its statute to 
ensure a lender with an interest in a property being foreclosed on 
by an HOA would receive adequate notice to protect its 
interest.217 NRS section 116.31163 provides that: 
The association or other person conducting the sale shall also mail, 
within 10 days after the notice of default and election to sell is 
recorded, a copy of the notice by certified mail to: . . . Each holder of a 
recorded security interest encumbering the unit’s owner’s interest 
which was recorded before the recordation of the notice of default, at 
the address of the holder that is provided pursuant to NRS 657.110 on 
the Internet website maintained by the Division of Financial 
Institutions of the Department of Business and Industry.218
This statute requires that notice be delivered to a holder of a 
recorded security interest that was recorded prior to the HOA 
213 Id.
214 Aušra Gaigalaite, Priority of Condominium Associations’ Assessment Liens vis-à-
vis Mortgages: Navigating in the Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
841, 866 (quoting AM. BANKERS ASS’N ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON HOA SUPER 
PRIORITY LIENS 1 (2015)). 
215 See supra Section III(B). 
216 Gloeckner, supra note 48, at 343–44. Gloeckner explains the notice argument for 
true lien priority: 
For example, proponents of HOAs have argued that because NRS Chapter 116 
requires multiple notices be provided to lenders, there is sufficient time to 
secure their interest. A lender does not lose its interest until the property is 
sold at an HOA foreclosure sale; therefore, lenders have ample time to cure 
delinquent assessments on the home. 
Id. at 343 (footnotes omitted). 
217 See Gardberg, supra note 3, at 17. 
218 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.31163 (West 2015). 
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assessment under which an association forecloses. Because first 
mortgage or deed of trust holders fall squarely within the 
category of parties who must be afforded notice, extinguishment 
of the lender’s interest is arguably equitable if they fail to act to 
protect their interest by paying the assessment. However, the 
argument that a lender has adequate notice to pay off an 
association lien and save its interest in the property ignores the 
basic principle that the lender is not responsible for the 
assessment debt in the first place.  
It is important to remember that the original homeowner 
who defaulted on payments is the party who is ultimately 
responsible for the assessment debt. The most equitable solution 
would be for the debtor to pay his own debts. However, often 
times this is not a practical solution because the debtor may not 
have the necessary funds to pay their debt. While placing the 
burden on another party that has the resources to pay is 
obviously more practical, it brings up issues of fairness and 
equity that cannot be ignored. 
One of the strongest fairness arguments for a Nevada-type 
regime is that it is fair for a lender to shoulder the responsibility 
of HOA dues because the lender acts wrongfully by delaying 
foreclosure proceedings and is thereby unjustly enriched.219
However, in order for a party to fairly be held accountable for a 
wrongful omission or inaction, they must fail to perform a legal 
duty the party is obligated to perform. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines a duty as “[a] legal obligation that is owed or due to 
another and that needs to be satisfied; that which one is bound to 
do, and for which somebody else has a corresponding right.”220
A lender is in privity with a homeowner mortgagor who has 
been granted a mortgage loan to purchase property located 
within a neighborhood governed by an HOA. An association is in 
privity with such a homeowner through the covenants attached 
to the purchased property. However, a lender and association 
have no direct connection with each other through these 
relationships with the homeowner. Until a lender takes title to 
the property by foreclosure sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure, a 
219 See Goldmintz, supra note 158, at 289. Goldmintz states that a full priority 
scheme “incentivizes . . . the quick execution of foreclosure proceedings, since, the longer 
the bank waits, the more money they’ll have to pay to associations. This, in turn, is 
therefore more equitable, more efficient, and more beneficial to all the parties involved.” 
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Newsom, supra note 96, at 363 (arguing that banks are 
unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of the higher value of a property in a well-run 
HOA by delaying foreclosure, and therefore, their obligation to pay assessments). 
220 Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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lender has no legal duty to pay association assessments.221
Therefore, a lender has no legal duty to pay an HOA when the 
homeowner mortgagor defaults on association assessments, just 
as the HOA has no legal duty to pay the homeowner’s mortgage 
when he or she defaults on mortgage payments. 
Even if it is determined that it is equitable for a lender to 
pay the mortgagor’s delinquent assessments, extinguishment and 
threat of extinguishment of the lender’s mortgage lien does not 
correspond proportionally to the wrong the lender committed. As 
to the wrong the lender commits, there is a good argument that 
the lender is unjustly enriched by not paying dues the 
non-defaulting HOA members must pay.222 Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines unjust enrichment as “[a] benefit obtained 
from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for 
which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense.”223
As previously discussed in this Part, a lender obtains the benefit 
of protection the value of his interest in the property without 
having to pay for that benefit. 
However, the normal remedy for unjust enrichment is 
restitution which does not involve extinguishment of a lien far 
more valuable than the benefit conferred.224 The remedy of 
restitution definition provides that “the measure of recovery is 
usually based not on the plaintiff’s loss, but on the defendant’s 
gain.”225 The unjust benefit conferred to lenders was protection of 
their interests’ value through the payment of assessments by 
other association members. Restitution of this benefit would 
mean that the lender would have to disgorge the benefit 
conferred: the payment of the assessments.  
A Nevada-style regime does require payment of assessments 
by the unjustly enriched lender and is in accordance with the 
principle of restitution. However, it does so by giving a power of 
extinguishment of the lender’s lien to the HOA through its 
ability to foreclose on the property. Because a lender’s lien will 
usually be much more substantial than the relatively minor 
benefit of protection of the mortgaged property’s value, even 
inadvertent extinguishment would produce an extremely harsh 
and unjust result. 
221 JEB Report, supra note 106. 
222 See Newsom, supra note 96, at 361, 36364 (“[A] bank that purposely delays 
foreclosure on a property located in a homeowner’s association is unjustly enriched by 
the association when the bank knows the homeowner has also defaulted on its 
homeowner’s association dues.”). 
223 See Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
224 Id.
225 Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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The Florida approach of joint and several liability for the 
purchaser and seller likely strikes a fairer balance between these 
divergent extremes of first-in-time jurisdictions and true 
priority super lien priority statutes. As previously discussed, both 
first-in-time and true priority super lien priority statutes 
completely place the cost of delinquent dues either on the 
association or lender respectively. Under the Florida method, the 
burden of paying delinquent HOA dues shifts to the purchaser.226
After the homeowner who originally defaulted on the debt, 
the purchaser is arguably the party upon which it is most fair to 
impose this cost. The negative externalities of delinquent 
assessments must be borne by a party other than the original 
debtor if the debtor cannot be made to pay. Pursuit of a judgment 
against that debtor may be impractical because they are 
insolvent or judgment proof. If the association internalizes the 
cost of the debt, the cost is distributed to its other members.227
This is an unjust result because the other members are not 
responsible for the debts of the defaulting members, and those 
other members are likely under similar financial burdens which 
caused the non-paying members’ defaults.228 As previously 
discussed, while a lender may be better able to bear the cost, 
forcing him or her to pay for an externality he or she did not 
cause also produces an unjust result. 
In contrast to the association and lender, a purchaser of the 
property has the ability to either accept the added liability of 
paying the delinquent dues, or to walk away from the 
foreclosure sale. In addition, the association lien is taken out of 
competition with the first mortgage because the assessment 
amount is statutorily required to be paid by the foreclosure 
purchaser.229 Rather than having a zero sum game between the 
association and lender, liability for the externality is simply 
placed upon the shoulders of the one party who can make the 
choice to accept it.230 The added factor of choice arguably makes 
the Florida approach the most fair and equitable of the different 
226 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2017); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 
(West 2017). 
227 Christine Haughney, Collateral Foreclosure Damage for Condo Owners, N.Y.
TIMES (May 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/business/15condo.html. 
228 See CMTY ASS’N LEADERSHIP LOBBY, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS FACE A PERFECT 
STORM: FORECLOSURES, BUDGET SHORTFALLS, AND STATE MANDATES (Dec. 1, 2009).  
229 Bromley, supra note 60, at 45455.
230 Under a first-in-time regime, a first mortgage or deed of trust will usually take 
priority and extinguish an association lien upon the lender’s foreclosure. On the other 
hand, a true priority super lien priority statute completely shifts this advantage to the 
HOA lien that will extinguish a first mortgage if foreclosed upon by the association. This 
situation presents a zero sum game where it is all or nothing for either side. See supra
Sections II(A) and II(B). 
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lien priority schemes discussed. The next Sections examine 
whether it remains in that favored position after considering 
other policy concerns. 
B. The Disproportionate Value of the Liens 
One of the most compelling policy arguments against the 
Nevada super lien statute and its interpretation by the Nevada 
Supreme Court relates to the differential value between 
competing lien interests. The value of an association lien 
compared to a first mortgage is usually extremely 
disproportionate. An association lien will typically only be for a 
few thousand dollars of delinquent dues,231 whereas a first 
mortgage will usually be an amount closer to the entire value of 
the home at the time it was bought.232 To allow an HOA 
foreclosure on a lien worth a few thousand dollars to extinguish a 
million dollar mortgage does not appear to be fair and just. 
Consider the following examples of the inequities that can result 
in some true super lien priority jurisdictions. 
In SFR Investments, U.S. Bank approved a mortgage loan 
for $885,000 in 2007, just before the housing bubble imploded 
the following year.233 During the recession, the homeowner fell 
behind on payments and then quit paying altogether because the 
value of the home was underwater.234 In addition to their 
mortgage, the homeowners also owed about $4500 in association 
dues.235 The HOA began a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding 
without notice to the bank and sold the home at an auction for 
$6000 to SFR, a speculation company that was taking advantage 
of the legal/economic situation.236 SFR initiated a quiet title 
action, and the court held U.S. Bank’s security interest on 
the remaining $800,000 of the loan was extinguished.237 The 
231 Melissa Waite, The HOA Foreclosure and Priority: Who is in First?, CLARK 
COUNTY B. ASS’N COMMUNIQUÉ, Nov. 2013, at 26, 2628. Waite describes HOA foreclosure 
sales in Nevada at the time of this article as being “very low in relation to the fair market 
value of the property being sold” with the typical sales price being between $3000 and 
$12,000. Id. 
232 Timm Herdt, Foreclosure crisis not driven by luxury home purchases, VENTURA 
COUNTY STAR (Aug. 17, 2010), http://archive.vcstar.com/business/foreclosure- 
crisis-not-driven-by-luxury-home-purchases-ep-367899884-348388001.html/?page=1 
[http://perma.cc/L2EW-4FTA] (stating an analysis by the nonprofit Center for Responsible 
Lending showed that the average value at the time of loan origination was $396,351). 
233 SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 409 (Nev. 2014). 
234 Id.
235 Id. at 418. 
236 Id. at 409. Note that under subsequent Nevada laws, notice would be required. 
The Nevada Legislature addressed the issue of notice by requiring adequate notice to 
other interest holders in a property that is the subject of an HOA foreclosure. See supra
Section III(A). 
237 Id. at 41819. 
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loan became unsecured and eventually resulted in losses to 
the bank.238
In Chase Plaza Condominium Association, Inc. v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, the original buyer of a condo bought the property 
with a loan from JPMorgan Chase Bank for $280,000.239 The 
owner fell behind on payments for the loan, and also owed 
payments to their condominium association amounting to 
$9415.240 The association foreclosed without notifying the bank 
and sold the condo for $10,000.241 The bank was alerted to the 
sale when the association sent a check to the bank for the surplus 
of $478.242 The court upheld this action as valid because the 
Washington D.C. super lien priority statute gave the CIC lien 
priority over the mortgage, and the foreclosure by the HOA 
extinguished the bank’s interest in the condo.243
In Saticoy Bay, the original purchaser took out a mortgage 
loan for $81,370 from Wells Fargo Bank.244 The homeowner fell 
behind on their association dues, and the HOA foreclosed on 
their lien.245 The property was sold for only $6900 to another 
speculation LLC intending to cash in on the situation.246 The 
Court upheld the Nevada super lien priority statute as 
constitutional, holding, inter alia, that the HOA’s exercise of its 
new statutory rights did not constitute state action for purposes 
of the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause.247
As these cases demonstrate, because an HOA can only collect 
the small amount it is owed on its lien from the profits of its 
foreclosure sale, it has little incentive to sell the home at a price 
which exceeds the amount they are owed.248 One Nevada 
attorney stated that a typical sales price at an association 
foreclosure in Nevada during 2013 was between $3000 and 
238 Vaughn, supra note 3, at 4. 
239 Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 98 A.3d 166, 168 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
240 Id.
241 Id. The court hinted that the failure of the lien priority statute to require notice be 
sent to other lienholders may be facially unconstitutional, but was unable to reach the 
issue because JPMorgan did not raise it as an issue. See Goodwin Mortgage Liens, supra
note 149. 
242 Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 98 A.3d at 16869. 
243 Id. at 178. 
244 Saticoy Bay LLC v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 388 P.3d 970, 971 (Nev. 2017). 
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 975. 
248 See 6A PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: HOME OWNER 
ASSOCIATIONS AND PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS – LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.15 (Matthew 
Bender ed., 2013) (“The purpose of foreclosure of an association’s lien is to have the 
property applied to the payment of the outstanding assessment liability.”). 
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$12,000.249 This amount is not even close to what would usually 
be required to satisfy a first mortgage, which can often run in the 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars. Savvy real 
estate investment companies have taken advantage of the 
situation and often make a profit of twenty to fifty times the 
amount in which they paid at the HOA foreclosure.250 It is 
obvious that equity to the lender demands this wrinkle in the law 
be addressed, and addressed quickly. 
One route for challenging an association’s foreclosure sale 
that has been met with limited success is a claim the UCIOA 
incorporates a duty of good faith on the part of HOAs conducting 
foreclosure sales to expend efforts to get the fair market price for 
the property.251 The UCIOA states: “Every contract or duty 
governed by this [act] imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance or enforcement.”252 The Vermont Supreme Court 
recently held that enforcement of an HOA lien via foreclosure 
must be executed in good faith as defined by section 1-113 of the 
UCIOA, which requires a standard of commercial 
reasonableness.253 In doing so, the court set aside a foreclosure 
sale of a parcel just over $33,500 when that parcel had a fair 
market value of at least $70,000.254 The court reasoned that the 
sale was not commercially reasonable, so the sale must be void 
under the good faith standard of the UCIOA.255
This application of the law by the Vermont Supreme Court 
demonstrates a possible solution to prevent this unjust result 
under Nevada-type lien priority regimes.256 It is possible that had 
the good faith issue been raised in SFR Investments, Chase
Plaza, and Saticoy Bay, these courts could have found that the 
associations failed to meet the good faith standard because the 
sales prices were for just a fraction of the likely fair market 
249 See Waite, supra note 231, at 26. 
250 See Robin E. Perkins, Can an HOA “Super-Priority” Lien Extinguish a Lender’s 
Deed?, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
litigation/committees/corporate-counsel/articles/2014/winter2014-can-an-hoa-super-
priority-lien-extinguish-a-lenders-deed.html [http://perma.cc/KP6J-SV4R]. Perkins states 
a home costing anywhere from $200,000 to $500,000 would be sold at an HOA foreclosure 
sale for an amount between $3000 and $10,000 because “properties are auctioned for little 
more than the amount of the HOA lien.” Id.
251 See Gaigalaitŝ, supra note 214, at 868. 
252 UCIOA § 1-113.  
253 Will v. Mill Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 848 A.2d 336, 341 (Vt. 2004). 
254 Id. at 34243. 
255 Id.
256 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses on three approaches to 
HOA lien priority as they currently exist, incorporation of the duty of good faith into the 
UCIOA may be a possible solution to the inequitable result to lenders of homes being sold 
by HOAs at foreclosure for a fraction of their value. It will be interesting to see if this 
proposition is adopted by the true super lien priority states in the near future. 
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values of the properties. Such sales of properties would probably 
not fall within the definition of commercial reasonableness 
required by the UCIOA good faith standard. Therefore, the good 
faith standard may have played an important role in these cases 
because the UCIOA was incorporated by the lien priority statutes 
of both the District of Colombia and Nevada. 
While super lien priority statutes have solved many of the 
problems that associations have encountered in first-in-time 
jurisdictions, the cost of this benefit should not be a disaster to 
lenders and a windfall to third-party purchasers taking 
advantage of the situation. When an association’s small value 
lien is able to extinguish a large first mortgage, there is possibly 
a commercially unreasonable transaction if the HOA forecloses 
and sells the property. The other possible end result is the lender 
is coerced into paying another’s bill to prevent such a 
transaction. It is difficult to invent an argument where either of 
these results could be considered fair to the lender. Nonetheless, 
any proposed solution must balance fairness to the lender with 
the ability of an association to collect dues and remain financially 
solvent, a goal that we have seen is not easy to reach. The next 
Section focuses again on some of the special values of HOAs 
implicated by the competing liens. 
C. The Value of HOAs as an Efficient Means of Private 
Governance 
Another major policy consideration related to lien priority 
lies in preserving the financial security of CICs so that they 
may serve to reduce the burdens on local governments. Many 
argue that typically, HOA’s are a more efficient and better 
vehicle for neighborhood maintenance, upkeep, and community 
relations than public government.257 HOA’s are usually run by 
members of the community who are closely attached to the 
situation in their neighborhood and have a personal stake in the 
betterment of their community.258 In contrast, elected officials 
in public government may be detached from specific needs and 
requirements of a particular neighborhood.259 Allowing semi-
autonomous governance of a community by private associations 
reduces the responsibilities of municipal government and places 
257 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 26165. 
258 See HYATT, supra note 29, at 21 (“An association of the property owners in the 
community (the ‘community association’) manages the common property with funds 
obtained by levying assessments against the property.”). 
259 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 26263. 
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them in the hands of the community members themselves.260
This often equates to a well maintained community with 
corresponding higher property values.261
Beginning in the 1960s, CICs developed from an experiment 
in suburban housing into one of the most common forms of 
residential neighborhoods in America today.262 In 1970, there 
were about 10,000 CICs with an estimated 2.1 million residents 
living in approximately 700,000 housing units.263 By 2015, the 
number had exponentially increased to an estimated 338,000 
communities with sixty-eight million residents living in 26.2 
million housing units, and twenty-one percent of the total United 
States population living in CICs.264 CIC housing was estimated, 
in aggregate, to be valued at $5.287 trillion in 2015.265
The Foundation for Community Association Research 
attributes this rapid growth of community association to four 
factors: (1) the value of collective management at the neighborhood 
level, (2) the privatization of public functions reducing financial 
pressure on local municipalities, (3) the expansion of affordable 
homeownership with condominiums as lower cost entry housing, 
and (4) the minimization of social costs and fostering of market 
efficiencies by reducing government oversight of routine community 
maintenance.266 In fact, local governments often require new 
subdivisions to form HOAs as a condition of land use approval as 
a “load shedding” function of services and tasks which are 
usually carried out by local government.267
The ability of an HOA to collect the dues necessary to 
maintain the community through a secure mechanism afforded 
by law is essential to encouraging the continued growth of 
HOAs.268 If associations are underfunded because members are 
not paying their dues, both lower property values and higher 
260 See FOUND. FOR COMMUNITY ASS’N RES., STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 
U.S. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS, CONDOMINIUM COMMUNITIES AND HOUSING
COOPERATIVES (2012). 
261 Daniel S. Scheller, Neighborhood Governments and their Role in Property Values,
URBAN AFFAIRS REV. 1, 2425 (2010). 
262 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 26162. 
263 COMMUNITY ASS’N INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2015:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION DATA (2015). 
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 FOUND. FOR COMMUNITY ASS’N RES., supra note 260. 
267 Bromley, supra note 22, at 262. 
268 Id. at 26465. Bromley notes there is an “inherent interdependency” between 
associations and their members. Id. at 264. “The association provides vital necessities to 
the community that will be dramatically affected, should some or all be eliminated if the 
association is unable to sufficiently fund them. The association is simultaneously 
dependent on the property owners’ payment of dues in order to maintain these 
necessities.” Id. 
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dues for members who are continuing to pay assessments 
result.269 The impact on association services, in turn, can actually 
have a negative effect on the economy on a large scale by the 
corresponding decline in property values.270 Therefore, it is in the 
interest of public policy to both encourage the growth of HOAs 
and ensure they have the means to fund themselves.  
While encouragement of community associations remains a 
high public policy goal, such support should not undermine 
issues of fairness under the law and other public policy goals. 
These issues are at the center of the controversy over the Nevada 
statutes.271 Although these regimes have largely solved first-in-
time HOA lien priority issues, they have also lead to negative 
fairness and policy consequences. In contrast, the original 
difficulties of HOA collection on delinquent dues remain in the 
first-in-time and limited priority UCIOA jurisdictions.272 A more 
balanced approach is required to address the issue of protecting 
HOA solvency because negative policy consequences result from 
the application of both super lien priority statutes and traditional 
first-in-time regimes. 
A better solution may be one similar to the more balanced 
Florida approach. Unlike the preferential treatment to either 
lender or association afforded under the other approaches 
through lien priority, this method passes the cost of the unpaid 
assessments to the purchaser of the property by statute.273 The 
purchaser is free to make the decision to either assume or reject 
the debt imposed by the statute on the purchase price because 
they may decide whether or not to purchase the property. While 
some may argue that this approach would damage HOAs by 
chilling possible sales due to the additional cost, this will usually 
only amount to a few thousand dollars on top of the purchase 
269 Haughney, supra note 227. Even “[b]argain hunters say they are reluctant to buy” 
when “they might have to pay unexpected fees as distressed neighbors default on their 
mortgages or just stop paying the association fees that cover everything from taxes to pool 
maintenance to air-conditioning repair.” Id. 
270 See Goldmintz, supra note 158, at 28687. Goldmintz argues that “when 
associations buckle under the pressure of multiple, simultaneous delinquencies, property 
values suffer. This hinders the mortgagee’s ability to maximize its recovery at a 
foreclosure sale.” Id. at 286. Therefore, “the lender’s pecuniary interests are intimately 
wrapped up in the long-term viability and short term liquidity of associations. As lenders 
work to undermine the extension of super-liens beyond the current six-months, they work 
contrary to their own financial interests.” Id.
271 See Aalberts, supra note 18, at 327–29. 
272 See supra Section II(A). 
273 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2014); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 
(West 2014). 
590 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:2
price.274 Because a buyer is probably already getting a reduced 
price in a foreclosure sale, it is likely that this small amount in 
relation to overall cost will not have a large effect on finding 
buyers at foreclosure sales. 
The Florida statute also addresses the first-in-time 
jurisdiction problem of lenders delaying foreclosure proceedings. 
As discussed previously, one of the major problems of a first-in-
time jurisdiction is that a lender’s superior priority allows them 
to delay foreclosure to wait for market recovery and avoid paying 
the additional cost of association assessments. Lender foreclosure 
delay places a large burden on associations and their remaining 
members because it causes the property to remain without a 
custodian and no one paying dues. 
Both the Florida HOA and condo association lien priority 
statutes allow for up to twelve months of assessments or one 
percent of the mortgage in regards to a purchase by the lender.275
This is double the amount which is provided for under the 
UCIOA and currently greater than any super priority lien 
statute jurisdiction allows.276 This provides incentive to a lender 
who will be motivated to expedite foreclosure proceedings 
because the assessments it is liable for upon purchase will be 
accruing for twice the period provided for by most states with 
super lien priority statutes. 
However, the large Florida super priority amount does not 
address the issue of lender foreclosure delay in two situations: 
(1) when the lender is not considering purchase of the property if 
the HOA forecloses, and (2) when the lender has already waited 
twelve months to foreclose and the super priority amount it 
would have to pay upon purchase is already capped. One possible 
solution to the second issue is for Florida to adopt a provision 
similar to the 2014 UCIOA section 3-316(c)(1) amendment 
allowing for rolling liens.277 The rolling lien authorized under the 
UCIOA allows for a six month super priority amount for each 
budget year for the HOA.278 Therefore, an HOA is entitled to the 
super priority amount available under the statute for each 
budgeted year. 
274 Waite, supra note 231, at 2628. Waite states that a typical sales price of a 
Nevada home in an HOA foreclosure sale would be in between $3000 and $12,000, which 
is “slightly more than the amount owed to the HOA.” Id. at 26. 
275 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2014). 
276 See Lewis supra note 38, at 1. The UCIOA offers six months of assessments for its 
super priority amount. Nevada statute provides for up to nine months of assessments 
which is the second largest amount provided for by any state. Id.
277 UCIOA § 3-116(c)(1). 
278 Id.
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While not a perfect solution, the Florida regime balances the 
interests of both parties by providing a better mechanism for 
collection of association dues without threatening or otherwise 
jeopardizing the lender’s substantial interest in the property. As 
will be shown in the next Section, security in a lender’s interest 
in a property may have more importance than solely on the 
question of what is equitable and fair. 
D. Lender Willingness and Buyer Opportunity to Obtain 
Financing
Lenders have been watching carefully (and with anxiety 
and unease) the decisions affording true priority to HOA liens. 
There is inherent risk in implementing unrestricted HOA super 
lien priority statutes because it may have a chilling effect on 
the housing market.279 Lenders will be taking on a great 
amount of additional risk by lending to borrowers purchasing 
in HOA communities.280 When their liens can be subordinated 
by statute and extinguished if they fail to pay a homeowner’s 
delinquent assessment, they will be reluctant to take on this 
substantial risk.281
Proponents of HOA super lien priority statutes have argued 
that this risk can be almost completely mitigated by adequate 
notice to the lender of the association’s intent to foreclose.282
In 2015, the Nevada Legislature amended its super lien 
priority statute to require the HOA to send foreclosure notices to 
any lienholders who have a recorded interest in the property.283
279 Deborah Goonan, Is the HOA priority lien necessary and beneficial?, INDEP.
AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (June 9, 2016), https://independentamericancommunities.com/ 
2016/06/09/is-the-hoa-priority-lien-necessary-and-beneficial/ [http://perma.cc/FKB3-ZDZT]
(“Essentially, wiping out the first mortgage lien ultimately forces other borrowers to pay 
more for a mortgage, makes it more difficult to obtain a mortgage, and makes 
homeownership more elusive.”). 
280 Kenneth R. Harney, Homeowner association liens pose perils for condo buyers, L.A.
TIMES (May 17, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-harney-20150513-
story.html [http://perma.cc/J9K4-KG6N] (“For example, if the amount of back 
assessments owed is $6,000 but the first mortgage on the property is in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, the house might be sold at foreclosure to a bargain-hunting buyer for 
the assessment amount plus fees, leaving the lender with huge losses.”). 
281 Realtor Magazine noted the lending industry has warned that “[h]ome buyers may 
soon face more stringent underwriting standards and even higher interest rates when 
applying for a mortgage to purchase a home that falls within a homeowner association.” 
Buyers Face Barriers in HOA Neighborhoods, REALTOR MAG. (May 17, 2015), 
http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2015/05/18/buyers-face-barriers-in-hoa-neighborhoods 
[http://perma.cc/KM7G-7ZF8].
282 See SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 414, 418 (Nev. 
2014) (“[A]s a junior lienholder, U.S. Bank could have paid off the SHHOA lien to avert 
loss of its security.”). 
283 Gardberg, supra note 3, at 17 (“The lienholder then has a specific period of 
time—until five days before the foreclosure sale—to pay off the superpriority lien. Upon 
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However, it is not yet clear if this notice process will reduce the 
risk of inadvertent extinguishment of lender interests. Large 
lending institutions have mortgages on a large amount of 
properties, and verifying which properties are located in some sort 
of community association is not as easy as one would assume.284
Lenders continue to deal with the uncertainty of inadvertent 
extinguishment because the reliability of the notice regime to 
correct information deficiencies has yet to be fully tested. 
This higher risk in super lien priority statute jurisdictions, 
whether real or merely perceived, could trigger both higher rates 
on financing and an overall reluctance of creditors to extend 
credit to certain buyers.285 The Mortgage Bankers Association 
reports that currently: 
Over 1,000 Nevada cases continue to be litigated to determine 
whether clear title existed for property purchasers at HOA foreclosure 
sales, and subsequently whether proper notice was given by HOAs to 
first lien mortgagees before these sales were executed. If the courts 
determine notice was proper and clear title exists, these mortgagees 
could lose hundreds of millions of dollars from this change in 
interpretation.286
This additional risk and possible loss of a substantial amount of 
lender investment has a high probability of affecting availability 
and interest rates on credit. Though it has not yet played out, 
lending industry representatives have already indicated that 
“[w]here any HOA super lien authority exists, lenders may be 
forced to price risk through higher interest rates, mitigate it 
through larger downpayment [sic] requirements, or exit risky 
jurisdictions altogether. Property owners may even be unable to 
sell or refinance their homes.”287 This effect, in turn, could lead to 
certain buyers being effectively shut out of the market. 
While lenders will most likely not make good on their threat 
to exit super lien priority statute jurisdictions since almost half 
of the United States has some form of these statutes, other 
effects such as higher interest rates and limited availability of 
doing so, the HOA may still foreclose (on the portion of its lien, if any, not having 
superpriority status), but the lender’s lien will not be extinguished.”). 
284 Goonan, supra note 279 (“According to Equifax . . . private industry has taken the 
lead in creating a national database of HOAs,” but the “database is missing a minimum of 
125,000 HOAs, based upon CAI’s estimated total of 350,000 HOAs.”). 
285 Harney, supra note 280. In a statement before the Nevada Legislature, general 
counsel for the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Alfred Pollard, stated that if lenders’ 
rights can be extinguished by community associations, purchasers “may face challenges in 
securing a loan to buy a unit or refinance.” Id.
286 Homeowners and Condominium Associations Should Not Be Granted “Super Lien” 
Priority, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, https://www.mba.org/issues/residential-issues/hoa-
super-lien-priority [http://perma.cc/48LC-8MX4] (last visited March 19, 2018). 
287 Id.
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credit to certain borrowers are very real possible consequences.288
Proponents of super lien priority statutes argue that lenders are 
in the best position to absorb the externality of delinquent 
assessments by directly assuming those debts when the original 
debtor cannot be compelled to pay.289 However, it is likely that 
these costs will ultimately be passed on to consumers causing 
further negative economic consequences. 
E. Which Party is in the Best Position to Internalize the Cost? 
One of the major questions in determining which of the three 
discussed approaches is better, both in fairness and policy, is 
money. Who should bear the cost of the delinquent HOA dues when 
the original debtor walks away from the property and refuses to 
pay both the mortgage and association assessments? There appear 
to be four different options of those whom could potentially bear 
the cost: (1) the original homeowner, (2) the association, (3) the 
lender, or (4) the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. 
One student comment suggests that the optimal method 
would be for the HOA to seek a money judgment against the 
original homeowner who is in default.290 While this approach 
seems to be the most equitable because it would force the person 
who incurred the debt to internalize their own costs, it does not 
have a realistic likelihood of resulting in successful collection. A 
person who is underwater and walking away from their home, 
including the debt associated with it, likely does not have enough 
assets to make legal action against them worthwhile.291 This type 
of judgment is also difficult to enforce both because it is against 
an individual rather than a business, and the personal debt 
against the individual is unsecured.292 A court order could 
provide for garnishment of wages, but pursuing a judicial remedy 
against the owner costs the association money and time.293
288 See Lewis, supra note 38, at 1. Lewis notes that twenty-two states currently have 
super lien priority statutes. Id. It will be interesting to see if loan statistics confirm the 
lender threat of higher interest rates and less availability of credit. 
289 Vaughn, supra note 3, at 11. 
290 Id. at 2830. 
291 JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT § 2.11 (3d ed. 2017) (“The client may 
decide that the hourly fees have reached the limit of economically achieving the judgment 
enforcement objectives. There is a point in postjudgment litigation when the client 
rightfully cuts his losses, sits on the judgment, and waits for other enforcement 
opportunities to come along.”). 
292 ALAN M. AHART, Lawyer’s Role in Debt Collection Process, in ENFORCING 
JUDGMENTS AND DEBTS (2017). Judge Ahart explains that enforcing unsecured judgments 
on consumer claims are difficult to collect because of liberal exemptions under the law, 
difficulty in locating the debtor, insufficient assets and income, and a consumer is more 
likely than a business to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Id.
293 BROWN, supra note 291, § 2.11 (“Counsel engaged in enforcing judgments must 
consider the size of the judgment and collection prospects vis-à-vis a reasonable budget for 
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judgments against debtors are compounded when there are 
multiple owners within the community who have walked away 
from their debt. In such situations legal costs for pursuing and 
collecting the individual judgments will be multiplied since they 
must be pursued against multiple debtors. Because the debt is 
secured by lien, foreclosing on the property is a safer and more 
cost efficient option for an association to collect the deficiency 
when an owner is likely not to have sufficient personal assets to 
pay a judgment.294
Making the HOA bear the cost of the delinquent assessments 
is another option. The first-in-time approach gives priority to the 
lender’s mortgage when it is first-in-time.295 In the foreclosure 
context, the HOA cannot recoup the cost of the delinquent dues 
unless: (1) there is a surplus from the lender’s foreclosure, or 
(2) the HOA forecloses and is able to sell the property for an 
amount in excess of the lender’s mortgage.296 Either are highly 
unlikely in a recession, and the law should be prepared for the 
worst of situations.297 Therefore, in a first-in-time jurisdiction, 
the burden remains with the association, which will have to 
internalize the cost by passing it on to its members through 
higher regular and special assessments.298 These new costs may 
prove too expensive for other innocent association members. 
Therefore, these costs may cause additional harm by forcing even 
more homeowners to default on assessment dues and walk away 
from their underwater properties.299
Another option would be to make the mortgagee lender bear 
the cost of delinquent assessments. The Nevada super lien 
priority approach shifts the cost to the lender who must “buy out” 
the HOA lien or have its own interest extinguished.300 There is a 
good argument that this is an efficient and secure approach for 
associations to recoup their costs because the lender has a 
accomplishing postjudgment objectives, whether his fees are paid on an hourly or 
percentage basis.”).  
294 Roger Chase, HOA Collection Options: Lien Foreclosures vs. Money Judgments,
CONDO ASS’N (May 25, 2009, 9:56 AM), http://www.condoassociation.com/blog/tabid/ 
19257/bid/8954/HOA-Collection-Options-Lien-Foreclosures-vs-Money-Judgments.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/QX34-53WF]. Chase explains that “[m]any attorneys specializing in 
homeowner association law recommend the lien foreclosure route because it is less 
expensive and typically more successful than a money judgment.” Id.
295 See supra Section II(A). 
296 Boyack, supra note 51, at 95.
297 See Bromley, supra note 22, at 258; Boyack, supra note 51, at 78. 
298 See Collins, supra note 4. 
299 See CMTY. ASS’N LEADERSHIP LOBBY, supra note 228. One HOA board member 
recognizes the issue that raising assessments can drive other members into foreclosure. Id.
300 See SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 334 P.3d 408, 409–10 (Nev. 2014). 
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substantial motivation to pay this relatively small amount to 
protect its interest.301 Proponents of the method state it is also 
fair, provided the lender has notice and the opportunity to 
protect its interest.302 Institutional lenders typically have much 
greater resources than HOAs, and can internalize the external 
cost of paying their borrowers’ delinquent dues much easier than 
a community association.303 But as previously mentioned, this 
policy forces the lender to pay the debt of another when the 
lender has not committed any kind of wrongful act.304
Instead, the law could be structured so that the purchaser 
at the foreclosure sale bears the cost of the delinquent 
assessments. The Florida approach shifts the cost from the 
HOA to the purchaser by a statutory mechanism.305 This 
method is likely superior to a money judgment on the original 
debtor, the HOA internalizing the debt, or cost shifting to the 
lender, because shifting the cost to the purchaser is both fair 
and financially practical. 
Presumably, the purchaser has the resources to pay this 
relatively small additional cost, either through their own funds 
or through financing, since they are making an offer on the 
property. Therefore, this approach is more financially realistic 
than collecting the delinquent assessment directly from the 
original debtor. Also, the association’s lien is taken out of 
competition with the lender’s lien by the statutory imposition on 
the purchaser.306 This bypassing of lien priority provides the 
HOA with a better chance of recouping its costs than in a first-in-
time regime where its lien will usually be junior to a first 
mortgage.307 Lastly, a lender’s first mortgage or deed of trust 
survives extinguishment by an HOA foreclosure.308 Therefore, 
this approach does not have the unjust result of forcing the 
lender to pay to maintain their interest, nor the negative 
economic consequences to borrowers of that approach. 
CONCLUSION
This Comment has analyzed three different jurisdictions 
with respect to HOA lien priority and whether the interest of a 
first mortgage or deed of trust may be extinguished under each. 
301 See UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116. 
302 See SFR Investments, 334 P.3d at 409–10. 
303 Vaughn, supra note 3, at 11. 
304 See supra Section II(B). 
305 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2014). 
306 FLA STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2014).
307 See supra Section II(C). 
308 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2014). 
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Traditional first-in-time jurisdictions favor a lender’s interest to 
the detriment of HOAs. Under a first-in-time regime, a lender’s 
first mortgage usually takes priority over an association’s lien, 
and therefore, is not extinguished by an HOA’s foreclosure on the 
property in question. While this falls in line with the lender’s 
interest, this means that an HOA’s junior interest will usually be 
extinguished by a foreclosure sale by the lender because such a 
sale will not usually generate enough profits to satisfy both liens, 
especially in a troubled economy.  
A similar situation arises if the HOA tries to foreclose on its 
lien because the first mortgage still has priority. This leaves 
associations with the less reliable option of seeking a money 
judgment against delinquent homeowners. Furthermore, lenders 
have no incentive to expedite foreclosure proceedings in such a 
jurisdiction, and may intentionally postpone initiating 
foreclosure in order to avoid paying HOA assessments. 
Nevada’s super lien priority statute and case law flips the 
balance of power completely in the HOA’s favor. Under this 
regime, an association lien’s super priority portion is afforded 
true priority. This allows an association to foreclose on the super 
priority portion and extinguish a first mortgage or deed of trust 
as a junior lien. This puts lenders at an HOA’s mercy, and 
requires them to pay off the super lien portion of the HOA lien, or 
suffer the consequences of lien extinguishment.  
Proponents of this approach argue that this has solved the 
financial problems for associations inherent in first-in-time type 
regimes, because it encourages the lender to expedite foreclosure 
proceedings and almost guarantees an association’s ability to collect 
delinquent dues. However, it does so by arguably violating 
principles of fairness while generating negative policy consequences 
that could adversely affect borrowers’ access to credit. 
While not a perfect solution, the purchaser liability approach 
taken by Florida is a more balanced method, improving the 
chances of collection for an HOA while avoiding the drastic 
measure of extinguishment of a first mortgage. This regime is 
more equitable to both lenders and associations because it 
bypasses priority competition between the liens and instead 
attaches liability to the purchaser of the property at the 
foreclosure sale. Of the parties involved, only the purchaser has 
both the financial assets to accept the burden of the delinquent 
assessments and the freedom of choice to accept it.  
This regime also addresses the problem of lender 
recalcitrance to institute foreclosure by doubling the super 
priority amount currently provided for under the UCIOA. When 
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such an increase occurs, a lender has more motivation to 
foreclose since the super priority is capped at the greater amount 
of twelve months or one percent of the mortgage debt. 
However, the Florida approach to lender delay of foreclosure 
does not address when a lender is not considering buying the 
property if the HOA forecloses, or when the super priority period 
is already maxed out. One possible solution to lender delay of 
foreclosure under these circumstances is partial adoption of the 
2014 UCIOA amendment providing for rolling liens. Under this 
amendment, an association is entitled to the super priority 
amount for each budget year for the association. Adoption of such 
an amendment would mean the statutory cap would continue to 
accrue, and a lender purchaser would be motivated to initiate 
foreclosure because its liability for assessments would continue 
to grow. However, this solution still does not address the 
situation of when a lender has decided it will not purchase the 
property in question.
Given the negative consequences discussed in affording lien 
priority to either the association or the lender by Nevada-type 
regimes and first-in-time jurisdictions respectively, states should 
give the search for a balanced approach to lien priority greater 
future consideration as they attempt to find an optimal solution 
to the HOA lien priority issue. Only by bringing transparency to 
the existence of the stacked deck can we determine how to make 
the system work for all involved. Only then, by finding the right 
balance, can we achieve the objectives of real estate law to 
provide an equitable and predictable system of lien priority. 
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